



*With the Compliments of  
All Ranks of the  
1<sup>st</sup> Battalion The Rajputana Rifles  
(Wellesley's)*

*Chittagong,  
Bengal,  
India*

**PRESIDENT'S SECRETARIAT**  
(LIBRARY)

The book should be returned on or before the date last stamped below.

[illegible]






\*

HISTORY OF THE 1<sup>st</sup> BATTALION  
6th RAJPUTANA RIFLES (WELLESLEY'S)

\*

\*



**ARTHUR WELLESLEY, DUKE OF WELLINGTON.**

**From a portrait in the Officers' Mess presented by  
Lieutenant F. J. Chadwick in 1910.**

\*

# HISTORY *of the* 1st BATTALION 6th RAJPUTANA RIFLES (WELLESLEY'S)

*by*  
LIEUT.-COLONEL F. H. JAMES  
O.B.E., M.C.

PRINTED BY  
GALE & POLDEN LTD., ALDERSHOT  
1938

\*

PRINTED IN ENGLAND  
BY  
GALE & POLDEN LTD.  
ALDERSHOT.

6226-L

\*

## FOREWORD

IT has been the endeavour of the Author to record not only the facts and incidents of the career of the Battalion now known as the 1/6th Rajputana Rifles (Wellesley's), but to present these in such a form as to give life to the dry bones of History and so present to the reader's attention the picture of a unit with a living personality.

This work involved not only prolonged research of the records, but the consultation of many other authorities, as well as of surviving participators in the more recent events.

Knowing how instructive to young officers such a book would have been in the past, and how much it would have been appreciated as an additional incentive to *esprit de corps*, sincere congratulations may justly be offered to Lieut.-Colonel F. H. James, O.B.E., M.C., a former Adjutant and Commanding Officer, on the successful accomplishment of what has been to him a labour of love.

WM. C. WALTON (Brig.-General)

*Colonel, 1/6th Rajputana Rifles (Wellesley's)*

16th April 1937



## AUTHOR'S PREFACE

EVER since I joined the 104th Wellesley's Rifles in January 1904, I have felt the need of an adequate Regimental History to replace the very short Summary which was issued to newly joined Officers on their arrival. It is in the hope of fulfilling this need that I have undertaken to compile it, rather reluctantly, knowing my shortcomings as a writer. I was fortunate to have the advice and encouragement of the late General Walton, then Colonel of the Battalion, who read and corrected all my manuscript, and without whose assistance I should never have completed the task. I much regret that owing to the time taken in compiling the Appendices it was not possible to publish the book before his death.

To ensure accuracy in the earlier periods, except where I have quoted some other authority, all facts and figures concerning the Battalion have been taken from, or verified with, the Official Records in the India Office, and I should like to take this opportunity of thanking the Record Staff for their unfailing courtesy and invaluable help. I am also much indebted to Sir Patrick Cadell and Colonel E. S. J. Anderson for help with the earlier periods.

With regard to the periods dealing with the Ogaden Expedition, the Great War and Waziristan, I have based my narrative on the Regimental War Diaries supplemented by private letters, diaries and accounts written by Officers then with the Regiment to whom my thanks are due, and especially to Colonel Manners, Colonel Stoddart and Major Wilson. I am also much indebted to three kind friends for typing my much corrected manuscript.

F. H. JAMES





## CONTENTS

CHAP.		PAGE
	FOREWORD. By the late Brigadier-General Wm. C. Walton, C.B., C.M.G. . . . .	v
	AUTHOR'S PREFACE . . . . .	vii
	INTRODUCTION. Bombay from 1532 to 1774 . . . . .	xix
I.	1772-1782 . . . . . The raising of the Battalion—Field Service in Gujarat 1775—Field Service in the Deccan 1778-1779—Death of Captain Stewart—Field Service in Gujarat 1780-1782—Capture of Dabhoi and Ahmedabad.	1
II.	1782-1788 . . . . . Field Service in Malabar. Capture of Bednore. Battalion made Prisoners of War by Tipu. Captain Eames poisoned.	12
III.	1788-1795 . . . . . Reconstituted as 9th Battalion—Field Service in Mysore—Capture of Dharwar and Hooly Onore, action of Simoga—Expedition against the Pirates in the Gulf of Cambay.	21
IV.	1796-1799 . . . . . Reorganization as the 2nd Battalion 2nd Regiment Native Infantry—Field Service in Mysore, storming of Seringapatam.	31
V.	1800-1803 . . . . . Capture of Jamalabad Fort—Field Service under Colonel Wellesley—Suppression of rebellion in Malabar.	39
VI.	1804-1809 . . . . . Field Service in Gujarat—Unsuccessful assaults on Bhurtpur—The Kathiawar Field Force 1807.	46
VII.	1809-1811 . . . . . Operations in the Persian Gulf—Occupation of Island of Rodrigues—Raid on St. Paul, capture of Bourbon and Mauritius.	55
VIII.	1811-1819 . . . . . Formation of the Peshwa's Brigade—Field Service in Kathiawar—Flank Companies in Gujarat against the Pindaris—Operations in the Konkan.	72
IX.	1820-1838 . . . . . Operations against the Beni Boo Ali—Operations in Sirohi State—Renumbered 4th Bombay Native Infantry—Minor operations on the Rann of Cutch and against the Ramosis.	82

CHAP.		PAGE
X.	1838-1848 . . . . . The Regiment organized as a Rifle Corps—The 1st Sikh War—Major Honner appointed to Command—Facings changed from black to red.	89
XI.	1848-1853 . . . . . The 2nd Sikh War, storming of Multan—Execution of the murderer of Mr. Vans Agnew.	94
XII.	1853-1857 . . . . . Field Service in Persia—Capture of Reshire Fort, occupation of Bushire, action of Khush Ab.	103
XIII.	1857-1860 . . . . . Operations in the Bheel Country—The Satpura Field Force—With the Malwa Field Force in pursuit of Tantia Topi.	112
XIV.	1860-1885 . . . . . The Afghan War—The Defence of Kandahar—The Action of Kandahar—The Bozdar Column—Inspection by H.R.H. The Duke of Connaught.	118
XV.	1886-1898 . . . . . Formed into a Rifle Corps with 23rd and 25th Light Infantry—Reorganization with Class Companies—Field Service in East Africa.	125
XVI.	1899-1914 . . . . . Renumbered 104th Wellesley's Rifles—The Mingal Rising in Las Bela State—The Mekran Expedition—Suppression of Bheel Rising in Sunth State.	133
XVII.	1914 . . . . . Mobilization—The 16th Brigade—Bahrein—Disembarkation at Sanniya—Action of Saihan—Action of Sahil—Occupation of Basra.	143
XVIII.	CAPTURE OF QURNA . . . . . Advance on Qurna—First attack and withdrawal—Arrival of Reinforcements—Turks driven from Muzaira—Gallantry of Sub-Asst. Surgeon Pandit—The Regiment crosses the Tigris—Attack on Qurna—Qurna surrenders.	151
XIX.	BATTLE OF SHAIBA . . . . . Occupation of Shaiba—The Turkish attack—The Regiment in support of the Cavalry Brigade—Capture of North Mound—Turks cleared from the Western face, death of Captain Leckie—Levelling Shaiba defences—Return to Basra.	157
XX.	BATTLE OF KUT AL AMARA . . . . . Occupation of Amara—Battle of Kut al Amara—The Turkish Position—General Townshend's Plan—Clery's Post—Night March—The Regiment captures new redoubt—Turkish main body defeated—Turkish Reserves defeated—Move to Kut al Amara.	166
XXI.	BATTLE OF CTESIPHON . . . . . Turkish position and strength—Plan of Attack—Attack on V.P.—The Regiment detached to assist Column B—Gallant leading by Major Bailey—Junction with Column B—Withdrawal to V.P.—Turkish Counter-attacks repulsed—Retreat to Kut al Amara.	178

CHAP.		PAGE
XXII.	THE SIEGE OF KUT . . . . .	190
	Turkish Attack on N.W. Sector—Gallantry of the Indian Ranks—The Relief Force—Rain and Floods—Preparations to join Relief Force—Reduction of rations—S.S. <i>Julnar</i> —Surrender of Kut al Amara.	
XXIII.	IN CAPTIVITY . . . . .	201
	Camp at Shumran—Hardships of the march to Turkey—Distribution of Prisoners—Loyalty of Subadar-Major Hasan Muhammad—Movement of detachments not with the Regiment in Kut al Amara.	
XXIV.	1917-1919 . . . . .	207
	The Regiment re-formed—Mobilization for Mesopotamia—Training at Nasiriya—With the 56th Brigade on the Euphrates—Railway construction work—Return to India—The Delhi Riots.	
XXV.	1919-1937 . . . . .	213
	Field Service in Waziristan—The Tochi Column—The Derajat Column—Formation of the 6th Rajputana Rifles—Jhansi—Razmak—Unveiling of the Regimental War Memorial—The Viceroy's Guard—Mhow—Ahmedabad The Khyber—Aurangabad—Saidpur.	
	INDEX . . . . .	273



## APPENDICES

APP.	PAGE
I. DESIGNATIONS OF THE BATTALION . . . . .	227
II. ORIGIN OF, AND TRADITION WITH REGARD TO, RIFLE DRESS AND CUSTOMS . . . . .	228
III. BATTLE HONOURS OF 1ST BATTALION 6TH RAJPUTANA RIFLES (WELLESLEY'S) . . . . .	230
IV. HONOURS AWARDED DURING THE GREAT WAR . . . . .	231
V. CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF STATIONS . . . . .	234
VI. LIST OF COLONELS . . . . .	236
VII. LIST OF COMMANDANTS . . . . .	237
VIII. LIST OF ADJUTANTS . . . . .	240
IX. LIST OF SUBADAR-MAJORS . . . . .	241
X. ALPHABETICAL LIST OF BRITISH OFFICERS . . . . .	242



## ILLUSTRATIONS

### IN COLOUR

ARTHUR WELLESLEY, DUKE OF WELLINGTON . . . .	<i>Frontispiece</i>	
	FACING PAGE	
THE STORMING OF MOOLTAN, 2ND JANUARY 1849 . . . .		100
HAVALDAR IN REVIEW ORDER, 1891 . . . . .		122
THE ARCH OF CHOSROES, ON THE SITE OF THE BATTLE OF CTESIPHON . . . .		182

### IN MONOCHROME

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR ROBERT WILLIAM HONNER, K.C.B. . . . .	92	
GROUP OF OFFICERS, CHAMAN, 1893 . . . . .	126	
PUGGRI BADGE AND POUCH BELT PLATES OF 4TH BOMBAY RIFLES . . . .	130	
SHOULDER BADGE, PUGGRI BADGE AND POUCH BELT PLATE OF 104TH WELLESLEY'S RIFLES, 1905 . . . . .	134	
BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. C. WALTON, C.B., C.M.G. . . . .	136	
MEKRAN EXPEDITION, 1911 . . . . .	138	
GROUP OF OFFICERS, 1914 . . . . .	140	
HAVALDAR SEDU RAM IN FIELD SERVICE ORDER, 1914 . . . .	144	
MESOPOTAMIA: ATTACK ON QURNA, AND RIVER TRANSPORT . . . .	154	
MESOPOTAMIA: SHAIBA TRENCHES AND TROPHIES . . . . .	162	
THE BATTALION WAR MEMORIAL . . . . .	210	
INDIAN RANKS IN MUFTI . . . . .	214	
SHOULDER BADGE, PUGGRI BADGE AND POUCH BELT PLATE OF 6TH RAJPUTANA RIFLES, 1923 . . . . .	218	
THE REGIMENTAL WAR MEMORIAL AT NASIRABAD . . . . .	220	
THE PIPE AND BUGLE BAND IN REVIEW ORDER, 1936 . . . .	222	
BRITISH OFFICERS' UNIFORMS, 1936 . . . . .	228	<i>between 228 and 229</i>
INDIAN OFFICERS' UNIFORMS, 1936 . . . . .	229	
INDIAN RANKS IN REVIEW ORDER, 1936 . . . . .	229	
INDIAN RANKS IN FIELD SERVICE AND DRILL ORDER, 1936 . . . .	229	
SUBADAR-MAJORS . . . . .	240	





## MAPS

### MAP

1.	ENVIRONS OF BOMBAY . . . . .	<i>facing page</i>	8
2.	SIEGE OF SERINGAPATAM . . . . .	„ „	38
3.	BOURBON . . . . .	<i>page</i>	66
4.	CAPTURE OF ST. DENIS . . . . .	„	67
5.	MAURITIUS . . . . .	„	70
6.	SOUTH-WEST INDIA . . . . .	<i>facing page</i>	80
7.	SIEGE OF MULTAN . . . . .	„ „	102
8.	GUJARAT AND KATHIAWAR . . . . .	„ „	116
9.	KANDAHAR AND ENVIRONS . . . . .	„ „	124
10.	JUBALAND . . . . .	<i>page</i>	132
11.	THE PERSIAN GULF . . . . .	<i>facing page</i>	142
12.	ACTIONS OF SAIHAN AND SAHIL . . . . .	„ „	150
13.	CAPTURE OF QURNA . . . . .	„ „	156
14.	THE FIGHTING NEAR SHAIBA . . . . .	„ „	164
15.	BATTLE OF KUT AL AMARA . . . . .	„ „	176
16.	BATTLE OF CTESIPHON . . . . .	„ „	188
17.	DEFENCE OF KUT AL AMARA . . . . .	„ „	200
18.	LOWER MESOPOTAMIA . . . . .	„ „	212
19.	WAZIRISTAN . . . . .	„ „	224
20.	THE INDIAN EMPIRE . . . . .	„ „	270



## INTRODUCTION

### BOMBAY FROM 1532 TO 1774

DURING the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, England, France, Holland and Portugal were all competing for the rich trade of the East Indies, sometimes as allies and at other times as foes.

As early as 1534 Bombay Island had been occupied by the Portuguese who at once fortified it, and in 1626 the English and Dutch made their first successful raid on it, holding the island for one day and plundering the inhabitants.

In 1661 Bombay was ceded to Great Britain as part of the dowry of the Infanta Catherine of Braganza on the occasion of her marriage to King Charles II. The treaty, under which this was arranged, stipulated that the King should send his fleet to take over the Island and sufficient troops to guard both it and the Portuguese possessions in the East Indies.

For this purpose a fleet of six Ships of War, carrying a force of 400 men, specially raised by Sir Abraham Shipman for service in the East Indies, sailed from England on 6th April 1662, reaching Bombay on 18th September the same year. The Portuguese Captain of Bassein, of which Bombay was a dependency, refused to hand over the Island or permit the troops to disembark, on the ground that the instructions were not drawn up in the correct form. The Portuguese Viceroy, who was on board the fleet which brought out Shipman, refused to assert his authority and after arrival at Goa definitely refused to permit the troops to land, although it was represented to him that among troops, shut up for so long in such heat on board ship, the mortality was very heavy.

The Earl of Marlborough, the Admiral in Command of the fleet, then applied to Sir George Oxenden, the head of the British factory at Surat, for permission to land there, but this too was refused as it was likely to give offence to the Moghul. To get the men off the ships somewhere, they were disembarked at Swally, not far from Surat, but the Native Governor of Surat threatened to destroy the factory there if they remained on shore.

They then proceeded to the uninhabited island of Angediva, some 35 miles from Goa and about 1 mile from the mainland, on which they were entirely dependent for provisions. They landed there on the 27th December 1662 and remained there for more than a year, during which time information was conveyed to the King as to their plight.

When at last they reached Bombay on 8th February 1664 they had lost 300 of the 400 men and practically all their Officers, including Sir Abraham Shipman. Just before his death he appointed his secretary, Mr. Cook, to succeed him, and it was he who eventually took over the Island.

His administration failed to cope with the difficulties of the situation, and the Government, being dissatisfied at the trouble their new possession was giving them and little realizing its potential value as a port, leased it to the East India Company in 1668 for an annual payment of £10.

To meet an anticipated attack by the Dutch, the fortifications were improved, but as reinforcements were so difficult to obtain and took so long to arrive, a certain number of natives were enrolled by the East India Company, while the inhabitants of the city were formed into a Militia. As the East India Company extended its area of trade the British Troops were reinforced to the strength of one Battalion which was called the Bombay European Regiment and afterwards became the Royal Dublin Fusiliers. More and more natives were enrolled and formed into Companies under British Officers for the protection of the factories. It was by amalgamating some of these companies that, in 1768, the first two Battalions of the Bombay Native Army were formed. The men enlisted were chiefly the inhabitants of the Western Coast of Bombay and Malabar, and included some Hindus and Muhammadans from up country and a large number of Jews, Christians and Parwaris. All these classes proved themselves excellent soldiers and were very amenable to discipline. By 1774 the number of Native Battalions had been raised to four.

# HISTORY OF THE 1st BATTALION 6th RAJPUTANA RIFLES (WELLESLEY'S)

## CHAPTER I

1772-1782

The raising of the Battalion. Field Service in Gujarat 1775. Field Service in the Deccan 1778-1779, Death of Captain Stewart. Field Service in Gujarat 1780-1782, Capture of Dabhoi and Ahmedabad.

*(See Maps No. 1, opposite p. 8, and No. 8, opposite p. 116.)*

THE Battalion now bearing the title of "1st Battalion 6th Rajputana Rifles (Wellesley's)" was raised as the "5th Battalion of Bombay Sepoys," in this wise. In the year 1772 the Court of Directors of the Honourable East India Company had appointed a Resident to the Peshwa's Court at Poona with a view to fostering commerce, maintaining friendly relations with Native Powers, and, above all, obtaining possession of the island of Salsette, the port of Bassein and the small islands of Kennery, Hog Island, Elephanta and Karanja.

**The Situation leading up to the Raising of the Battalion.**

These were at that time occupied by the Mahrattas, who had taken them from the Portuguese. They were of first importance to the East India Company because the small islands effectually commanded the harbour of Bombay which was in possession of the Company; while through Salsette lay the only communication by land for trade with the interior.

Negotiations with the Mahrattas for the cession of these places dragged on until towards the end of 1774, when the Directors in Bombay received information that the Portuguese Government had despatched a powerful armada to Goa with the object of recovering possession of Bassein and Salsette. Thereupon, as negotiation with the Mahrattas had been fruitless, the Board, on 9th December 1774, decided to employ force. Three days later, on 12th December, an expedition was despatched under Brigadier-General Gordon.

The day after the expedition started, the Portuguese Fleet anchored at the mouth of Bombay Harbour and lodged a protest against these proceedings. Their protest was ignored, the Fort of Thana, guarding the main line of communication across the creek separating Salsette from the mainland, was captured, and the whole island of Salsette was occupied before the end of the year.

## HISTORY OF THE 1st BATTALION

On 10th January 1775, on the representation of General Gordon, it was resolved to raise two new Battalions to garrison the new acquisitions. These were styled the 5th and 6th Battalions of Bombay Sepoys. Captain James Stewart was appointed to command the 5th Battalion, which has ever since maintained its individuality under various titles, and is now known as the 1st Battalion 6th Rajputana Rifles (Wellesley's). The 10th January 1775 was therefore the birthday of our Battalion.

**The Raising  
of the Battalion,  
10th Jan. 1775.**

James Stewart was at this time a man of 31 years of age and during his ten years' service had already made his mark as an efficient officer. In 1770 he had been appointed Adjutant of the 1st Battalion of Sepoys, and three years later was appointed A.D.C. to the Governor of Bombay, a much-prized distinction. Lieutenant Dawson was appointed our first Adjutant and Quartermaster. There is no record of the other Officers posted at this time.

All supernumerary Indian Officers and N.C.O.s were posted to the new Battalions and received immediate promotion in proportion to the number of recruits they brought forward for enlistment without expense to the State. At this time Battalions were formed of eight Companies, each of 90 sepoy. Of these, the two "Grenadier Companies" were called the "Flank Companies," the other six being known as the "Battalion Companies." The "Grenadier Companies," apart from the difference in dress, were formed of specially selected men with a minimum height of 5 ft. 3 ins. as compared with 5 ft. 1 in. for the "Battalion Companies."

As recruits were slow in coming forward, the Commanding Officer, towards the end of the month, applied to the Board of Directors for the grant of a bounty for recruits. This was refused, but sanction for an advance of Rs.6 per recruit, to be deducted from his pay in instalments, was obtained. This, presumably, had the desired effect, for towards the end of March a part of the Battalion was sent to Salsette to relieve the existing garrison.

The Mahrattas were at this time split into numerous factions, and the Bombay Government decided to support the claim of Raghunath Rao to the throne of the Mahratta peoples in opposition to the Poona Ministerial candidate who was the posthumous son of Narain Rao and was still a child.

**Field Service  
in Gujarat,  
1775.**

Raghunath Rao, usually spoken of as Ragoba, was the son of the famous Baji Rao who, in 1736, had led the Mahratta forces to the gates of Delhi. Ragoba, after suffering a severe defeat at the hands of the Ministerial army on the plain of Arras, had fled to Cambay where he put himself under the protection of the Bombay Government and asked them to assist him with troops, his own being scattered in disorder in Gujarat. His Commanders were still loyal to him, and their efforts to collect and reorganize his forces had now been largely successful; but, as the Ministerial army lay between them and Ragoba, they could not effect a junction.

In March 1775, therefore, Colonel Keating was sent to Surat to take command of a force of some 4,000 men with orders to effect a junction with Ragoba's army and then to escort him to Poona and install him as Peshwa. The Sepoy Battalions available for this service were reinforced with detachments from the old soldiers of the newly raised Battalions, the 5th (our Battalion) and 6th, while the recruits were left to garrison Bombay and Salsette. There is no record of the number of men and officers taken, but from the fact that both our Commandant, Captain Stewart, and Adjutant, Lieutenant Dawson, went, it is reasonable to assume that they took a fairly large contingent from our Battalion.

As it has been found impossible to follow the part played in this campaign by our Battalion's contingent, it is not proposed to deal with it in detail. Suffice it to say that a junction was duly effected, after which several successful engagements were fought with the Ministerial Army, but the rains broke before any move towards Poona could be made and the troops sheltered from the monsoon in Dabhoi and Broach. A peace treaty was then made by the Calcutta Government with the Mahrattas recognizing the Ministerial candidate as Peshwa, whereon the Bombay army was withdrawn.

Throughout the campaign Stewart was always conspicuous. Colonel

Keating writing from "Off Swally, 15th March 1775" says:  
**Capt. Stewart's Leadership.** "Agreeable to what I wrote your Honours under the 9th inst.,

I ordered a detachment on the 10th at night under the command of Captain Stewart, joined by 1,000 country troops belonging to Ragoba and the Nabob of Cambay, to attack the Mahrattas in the neighbourhood of Surat." The night attack was a complete success, Stewart, surprising the enemy, captured their camp, some camels, 150 horses and several prisoners with no loss to himself.

Forbes, who served in the campaign as Colonel Keating's secretary, in his *Oriental Memoirs*, describing an engagement near Hossamlee on the south bank of the Sabarmati River, writes:—

"After two hours' cannonading across the river, a strong body of enemy cavalry crossed the river and repeatedly charged the detachment commanded by Captain Stewart who repulsed them so gallantly that he was publicly thanked by the Commander in Chief: Ragoba presented him with a diamond ring."

At the successful battle on the plains of Arras on 18th May 1775, Stewart was in command of the flank detachment, and among the casualties was Lieutenant Dawson who was severely wounded.

During the rains it was decided to increase the strength of the Sepoy Battalions to ten Companies each instead of eight; each Battalion was also given its complement of artificers.

**Increase in Establishment, 1775.**

Towards the end of the following year our Battalion was sent to Surat to relieve the 1st Battalion.



The distribution of the Bombay Sepoy Battalions in 1777 was as follows:—

Distribution of Sepoy Battalions, 1777.	At Thana	} One complete Battalion each.
	„ Surat	
	„ Broach	
	„ Bombay	

Three Battalions and the Marine Battalion.

Our Battalion at Surat was under Captain Stewart with five Lieutenants and five Ensigns.

While stationed here, Stewart obtained the sanction of the Bombay Government to establish a Sepoy Hospital, an innovation which was badly needed. But when, early in May 1779, the Surat accounts came before the Bombay Board for scrutiny, they were so horrified at the cost of its maintenance that they issued orders that it was at once to be entirely abolished.

In 1778 our Battalion was recalled to the “Presidency” to take part in one of the most amazing and disastrous campaigns ever set on foot by the Bombay authorities.

A French soldier of fortune, a M. St. Lubin, had recently arrived in Poona where he was intriguing with certain factions of the Mahrattas to overthrow the British. In order to counter French influence, the Bombay Government decided again to espouse the cause of Raghunath Rao and to install him at Poona as regent during the minority of the young Peshwa.

Though this decision was made in July the expedition was not sanctioned by the Calcutta Government until October. In this month Colonel Charles Egerton was appointed to command it. This Officer had learnt his soldiering in Europe and had no experience of the conditions or people of India. He seems to have lacked strength of character and to have been physically unfit for active service. Three years previously he had been passed over for the command of the expedition to Gujarat which had been given to Colonel Keating, his junior.

His appointment created a good deal of comment and it was partly on this account that it was decided that the operations should be directed by a Committee composed of the Colonel Commanding and two members of Council.

Captain Stewart, with our two Grenadier Companies, left Surat for Bombay on 7th March and in August received orders to carry out a reconnaissance of the road to Poona. He sailed across the harbour to Panvel where he reported that the landing was very bad; that from there to Kampoli, at the foot of the *Bhor Ghat*, the road, passing over the *bunds* between the paddy fields, was impracticable for wheeled transport; and that the *Bhor Ghat*, then the most frequented trade route between the Konkan and Deccan, was passable for pack bullocks, but guns must be dismounted and slung. From the top of the *Ghat* the road to Poona was passable for carts.

Capt. Stewart's  
Reconnaissance,  
August, 1778.

On the return journey, after descending the *Bhor Ghat*, he made for Apta and found the road very much better and shorter than that by Panvel. He was much impressed by the strength of a position at Khandala, which, he said, could be held for a long time by a few men. He recommended sending by way of Apta "a detachment of able young men who may easily be there (Khandala) in twenty-four hours." Knowing the wholesome respect that the Mahrattas had for our artillery, he considered it desirable that this party be supported "by two small three pounder field pieces. The size is not so much to be minded, if they have the name and shape of guns."

The remainder of our Battalion was ordered to Bombay early in November and on the 19th the Bombay Government, having received information that the Mahrattas were mobilizing at Poona, decided to move at once. On 22nd November 1778 an advanced party, composed of six Companies of Grenadiers\* including those of our Battalion, and two light field guns, under the command of Captain Stewart, left Bombay on the evening tide with orders "to move up the Apta River and secure the *Bhor Ghat*." The rest of the force, about 3,000 strong, moved off the following day "to secure Belapur Fort for a magazine and to support the 1st Division (Stewart's) in case of necessity." Our Battalion Companies, under Captain-Lieutenant Cadger,† formed part of this supporting force.

Stewart's detachment, moving fast, surprised the *Bhor Ghat* and occupied Khandala without opposition. The main body, after capturing Belapur Fort and leaving a small garrison, re-embarked and moved up the river to Panvel. Here camp was formed and the troops were occupied in unloading stores and improving the road ahead. Progress was so slow that after five days Colonel Egerton reported that he expected the road to Bara (about 5 miles) to be completed next day, "when the rest of the Army shall move forward a little as their present ground begins to smell offensively." It was practically a month before the force reached the top of the *Bhor Ghat*.

During this month Mr. Mostyn, the most capable member of the Committee, was taken ill and had to return to Bombay where he died on 1st January 1779. The Committee was thus reduced to two members, of whom Mr. Carnac, the other civilian member, as President, by virtue of his casting vote, practically obtained control of the army. Mr. Carnac had previously been in the Army of the Bengal Presidency and had risen to the rank of Brigadier-General; he was now, however, one of the civil members of the Bombay Board. Colonel Egerton's objection to this arrangement was overruled by Bombay

---

\* Probably two Companies each from 2nd, 3rd and 5th Battalions.

† The rank of Captain-Lieutenant was given to the senior subaltern officer and was in the nature of a Brevet, carrying no pay or allowances. It was abolished in the Bombay Army in 1819.

Headquarters; though it may well be imagined that this system of command would prove disastrous.

Captain Stewart at Khandala, exposed to the constant attacks of the Mahratta Cavalry, had given a very good account of himself. The main body, accompanied by Raghunath Rao, now commenced to advance. Marching in echelons, it took eleven days to reach the village of Karli, eight miles distant.

Here, on the 4th January 1779, Captain Stewart was killed by a cannon ball.

**Death of**  
**Capt. J. Stewart,** The Mahratta Armies had bestowed on him the title of  
**4th Jan. 1779.** "*Phakde*," which is perhaps best translated as "Hero."

So high were the qualities needed to earn it, that during the whole two hundred years of Mahratta dominance only three persons ever attained to it. Of these, two were Mahratta leaders of outstanding merit and daring, and the third was our first Commandant, Captain James Stewart.

C. A. Kincaid in his book *Ishtur Phakde* tells us that:—

"The Mahratta account of his death states that, at Karli, Stewart climbed a tree to reconnoitre. His commanding figure, however, was at once recognized, and the entire Mahratta Line resounded with a cry of '*Shabash Ishtur Phakde*.' At the same time Hari Pant Tatya, who commanded the enemy's artillery, aimed a number of guns on the tree which sheltered Stewart. A moment later the tree and its burden were shattered by a storm of cannon shot.

"As Stewart fell at Karli, a strange incident happened at Poona. The news which had so far reached the Peshwa's court was far from reassuring and the boy prince's household were a prey to despondency. Suddenly Mahdavarao II rose to his feet and asked them the cause of their gloom. 'The English,' they replied, 'will not give way.' The boy prince sent for his sword, fastened it on and then said, 'The Englishman is dead!' To his listeners there was only one Englishman who mattered. And the same evening a breathless rider brought the news that '*Ishtur Phakde*' was no more. By some mysterious telepathy the death of the Englishman had reached the Brahman prince several hours before the messenger."

Though no tomb marks the spot where Stewart fell and his name is almost forgotten in the annals of the Indian Army, the legend of "*Ishtur Phakde*" is still told by the Brahmans of Poona. It is fitting that the memory of the heroism and devotion to duty of our first Commanding Officer should live as an inspiration to all in our Battalion.

During the advance from the top of the *Ghats* the troops were continually harassed by the advance party of the Mahrattas, consisting of 7 guns, 5,000 horse and 4,000 infantry, the brunt of the fighting falling on Stewart's Grenadiers. Although on every occasion the enemy were resolutely attacked and driven back, the slowness

**Operations at**  
**Telegaon,**  
**January 1779.**

of the progress put heart into them and gave them ample time to assemble the main body of their troops, which advanced on Telegaon as the British approached. Now another complication in the command arose. Colonel Egerton, owing to sickness, was obliged to give up the command, which then devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, the next senior. But, as a party of the enemy's horse had cut off communication with Bombay, Colonel Egerton could not get away. He thus had to remain with the force and still continued to be a member of the committee.

On the 9th of January the force reached Telegaon whence, after a feeble resistance, the Mahrattas retired, having previously destroyed the village. Here a report was received that orders had been given for the similar destruction of Chinchvad and Poona.

The Committee were now completely nonplussed. Instead of moving at once to seize Poona, only 18 miles away, the desirability of negotiating with the enemy and of retiring was discussed, although eighteen days' rations were available and they were assured, on good authority, that a reinforcement in the shape of a party of horse under Moraba might be expected at any moment.

On 11th January, in spite of the opposition of such junior officers as had been consulted, and in the face of the earnest entreaties of Raghunath Rao to push on, it was finally decided to retire. It was hoped that, by slipping away in the darkness, one march would be accomplished before the Mahrattas discovered the move. In this, however, they greatly underestimated the enemy's intelligence service.

One of the reasons which had been adduced against the advance from Telegaon to Poona was the difficulty of protecting the bazaar and transport, of which the bullocks alone numbered 19,000. Now the unwieldy proportions of these impedimenta proved one of the greatest difficulties in the retreat. To make things easier the heavy guns were thrown into a nearby tank, and a quantity of stores was burnt.

At 11 p.m. on 11th January 1779 this small British Force, under 3,000 strong, hampered by this unwieldy mass of transport and followers and commanded by this faint-hearted Committee, commenced their retreat in the face of 50,000 Mahratta Troops. The force marched with an advanced guard a considerable distance ahead to guard the baggage. The main body was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, while the rearguard was found by the Grenadiers and two guns commanded, since Stewart's death, by Captain Hartley, another very gallant and able officer.

At 2 a.m. the Mahrattas attacked the advanced guard and plundered a great deal of the baggage, and it was not long before the rearguard too had the enemy on top of them. The whole force continued to move slowly till by daylight they found themselves completely surrounded. They halted and met an attack concentrated mostly on the rearguard, which fought magnificently and drove the enemy back.

Shortly after noon the rearguard, now reinforced and commanded by Major Frederick, was ordered to fall back on the main body; and the whole force retired towards the village of Wargaon, where the advanced guard had halted. As the main body approached the village, the baggage followers rushed in panic for shelter, getting mixed up with the troops. The Mahratta horse, charging through troops and baggage, caused heavy casualties before it was possible to restore order and drive them off. The next morning the enemy attacked the village with infantry supported by guns, but were repelled.

The casualties of the day before (the 12th) had amounted to 352, including 15 British Officers. They also included 155 missing, some of whom were said to have deserted. This probably led to the report that the troops were disheartened and Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn acquiesced in this assumption. It was therefore resolved, a further retreat being considered out of the question, to open negotiations with the enemy in order to save the force.

In these circumstances, the directing council agreed to the following terms, viz.:—

**Treaty of Wargaon with the Mahrattas, 14th Jan. 1779.** The return to the Mahrattas of all territory seized since 1773; the surrender to Sindia of half the revenue of Broach; a payment of 41,000 rupees to his followers; and the leaving of two Officers as hostages.

The Mahrattas had also demanded the surrender of Raghunath Rao, but this possibility had been forestalled by his taking matters into his own hands and concluding a separate treaty with Sindia to whom he surrendered himself.

After concluding this treaty and leaving Mr. Farmer and a Lieutenant Stewart as hostages, the troops returned to Bombay. So ended a campaign noteworthy for the staunchness and gallantry of the troops and the faint-hearted ineptitude of the directing council.

The treaty was repudiated, and Mr. Carnac, Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn were dismissed the Service by the Court of Directors; while among those who were rewarded were Captain Hartley, who was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel, and Captain-Lieutenant Cadger, who was promoted to the rank of Captain and appointed Commandant of our Battalion for his gallantry in action.

The rest of the year 1779 was spent by our Battalion in Bombay replacing casualties and training recruits.

Our Grenadier Companies did not rejoin the Battalion, but were amalgamated to form one Company of the new 8th Battalion, now the 1st Battalion 4th Bombay Grenadiers, which was formed by one Grenadier Company from each of the existing Battalions and two Companies from the Marine Battalion.


**Formation of 1st Battalion 4th Bombay Grenadiers.**





# ENVIRONS OF BOMBAY

MAP No. 1







In December our Battalion was again detailed for Field Service and on 2nd December 1779, together with four Companies of the Bombay European Regiment and the 8th Battalion of Sepoys, with some artillery, all under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley, embarked at Bombay to proceed to Gujarat to join the force assembling under Brigadier-General Goddard who had come to the assistance of Bombay with some Bengal Troops. (See Map No. 8, opposite p. 116.)

Field Service  
in Gujarat.

The immediate cause of this campaign against the Mahrattas was the formation of an alliance by them with Haidar Ali of Mysore and Nizam Ali of Hyderabad, with a view to attacking the English in all three Presidencies simultaneously.

Since the repudiation of the "Treaty of Wargaon," General Goddard had been in continuous negotiation with Nana Furnavees, the Prime Minister of the Peshwa, without being able to reach any definite conclusion. The surrender of the island of Salsette and the person of Raghunath Rao, who had recently rejoined the British, were imperatively demanded by the Minister before any treaty could possibly be considered. As there was no intention of acceding to either of these conditions it was decided to resort to force, and an effort was made to induce Fateh Singh, the Gaekwar of Baroda, to co-operate. As the latter seemed unwilling to commit himself to anything definite, General Goddard set out on 1st January and moved slowly northward till joined by his battery train from Broach.

He then made for Dabhoi, a fort garrisoned by about 2,000 Mahratta Troops, and arrived before it on 18th January 1780. After preparations to storm the place had nearly been completed the garrison evacuated it on the night of the 20th.

Capture of  
Dabhoi Fort,  
20th Jan. 1780.

Lieutenant Charles Reynolds of our Battalion was the only casualty recorded, and in his report General Goddard writes: "I am happy at the opportunity of mentioning to you the satisfaction I received from the skill of Major Spaith, the Chief Engineer, in constructing and completing the Battery with so much expedition. Lieutenant Charles Reynolds, who acted under him and showed himself exceedingly alert and active in his duty, received a wound in his thigh from a matchlock, which, however, I am hopeful will not prove dangerous." Reynolds recovered from his wound and subsequently had a distinguished career as Surveyor-General.

This success was sufficient to bring Fateh Singh up to the scratch and he at once concluded a treaty by which he was to gain the Mahratta territory north of the Mahi River, while he ceded to the Company the revenue he obtained from districts south of the Tapti. He also agreed to support General Goddard with a force of 3,000 horse. The cession of territory to the Company was to have effect from the day on which he was put in possession of Ahmedabad. The capture of this fortress was therefore the next objective.

Even at that time Ahmedabad was a large city said to contain 100,000 inhabitants. The walls of the fortress were of immense extent and considered to be remarkably strong. It was garrisoned by some 6,000 Arab and Sindi Infantry and 2,000 Mahratta Horse. Its size prohibited complete investment.

General Goddard arrived before it on 10th February and after a day's reconnaissance, during which some casualties occurred, a battery was opened on 12th February and on the morning of the 15th the fort was carried by assault, the Bombay Troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley leading the attack. The garrison made a determined stand at the breach for a short time; but, after losing some 300 men, surrendered. There is no record of the casualties suffered by individual battalions in this action, but those of the whole force amounted to no more than 17 killed and 89 wounded. It speaks highly for the discipline of the Bombay Troops and the influence which Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley exercised that, in the confusion and excitement of the storming, no excesses were committed and no more than two civilians were wounded.

No sooner had Ahmedabad been taken than news reached Goddard that Sindia and Holkar with some 20,000 horse were advancing on Surat. He at once recrossed the Mahi River with a view to attacking them near Baroda. On his approach, however, Sindia retired, professing friendship to the English and stating that he had no desire to fight. He even released the two hostages who had been left behind at Wargaoon the year before and who had been consistently well treated. When it became evident that he was scheming to keep the English quiet until the monsoon broke, Goddard decided to force an action, but it was not until the 2nd April that he was able to do so. He then made a night march and successful attack at dawn on the 3rd in which our Grenadier Companies took part.

On 8th May 1780 Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley was recalled to Bombay where he proceeded with all but two of the Bombay Battalions. These two, of which one was ours, remained with General Goddard and, as the monsoon was approaching, the 5th (our Battalion) was sent to Broach, maintaining detachments at Dabhoi and Jambusar.

Towards the end of 1779 Captain Cadger died, but there is no record of the date. He was succeeded in the command by Captain S. W. S. Waddington who, in October 1780, took the Battalion to Surat to help in suppressing the inroads of the Bheels and Grasias. These latter were professional robbers and were devastating the newly acquired territory, committing numerous acts of the greatest cruelty. While this territory was under native control, parties of mounted men had been kept continually patrolling the more remote tracts. These patrols cut down marauders on sight; but with the advent of British control a more conciliatory

**Capture of  
Ahmedabad Fort,  
15th Feb. 1780.**

**Action against  
Sindia and  
Holkar.**

**Suppression of  
Bheels and  
Grasias, 1780.**

policy was introduced, with the result that many of the villages in the more distant parts were becoming depopulated.

Our Battalion and one other were consequently sent from Surat to Dabhoi at the request of the Collector of the latter place, and on arrival received orders to make a night march and surprise attack on the fortress of Mandwa, the headquarters of the most powerful of these marauding tribes.

This fortress was considered impregnable and had always beaten off the native armies sent against it. The move, however, was planned with the utmost secrecy and carried out at night, so that when, the following morning, the guards opened the gates to drive out the cattle and allow the women to draw water, the troops overpowered them and at once made themselves masters of the place without any bloodshed. The Chief himself succeeded in escaping, but his wife and daughter and several other women of the household were taken and sent in covered palanquins to Dhaboi. This summary action had the desired effect and the other chiefs soon tendered their submission and gave pledges for their good behaviour. Our Battalion returned to Surat where it remained till the end of 1782.

In August 1780 the establishment of British Officers had been increased to seven by an additional Subaltern; and in March the following year, owing to the extra number of cadets sent out from home, two more Subalterns were added.

In 1781, with a view to curtailing expenses, the Sepoy's haversack was abolished and only the knapsack retained.

## CHAPTER II

1782-1788

Field Service in Malabar. Capture of Bednore. Battalion made Prisoners of War by Tipu. Captain Eames poisoned.

(See Map No. 6, opposite p. 80.)

ENGLAND at this time was at war with America, France and Holland, and so unable to help the East India Company in their desperate struggle against the Mahrattas in the west and Haidar Ali of Mysore in the south. The ever-present danger of a French landing on the coast, by tying a certain number of the company's troops to the ports, reduced the strength of their forces in the field.

**Service in  
Malabar.**

**Friction with  
Haidar Ali  
in 1780.**

In prosecuting hostilities against the French, the British had captured the port of Mahe, just south of Cannanore on the Malabar coast. As this lay within the confines of Haidar's territory, he claimed that it was under his protection. Its importance lay in the fact that it was the port through which he obtained his warlike stores and reinforcements from the French Island of Mauritius. He now threatened in retaliation to lay waste the province of Arcot, in the east.

In July 1780, therefore, at the head of an army of 90,000 men, the largest and most efficient force that had ever been collected in the south, he proceeded to carry out his threat. Fort after fort fell to his arms and the whole country

**Victory at  
Porto Novo,  
July 1781.**

was laid waste with fire and sword. It was not until July 1781 that the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Eyre Coote, with a handful of men gained the most glorious victory at Porto Novo, but he was too ill-equipped to exploit this success.

The assistance promised by the French to Haidar had not materialized in full, thanks chiefly to the superiority of the British fleet under Sir Edward Hughes, in many naval encounters.

Haidar therefore decided to abandon his campaign in the Carnatic and clear the British from the ports of the western seaboard.

Prior to this, however, the Madras Government, who had helped Bombay against the Mahrattas, now in turn asked them to help by invading Haidar's territory from the west. Small forces under Colonels Macleod and Humberston and Major Abington were already operating on the southern Malabar Coast, and with considerable success. Money was the Bombay difficulty. The troops which had been fighting the Mahrattas were still many months in arrears of pay.

However, with a little help from Bengal, by economies and by the sale of all available merchandise, they planned to equip a force to raid the province of Bednore, one of the richest of Haidar's conquests, and to capture the port of Mangalore. They were warned that this might bring them single-handed up against the whole of Haidar's force, as neither the Bengal nor Madras armies were sufficiently well equipped to prevent it.

**Expedition  
to Bednore,  
1782.**

General Goddard, now Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, considered that a force of 1,500 Europeans, including two complete companies of artillery and 6,000 sepoy was necessary to ensure success; that all these sepoy should be found from the Bombay Army, as the Bengal Sepoy objected to sailing on the sea; and that the Bengal Battalions then at Kalyan be marched into Gujarat to relieve the Bombay Battalions at Surat and Broach, freeing the Bombay Army to concentrate at the Presidency.

These plans were scarcely set in train when news was received that Tipu, Haidar Ali's son, had attacked Colonel Humberston with a large army, driven him from Palghatcherry and was besieging him at Ponnani.

The Bombay Government decided to move at once to his relief with such troops as they had available, viz:—300 of the Bombay European Regiment, one Company of Artillery and 1,000 Grenadier Sepoy, including the Grenadier Companies of our Battalion, those from Surat and Broach having just arrived.

They did not, however, abandon their project of the raid into Bednore, as they considered this the best scheme, not only to draw off Haidar from the east, but, in the event of success, to recoup themselves for this heavy initial outlay. They therefore gave Brigadier-General Mathews considerable latitude to act as he might find the situation demanded, suggesting that he should call in at Goa as he passed and get the latest news from Ponnani. If Colonel Humberston were safe he was to land his troops at Kundapur and prepare to move up the *Ghats* to Bednore. The rest of the troops, as soon as they reached Bombay, would be sent on to join him. They also gave him letters to Colonels Macleod and Humberston directing them to join him with their troops and put themselves under his orders.

On calling in at Goa, General Mathews heard that Tipu had retired and that Colonel Humberston was now in no need of help. He then proceeded to land at the mouth of the Mirji River on 18th December and at once stormed the Fort of Rajamandrug, which he captured with the loss of one man killed and one wounded. He

**Capture of  
Rajamandrug.**

then sent a detachment which, on the night of the 22nd–23rd, captured the small fort of Kompta by escalade. Finding the country well cultivated and the inhabitants friendly, he next decided to capture the more pretentious fort of Onore (Honawar), and asked Bombay to send him 100 Gujarat bullocks to move his guns.

**Capture of  
Kompta Fort,  
23rd Dec. 1782.**

The Bombay Council were very displeased at his landing so far north and told him to re-embark and land at Kundapur. By the time these instructions reached him, however, he had captured Onore on 5th January 1783. Writing next day he states, "the breach was not a good one, but the gallantry of the soldiers, both European and Native, surmounted every obstacle." The casualties were two sepoy killed, one Portuguese Officer and four sepoy wounded. The garrison consisted of 2,000 men, of whom 1,200 were made prisoner.

**Capture of  
Onore,  
5th Jan. 1783.**

At this juncture news of the death of Haidar Ali reached Bombay. He had died on 7th December 1782, but the news was kept secret until his son Tipu had been recalled to take over the reins of government. Thinking this would cause confusion in Mysore, the Bombay Council sent an urgent message to General Mathews and ordered him "to relinquish all operations whatever on the sea coast and make an immediate push to take possession of Bednore." They did not, however, send him the transport he had asked for.

**On Death of  
Haidar Ali,  
7th Dec. 1782,  
Tipu becomes  
Sultan of  
Mysore.**

On receipt of these definite orders, Mathews at once moved to Kundapur where he established his base. Having been joined by Colonels Macleod and Humberston, he organized his force into four divisions. The Sepoy Grenadier Companies, including ours, were grouped into two composite Battalions, 1st Battalion (Dunn's), Grenadier Companies of 1st Battalion, 5th Battalion (ours) and 15th Battalion; 2nd Battalion (Lampard's), Grenadier Companies of 2nd Battalion, 3rd Battalion and 12th Battalion. Our Battalion Companies had not yet arrived, having been unauthorizedly detained at Surat. Having no transport, the troops set out with such food and ammunition as they could carry and, after some severe fighting and considerable privation, forced their way up the Husain Ghari *Ghat* and occupied Bednore on 28th January 1783.

**Occupation of  
Bednore,  
28th Jan. 1783.**

General Mathews' despatch gives a good idea of the conditions encountered. He writes:—

**General Mathews'  
Despatch.**

"I have the pleasure of informing you that I am in possession of Hyder Nugger the Capital of Bednore Kingdom and that Hyat Sahib, who managed the country for the Nabob, is in my hands, having delivered himself up and the Fort.

"The quantity of Military Stores is very great. The enemy, on my march towards the *Ghats*, formed their army and had what they called an engagement. We drove them before us and proceeded that day eleven miles. They lost many people and we suffered by rockets, but the greatest misfortune was the fate of Captain Hislop, who was struck down by a rocket. It is feared that he will lose his leg. The next morning we found the road so bad that our march was only 7 miles, and the third day, 7 miles further, brought us to the foot of the *Ghat*. The enemy abandoned the fort of Ussengary, but were in force at Ussengary barrier which was defended by eleven pieces of

cannon from 12 to 14 lbs. We lost this day in killed and wounded 70 men. Preparation was made to attack the barrier before daybreak, but upon entering by escalade, the place was evacuated. I pushed forward a party immediately which attacked with bayonets the second barrier, two miles up the hill and carried it with the loss of seven or eight men killed and wounded. On the place were mounted nine guns from 12 to 14 lbs. This success encouraged the men, and a timely reinforcement made them continue the difficult task. It is impossible for me to describe the danger that everywhere presented itself, and nothing but the most strenuous efforts and perseverance could have surmounted the numerous obstacles. From the second fort or barrier to the top of the *Ghat* is almost one continuance of batteries with cannons and breastworks.

"The firmness and intrepidity of the 15th Battalion who were foremost in the severe part of the conflict was rewarded with the honour of taking the fort of Hyderghar at the top of the *Ghat*, on which we found 25 pieces of cannon, from 24 to 4 lbs. and plenty of ammunition of all sorts. . . . My loss during this day was 50 killed and wounded. When the *Ghat* is surveyed, your Honours will be astonished that such could be forced by a handful of men in comparison to the number of the enemy, who had their cavalry dismounted, 1,500 sepoy and 15,000 peons and 60 pieces of cannon. The gallantry of this action increased the panic of the enemy who abandoned the valley of Hyder Nugger, and there remained in the fort only Hyat Sahib, with 350 sepoy who were taken by Tippoo Sahib in the Carnatic and about 1,000 other men. . . . The rapid success can only be attributed to the generous will of the Almighty and to Him our humble thanks are due. To the troops every praise and reward should be given that is in your power, for their merit before the enemy or in bearing the hardships of this severe service, cannot be surpassed. To what can it be owing but to the Divine Will that my Army without provisions or musquet ammunition should have had our wants supplied as we advanced, for without the enemy's rice and powder and ball we must have stopped until the Army could be furnished with Pack Bullocks and *Biggaries*."\*

He then goes on to demand the promised reinforcements as his sick and wounded list is about 800 and he has barely enough men to hold the various newly acquired forts. He states that three parties of the enemy are reported to be marching against him to the number of 14,000 horse and 20,000 foot, including 6,000 regular sepoy, and begs that two Battalions may be sent him to Kundapur.

Enemy's  
Movements,  
Jan. 1783.

A vast store of treasures was captured in Bednore and its disposal was now the cause of discontent throughout the force. The rules were that all Military Stores became the property of the Government, while of all other loot half went to the Government. The remaining half was to be handed over to the Army's Prize Agents whose duty it was to see that it was properly guarded,

---

\* Forced labourers for porter transport.



accounted for and divided into shares, a certain number of which were allotted, according to rank, to the Officers and men concerned. Delay in handing over their share to the prize agents at Bednore was much resented by the troops, and a circular, signed by all Officers, was sent to the General demanding that it be handed over at once.

Colonels Macleod and Humberston had also fallen out with the General, not only over the prize money, but also over the question of the command of a column which had been given to an Officer of the Bombay Army. At that time Officers with Commissions in His Majesty's Army took precedence over all Company's Officers of the same rank. Further, as Mathews was only a temporary Brigadier-General, his Company's Commissioned rank being Colonel, they disliked having to serve under him and therefore went to Bombay on leave to put their case before the Bombay Government.

As soon as Mathews was established at Bednore he proceeded to capture the subsidiary forts in the neighbourhood. At the beginning of February our Battalion, which had recently joined up with its Grenadier Companies, and the 8th Battalion of Sepoys were sent to occupy Mangalore. The following account of this operation is taken from a letter written to his father, after release from captivity, by Lieutenant Sheen, 1st Battalion Bombay Sepoys. He writes:—

**Capture of  
Mangalore,  
9th March 1783.**

"The 5th (our Battalion) and 8th Battalions of Sepoys were ordered to march to Mangalore, a fort on the Malabar coast, 92 miles distant. On their approach to this town, the enemy made some opposition, and sprung several mines, by one of which we lost 80 men; but such was the superiority of our troops, and the contempt in which they held Tippoo's, that they rushed on regardless of danger, and took, by a *coup de main*, eight guns, on which the *killadar* and his rabble fled into the fort, and left us in peaceful possession of the town, though every street of it was mined and stockaded. The fort was then summoned to surrender; and on the arrival of General Mathews with the main army, the *killadar* showing an intention to stand a siege, batteries were erected and in thirty-six hours a breach was made when the Governor offered to surrender."

Our Battalion's casualties were nine killed and eleven wounded. After this it returned to Bednore with General Mathews, who seems to have profited little from his early information of the approach of the enemy's forces, beyond asking for reinforcements. Instead of concentrating and organizing his defence he spent his time and force in capturing the numerous small forts in the neighbourhood, into each of which he put a small garrison. Consequently when the blow fell he was unprepared.

On 9th April the enemy, numbering about 12,000, including a body of French Troops, attacked and overwhelmed the small force holding the *Ghats*. Kundapur, the military base, was evacuated in a panic and Bednore was cut off from communication with

**Tipu attacks  
Bednore,  
9th April 1783.**

the sea and beleaguered. Tipu now attempted to take the place by storm, but the fort was strong and the garrison, which included our Battalion, repulsed him. He then established a regular siege with thirteen batteries which caused many casualties. The garrison made an enterprising and successful sally on the main battery where they killed a few Frenchmen and about 100 irregulars, but were forced to retire in the face of superior numbers.

As Mathews saw no hope of receiving reinforcements or supplies he opened negotiations for the surrender of the fort, and Captain Eames, our Commandant, was sent blindfolded into the enemy's camp for five or six days running to arrange the terms of capitulation. On 28th April 1783 Bednore surrendered with its garrison of about 600 Europeans and 1,500 sepoy, whose casualties during the siege had amounted to some 500 killed and wounded. The following is a summary of the terms of surrender:—

General Mathews  
surrenders  
Bednore,  
28th April 1783.

- (a) The whole garrison to march out with the honours of war.
- (b) All prisoners taken since the beginning of the siege to be given up.
- (c) As soon as the garrisons of the forts of Caveldrug and Anantpur had joined them, they were to be free to march to Sadashughar and embark for Bombay.
- (d) Tipu to furnish a guard and safe escort through his territories, a plentiful bazaar and proper conveyance for the sick, wounded and baggage.

These conditions were agreed to by Tipu and *doolies* were provided for the removal of the sick and wounded. The force then marched out, piled arms on the *glacis* and were taken to a dry tank nearby, where they were ordered to remain for the night.

The 5th, our Battalion, at the time of surrender, consisted of Captain Eames as Commanding Officer, Lieutenants Wiseman, Nesbitt and Budden, Ensign Bateman and about 300 Indian Ranks.

After spending their night in bivouac in the dry tank they expected to commence their march to the coast next morning, but Tipu summoned General Mathews and Captains Eames and Lendrum to Bednore and the troops remained where they were all day anxiously awaiting the return of their Officers. In the evening they learnt that they had been made prisoners. The troops also had been completely surrounded by armed sentries, and it was obvious that Tipu had no intention of carrying out the terms of the agreement.

Tipu's  
Treatment of  
Prisoners,  
1st May 1783 to  
22nd March 1784.

On 1st May all ranks were searched and plundered and then marched as prisoners back to Bednore, the sick and wounded being thrown out of their *doolies* and subjected to the most inhuman treatment. The Officers were now confined in the Sepoy barracks and were given a daily ration of one *seer* of the coarsest rice and one *pice* per diem to purchase other necessaries, such as firewood, etc. On 8th May the remaining Captains were removed,

most of them being sent off to Fort Caveldrug, where they, including Captain Eames, were subsequently poisoned.

On 9th May the rest of the Officers and the British troops were told to prepare for a march. They were then led out into the streets where they were stripped of their coats and chained together two and two by the hands, some Officers being chained to private soldiers. The following day they commenced a most humiliating and distressing march of 128 miles to Chitaldrug where they were to be confined. Few of them by this time had much left in the way of clothing, and some were without boots. In spite of their entreaties all marches were carried out in the heat of the day and, as this was the height of the hot weather in the Deccan, it is little to be wondered at that several succumbed to sunstroke. The coarse rice, which was their only ration, brought on dysentery which also claimed many victims. On approaching any village during the course of a march, trumpeters were sent on ahead to call out the inhabitants before whom they were paraded to receive insults and abuse. Their guards treated them with the utmost brutality, and in the case of a death, the companion was often left chained to a corpse for many hours, even on the march, before anyone could be persuaded to release him.

Chitaldrug Fort was reached on the twelfth day after leaving Bednore and was welcome as being the first chance they had of getting out of the direct rays of the sun. Here they were separated into two parties, confined in separate parts of the fort and not allowed to communicate with one another. During the eleven months that they remained imprisoned here several more died, including Ensign Bateman of our Battalion. Their handcuffs were knocked off but heavy irons were put on their legs. It was not until 22nd March 1784 that they were told that a treaty of peace had been signed at Mangalore between Tipu and the English and their irons were knocked off next day.

The treatment meted out to the Native Ranks was even worse than that from which the British suffered. They were informed that  
**Treatment of** all their Officers had entered Tipu's army and that if they would  
**Indian Ranks.** do the same they would be well paid and well treated. They were also informed that thousands of Madras sepoy were then serving in Tipu's army. The truth of this statement is borne out by a letter from Mr. Sibbald, a member of the Bombay Board, dated 27th October 1783, in which he states: "There are 2,500 Madras Sepoys under Indian Officers serving in Tipu's army to escape irons and inhuman treatment." One of the Officers who was confined states: "The Sepoys of Madras, who had been taken prisoners with Colonel Baillie, generally formed part of the guard that was placed over us: many of these, in order to display their loyalty and attachment to their new Sovereign, treated us with still more rigour than the natives." When persuasion was found to be of no avail ill-treatment was resorted to.

The Indian Officers, who were separated from the men, were threatened with death and mutilation if they did not transfer their allegiance. It speaks

volumes for the loyalty of the Bombay Troops that both the men and the Officers remained true to their salt and said they would undergo any hardship rather than enter the service of the enemy. As a result the men were worked all day and every day as coolies and at night they were chained up with their hands bound behind them.

In the case of the Indian Officers, their captors did not always stop at threats, as Subadar Mahomed Ebram Ajibald, of our Battalion, **Loyalty of Subr. Mahomed Ebram Ajibald.** who repeatedly refused to serve Tipu, had his nose cut off. This loyal *Sardar* rejoined the Battalion after peace had been signed, and was present with it at the fall of Seringapatam and death of Tipu in 1799; serving on until his own death on 20th June 1801.

All the prisoners were assembled at Chitaldrug on 28th March 1784 and commenced their march to Madras. Though much better treated than before, they were still unable to get adequate food, and were informed that Tipu had issued orders that they were only to be given just sufficient to keep them alive, as nothing had been mentioned in the treaty with regard to rationing them. On the 12th April they were met by a detachment of Madras Cavalry and given clothing and money, and then marched to Vellore and Madras where they embarked for Bombay.

The Madras authorities did the best they could for the prisoners and advanced them a certain amount of pay but, being short of funds, were quite unable to pay them up to date.

On arrival in Bombay the sepoys were made much of and warmly congratulated on their loyalty. Otherwise they found themselves very little better off than they had been in Madras.

As soon as the treaty with Tipu had been signed, the Bombay Government, with a view to effecting economies, decided to reduce their army to ten Battalions. As the bulk of our Battalion had been captured at Bednore and were still prisoners of war, and as it was not known how many men would return,

**Incorporation of 9th with 5th Battalion, 1784.** orders were issued in May for our depot to move to Bombay and for the 9th Battalion to be incorporated with it to bring the Battalion up to strength. On the arrival of the prisoners of war they were sent to rejoin their own Battalions, but orders were issued that Indian Officers, who were supernumerary, were to be placed on half pay, and N.C.O.s were to be reverted to the pay of sepoy until they could be absorbed as vacancies occurred.

Nor were they very much better off with regard to arrears of pay, as at that time the Bombay Government had no funds available. The committee which was appointed in June to draw up a statement of arrears due, reported that the total sum amounted to Rs.700,000. This figure so staggered the Government that they decided that no arrears were to be paid on account of men who had been killed, or had died.

In those days when native troops went on service most of the women and

children accompanied them, and were employed in cooking food, erecting bivouacs, carrying cooking-pots, etc. When a man was killed, or died, it was the custom to settle up his accounts on the spot, his estate, if any, being then paid over to his relatives, either from Regimental money or, in many cases, out of the Commanding Officer's own pocket. Should no heirs be available to receive the money it was pocketed by the Commanding Officer as part of his recognized perquisites. Finding that they would be out of pocket under this order all Commanding Officers appealed to the Board with the result that the order was eventually rescinded.

In May 1785 we find Captain J. Bannatyne, who was then commanding our Battalion, writing very strongly to represent the injustice of ordering supernumerary N.C.O.s to be reverted to the pay of sepoy until absorbed "particularly in the case of my Battalion where most of them were prisoners of Tippoo, where their fidelity was unquestioned and on which they were complimented on their return to Bombay." They, however, received no redress.

It was not until 12th November 1785 that orders were issued for arrears of pay due to Indian Ranks to be paid in three monthly instalments. The British Officers, however, were to be paid half in cash and half by draft on Bengal which was to bear interest from 1st January 1786 to the date of payment. This caused a great deal of hardship as these Officers were greatly in need of cash, having all run heavily into debt for current expenses and arrears of wages to their servants. We find many of them negotiating these drafts with *Shroffs* in Bombay who would only pay them 30 per cent. of their face value. Nor were these settlements final, as many allowances were still withheld. The Committee of Arrears presented a statement dated 26th July 1786 showing arrears still due to Sepoys of the 5th (our Battalion) amounting to Rs.24,219, which was ordered to be paid immediately; while a petition was signed by all officers in July 1788 begging for payment of arrears still due to them for the year 1783.

In 1786 the Battalion proceeded to Tellicherry by the Company's Marine Ship *Rockingham*, whose crew appear to have made the voyage as unpleasant as possible for the men, the written complaint stating that "they ill-treated the sepoy and their conduct was particularly objectionable to the Rajput Classes." From that place two Companies were sent to Poona as an escort to Charles Malet, Esq., who had been appointed Resident at the Peshwa's Court.

In April 1788 it was thought that Tipu would attack Tellicherry and it was considered necessary immediately to put the defences in order. During peace time this work was normally carried out by coolies under orders of the Garrison Engineer, but, owing to the present urgency, our whole Battalion volunteered for the work and their offer was gratefully accepted by the Civil Authorities, who paid them working pay and expressed a hope that volunteers might be forthcoming from the other Battalion which was stationed there at that time.

## CHAPTER III

1788-1795

Reconstituted as 9th Battalion. Field Service in Mysore. Capture of Dharwar and Hooly Onore, action of Simoga. Expedition against the Pirates in the Gulf of Cambay.

(See *Maps* No. 6, *opposite* p. 80, and No. 8, *opposite* p. 116.)

THE second stage in the evolution of the 1st Battalion 6th Rajputana Rifles was a change of title from 5th to 9th Battalion of Bombay Sepoys. In September 1788 the Bombay Army was again expanded by forming the seven existing Battalions into twelve Battalions of eight Companies each. The 1st and 5th Battalions were combined to form the new 7th, 8th and 9th Battalions. Our Battalion now became the 9th Battalion of Bombay Sepoys and was commanded by Captain John Riddell.

The Bombay Army was divided into two Brigades, the 1st to the 6th Battalions forming the 1st Brigade, the 7th to the 12th Battalions the 2nd Brigade. The dress of the Brigades was differentiated by the colour of the lace: gold for the officers and yellow for the men of the 1st Brigade; silver for the officers and white for the men of the 2nd Brigade. Turbans and *cummerbands* were blue, edged with lace; and the short drawers were similarly ornamented. The front of the turban was of black leather with the number of the Battalion cut in Roman figures in metal of colour similar to the lace worn by the Brigade. The plume of our 9th Battalion was blue. A badge was sanctioned for those Battalions which had been on the old peace establishment, whereas the new Battalions still had to win this distinction. The badge of the 9th Battalion was a crescent.

Under the new establishment Battalions were commanded by Captains and each company by a Lieutenant. The Company consisted of:—

1 Sergeant (British)	4 Naiks
1 Subadar	1 Drummer
1 Jamadar	1 Fifer
4 Havaldars	68 Privates

In February 1789 the 2nd, 3rd and 6th Battalions relieved the 7th, 8th and 9th (our Battalion), who proceeded from Tellicherry to Bombay. The memoirs of Major David Price record that the boats taking them from Telli-cherry to Bombay met with adverse winds and took from the 3rd February

to 15th March to complete the journey. The time in Bombay was spent completing new clothing and ornaments, and in training.

During the rains four or five of the officers opened a Mess, taking turns to run it, week and week about, but Price states that he decided eventually to leave it to avoid quarrels and habitual excess. Such Messes were purely private affairs and were not sanctioned by Government until 1806, when an allowance of Rs.120 a month was granted.

Captain Riddell, who then commanded our Battalion, was considered a very efficient soldier, but Price says that he was by no means popular. This may have been owing to his *penchant* for taking the Battalion for route marches to Sion and Sewree, where he practised what would correspond to our modern-day "battle drill" over the "rolling downs." Though it was generally admitted that this innovation was more practical than practising these evolutions on the Parade Ground, it does not appear to have aroused much enthusiasm.

The threatening attitude of Tipu, the ruler of Mysore at this time, particularly with regard to the conquest of Travancore, was responsible for the decision to act vigorously against him from all three Presidencies. The Mahrattas and the Nizam being equally anxious to see him brought to heel, a treaty was concluded with them in 1790 to secure their co-operation. By this treaty it was agreed that each of them should furnish an army of at least 25,000 men to invade the enemy's territory; while to each army would be attached two Battalions of the Honourable Company's Troops, those for the Nizam being found by Madras, while Bombay was to find those for the Mahrattas.

The troops detailed by Bombay for this duty were placed under the command of Captain John Little and consisted of his own Battalion, the 8th; Captain Alexander MacDonald's Battalion, the 11th\*; one Company of the Bombay European Regiment; and two Companies of Native Artillery with six 6-pounder Field Pieces. (See Map No. 6, opposite p. 80.)

This detachment embarked on 24th May 1790; sailed up the Jaigur River and disembarked at Sangamseer. After very heavy work, owing to the breaking of the monsoon, in dragging the guns up the *Ghat* by the Ambah Pass, it joined the Mahratta Army commanded by Paresram Bhow at Coompta on 26th June 1790. The Bhow's army was at this time only about 5,000 strong. A halt was made here till the beginning of August to permit of its assembly.

The orders issued to Captain Little insistently impressed on him that he must fall in with all the Bhow's plans for the prosecution of the campaign; whether he approved them or not. It was also stressed, as of the first importance, that the conduct of the troops, both in action and in camp, should be

---

\* On reorganization of the Bombay Army in 1796, the left wing of the 11th Battalion was absorbed into our Battalion to form the 2nd Battalion 2nd Regiment of Native Infantry.

beyond reproach, so as to impress the Mahrattas favourably with the efficiency and discipline of the Company's Army. He was also warned against permitting anything that would offend their religious feeling or caste rules.

By the beginning of August the Bhow's Army amounted to some 20,000 horse, 10,000 foot and an assortment of guns with an enormous following of people of all descriptions which turned each camp into a regular town. This vast concourse left Coompta on 3rd August and moved slowly southward, meeting with little opposition till it reached Dharwar in September, when it went into camp at Nerindra 5 miles north-west of the Fort. Here they remained for a month and a half reconnoitring and trailing their coat beneath the walls, without bringing the enemy to an action. At the end of October the whole force moved to the south of the city and drove in an outlying party of the enemy, capturing three guns and inflicting heavy casualties. On 13th December another attack drove the enemy out of the town. Both these actions were entirely planned by Captain Little and carried out by his troops, the Mahrattas only participating in time to loot and burn the city.

As the Fort was still intact and making an unexpectedly stout resistance,

**Our Battalion  
reinforces  
Capt. Little's  
Detachment.**

it was decided to reinforce the Company's troops. On the 19th November a force, consisting of the 2nd Battalion Bombay European Regiment, our Battalion under Captain Riddell and some more guns, left Bombay under the command of Colonel

Frederick. It took the same route as Captain Little's force, but there was great delay in leaving the point of disembarkation at Sangamseer, as the Mahrattas had made no arrangement for feeding the troops, nor was there sufficient transport.

The local inhabitants would produce no meat for the British Troops; the Indian Troops, who had to purchase their own rations, found prices so exorbitant as to be quite beyond their means. This led to some 30 men of our Battalion deserting but, when Captain Riddell represented that this was the cause, a gratuity of Rs.1 a month was granted as compensation for the high prices. This measure had the desired effect and no more desertions are recorded.

It was not until 2nd January 1791 that these reinforcements joined

**The Siege of  
Dharwar.**

Captain Little's detachment before Dharwar. Colonel Frederick then took over command of the whole force and was received in state by the Bhow.

Measures for the regular prosecution of the siege were now taken in hand. On 8th January the six Grenadier Companies of the 8th, 9th (our Battalion) and 11th Battalions were formed into one Battalion under the command of Captain Riddell, who took with him his Adjutant, Lieutenant Moor, to act in the same capacity. The rest of the three Battalions were brigaded under Captain Little, who had just recovered from the wound he had received in the attack of the 13th December.



On 14th January the British guns opened on the walls and silenced some of the enemy's guns. Owing to the scarcity of ammunition fire had to cease during the night, so giving the enemy time to repair each day's damage. The Mahratta guns had practically no effect because they were not concentrated on any one spot, but plastered the whole of the southern face indiscriminately.

Unsuccessful  
Assault on  
5th Feb. 1791.

By the 5th February the breach looked just possible and, as ammunition was again running short, Colonel Frederick decided to storm the place. In accordance with his orders our Battalion paraded without arms and led the advance carrying fascines with which to fill the ditch. They were followed immediately by the storming party which was led by Captain Little and consisted of 200 British Infantry and the Indian Grenadier Battalion under Captain Riddell.

Arrangements had been made for the Mahrattas to make a feint attack from another point to distract the enemy's attention from our advance. This, like most other arrangements made with the Mahrattas, failed to materialize, with the result that at 4 a.m., when our Battalion advanced with the fascines, the enemy "opened a tremendous fire with guns, mortars, rockets and musketry." Fortunately the glacis of the fort was unfinished and very steep, so giving good protection to the storming party waiting for the ditch to be filled. Parties despatched to right and left to keep down the flanking fire met with considerable success. For about an hour our Battalion laboured to fill the ditch, but just as it was beginning to get light and their task was almost completed, the fascines caught fire. It was now obvious that the attack was doomed and orders were issued for a withdrawal which was effected without much loss.

The total loss in this operation was put at 20 to 30 killed and 50 to 60 wounded. Of these our Battalion's casualties were:—

Killed, Lieutenant Chalmer and 7 Sepoys.

Wounded, Lieutenant Price and 4 Havaldars, 16 Sepoys and 1 Pakhali.

Of the wounded, 4 Havaldars, 1 Naik and 8 Sepoys died owing to the severe nature of their wounds. We are told that few of the wounded ever recovered "owing to the unsoldierlike manner in which the musquet ammunition of the enemy is made up: from the ball a piece of lead projects, not unlike a small nail, and the balls are cut into four parts, joined slightly by the projecting piece, so that when resisted, they separate." It was one of these balls which hit Lieutenant David Price in the ankle, subsequently necessitating the amputation of his leg.

The assault having failed, preparations were now made for a methodical advance by sapping. As only one Battalion was on duty at a time the others had plenty of opportunity for relaxation, the Officers indulging in "hunting and shooting, this country

Siege of Dharwar  
resumed.

abounding in foxes, jackals, hares, partridges, etc." Further amusement was provided from the Bhow's camp, which contained " numerous parties of singing and dancing girls, jugglers, tumblers, etc., of whom ten or fifteen parties constantly visited our camp."

Colonel Frederick was greatly distressed over the failure of the assault, and being in ill health completely broke down and died on 13th March.

By 27th March the British battery was completed. It contained a 36, a 32, a 24 and three 6-pounder guns, which now opened again on the defences. On the 30th March the *killadar* asked for a cessation of hostilities to arrange terms of capitulation. On 7th April the fort surrendered to the Mahrattas after a siege of nearly 29 weeks.

The Grenadier Battalion was now dissolved, the Companies rejoining their respective Battalions.

The 2nd Bombay European Regiment and our Battalion having received orders to return to Bombay, left Dharwar on 12th April, but on the 26th April, having covered 80 miles, our Battalion was ordered to return at once to Dharwar and rejoin Captain Little. They arrived at Dharwar on 3rd May to find that Captain Little and the Bhow had moved off southwards towards Seringapatam in order to join Lord Cornwallis, who was relying on the Mahrattas for supplies for his army.

Our Battalion now commenced a most harassing march to overtake the main force. The monsoon had set in and the men had no shelter at night from the incessant rain. Tentage was provided for Bengal and Madras, but not for Bombay, Troops. Moreover the Mahrattas as they advanced had looted and burnt far and wide, leaving a broad trail of destruction, so that there was no opportunity of obtaining supplies for men or animals from the country. On 30th May, having reached Naumangal, they halted, the Mahrattas having already effected a junction with Lord Cornwallis.

We must now glance briefly at the movements of the other armies. Lord Cornwallis, in command of the Bengal Army, after capturing Bangalore on 21st March, moved towards Seringapatam as soon as he had been joined by a contingent of the Nizam's Army. Then having decided to besiege Seringapatam, he ordered General Abercromby, who commanded the Bombay Army, to move from the west and join him there. As the grand army advanced from the north Tipu withdrew, burning villages, destroying forage and driving off the inhabitants and their cattle; leaving desolation behind him over which the army had to advance. This soon told on the state of the transport animals, and though Lord Cornwallis defeated Tipu at Arikere on 15th May and was before the capital on the 19th, the state of his transport was so bad and he was so short of provisions, Seringapatam could not be reduced before the arrival of the monsoon.

The Mahrattas, who were long overdue and on whom he was relying for

supplies, had so far failed to turn up. Moreover, he had no information as to their whereabouts because the Bhow's messengers, with news of his movements, were all intercepted by Tipu's intelligence service, not a single one reaching his destination.

Lord Cornwallis therefore ordered General Abercromby to return to Malabar and, having destroyed his siege train and heavy stores, raised the siege on 26th May and started back for Bangalore. It was during the first day's march that the Mahrattas, quite unexpectedly, joined him. Though too late now to enable him to prosecute the siege, their large supplies were very welcome to the half-starved troops and followers, who flocked into the Mahratta bazaar and were only too thankful to purchase food at any price; nor did the Mahrattas lose the opportunity of driving a good bargain. There now being no need to hurry, the army halted about a week to recuperate and then marched to Bangalore where they arrived at the beginning of July.

Our Battalion, which had rejoined Captain Little's Detachment during the halt, accompanied Lord Cornwallis's Army to Bangalore, staying there about a week, which enabled them to replenish their stores.

From here on the 8th July the Bhow's army with Captain Little's Detachment moved north towards Sera, partly to simplify the question of supplies and partly to keep open communication with the north and to control such of Tipu's territory as had been conquered. It was proposed that they should remain in the neighbourhood of Sera and Chitaldrug until the end of the monsoon made possible a renewal of concerted action against Seringapatam.

**Mahratta force  
moves north.**

During this move northward the only occurrence of note was the unexpected resistance of the Fort of Doridrug, in the attack on which Lieutenants Moor (the Adjutant) and Rae and a few Grenadiers of our Battalion were wounded.

**Capture of  
Doridrug.**

After the rains the Mahrattas marched slowly southwards, only moving as supplies got eaten up. By 18th December they reached the fort of Hooly Onore, situated at the junction of the Rivers Toom and Budra, and reported to be very strong.

After a preliminary attack to establish the guns, during which our Battalion lost an Indian Officer and 4 men, the fort was carried by assault on 21st December 1791, our Battalion forming the storming party. This operation was very well planned. The enemy's attention was drawn to the southern part of their defences by a feint made by the 11th Battalion, enabling the stormers to reach the breach unobserved and capture the Fort without a single casualty. Christmas was spent near this fort where the Subalterns entertained all the officers of the force. "A bullock was surreptitiously slaughtered and a roast sirloin thoroughly enjoyed."

**Capture of  
Hooly Onore,  
21st Dec. 1791.**

A move was now made toward Simoga where, besides the garrison, there was a hostile force of some 8,000 troops and 10 guns under the command of one of Tipu's relatives. On the approach of the Mahrattas he moved the force away from the fort and took up a very strong position in thick jungle near the village of Gajnur, his right resting on the River Toom and his left on a steep hill covered with impenetrable jungle, while a very deep *nala* ran across his front.

The Mahrattas, having selected a camping site, deputed Appa Sahib, the son of Paresram Bhow, with a party of horse to attack the enemy. The Bhow requested Captain Little to leave eight Companies to guard the Camp and to support his son with the remainder of his force, some 800 bayonets.

On reaching the front of the enemy's position Little found the jungle so thick as to make cavalry action impossible. As the position was very well hidden he decided to advance with one Battalion and keep the rest in reserve until he could get further information.

The attack was commenced by the 8th Battalion who at once came under fire and were checked by heavy losses. The 11th Battalion was ordered up to support them, but the *nala* across the front of the position was so deep and so steep that the Sepoys could not cross to attack with the bayonet.

At this juncture, our Battalion was ordered to move to the left where the Grenadiers of the 8th Battalion, having expended all their ammunition, were being driven back by a party of Arabs. These our Battalion attacked and routed.

Our Grenadier companies under Lieutenant Moor, the Adjutant, succeeded in crossing the *nala*, here full of water, near its junction with the river. Pressing on they penetrated about 300 yards within the enemy's camp, where they took up a strong position. This small body was now strongly counter-attacked and, after Lieutenant Moor had been wounded, commenced to fall back. Captain Little, however, having been informed of their success, collected a party of the 11th Battalion and arrived in time to restore the situation and drive the enemy from their camp, capturing 3 guns. He pursued them so closely through the jungle that all the remaining 7 guns were captured shortly after. On hearing of the success on the left, the rest of the force advanced and captured the camp, securing 300 horses, 1,000 bullocks and a number of good muskets.

This brilliant victory of the 29th December 1791 was secured by 800 Sepoys under Little; for although the Mahratta Infantry lost some 500 men they effected nothing and were driven back in disorder each time they endeavoured to advance.

The total casualties in the British force were: British Officers 1 killed and 4 wounded; Indian Ranks 55 killed and wounded, the bulk of the casualties occurring in the 8th Battalion.

This enabled the siege of Simoga to be undertaken without fear of interruption. But as soon as a practicable breach had been made, the defenders surrendered to Captain Little on condition that they were permitted to remain under protection of the British and were not handed over to the tender mercies of the Mahrattas.

**Capture of  
Simoga Fort.**

For a long time the Mahrattas had hankered after the fertile district of Bednore and the present time, while he had three Battalions of the Company's Troops at his disposal, appeared to the Bhow to be a wonderful opportunity to seize it. Although he was shortly due to join Lord Cornwallis before Seringapatam, he set out for Bednore in spite of the protests of Captain Little. On arrival there he commenced operations for the siege, but very shortly, learning that a large army had been despatched from Seringapatam by Tipu to attack him, he raised the siege and marched southwards to join the allies, arriving on 10th March to find that peace had already been arranged.

The Armies of Bengal and Bombay had joined hands on the 16th February 1792 and operations for the siege had commenced on 24th February. Finding that resistance was useless, Tipu sued for peace and hostilities ceased. By the terms of the peace, which were not finally settled until 19th March, Tipu agreed to cede half the territory he possessed before the war; to pay an indemnity of 3 crores and 30,000 rupees; release all prisoners captured since the time of Haidar Ali; and to deliver up his two sons as hostages.

**Peace with  
Tipu,  
19th March 1792.**

The war now being over, Captain Little's detachment quitted the Bhow's army and marched with General Abercromby to Cannanore. There our Battalion embarked for Bombay which it reached before the monsoon set in. All troops who served in the war against Tipu were subsequently granted six months' special *batta*.

In May the strength of the Bombay Army was again reduced, this time by cutting down Battalions from 10 to 8 Companies of 60 men each. The junior supernumerary British Officers were sent to the Bombay European Regiment, while Indian Officers and N.C.O.s were to be absorbed as vacancies occurred.

In August we find that Lieutenant Moor, the Adjutant, who had been wounded at Simoga, was recommended to proceed to Europe because his wound would not heal, but being quite unable to afford to pay for a passage, he had to petition the Bombay Board for assistance and was granted Rs.1,000 subject to the final approval of the Home Board.

On returning to Bombay the Officers of Captain Little's Detachment were generously entertained by the residents whose hospitality they returned in due course. The *Bombay Courier* published an account of how "On 19th December 1792 the Officers of Captain Little's detachment entertained 150 residents in Bombay to an elegant dinner in the Bombay Tavern."

The year 1793 passed without incident, but in September 1794 the

1st Grenadier Company of our Battalion took part in operations against the Koli pirates in the Gulf of Cambay. (See Map No. 8, opposite p. 116.)

The force was commanded by Captain Little, who was then with his regiment at Surat, and consisted of:—

A Half Company of Artillery with two 6-pounder field pieces.

The 1st Grenadier Company of 2nd Battalion Bombay European Regiment.

The 1st Grenadier Companies of 5th, 9th (ours) and 11th Battalions of Native Infantry.

The two Flank Companies of 8th Battalion of Native Infantry (Captain Little's own Regiment).

The object of the expedition, as detailed in General Orders dated 23rd September 1794 was: "The destruction of the piratical boats of the Coolies in the Gulf of Cambay."

The troops from Bombay joined Captain Little's two Flank Companies on the 6th of October and the force set sail from Surat westwards, escorted by some of the Company's cruisers. During the next two days the weather was very unfavourable and the troops, who were in open boats, were exposed to heavy rain. On the 8th the ships passed Gopinath promontory and at dawn the following day eight of the pirates' vessels were sighted behind the Island of Shial Bet. These at once tried to escape westwards, but were headed off by the cruiser *Rodney*. They then went about to run between the island and the mainland. Chased by armed boats and part of the 8th Battalion, they were driven into the arms of two other cruisers which were waiting for them to the east of the island. Three of the boats were sunk and the other five captured. The pirates' strength was about 400 men with 50 firearms. The casualties amongst the sailors and 8th Battalion, were Captain West and three men killed, and eleven men wounded.

On the 10th the flotilla ran to shelter at Jafferabad, remaining there the next day. On the 12th the troops disembarked at 4 p.m. to find Rajapura fort and village had been evacuated.

On the 13th the force, while destroying the pirates' boats, was reconnoitred by about 40 mounted men, while about the same number of infantry sniped the outpost piquets, which were found by our company, and wounded three of our men.

On the 14th a reconnaissance at Nawa Bandar showed that the enemy had two guns and some two hundred men covering the landing place; disembarkation was consequently postponed till the following morning.

It commenced at 5 a.m., but an off-shore wind made the operation difficult. The Grenadiers of the European Regiment under Captain Tydd, being first ashore, drew all the fire, losing three men killed and Captain Tydd and seven men wounded. By 8 a.m. the fort and village were captured. The Sepoy Companies then took up the pursuit, the enemy retiring 700 yards to another small fort from which they were soon driven and dispersed.

The rest of that day and the next were spent in burning the pirates' boats, and the 17th, 18th and 19th in rounding up boats which had hitherto escaped. The evening of the 20th saw the force back again in the Surat Roads, whence troops rejoined their own Battalions.

Lieutenant Baker was in command of our Grenadier Company, and Captain Tydd, who was wounded on the 15th in command of the Grenadiers of the European Regiment, had actually been posted Commandant of our Battalion from 30th of September in place of Captain Riddell who had been promoted Major and transferred to the 1st Battalion Bombay European Regiment.

In November 1794 our Battalion moved to Calicut in relief of the 3rd Battalion, but Captain Tydd remained in Bombay on sick leave as his wound had not yet healed.

In the year 1795 it was common knowledge that reforms in the Company's Army were imminent and all sorts of rumours were current as to what was going to happen. The Officers were very apprehensive that their prospects, then none too bright, would be adversely affected.

**Terms of British  
Officers' Service.**

At that time no Officer in the Company's service could be promoted to the rank of General. When an Officer proceeded home either on private affairs or on account of wounds or sickness, he had to resign his commission and the vacancy so created was filled up. If, subsequently, he were permitted to return to duty, he had to go on half pay until a vacancy occurred into which he could be absorbed. During the period of his absence he received no pay whatsoever. To draw attention to these matters a memorial was sent home signed by all Officers representing their difficulties and apprehensions.

## CHAPTER IV

1796-1799

Reorganization as the 2nd Battalion 2nd Regiment Native Infantry. Field Service  
in Mysore, storming of Seringapatam.

*(See Maps No. 6, opposite p. 80, and No. 2, opposite p. 38.)*

IN July 1796, owing to the reorganization of the army and many far-reaching changes introduced, our Battalion, with the left wing of the 2nd Bn. 2nd Reg. 11th Battalion and the 6th Company of the 10th Battalion, N.I., July 1796. became the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment.

The whole Indian Army was formed into Regiments of two Battalions each, each Battalion consisting of ten Companies. The flank Companies were still called Grenadier Companies, but the left Grenadier Company was not necessarily composed of taller men, "but of such as by merit and activity of make are deemed deserving of that distinction, and equal to the fatigues that may be required from a chosen company."

Each Regiment of two Battalions was commanded by a Colonel; and each Battalion by a Lieutenant-Colonel.

The Colonel Commandant sanctioned all promotions in the Native Ranks. The Regimental Adjutant and Quartermaster acted as Quartermaster to both Battalions when they were stationed together, but when separated the Quartermaster's duties were taken over by the Battalion Adjutant.

All the British Officers of the Honourable Company's Service were given King's Commissions; and furlough rules were promulgated by which one-third of the Field Officers, a quarter of the Captains and a sixth of the Subalterns were permitted to be absent on leave, without loss of rank or pay, up to a period of three years. Subaltern Officers, however, could not qualify for furlough until they had completed ten years' service.

In February 1797 our Battalion moved from Calicut to Angaripur under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel T. Bellis. During this year the Battalion took part in operations in Malabar and the Wynaad. Malabar had been ceded by Tipu under the treaty of 1792 in which no specific mention was made of the Wynaad. Opinions therefore differed as to whether it was part of the ceded territory or not. (See Map No. 6, opposite p. 80.)

A Commission had been appointed to administer Malabar which consisted of numerous small States under petty Rajas. The most intractable of these



was the Cotiote, or Pyche, Raja, whose territory lay to the north-east of Tellicherry and his capital at Palassi, some fifteen miles from the coast.

He did not concur in the revenue settlement and was continually in arrears of payment. Furthermore, he preferred to administer justice in his own crude way rather than have recourse to the Civil Courts, which had been set up in the district. In 1795 two Moplas, who were accused of theft, were sentenced by him to death, the execution being carried out in accordance with ancient custom, by impalement alive.

Government thereupon issued orders for the collection of arrears of revenue and the arrest and trial for murder of the Raja.

To effect this arrest a force of 300 Sepoys under Lieutenant James Gordon of the 2nd Battalion 1st Regiment Native Infantry\* was despatched in April 1796 from Tellicherry. But getting news of the move the Raja fled with his family and a considerable following into the hills of the Wynaad. His house was then broken open and considerable treasure seized.

In July he agreed to come in on pardon and reinstatement being offered, and subsequently approved, by the Bombay Government; but in October, owing to lack of trust in the good faith of the Commissioners and to tactless handling on their part, he again fled to the Wynaad. In consequence a proclamation was issued by the Commissioners in December forbidding people to assemble to assist him, and ending with the statement "not a sepoy shall rest in this province till you and all your adherents are utterly extirpated." This drove him at once into the arms of Tipu, to whom he appealed for help, which was accorded.

In January 1797 a detachment of 80 Sepoys under Captain Bowman, 2nd Battalion 1st Regiment was sent to Manandeer where the proclamation was to be read. The country, being very hilly, broken and covered with dense jungle without roads, was ideal for guerilla warfare, and difficult for the movement of troops. The detachment was surprised and Captain Bowman killed, several Officers and men were killed and wounded and their families, who were with them, butchered. A Havaldar's guard at Palassi was also wiped out.

At this time a few small detachments of troops were already in the Wynaad to secure the Cardamom crops. One of these under Lieutenant Inglis, 2nd Battalion 1st Regiment, was heavily attacked and had great difficulty in withdrawing. They suffered several casualties and all the followers and families were butchered. Several other small parties were similarly treated.

To counteract these savage excesses the Commissioners proposed, and Government agreed, that more troops be sent to the Wynaad and several fortified posts occupied. Detachments from our Battalion were included in these reinforcements.

---

\* 4th Battalion 4th Bombay Grenadiers, disbanded 31st March, 1930.

Disaster to a  
Detachment in  
the Wynaad,  
March 1797.

Colonel Dow, one of the Commissioners, who was now in Military Command of the district, was to assemble a force above the *Ghats* at Periah in March. He himself ascended the *Ghats* by the Tamaraseri Pass and reached Periah in due course, but a detachment of 200 men of our Battalion under Lieutenants Mealy and Mellinchamp was not so fortunate. They ascended the *Ghats* by the Karkur pass, but before they could join hands with the rest of the force they were attacked by "some thousands" of Nairs through whom they had to fight their way on the 9th, 10th and 11th March and were finally forced to retreat down the Ellicherrum *Ghat*, their casualties being:—

			Indian Officers	Havaldars	Naihs	Sepoys	Bhisties
Killed ..	..	..	1	2	2	32	1
Wounded ..	..	..	1	3	4	67	—

Lieutenant Mellinchamp was also wounded, making a total of 112 casualties.

The main force, on arrival at Periah, found itself short of supplies and had to retire, losing heavily. Among the killed was Captain W. Brown of our Battalion, at that time Malabar Paymaster.

In consequence of the resulting situation, the Governor and the Commander-in-Chief of Bombay came to Malabar and made terms with the Pyche Raja.

Throughout the years 1797 and 1798 our Battalion was split into small detachments which were constantly employed to round up parties of insurgents.

Although the Treaty of 1792 had considerably curtailed the powers of

Tipu's Intrigues  
with the French  
in Mauritius.

Tipu, he was still, in 1798, a hostile power threatening the Carnatic. It was suspected that he had been in communication with the French authorities in Mauritius. As a matter of fact he had, in February 1798, sent ambassadors to Mauritius proposing an offensive and defensive alliance against the British and promising to pay and subsist whatever troops the French would send to his assistance.

The Governor-General at Mauritius, unwilling to reduce his forces already depleted by reinforcements sent to help the Dutch, issued a proclamation calling for volunteers to enrol in Tipu's service. By this means he obtained 100 men, including many officers, who departed with the envoys in the French frigate *La Preneuse*, reaching Mangalore in April. Though insignificant in numbers, they were of great value to Tipu in training and organizing his troops, and he hoped that many more would in due course follow from France.

This action of Tipu's being a flagrant breach of the treaty of peace concluded in 1792, the Governor-General, Lord Mornington, decided to strike at Tipu before he could receive further help from the French. In June 1798, therefore, he issued orders for the assembly of armies on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar without delay.

Owing, however, to the fact that during peace no large supplies of food,

fodder or transport were maintained, he found that to assemble armies adequately equipped to deal with Mysore would take a long time. In the interim he turned his attention to strengthening the bonds of alliance with the Peshwa and Nizam, both of whose kingdoms were convulsed with internal troubles and in no state, at the moment, to afford any material assistance against Tipu.

From the Mahrattas he received an assurance that they were in accord with the British intentions but were not in a position to co-operate. The Nizam at that time was greatly under the influence of the French, who had trained and officered a force of 14,000 Sepoys for him. However, a timely mutiny in this force against their Officers enabled British Troops, sent to Hyderabad, to capture all the French Officers and disarm the Sepoys without shedding any blood, so re-establishing British ascendancy and obtaining a promise of co-operation which was duly fulfilled.

By August reports were received of the activity of the French in the Mediterranean, followed, in October, by news of their invasion of Egypt, indicating the need for early action. Orders were at once issued for the move of the Madras Army to the frontier of the Carnatic and for its reinforcement by 3,000 volunteers of the Bengal Army. The Government of Bombay was ordered to collect troops and a large store of supplies on the Malabar Coast with all speed.

A few days later news of Lord Nelson's glorious victory over the French at Aboukir was received. It was hoped that this would be such a blow to Tipu that he might agree to an amicable settlement. Therefore, without stopping the military preparations, the Governor-General wrote to Tipu requesting him to receive Major Doveton to settle all differences on behalf of the Allies.

Tipu's answers to several such letters were so evasive and so long delayed as to make it evident that he was just playing for time. Consequently on 3rd February 1799 orders were issued for the combined armies of Madras and Bengal under General Harris to enter Mysore territory, and for General Stuart, who commanded the Bombay Army, to co-operate; while the Allies were informed that a state of war with Tipu was deemed to exist.

This war entailed the assault and capture of Seringapatam, and in dealing with this only the operations of the Bombay Army will be followed in any detail.

And now to return to the doings of our Battalion, which was still at Angaripur. It was now commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall who had replaced Lieutenant-Colonel Bellis, on his retirement, in April 1797.

On 12th January 1799 orders were received to march to Cannanore to join the army assembling there under Lieutenant-General Stuart. On arrival, the Battalion was posted to the Left Native Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Wiseman, who had been Adjutant of our Battalion during the

ill-fated expedition to Bednore in 1783. This Brigade consisted of 2nd Battalion 3rd Regiment,\* 1st Battalion 5th Regiment† and 2nd Battalion 2nd Regiment (our Battalion).

The Bombay Army, composed of three Brigades, one British and two Native, with detachments of Engineers and Artillery and a Corps of Pioneers, was reported to be in very good spirits as it was much better equipped than ever before. Sufficient rice had been collected to feed 30,000 men for 60 days, while bullocks and elephants were enough and to spare.

On 21st February the Army marched from Cannanore, reaching the top of the Poodicherrum *Ghat* by the 25th of that month. They took up positions in the vicinity of Sidapur and Seedaseer, with orders to remain in these positions until the Madras Army approached Seringapatam when, as previously arranged, the armies were to join hands. On the 6th March when the right brigade under Colonel Montresor fought the gallant action of Seedaseer, our Battalion was at Sidapur, and so took no part in the fight, except that Captain W. Sholl of the Battalion, who was attached for duty to the 1st Battalion 2nd Regiment,‡ was killed in that action.

The Madras Army, after defeating Tipu at Malavelly on 26th March, crossed the Caverry at Sosile and took up its position south-west of Seringapatam on 5th April. The next day General Floyd with the cavalry left for Periapatam to join hands with the Bombay Army which advanced to Seringapatam, reaching there on the evening of 14th April and encamping in rear of the Madras Army. (See Map No. 2, opposite p. 38.)

On the 16th April the Bombay Army crossed the river Caverry and took up a very strong position north of the river and facing east with their right on the river bank and their left on a hill which commanded all the ground in front. The rear of the position was protected from the enemy's Cavalry by *nalas* and broken ground.

On the 17th the enemy were seen to be entrenching a small rise in front of the Bombay Army near the ruined village of Agrarum. This rise commanded the ground over which the troops would have to advance and was a suitable point at which to establish a battery to enfilade the south-west wall of the fort. General Stuart was therefore ordered to advance and seize it at once. The following account of this and subsequent events is taken from letters written by an Officer of the 75th Regiment§ and published in the *Bombay Courier* in May 1799.

"On the morning of the 17th April the enemy appeared to be destroying a redoubt in our front which it was thought would afford excellent cover for us to advance under. It was therefore determined to take it, and our army

\* Became 6th Bombay Native Infantry, disbanded 3rd May 1882.

† Became 4th Battalion 4th Bombay Grenadiers, disbanded 31st March 1930.

‡ Now 1st Battalion 5th Mahratta Light Infantry.

§ The Gordon Highlanders.

being reinforced in the course of the forenoon by the 74th Regiment\* with Marshall's Battalion (ours), half of Disney's† and half of Lawrence's‡ started at 3 p.m. and in less than an hour got possession with little opposition and little loss. The whole of the night was spent in making cover for the troops at this post and erecting an enfilading battery. The enemy kept up a continuous cannonade and our people were much annoyed by snipers who were enabled to approach very close under cover of a ruined village.

"On the 18th six 10 pounders were brought from the other army and got into the battery during the night. Early in the morning of the 19th we were aroused by an attempt to attack the rear of our camp, an immense number of rockets were thrown without doing any harm—our piquets being properly reinforced the enemy moved off—we have since heard that the attack was made by Cammer ud din Cawn with 4,000 horse, a large party of rocket boys and a few infantry, the ground was so difficult that the horse was of no use."

"Last night (22nd) we were again roused by an attack on our advanced posts and rear at the same moment. They instantly got under arms and the rear piquets being augmented the attempt on the rear was very feeble, that on the front was truly serious and lasted several hours, the enemy by dint of numbers actually got into our trenches where 20 of them were bayoneted by the 75th. I am sorry to say our loss was considerable."

**Sally by Tipu,  
22nd April 1799.**

The last night attack referred to above is said to have been carried out by 6,000 Infantry led by Lally's Corps of Frenchmen who fought most gallantly. The enemy is said to have lost 600 or 700 men.

During this time the Grand Army under General Harris were advancing their approaches and completing their breaching batteries. The point selected for the breach was the curtain in the south-west wall about 60 yards from the bastion at the north-west corner of the Fort.

On 2nd May 1799 all the breaching batteries opened fire, and by the evening of the 3rd the breach was considered practicable.

It was decided to storm the fortress on the 4th at about 1 p.m. This hour was selected as it was thought that, owing to the extreme heat, Tipu's Troops would be either feeding or resting after their food and would not be on the alert.

**Seringapatam  
stormed and  
taken,  
4th May 1799.**

The Command of the Storming Troops was given to General David Baird, who divided them into separate Columns. General Baird had for many years been a prisoner of Haidar Ali in Seringapatam and claimed the right of leading the stormers. On reaching the top of the breach, the Columns were to turn right and left respectively and fight their way along the

---

\* 2nd Battalion The Highland Light Infantry.

† Became 1st Battalion Bombay Pioneers, disbanded 10th February 1933.

‡ Became 6th Bombay Native Infantry, disbanded 3rd May 1882.

walls. Each battalion of Sepoys of the Bombay Army furnished one Grenadier Company to form part of the assaulting Column. The Grenadier Company of our Battalion was commanded by Captain Heath. The Bombay Troops destined for the assault crossed the river during the night to take up their positions in the forward works, from which the enemy had been driven by the Bengal Troops on 26th April. The Bombay Sepoy Grenadier Companies joined the left assaulting Column under Colonel Sherbrooke. The following is an extract from the letter of an eyewitness:—

“A little after one o'clock, a general discharge of cannon from all quarters of the Fort and a tremendous fire of musketry announced the commencement of the attacks; in a few minutes we had the pleasure to see our people ascend the breach and push along the walls. In about two hours the English flag was hoisted under a salute of 21 guns from both Camps.” Our Battalion's casualties during the operations subsequent to arrival at Seringapatam were:—

Killed: 1 Havaldar and 4 Sepoys.

Wounded: Lieutenants J. Lock and J. Barnard, 1 Subadar, 1 Fifer and 8 Sepoys.

Tipu himself was killed in the assault, and his body was found under a mass of corpses in a gateway on the north side of the Fort. After the place had been captured the troops spent the whole night looting, and an enormous quantity of booty was carried off to the Camps. On the morning of the 5th May Colonel Wellesley was placed in command of the Fort, and he had to resort to the severest measures, including flogging and hanging, to restore order among the troops by the evening.

A Prize Committee was appointed to collect all Tipu's valuables and money.

**Distribution of  
Prize Money.**

Captain Price, who as a Subaltern had been in our Battalion and lost a leg in the siege of Dharwar, was appointed Prize Agent for the Bombay Army. The prize money was distributed in July, shares being as follows:—

	Star pagodas (about Rs.3 each)			Star pagodas (about Rs.3 each)	
Sepoys and Naiks	..	12	Subalterns	..	1,080
Havaldars	..	18	Captains	..	2,160
Jamadars	..	36	Majors	..	4,320
Subadars	..	108	Lieutenant-Colonels	..	6,480

Followers were granted six days' free rations in recognition of their services.

The Bombay Army left Seringapatam on 13th May 1799 and marched to Cannanore, arriving there on the 22nd of that month. Our Battalion was thence sent to Tellicherry where it remained till the end of the monsoon.

In order to stop the frequent shifting of Officers from one Regiment to another on promotion, the Court of Directors, at the end of 1798, decided

that all Officers of the Bombay Army were to be redistributed and posted according to seniority and that thereafter promotion should proceed Regimentally. Owing to the outbreak of war with Tipu, this order did not take effect till towards the end of 1799. Moreover as one of the Commanding Officers, in sending in his nominal roll, omitted the name of one of his Subalterns and as the mistake was not discovered for some months, about 50 or 60 junior officers had to be reposted, so that this General Post of Officers continued till about the middle of March 1800.








# SIEGE OF SERINGAPATAM

MAP No. 2





## CHAPTER V

1800-1803

Capture of Jamalabad Fort. Field Service under Colonel Wellesley. Suppression of rebellion in Malabar.

*(See Map No. 6, opposite p. 80.)*

THOUGH danger from Mysore was now at an end, the Bombay Government was very apprehensive of a descent by the French on the western coast. Malabar, in spite of several suitable landing places, was not regarded as the danger zone. The country was so hilly and broken and the jungle so thick as to form a formidable obstacle to a landing force. Kanara, in this respect, was very much more suitable and the Portuguese settlement of Goa was the most vulnerable point.

The Government, having little faith in the capacity of the Portuguese to ward off a French landing, opened negotiations with a view to establishing a British Garrison at Goa. With the consent of the Portuguese Governor a force, which included our Battalion, was sent there in September 1799 under General Sir William Clarke.

About May 1800 two Companies of the Battalion under Lieutenant Broomhall were sent by boat to Mangalore to take part in the recapture of the Fort of Jamalabad. This fort had been built by Tipu and named after his mother Jamal Bai. The outer fort had been captured at once, but the inner fort, which was built on an almost precipitous rock 1,788 feet high, held out in spite of three attempts to storm it. It was then invested in order to starve out the garrison, who eventually succeeded in escaping by night.

In May 1800 our Battalion was ordered to march from Goa to Hurry Hur to join the army of the Hon. Colonel Wellesley. The two Companies under Lieutenant Broomhall were still engaged in the siege of Jamalabad and did not accompany the Battalion. Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall having a month or two before proceeded to Bombay on transfer to the European Regiment, the command of our Battalion devolved on Captain J. Lock.

On the capture of Seringapatam in 1799, all the prisoners of Tipu were released as an act of clemency, and among them was Dhoondia Wagh, an inveterate freebooter. As soon as he was released he raised a following and recommenced his depredations. On his defeat by a Mahratta force under

Gokla he entered the service of the Raja of Kolapur who was then fighting against the Peshwa. He commanded a part of his army until the Raja was defeated at the end of 1799, when he cut adrift from him and started plundering the Company's newly acquired districts and also those of the Peshwa. To exterminate this marauder was the task given to the Hon. Colonel Wellesley who marched north from Seringapatam on 21st May 1800. His force, consisting of two Brigades of Cavalry and three Brigades of Infantry, arrived at Hurry Hur on 15th June. Dhoondia Wagh was said to have a following of 40,000 men which, in Wellesley's words, "increased as it advanced, like a snowball."

Our Battalion joined the force on the 16th June and was posted to the 3rd Brigade which was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Capper and consisted of:—

2nd Battalion 4th Regiment of Madras Native Infantry.\*

2nd Battalion 2nd Regiment of Bombay Native Infantry (our Battalion)

1st Battalion 4th Regiment of Bombay Native Infantry †

The last-named battalion had not yet joined the force. It was then at Hullial in the Soonda territory but was expected any day. In a letter written by Colonel Wellesley dated 25th June, he states: "No tidings yet of the Bombay Battalion (1st/4th) excepting that they had not marched (from Hullial) on the 15th. The Officer Commanding in Soonda complains sadly of Major Munroe's people who absolutely refuse to give the smallest assistance in forwarding the equipments of this Corps. Their demand cannot be very heavy, at least if they have not much more baggage than their friends (our Battalion) who arrived some days ago. They had literally nothing, excepting what was carried by 24 bullocks, and about 50 coolies, and the private baggage of their officers goes upon 16 bullocks." As usual the Bombay Government had despatched them without tents and had provided no doolies; both of which deficiencies they had to make good in the field as best they could.

On arrival at Hurry Hur the river Toombudra was found to be in flood and unfordable, so the whole force had to be ferried across in boats and as the current was strong this occupied ten days.

During these operations the Camp piquets were mounted just before the march commenced, the new piquets furnishing the Advanced Guard and the relieved piquets the Rear Guard.

On the 17th June the force marched to Rani Bednore, a fort which had been occupied by Dhoondia's Troops, where the Cavalry were at once fired on. Wellesley decided to attack the place immediately with the advanced piquets supported by one Madras

**Wellesley's Report on Equipment of Bombay Troops.**

**Capture of Fort Rani Bednore, 17th June 1800.**

\* Became 75th Carnatic Infantry, disbanded 24th May 1926.

† Became 1st Battalion Bombay Pioneers, disbanded 10th February 1933.

Battalion, while the Cavalry waited to cut off anyone who escaped. The fort was escaladed and captured without any loss. The piquet, furnished by our Battalion, which took part in the assault, was commanded by Captain Lock and Lieutenant Hicks. The force halted here till 3rd July to await the arrival of *brinjarries*\* with supplies. In the meantime the Cavalry were sent out to clear all the country of enemy as far as the River Wardah.

On 3rd July the Infantry marched north to the River Wardah where they made a bridge over which the force crossed and moved on to Savanore, where a further halt was called to let supplies come up. Moving on again they reached the fort of Dammal on 26th July and carried it by storm with trifling loss. The following is taken from Wellesley's despatch dated 26th July 1800:—

Capture of Fort  
Dammal,  
26th July 1800.

“The Fort was surrounded by Cavalry under Colonel Stevenson and by Mahrattas under Goula. It was attacked in three places: at the gateway, by Major Desse with piquets supported by two Companies 2nd/2nd (our Battalion); on one face by Lieutenant-Colonel Capper with the Grenadiers and Light Infantry of 73rd† and the 2nd of the 4th; and on the other by Captain McPherson with the Grenadiers and Light Infantry of the 77th‡ and the rest of the 2nd/2nd. It was impossible to force the gateway, and the party, on that attack, entered the fort by escalade; and the other two attacks likewise succeeded at nearly the same time.

“The fort is strong and well built, the wall 30 feet high with a dry ditch, in some places of considerable depth. It had held out against Dhoondia for several weeks. I cannot say too much in favour of the troops, who, by the exploit, have added to the reputation which they have already gained in this country.”

The total casualties were 1 killed and 11 wounded, none of which occurred in our Battalion.

Dhoondia was now reported to be at Sunduti on the south bank of the River Malpurba, which he wanted to cross, and Wellesley hoped to attack him before he could do so. After four days' march he moved ahead with the Cavalry to Manouli, where Dhoondia's baggage was being put across the river, and surprised the camp and part of the force which was immediately attacked and annihilated. Much booty was taken, including a good deal of transport and stores and six guns.

Dhoondia himself with part of his force moved off westward into the jungle, making for the sources of the Malpurba so as to avoid having to cross it. Colonel Stevenson, with the Cavalry, was sent in pursuit while the rest of the force ferried over the river.

---

\* The *brinjarries* were a tribe of grain and salt dealers who moved about in numerous parties with their cattle, carrying their goods to different markets. During the Deccan wars they furnished the Commissariat by the sale of supplies.

† 2nd Battalion The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment).

‡ 2nd Battalion The Middlesex Regiment.

It was now considered probable that, once Dhoondia had rounded the head waters of the Malpurba, he would make eastwards towards the junction of the rivers Gutpurba and Kistna, cross them either above or below the junction, and join hands with the Poligars.\*

The plan of campaign therefore was to make a complete sweep from west to east of the country between the rivers Gutpurba and Malpurba, in order to drive Dhoondia into the triangle formed by their junction with the Kistna and bring him to action before he had time to ferry across either river. The Raja of Kolapur had undertaken to prevent his crossing the Gutpurba to the northward into his territory.

To carry this scheme into effect, Colonel Stevenson with the bulk of the Cavalry followed the southern bank of the Gutpurba River, while Wellesley with the Infantry and a portion of the Cavalry followed the northern bank of the Malpurba. The space in between these two forces was to be swept by Mahratta and Nizam's Cavalry which were now co-operating.

It was thought possible that should Dhoondia find himself being cornered, he might try to break back, cross the Malpurba near Badanir and again make south to Savanore. To prevent the possibility of his escaping in this direction, the 3rd Brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Capper and about 3,000 Mahratta Horse were to proceed along the south bank of the Malpurba and occupy all likely crossings.

Dhoondia's movements were exactly as anticipated. Finding that he was likely to be cornered by the forces approaching from the west he broke southward to the Malpurba at Budihal where fortune favoured him, the river dropping sufficiently to enable him to ford it and get away south before Lieutenant-Colonel Capper could intercept him.

In issuing orders to Capper's force, Wellesley had stressed the necessity of the Mahratta Horse moving ahead to occupy the crossings, but in spite of Capper's frequently urging them to move ahead, they refused to go on alone without him. At the time that Dhoondia succeeded in fording the river Capper was only 20 miles away, so that had the Mahrattas carried out their orders the freebooter would certainly have been intercepted.

We must now return and follow the movements of the 3rd Brigade from the time it left the main force at Hubli on 18th August 1800. Its route lay down the Purusghar Valley and during the first day or two it was joined by the 1st Battalion 4th Bombay Regiment which completed the Brigade.

When the main army had been moving in pursuit of Dhoondia south of the Malpurba, the baggage had been looted by men from two forts, Huli and Seringhi, but circumstances did not admit of Wellesley's delaying at that time

---

\* Poligar is a term confined to the Madras Presidency. It is a Tamil word used for the small feudatory chiefs who occupied wild tracts of country.

to deal with them. As these forts now lay on Capper's route, the opportunity of settling with them was taken.

On the morning of the 22nd the Fort of Huli was carried by escalade, led by the right wing of our Battalion under Captain Lock. The force then moved the same day to Seringhi, a fort some 8 miles east of Huli, and attacked it at once. The enemy put up a stout resistance, and their fire was so heavy that the Pioneers were unable to place the scaling ladder against the wall. It was then carried by the Officers, but was found to be too short. The outer gateway was then attacked by the left wing of our Battalion led by Lieutenant Hogg who succeeded in blowing it in. It was too narrow, however, to admit a gun upon its carriage, so the gun was dismounted and carried in by Captain Sir John Sinclair and his detachment of Bombay Artillery, and with it they burst open the inner gate. This put an end to resistance and the fort was soon occupied.

**Capture of the  
Forts of Huli  
and Seringhi,  
22nd Aug. 1800.**

During the attack on the fort of Huli, Jamadar Trimbackji Cutwali of our Battalion was conspicuous for his gallantry and received immediate promotion to the rank of Subadar as a reward. The total casualties in these two affairs were 2 killed and 35 wounded, of which our Battalion's loss amounted to:—

Killed: 1 Havaldar and 1 Sepoy.

Wounded: 2 Havaldars, 2 Naiks, 1 Drummer, 12 Sepoys.

On receipt of the report of this action, the following General Order was published:—

“General Order. Camp at Dadabaree, Tuesday 26.8.00.

“Colonel Wellesley has received from Lieutenant-Colonel Capper a detailed account of the successful attack by storm of the forts of Hooley and Syringhy on the same day, in which it appears that the troops under the command of Captain Lock (Commanding our Battalion) and Captain Dickinson (1/4th) have behaved with the same spirit which he has had so frequently the satisfaction of observing and reporting to the Commander-in-Chief, and which has received his applause. Upon this occasion it appears that the Officers above mentioned and Captain Sir John Sinclair, and the Coast and Bombay Artillerymen under his orders, particularly distinguished themselves. Colonel Wellesley requests that they will accept his thanks, and he will not fail to report their conduct to the Commander-in-Chief.”

Dhoondia, having now escaped from the converging British forces, was making southwards for the Nizam's territory. Wellesley issued orders to Colonel Stevenson to recross the Malpurba with the Cavalry with all speed and prevent Dhoondia turning westwards against his line of communication or southwards into the Nizam's territory. He himself with the main body recrossed the Malpurba by a deep ford at Jalahal on 29th August. He saw that it was useless to try to capture

**Further Pursuit  
of Dhoondia.**



Dhoondia by any movement against his rear and, as it was essential that he himself should replenish his supplies, he halted until 3rd September. His plan now was to get to the west of Dhoondia and to drive him into the triangle formed by the junction of the Rivers Kistna and Toombudra, both of which would remain unfordable for another month.

After receiving his supplies he moved southward and on the 10th September, by moving forward rapidly with the Cavalry he surprised Dhoondia and completely defeated him. This was entirely a cavalry action in which their gallantry and determination were noteworthy. Dhoondia was killed, his army dispersed and his baggage captured.

This brought the campaign to a close and our Battalion marched back to Seringapatam with the rest of the Army.

Early in 1801 a force was organized to deal with the Pyche Raja who had again been making trouble. As the Hon. Colonel Wellesley was called away to command the force destined for the Red Sea and Egypt, the command in Mysore devolved on Colonel Stevenson, under whom our Battalion took the field and entered the Wynaad by the Edaterri Pass. No fighting of any importance appears to have taken place, and the force was broken up for the rains during which the Battalion remained at Pullynia. In December 1801 orders were received to march to Cannanore, but while still on the march there, this order was countermanded and the Battalion was directed to Montana in the Wynaad where it remained till 24th March 1802 before completing its move to Cannanore.

The remainder of the year 1802 was spent in Cannanore completing equipment and filling up to strength.

In 1803 Colonel Montresor, who had now taken over command of Malabar, instituted more active measures for the suppression of the rebellion which had now spread into Malabar. Our Battalion was ordered into the Cotiote District and was split up into detachments to keep open communications through the jungle, while one wing, under Captain Mealy, was used to sweep the jungle for the enemy. It was while employed on this duty that a post under Lieutenant Besnard was heavily attacked and successfully defended as described in Colonel Montresor's despatch of July 1803:—

" Sir

In a former letter I had the honour of stating to you that an attempt had been made to escalate the Fort of Pyche by the Rebels; and that they had been very gallantly repulsed by the detachment stationed there under Lieutenant Besnard of the 2nd of the 2nd Bombay Native Infantry. I have since had an opportunity of ascertaining that the principal attack was on a small redoubt adjoining the Post, in which a Havaldar's party was stationed, and as three

**Gallant Defence  
of Fort of Pyche  
by our  
Detachment.**

**Death of  
Dhoondia Wagh,  
10th Sept. 1800.**

**Suppression of  
Rebellion in  
Malabar.**

Rebels were left dead on the walls of the Redoubt and several others were carried off, the Havaldar and his party must have conducted themselves with so much spirit and bravery that I think the circumstances deserving of being particularly noticed to you. The name of the Havaldar is Dhonjee Kiljee of the 2nd of the 2nd, he is also a man of good private character."

Colonel Wellesley, who on supersession by General Baird had now returned to the command of Mysore, forwarded the despatch to Bombay and obtained sanction for the Havaldar to be specially promoted to Jamadar for his gallantry.

In September 1803 our Battalion proceeded to Goa, as, although the rebellion had not yet been completely stamped out, there was another scare of a French landing on the coast. The Battalion remained in Goa for the cold weather.

## CHAPTER VI

1804-1809

Field Service in Gujarat. Unsuccessful assaults on Bhurtpur. The Kathiawar  
Field Force 1807.

(See Maps No. 20, facing p. 270, and No. 8, opposite p. 116.)

IN March 1804 our Battalion at Goa received orders to join the force which was assembling in Gujarat under Colonel Murray.

**Field Service  
under Colonel  
Murray  
against Holkar.**

There were some 250 recruits on the square and as there did not appear to be prospects of any immediate fighting, the Bombay Government ordered the recruits to accompany

the Battalion.

On the 19th March 1804 the Battalion left Goa with 9 British Officers, 2 Sergeants, 1,106 Indian Ranks and some 500 families and followers. The journey to Surat was made in one of Messrs. Forbes & Co.'s ships, the *Sarah*, 963 tons, which was hired for the trip for Rs.25,000. As they had their own tentage they were ordered to march from Surat to Broach and thence to Baroda where they arrived on 4th May 1804 with orders to remain there during the monsoon.

Colonel Murray's force consisted of two Brigades. The 1st Brigade was made up of His Majesty's 65th Regiment,\* 1st Grenadier Battalion Native Infantry,† and the 2nd Battalion 1st Regiment Native Infantry.‡

The 2nd Brigade contained His Majesty's 86th Regiment,§ 2nd Battalion 2nd Regiment Native Infantry (our Battalion), 1st Battalion 3rd Regiment Native Infantry,|| and 1st Battalion 9th Regiment Native Infantry.¶

Before following the course of Colonel Murray's operations, it is necessary to make a brief survey of Mahratta affairs.

For some time past the Government had been trying to make a treaty with the Mahratta nation as a whole, but these attempts had been frustrated by the jealousy of the individual Chiefs.

The most important of these were:—

(1) The Peshwa of Poona, who ruled the hilly country of the Western Ghats.

---

\* 1st Battalion York and Lancaster Regiment.

† 1st Battalion 4th Bombay Grenadiers.

‡ 2nd Battalion 4th Bombay Grenadiers.

§ 2nd Battalion The Royal Ulster Rifles.

|| 2nd Battalion 5th Mahratta Light Infantry.

¶ 5th Royal Battalion 5th Mahratta Light Infantry.

- (2) Sindia of Gwalior.
- (3) Holkar of Central India.
- (4) The Gaekwar of Baroda.
- (5) The Bhonsle Raja of Nagpur.

The Peshwa was nominally the head of the Confederacy, but each of the Princes was free to form his own alliances. Holkar and Sindia, the two most powerful, had entertained a large number of European Officers, chiefly French, to train their troops, and the French element was very averse to their forming any sort of alliance with the British Government.

Early in 1802, however, a defensive alliance was formed with the Gaekwar of Baroda; but it was not until Holkar, whose army was now 80,000 strong, had defeated the combined forces of Sindia and the Peshwa that the latter decided to throw in his lot with the Government. A treaty of alliance with him was signed at Bassein at the end of December 1802. Sindia was still unwilling to come to terms and joined forces with Roghojee Bhonsle of Nagpur, ostensibly with a view to attacking Holkar, though actually at that time trying to induce Holkar to join in attacking the British forces.

Seeing that further negotiations were useless, the Governor-General decided to attack the Confederates simultaneously in all their territories.

In 1803 the Army, under General Wellesley, by the gallant actions of Assaye and Argaum, had completely defeated the combined forces of Sindia and the Raja of Nagpur in the south, while in the north the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Lake, had been equally successful against Sindia's Northern Army in a series of actions culminating in the gallant victory of Laswaree.

During this period Holkar had retired to Malwa, but the rapidity of the British successes roused him to action. He first endeavoured to enlist the help of the Rajputs, the Jat Raja of Bhurtpur, the Rohillas and the Sikhs, at the same time carrying on negotiations with Lord Lake, who thought that in the end an amicable settlement might be brought about.

By April 1804 it became obvious that a resort to force would be necessary and the Governor-General issued orders for Holkar's troops and territories to be attacked in every direction.

The Commander-in-Chief at once despatched Colonel Monson with three Battalions to Jaipur and supported him with the rest of the army. He also directed General Wellesley to co-operate.

As it was considered impracticable to carry on the war in the Deccan that year owing to the devastation of the country, General Wellesley issued the following orders to Colonel Murray, dated Bombay, 7th May 1804:—

“The Commander-in-Chief has received orders to attack Jaswant Rao Holkar and has ordered me to arrange to co-operate. You will advance north into Malwa at the earliest possible date, leaving one Battalion at Surat and two more on the northern frontier of Guzerat, north of the Nerbudda, to act as your reserve and give confidence

General Wellesley's  
Orders to  
Colonel Murray.

to the Guicowar, and so post yourself with the main body as best to be able to harass and impede Holkar's flight or if you can, to engage him. You will take with you as large a force of Guicowar Cavalry as can be furnished. Until Holkar's army is destroyed or dispersed, you will not endeavour to subdue any of his forts in Malwa other than those which may be upon your route." (See Map No. 8, opposite page 116.)

Colonel Murray set out in June, reaching Sheogarh on the 25th, Pitlaud on the 28th, where he crossed the Mahi River, and Rajode on the 29th. Our Battalion was one of those which accompanied him.

On arriving at Rajode he heard from Colonel Monson, from near Kotah, that the Commander-in-Chief was suspending operations owing to the excessive heat. He also received information that Holkar was moving with the intention of attacking his force. He himself could only muster 2,800 Infantry, and none of the Gaekwar's Cavalry had as yet joined him. He considered that to continue the advance to Ujjain, which was his first objective, would be courting disaster, as Holkar was reported to have 40,000 troops. He therefore decided to retire behind the Mahi River and secure his communications. This action had the most disastrous result, as Colonel Monson, hearing that Colonel Murray was returning to Gujarat and finding himself opposed to the whole of Holkar's army, also decided to retire. He was pursued relentlessly by Holkar and, after the most appalling privations and hardships, his retreat degenerated into a rout till, at the end of August, the remnants of his force found asylum in Agra, while Holkar with some 75,000 troops advanced triumphantly to Muttra, which was abandoned on his approach.

Colonel Murray's decision did not meet with approval and he received very peremptory orders to advance at once. He recrossed the Mahi on 5th July, passed through Ujjain and occupied Indore on 24th August without opposition. Indore was handed over to Sindia's officers and he then returned to Ujjain.

He was called on for an explanation as to why he was unable to muster more than 2,800 men, when his strength was supposed to be 4,000. He points out that he had excluded 344 sick and 1,340 at drill, "as of the latter few were sufficiently far advanced to receive arms."

This very large number of recruits was due to two causes. The first was that, at the commencement of the Campaign, Battalions had been made up to strength with recruits instead of trained men; the second was the prevalence of desertion. During the preceding 6 months out of a force of 4,000, Colonel Murray had lost 508 men by desertion, and Commanding Officers had to enlist locally to keep up their strength.

After the occupation of Indore, the rain had been abnormally heavy, causing a lot of damage to his stores and equipment. This necessitated a halt at Ujjain to make good deficiencies.

Occupation of  
Tonk Rampura,  
18th Oct. 1804.

On 18th October 1804 he set off again after Holkar, his next objective being Tonk Rampura, a fortified town. This

place had previously been captured by a detachment of General Lake's army, but had subsequently been vacated. It was now reported to be held by 2,000 men, though it was not certain that they would offer any opposition.

On approaching it, our Battalion was sent on ahead, and was fired on from the walls. The guns were then brought up and fired a few shots while Colonel Murray was reconnoitring for the best point to escalate. Just as our Battalion, supported by the 86th Regiment, was about to advance to the assault, several of the inhabitants came out to surrender, and said that the remains of the garrison had escaped to a fortified hill in rear of the town. The fortress was occupied without further opposition, and the Commanding Officers of the 86th Regiment and our Battalion were congratulated on having carried out the occupation without the least appearance of plunder or disorder. There is no detail of the casualties, which are stated in Regimental records to have been trifling.

From Tonk Rampura the force moved into Hindustan with a view to intercepting Holkar if he should retire towards Malwa. The Chambal was crossed on the 24th November and Kotah reached towards the end of December.

On 25th December Major-General Jones, who had been sent to supersede Colonel Murray, took over command of the force, and received orders from the Commander-in-Chief to join up with the Grand Army as soon as possible.

**Supersession of  
Col. Murray by  
Maj.-Gen. Jones.**

As soon as Lord Lake heard of Colonel Monson's disaster, he set out to restore the situation by retaking Muttra and sending more troops on to Agra, Holkar retiring as he advanced. While he was halted at Muttra completing his supplies, Holkar made a dash for Delhi with his Cavalry, but was beaten off by the Commander-in-Chief, who pursued him with his mounted troops and defeated him. Meanwhile the Infantry, under General Fraser, was sent to engage Holkar's Infantry, brought them to an action beneath the walls of Deeg, and signally defeated them, capturing numerous guns. As they were driving them back under the fortress, the garrison, which consisted of Bhurtpur's troops, opened fire from the walls and caused the British heavy casualties.

Although Bhurtpur had made an alliance with the British, and actually had troops with Lord Lake at Laswaree, it was known that he had for some time been in secret communication with Holkar, but it was doubtful whether he would actively help him. The conduct of the garrison of Deeg in firing on the British and giving asylum to Holkar's defeated army cleared up all doubt in the matter, and the Commander-in-Chief decided to settle with Bhurtpur before completing the destruction of Holkar's forces.

The first move was the storming of Deeg Fort, which was successfully carried out towards the end of December. The army then moved to Bhurtpur arriving there on 2nd January 1805.

**Capture of  
Fort Deeg.**

Bhurtpur was a fortified town with a circumference of 6 to

8 miles. Its mud walls were very strong and high, with a deep ditch, which could be made unfordable.

On the 9th, and again on the 21st of January 1805, unsuccessful attempts were made to storm it, and when the Bombay army, under General Jones, arrived on 10th February, more methodical preparations were being made for a further effort.

**Unsuccessful  
Assaults on  
Bhurtpur.**

By noon the next day, 11th February, the new breach was reported to be practicable, but as the approaches and parallels were by no means ready the assault could not be made for some days.

Each night the enemy repaired the breach by building a stockade and, by this premature disclosure of the point of assault, were able to frustrate it.

The date eventually fixed for the assault was 20th February at 3 p.m.

**Third Assault,  
20th Feb. 1805.**

Troops detailed for the assault moved into a dry tank where they were to remain concealed until the time came to attack.

They had only just reached their positions, however, when the enemy made a sortie and attacked all our trenches, capturing the most advanced parallel and a deep communicating trench.

This communicating trench was in places as much as ten feet deep and had no steps to enable men to get out of it, and a large number of British Troops were trapped in it and lost heavily.

When the time for the assault arrived, the British Troops refused to follow their Officers, but the Native Troops advanced to the ditch where they found the breach cut off by very deep water. They then moved to the right where the water was shallower and endeavoured to scale the nearest bastion, and though the 12th Bengal Regiment succeeded in planting their colour almost on the top, they were driven back and forced to retire.

Of the other two columns which were to act independently, the right column under Grant, which was detailed to attack the enemy's outworks, was successful in routing them and capturing eleven guns but was unable to force a way into the fort with the refugees.

The Column of the Bombay Army under Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, which included our Battalion, was led astray by the guide, and coming under heavy fire at the commencement of its advance, had all its scaling ladders smashed and one of its guns dismounted. Being now unable to effect its object, it took up a position under cover until ordered to withdraw. Thus the third assault failed.

That night all guns were sited to fire on the bastion to the left of the breach and the fire was kept up all morning. Although at 2 p.m. the upper part of the bastion was still very steep the General decided on a fourth assault.

**Fourth Assault,  
21st Feb. 1805.**

He addressed the troops who had failed to respond the previous day and to a man they volunteered to lead the fresh assault. This was launched at 4 p.m., the whole of our Battalion taking part. On reaching the bastion it

was found to be extremely steep and although for two hours the troops strove with the utmost gallantry to gain the top they failed. Attempts were also made on the breach of the previous day, and any spot that promised a chance of success, but the enemy knocked the climbers down by throwing down great logs of wood, flaming packs of cotton, which had previously been soaked in oil, followed by pots filled with gunpowder which exploded with terrible effect.

Captain Imlach, who commanded our Battalion, led his party forward in the most gallant manner. His Havaldar orderlies on this occasion were Harjee Israel and Nagojee Timblia. The former, in endeavouring to gain the top of the bastion by climbing on to Imlach's shoulders, was instantly killed, on which the latter at once in the most undaunted manner made a similar but unsuccessful attempt. After the action he was promoted to Jamadar for his gallantry.

The casualties on these two days were:—

British Troops: Killed, 51; wounded, 410.

Indian Troops: Killed, 56; wounded, 355.

The casualties in our Battalion were:—

Killed, 1 Havaldar and 4 Sepoys.

Wounded, Captain Imlach, Lieutenant Thomas, 1 Jamadar, 2 Naiks, 13 Sepoys and 1 Bhisti.

While preparations were being made for another attack on the Fort, Holkar's Horse were overwhelmed by the British Cavalry and a detachment of his Infantry met with a severe defeat, with the result that the Raja of Bhurtpur sought a reconciliation. Terms were agreed upon on 10th April 1805 whereby the Raja paid 20 lakhs of rupees and renounced all alliances with the enemies of the British.

On 10th May 1805 General Jones received orders to march to Rampur where his force halted during the monsoon.

When on active service a great deal of hardship was sometimes occasioned by the fact that each state had its own currency in all of which the value of the rupee varied. From June to September 1804 the Bombay Troops had been paid in Baroda rupees, which at that time were very much depreciated in value. After much correspondence the Bombay Government ordered that an additional 4·6 per cent. should be paid in compensation, but as this was quite inadequate a Court of Enquiry was assembled at Rampur, which recommended that an additional 9·2 per cent. be paid, to which the Government eventually agreed.

After the submission of the Raja of Bhurtpur, Holkar joined hands with Sindia, but finding that he was not prepared to renew active operations against the British, he left him at Ajmer and proceeded north with a view to enlisting the aid of the Sikhs.



On 11th October General Jones received orders to follow the infantry and guns of Holkar and to take up a position near Udaipur to prevent his turning south again. Holkar, however, eluded him and crossed the Sutlej, but finding the Sikhs unwilling to assist him, he eventually came to terms in December, when the Bombay Troops were ordered to return to Gujarat, which they did via Bundi and Rutlam. The field force was broken up on 12th February 1806 when our Battalion was ordered to march via Surat, Poona and Ahmednagar to Sirur, where they arrived on 20th May 1806 after two years of almost continual marching, at times under very trying conditions. While at Sirur they formed part of the Poona Subsidiary Force maintained at the expense of the Peshwa.

**Holkar comes  
to Terms.**

At the end of 1806 the Commander-in-Chief of Bombay put up a scheme of yearly reliefs, whereby each Battalion would have one year either at Bombay or Goa; one year in the Deccan; and one year in Gujarat. This scheme was approved, and on 6th January 1807 our Battalion left Sirur for Bombay; but, on arrival there, was at once ordered to march to Baroda, which was reached on 21st March 1807.

**Move to Baroda  
for Pacification  
of Kathiawar.**

The reason for this very sudden move was that it had been decided to send a force into Kathiawar at the request of Major Walker, the Resident at Baroda.

Since his appointment as Resident, Major Walker had been employed in reorganizing the finances of the State, which were in a state of chaos. His first care was the payment of all arrears due to the troops and the reduction of military expenditure to a figure more in proportion to the income of the State. Part of this income was obtained from tribute paid by certain chieftains in the peninsula of Kathiawar, who, though nominally acknowledging the suzerainty of the Gaekwar, never paid their tribute until an army was sent to exact it. As this army was always in arrears of pay, it was permitted to exact what it could get by plundering the country which, in consequence, was in a very disturbed state.

As it was in the interest of the Bombay Government to induce a more peaceful state of affairs and so increase the prosperity of the inhabitants, it was decided to send an expedition to assess the amounts to be paid by the various Chiefs and to obtain engagements from them for their regular payment. An endeavour was also to be made "to include in the engagements with the Moorvee and other Chieftains habituated to the lamentable practice of destroying their female infants, to renounce a usage repugnant to every humane and natural feeling." The plan was to move the force to some central position, such as Morvi, and call on the various Chieftains to send in representatives to conclude agreements.

The force detailed for this duty was 2nd Battalion 2nd Regiment (our Battalion), 2nd Battalion 8th Regiment\* (already at Baroda), a detail of artillery,

---

\* 4th Battalion 5th Mahratta Light Infantry.

a troop of Cavalry and a Company of Pioneers, the whole to be commanded by Major Walker. (See Map No. 8, opposite page 116.)

The day our Battalion left Bombay for Baroda, 80 recruits were drafted into it, but too late to enable any advance of pay to be drawn for them. So each recruit was given  $2\frac{1}{2}$  seers of rice and an advance of Rs.1, made by the Commanding Officer, and orders were sent to Surat to be prepared to advance them a further Rs.3 each. When the Battalion reached Surat on 6th March, however, 30 of these recruits had deserted.

These continual desertions had for a long time been exercising the minds of the authorities as during the previous two years the number of desertions in the Bombay Army had amounted to 5,518, more than a quarter of the Infantry Establishment. It was considered that the bonus given to recruits was so liberal as to induce men to join for a short time and then go off home with a view to joining other Battalions.

On 11th April 1807 new Recruiting Regulations were issued providing that the bonus was not to be paid to a recruit until he had been present for two musters with his Corps.

It was also laid down that all recruits were in future to take an oath on parade under the Colours after the first muster, and that certain "Articles of War" were to be read to the troops at each muster. This was done monthly on every muster parade until about the year 1890 when the practice ceased.

The Kathiawar Force was ordered to assemble at Neriad, and our Battalion left Baroda for that place on 15th April 1807. In a letter to Captain Imlach, commanding our Battalion, enclosing his orders for the march, Major Walker states, "... that as your Corps will be the first to have intercourse with these people, who are friendly, it is of the greatest importance that their early impressions of English Troops should be decided by the utmost propriety of behaviour."

A return of camp equipment and transport shows that our Battalion had 46 tents, 11 camels, 68 pack bullocks and 4 carts, while the Officers had 11 tents, 8 camels and 9 pack bullocks.

The force left Neriad on 22nd April and marched to Gootoo, 5 miles east of Morvi, where it arrived on 12th July 1807. Here a long halt was made while the various chiefs sent their representatives and agreements were duly signed.

The Jam of Nawanagar, however, after agreeing with the desirability of the settlement of all dues to Baroda as proposed by Government, and while his Vakeel was actually in the British Camp at Gootoo, treacherously seized the fortress of Kadorna Ranaka, which belonged to the Raja of Porbandar, and refused to give it up.

It was therefore decided to take it from him by force and hand it back to the Raja of Porbandar, who said it was quite impossible for him to pay his dues to Baroda unless it was restored to him.

The force, now augmented by a detachment of the Gaekwar's troops, arrived before the fortress on 26th November and called on it to surrender, but the garrison, which consisted chiefly of Arabs, refused. The batteries were then brought up to breach the south and east faces while Captain Imlach, who had been detailed to command the storming party, was ordered to reconnoitre the crossing of the Minsar River which flows under the fort walls.

A breach was soon reported to be practicable; but as the storming party, which consisted of the Grenadier Companies of both Battalions, was moving off the Garrison surrendered. The Gunners, however, had succeeded in lightening their loads by the expenditure of 732 rounds of shot and 2,150 pounds of powder.

The outstanding agreements were now duly signed and the expedition was broken up on 29th December 1807. Although the promises to put down the practice of infanticide were not scrupulously kept, a beginning had been made of suppressing this inhuman practice.

Our Battalion now marched via Baroda to Bombay, where it arrived on 22nd March 1808 and was quartered at Varsovah with a detachment in Bombay. There were no quarters at Varsovah, so when the monsoon approached, the Commanding Officer asked for material with which to put up shelters for the men, but the Government refused to provide anything. The necessary material was then bought regimentally and sheds were erected.

The rest of the year 1808 passed uneventfully at Varsovah.

In January 1809 our Battalion was moved into Bombay and was camped on the esplanade. Having been caught at the commencement of the rains the previous year without any shelter they determined to make timely preparations this year and purchased hutting materials early in the year before the price rose. When the Town Major found them putting up huts on the esplanade he ordered them all to be pulled down, and said that the men would have to try and find accommodation with their friends living in the bazaar.

Captain Imlach in putting the matter up to the Commander-in-Chief pointed out that the men were total strangers in Bombay, the Battalion not having been there more than eight days since 1792, and would therefore have to pay rent for any accommodation they might find. It was eventually decided to set aside a piece of ground near the Sewree drain, belonging to the Company, and to build permanent huts on it for two Battalions.

On 14th January 1809 the Battalion received a new Colour. This was necessitated by the change in the colour of the facings of all Corps to yellow.

## CHAPTER VII

1809-1811

Operations in the Persian Gulf. Occupation of Island of Rodrigues. Raid on St Paul, capture of Bourbon and Mauritius.

(See Maps No. 11, opposite p. 142, and Nos. 3, 4 and 5, on pp. 66, 67 and 70.)

THE year 1809 was a busy one for our Battalion which had to furnish detachments for two amphibious campaigns and a small escort for General Malcolm's embassy to Persia.

The expedition to the Persian Gulf had become imperative owing to the depredations of the Joasmi pirates who inhabited the Oman promontory. The vigilance of the Navy had not succeeded in checking their raids, which extended as far east as the coasts of Kathiawar and Gujarat. During the previous two years three British vessels, one of which was the cruiser *Sylph*, had been captured.

**Persian Gulf  
Operations  
against  
Joasmi Pirates.**

These pirates were nominally subject to the Imam of Muscat, but were really in league with the Wahabis and both were a thorn in the side of the Imam, who was a friend of the English. The Wahabis were then a recently formed sect having been originated about 1757 by one Abdul Wahab of Hillah in Iraq. Being very fanatical and narrow-minded on religious matters they tried to convert by force all whom they encountered. They had a form of conscription whereby every male was forced to serve in the Army for one year. Their Cavalry was armed with a lance and their Infantry with a sword.

It was therefore decided in 1809 to send a military expedition to the Gulf to free the Imam from the power of the Wahabis, and to suppress the pirates by destroying their strongholds and burning their shipping.

The force detailed for this duty was placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Lionel Smith and consisted of his own Regiment, which was H.M.'s 65th Regiment,\* and detachments of H.M.'s 47th Regiment,† our 2nd Battalion 2nd Regiment Native Infantry, the Marine Battalion, and a small party of Artillery.

**Composition of  
Expeditionary  
Force.**

The Detachment furnished by our Battalion consisted of two Companies, of a total strength of 224 all ranks commanded respectively by Lieutenants Cory and Tanner with Ensigns Lloyd and Soppitt.

The original intention was that the expedition should start before the

---

\* 1st Battalion The York and Lancaster Regiment.

† 1st Battalion The Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire).

monsoon set in. But, owing to the nature of the service and the fact that the coast on which they were to operate could furnish no supplies, it was considered necessary for the force to take a six months' store of food and water. The provision of these and the work entailed in preparing the four transports to receive troops took longer than was expected, so that the departure had to be delayed till after the monsoon.

The naval part of the force consisted of two ships of the Royal Navy, nine of the Company's cruisers and a bomb-ketch, all under the command of Captain Wainwright.

The force sailed from Bombay in September 1809 and within twenty-four hours met with an accident which deprived it of a good deal of its ordnance, the bottom falling out of the bomb-ketch which had long since been condemned as unfit for service.

In the instructions issued to Lieutenant-Colonel Smith and Captain Wainwright, they were told to make their first objective Ras-el-Khaimah where they were to destroy all the shipping and recover any British property and prisoners they could locate. Their second objective was to secure the town of Muscat and recover for the Imam any ports of his that had been captured by the pirates.

Ras-el-Khaimah was the pirates' chief port and it was known that the captured British vessels had been taken there. In making it the first objective, it was hoped to effect a surprise. This plan, however, miscarried, as the casks in which the drinking water had been stored leaked so badly that by the time they reached the Gulf their supply was running short, and they had to put in to Muscat on 2nd October to replenish.

After repairing the casks and refilling them they sailed for Ras-el-Khaimah, arriving on 11th November 1809. Owing to the shallowness of the water, they were unable to get within four miles of the shore, except for the two transports and the small cruisers which succeeded in anchoring two miles farther in.

For three hours on the 12th the town was bombarded by the light cruisers, the frigates being unable to get within range owing to the shallow water. The loss of the bomb-ketch, which drew very little water, here proved a serious handicap. The enemy returned the fire briskly and made it evident that they meant to put up a stout resistance. It was now decided to land troops the next day, and orders were issued for them to be in their boats before daylight.

A feint attack was made at the entrance to the harbour north of the town from which it drew a heavy fire as soon as it was light enough to see, while the main body made for the beach to the south of the town, and got well on their way before they were observed.

As soon as they were seen, the enemy opened fire on them from the nearest towers, while their swordsmen rushed down to the beach to dispute the landing.

**Assault and  
Capture of  
Ras-el-Khaimah,  
13th Nov. 1809.**

Here they were charged with the bayonet and the town was taken after a sharp engagement.

The following is an extract from an order published on 14th November 1809:—

“Lieutenant-Colonel Smith returns his sincere thanks to all the Force for their gallantry in the attack on Ras-al-Khaimah, the coolness and good order in which they debarked shoulder high in water, and charged the enemy in a heavy sand was beautiful and truly soldier like.”

The losses in this affair were:—

Royal Navy, 2 killed and 10 wounded.

Army, 1 killed and 10 wounded.

There were no casualties in our Battalion.

The enemy are said to have had about 80 killed in the assault. The town was completely burnt as well as all their shipping, which consisted of 50 boats, many of which were very large dhows.

The troops were re-embarked on the morning of the 14th November and, in spite of the distance of the vessels from the shore, were all aboard by midday, which shows excellent staff work and co-operation between the two services. Captain Wainwright in his report to Rear-Admiral Drury states, “I have the satisfaction to state that the most perfect cordiality subsists between the Army and Navy as promises to ensure complete success in all subsequent operations.”

The enemy, though defeated, were in no way subdued by their losses, and as soon as the troops re-embarked, came down on to the beach waving their standards and firing off their muskets in defiance. However, having crippled their activity by the destruction of their ships, it was decided now to deal with the pirates of the Persian coast, who had joined hands with their more powerful neighbours the Joasmis.

The force proceeded to Linga, where it arrived on 17th November 1809 and destroyed 29 large dhows without opposition. After  
**Destruction of Dhows at Linga, 17th Nov. 1809.** visiting three smaller ports, where no shipping was found, they made for Laft which is on the north coast of the island of Kishm. The strait between the island and the mainland is very intricate and shallow and only the light vessels could approach the place. The cruiser *Vestal* was sent to block the western end of the channel, while the force approached by the eastern entrance.

The Chief, Mullah Husain, at first agreed to surrender the boats demanded; but the following morning, when it came to handing  
**Landing and Attack on Laft, 27th Nov. 1809.** them over for destruction, he changed his mind. Laft consisted of a town with a strong stone fort at the western end, which the inhabitants now manned. When it became evident that force would have to be employed, Lieutenant-Colonel Smith landed at 2 p.m. with the

Light Company of the 47th Regiment, half a Company of 65th Regiment, a detachment of our Battalion, a party of Marines from H.M.S. *Chiffonne*, and some seamen, who did gallant work in dragging close to the fort a howitzer with which to blow in the only gate.

After landing, the town was at once taken without loss; but when the troops got close to the fort and were preparing to force the gate they were met by a heavy fire from the loopholes and suffered severely. As there was little cover and the enemy's fire was very accurate, it was found impossible to storm the place without organized preparation. Troops were therefore withdrawn and re-embarked but the howitzer had to be abandoned as all efforts to get it away proved too costly.

Later in the evening the Chief agreed to surrender, if guaranteed safety for himself and his followers. Not much faith was placed in this promise and it was anticipated that hostilities would have to be recommenced the following morning. When day broke, however, great was the surprise of the whole force to see a solitary figure on the fort waving a Union Jack. This was Lieutenant Hall of the Bombay Marine, who had swum ashore alone during the night and, finding the enemy abandoning the fort, had taken possession of it.

The casualties during the action were:—

Navy, 2 killed, 25 wounded.

47th Regiment, 1 Officer and 3 men killed, 10 wounded.

65th Regiment, 2 killed, 1 Officer and 7 men wounded.

Our 2/2nd Regiment Native Infantry, 2 killed, Jamadar Solomonjee Israel and 12 men wounded.

The enemy's losses were reported as 80 to 90.

The force now returned to Muscat to confer with the Imam, with a view to obtaining his co-operation in the capture of Shinaas and Khor Fakan, two places to the west of Muscat, which had been seized by the Joasmis. He agreed to assist with a large force which was to move by land. The expedition sailed from Muscat on 24th December 1809; and arrived off Shinaas on the evening of the 31st.

On 1st January 1810 the fort was called on to surrender, but replied with a prompt refusal. Thereupon it was bombarded by the ships,

**Assault and  
Capture of  
Shinaas Fort,  
3rd Jan. 1810.**

but, being some distance from the shore, this had little effect.

Next morning the entire force was landed, together with a week's provisions; and a regular camp was pitched. Entrenchments were thrown up and the fort was bombarded again. As the enemy seemed determined on a protracted resistance, heavy guns were landed to breach the walls.

By 10 a.m. on 3rd January a practicable breach was made and at 2 p.m. the assault was successful and the fort was completely occupied by 5 p.m.,

but the enemy were still holding out in their towers. These were now battered at close range with double shot. In his despatch Lieutenant-Colonel Smith writes: "We resorted to hand grenades and fire balls. These he (the enemy) returned upon us, before they could burst, with the most deliberate resolution. As the towers were rapidly falling in, and every soul within them must have perished in a short time more, I again ceased firing and made another effort to save their lives." Shortly afterwards they capitulated; and the British had great difficulty in protecting the survivors from the Imam's troops. Our losses were only one killed and eleven wounded, none in our Battalion, which appears to have been employed with a detachment of the 65th Regiment, under Captain Stony, protecting the flank of the assault from the Wahabi Cavalry. The Imam's troops suffered chiefly in skirmishing on the flank with the Wahabis. The enemy's loss was estimated at about 400 killed.

The fort was so battered as to be quite useless, and the Imam decided not to occupy it. He also decided not to attack Khor Fakan, as he was afraid that a similar resistance would be met, resulting in the destruction of that fort also. As the place harboured no pirate vessels it had no interest for the British, so the troops returned to Bombay, where Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, on landing, was received with a salute of 15 guns.

In 1864 the Indo-European telegraph cable station was established at Hanjam, which is part of Kishm. It is also interesting to note that Basidu on the island of Kishm was used as a naval station and coaling depot in the policing of the Persian Gulf by H.M.'s Ships until 1935, when Kishm was claimed as an integral part of Persia and handed over to the Persians. The Bahrein Islands, under their feudal Arab chief, were then adopted as our naval and aeroplane base. The discovery of oil in these islands has increased their importance and added to their amenities.

We will now turn to the expedition to the French Islands in the Indian Ocean. The three islands were Mauritius, then known as the **Expedition to the French Islands.** Ile de France, the Ile de Bourbon, and Rodrigues. Mauritius was the most important, being the seat of government, with the best harbours and the bulk of the population. It was originally discovered by the Dutch in 1598 and was named Mauritius after their Stadtholder, Maurice, Prince of Orange. Though frequently visited by their ships, it was not occupied by them till fifty years later. The French occupied Bourbon and Rodrigues in 1648 and, as soon as the Dutch vacated Mauritius in 1712, they lost no time in taking possession of that too, forestalling by four days a British vessel bent on the same errand.

These islands furnished a very convenient half-way house to the French settlements in India; and a handy base from which to harass British shipping. They were also an important link in the chain of communication between the Mysore Government and Napoleon. As early as the year 1794 the British Government had despatched two men-of-war to blockade the islands, but



their presence had practically no effect, and the loss of British merchant vessels continued as heavy as before.

The damage was done, not by the French Navy, every ship of which was needed in home waters, but by privateers commanded by the most gallant and enterprising sailors. The effectiveness of this method is shown by the fact that between the years 1793 and 1797, for every French merchant vessel captured by our Navy, the French privateers captured six of our merchantmen. So serious was the loss, that Lord Wellesley, soon after the capture of Seringapatam, assembled a large force at Trincomalee with the object of capturing Java and the French Islands. Urgent orders from England, however, deflected this force to Egypt, and, on the conclusion of the peace of Amiens in 1801, the matter of the French Islands was dropped.

On the resumption of war with France in 1803, the French privateers again got busy and enormous losses were incurred. For a period of six weeks during 1807 Calcutta alone is said to have suffered a loss of 30 lacs of rupees (about £200,000). The most famous of these privateers was a man named Surcouf for whose capture the Indian Government offered a reward of one lac.

As the successful blockade of the French Islands by the Cape of Good Hope Squadron alone was impossible, in 1809 the Bombay Government was directed to despatch a force to occupy the undefended island of Rodrigues, about 350 miles north-east of Mauritius, in order to establish a Naval Base from which the ships engaged in the blockade could be supplied with provisions, vegetables and water.

When General De Caen had been forced to evacuate Pondicherry, he had proceeded to Mauritius with 1,200 French Regular troops and the numerous Officers who had been destined to train the Sepoy Corps. Of this force there still remained about 900 Regulars, distributed between Mauritius and Bourbon, while those spare Officers who had not returned to France had been distributed among the Militia. Besides the above there was one regular Battalion composed of Creoles and men of colour, while the Militia amounted to 3,000 in Mauritius and 2,500 in Bourbon. This Militia was a more or less negligible quantity, as, owing to the harsh government and heavy taxes imposed by the French, they were said to be more likely to welcome an invading force than try to repel it.

The Naval Authorities were naturally anxious to get the expedition away from Bombay before the monsoon broke; but it took so long to prepare the transports to receive the troops and the large number of cattle, and to accumulate six months' provisions for the force and the Navy, that it was not until the 28th June 1809 that they weighed anchor.

The force detailed for this expedition consisted of a small detachment of Bombay Artillery, 2 Companies of 56th Regiment\* and 2 Companies of our Battalion all under the command of Colonel Keating of the 56th Regiment.\* Four vessels were hired as

French  
Privateering.  
  
British  
Expeditionary  
Force.

---

\* The Essex Regiment.

transports, and the detachment of our Battalion was embarked on the *Eugenia*, a vessel of 350 tons, under command of Captain Imlach with

Lieutenant R. Seward	2 Subadars
Lieutenant J. Thomas	2 Jamadars
Lieutenant G. P. Seward	10 Havaldars
Lieutenant B. Grant	4 Drummers
	200 Rank and File and 39 Followers.

The Island of Rodrigues is about 2,500 miles south-west of Bombay, about half-way between it and the Cape of Good Hope.

The passage, in the teeth of the monsoon, was very rough, most of the cattle died, and a good deal of scurvy occurred among the troops. They reached Rodrigues on 5th August 1809, and Colonel Keating at once selected a site for his settlement, which he named Fort Duncan, after Mr. Jonathan Duncan, the Governor of Bombay. The only people found on the island were three French families with their slaves.

Landing on  
Rodrigues  
Island,  
5th Aug. 1809.

His first care was to get the guns and ammunition ashore and to build defences; he then had all the stores to disembark unassisted by Commodore Byng, who was in command of the escorting vessels. This occupied the troops for a full month.

Colonel Keating was under orders to establish a cattle farm and vegetable garden, but, as the cattle had all died, he decided to despatch two boats to Madagascar, about 800 miles farther west, to purchase more. Lieutenant

G. P. Seward and a small detachment of our Battalion was sent therefore with Rs.1,500 to purchase live stock as well as a few slaves to work in the garden. In his report to Bombay,

Lt. Seward sent  
to Madagascar.

Colonel Keating says of Lieutenant Seward, "I have selected him for that service knowing him to be a clever, sensible, steady young man," and he recommended that Government should grant him a suitable allowance for this duty, but this was not sanctioned. He also brings to notice "the cordial and warm support which I have received from Captain Imlach and the Officers of his detail."

In this report he gives a most glowing account of the island. He says: "There are some of the most delightful valleys I ever saw and the soil, naturally rich, in one of the finest climates of the world, is capable of producing every sort of vegetation."

When it came to starting the garden he received another disappointment, as the package said to contain the seeds, on being opened, disclosed nothing but small bits of canvas, while a large supply of seed potatoes were found to have been eaten during the voyage by orders of the Doctor as an anti-scorbutic. Fortunately he was able to procure fresh meat and vegetables from the French farmers; so that by the end of the year he was able to report

that scurvy had been completely eradicated from the blockading squadron, by regular supplies from Rodrigues.

Being unable to farm, he turned to building, and found plenty of timber at hand. His programme included store houses, barracks and a hospital, so that the troops were kept busy.

After seeing the work started Colonel Keating embarked on H.M.S. *Raisable* with Captain Rowley, R.N., to make a reconnaissance of the harbour of St. Paul on the island of Bourbon, about 450 miles to the south-west of Rodrigues. The French frigate *La Caroline* had just captured two homeward-bound Indiamen richly laden, and taken her prizes to St. Paul. As a result of the reconnaissance it was decided to capture the place by a surprise landing. To this end H.M.S. *Boadicea* was left to blockade the port, while three cruisers were despatched to Rodrigues to bring as many troops as could be spared after providing for the defence of Fort Duncan. These vessels returned to the point of rendezvous, some 50 miles east of Bourbon, on the evening of 18th September 1809, bringing 386 Officers and men, half of whom were of the 56th Regiment and half of our Battalion. (See Map No. 3, p. 66.)

The harbour of St. Paul is situated at the north-west corner of the island and to the north and east of the town there is a large swamp, which is flooded at high tide and is crossed by two roads built on causeways. To enable the troops to cross these causeways complete surprise was essential. There was no very accurate information as to the enemy's strength, but in fact his numbers were very small. One hundred French troops of the line and 300 Creoles were concentrated at St. Denis, the capital, under the immediate command of General des Brusleys, while the garrison of St. Paul consisted of 110 troops of the line, who were still on board the frigate *La Caroline*, and 300 Creoles. The rest of the Creole troops were scattered about the island and could not hurriedly be concentrated, while the Militia were hardly worth consideration.

The plan was to put the whole of the landing troops, made up to 600 strong by a detachment of Marines and Sailors under Captain Willoughby, on board H.M.S. *Nereide* whose commander, Captain Corbet, was particularly well acquainted with that coast. This was done on the evening of the 19th, after which the whole convoy sailed for Bourbon, reaching the east coast on the evening of the 20th.

As soon as it was dark they set sail for Port St. Paul, and on approaching it the *Nereide* was sent on ahead and anchored close to the shore, just south of Pointe de Galotte, about 7 miles north of the town. Five extra boats had been taken on board the *Nereide*, so that the landing was very quickly effected before it was fully light. The subsequent operations are best described by extracts from Colonel Keating's despatch to the Bombay Govern-

**Landing on Isle  
of Bourbon and  
Attack on Harbour  
of St. Paul,  
21st Sept. 1809.**

ment. "The force now started a forced march with a view to crossing the causeways that extend over the lake, before the enemy could discover our debarkation, or approach to the town, which we were fortunate enough to effect; nor had they time to form any force until we had passed the strongest position. By seven o'clock we were in possession of the first and second batteries, Lambousiers and La Centiere."

The guns in these batteries were at once manned by Willoughby's seamen and turned on to the French shipping "from whose fire, which was chiefly grape and well directed within pistol shot of the shore, we suffered much, being necessarily exposed to it during our movements upon the beach and through the town.

**Assault on  
Third Battery.** "From the battery La Centiere, Captain Imlach was detached with the second column, composed of 142 men of the 2nd Battalion 2nd Regiment and 12 Europeans to take possession of the third battery, 'La Neuf,' deserted by the enemy. On his way thither he fell in with and was opposed by the entire force of the French, who had concentrated and taken up a very strong position behind a stone wall with eight brass field pieces, six pounders, upon their flanks. This post was instantly charged in the most gallant manner by this Officer and his men. The enemy, however, maintained his position and Captain Hanna, of the 56th Regiment, was ordered to proceed with the third column to his support, who charged, and took two of the enemy's guns. The action now became warm, but never doubtful."

The ships of our squadron were unable as yet to render much assistance owing to the danger of hitting our own troops, so it became necessary to throw in the reserve, which up till now had been covering the seamen working the guns in the first and second batteries captured.

Orders were sent to Willoughby to blow up the guns in these batteries and to move at once to man the guns in "La Neuf." This enabled the Reserve to throw their weight into the fight which proved decisive, the enemy retreating and the remaining batteries being captured without resistance. By 8.30 a.m. the whole of the town was in our hands together with several prisoners.

**Capture of  
remaining  
Batteries and  
Town of St. Paul.**

As soon as they saw they could do so with safety, the Squadron stood in to the harbour and anchored close to the enemy's shipping which, after a short bombardment, surrendered. The rest of the day was spent destroying the batteries and guns and the troops re-embarked at 8 p.m.

Next day, the 22nd September, a high surf was running in the morning which precluded any landing operations, but in the afternoon, when reinforcements were seen to be approaching from the direction of St. Denis, it was decided to send a small party of Marines and Sailors ashore to destroy the Government stores. This was effected without loss.

On the evening of 21st, General des Brusleys at St. Denis learnt of the

landing of a British force near St. Paul and at once set out with all the troops he could muster and approaching St. Paul on the afternoon of the 22nd he encamped on a hill near by.

At daylight on the 23rd the entire British force was transferred to boats to effect another landing to attack the enemy. They found, however, that they had withdrawn during the night and returned to St. Denis, where the General blew out his brains from remorse.

The Commandant of St. Paul being prepared to negotiate, an agreement was signed for the cessation of hostilities within zone of the town, which was surrendered with all public property and money. The French troops were allowed to retain their liberty and to leave the town.

**Results of the  
Raid.**

The booty captured was considerable and included the frigate *La Caroline* and another man-of-war, also the two captured East Indiamen, with a large proportion of their cargoes still intact. There was also a large quantity of guns and ammunition.

The Captains of the Indiamen were found in St. Paul and returned to their ships to fit them out for sea while the troops were employed embarking the captured stores.

The total casualties in this raid were:—

Navy and Marines, 7 killed, 3 Officers and 15 men wounded.

56th Regiment, 6 killed, 27 wounded, 3 missing.

Our 2nd/2nd Regiment, 2 killed; Lieutenant Grant, Subadar Shaik Soloman, 2 Havaldars and 8 men wounded.

As soon as the stores were loaded and the Indiamen ready to sail, the force returned to Rodrigues.

The following are extracts taken from a General Order published in Bombay on 2nd November 1809 announcing the capture of St. Paul.

“The Governor in Council . . . feels the most lively pleasure in expressing his particular approbation of the conduct of Captains Forbes and Hannah of the 56th Regiment and Captain Imlach of the 2nd/2nd Regiment N.I. who commanded the columns on that occasion. . . . The resolute conduct and spirited attack

**Order by the  
Governor of  
Bombay,  
2nd Nov. 1809.**

made by the Native Infantry of the 2nd/2nd on the French force, which they unexpectedly encountered on their march to one of the batteries, does them the greatest credit.”

It was decided to recognize the gallantry of Subadar Shaik Soloman, who was severely wounded in this action, by presenting to him a special medal the design of which was approved by the Council at their meeting on 28th April 1810. Havaldar Shaik Mohideen, who was recommended for promotion by Colonel Keating for conspicuous gallantry on the same occasion, was in due course gazetted Jamadar.

Most of the buildings at Rodrigues were completely destroyed by a very severe hurricane which swept the island on Christmas Day 1809, ruining most of the stores and sinking all the small boats in the harbour.

The next day the transport *Eugenia* arrived back from Madagascar. Lieutenant Seward had managed to purchase 183 head of cattle and 216 fowls, but on the voyage back they were twice becalmed and took 72 days for the journey.

Lieut. Seward  
returns from  
Madagascar.

Again most of the cattle died of starvation and the heat, only 29 cattle and 106 fowls surviving. Scurvy broke out among the crew and they lost the Captain of the vessel, one sepoy and 28 cattlemen. Everyone was very ill and Lieutenant Seward had lost the use of his limbs.

Colonel Keating wrote to Bombay recommending "that Lieutenant Seward be appointed Bazaar Master and acting Chaplain as he will never recover from the effects of his voyage to Madagascar." The appointments were sanctioned with an additional allowance of Rs.2 a day for each of them.

As it was now considered desirable to occupy the other islands General Jones, the Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, was sent to Rodrigues in March 1810 to report on the number of additional troops required to carry this into effect, with the result that 1,800 European and 1,850 Native troops were placed under Colonel Keating by Bengal; and arrived at Rodrigues on 20th June 1810. They brought with them orders for the capture of the island of Bourbon.

Increase of  
Col. Keating's  
Force.

It was decided to make a surprise landing and capture St. Denis where the main garrison under the Commander-in-Chief was located. It was hoped that this would avert the necessity of protracted warfare in the interior of the island, which was very mountainous and thickly wooded.

The Force was divided into four Brigades.

#### 1st Brigade

Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser  
Detachment of Artillery  
86th Regiment\*  
Detachment 1/6th Madras N.I.†  
Detachment of Pioneers

#### 2nd Brigade

Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond  
Royal Marines  
2/12th Madras N.I.§

#### 3rd Brigade

Lieutenant-Colonel Macleod  
69th Regiment‡  
Detachment 2/2nd Bombay N.I.

#### 4th Brigade

Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell  
The Flank Corps  
Detachment 56th Regiment||  
Detachment of Pioneers

(See Maps Nos. 3 and 4 on pp. 66 and 67.)

\* The Royal Ulster Rifles.

† 2nd Battalion 1st Punjab Regiment.

‡ 2nd Battalion The Welch Regiment.


§ 10th Battalion 1st Punjab Regiment.

|| 2nd Battalion The Essex Regiment.

**Landing on Isle  
of Bourbon and  
Capture of  
St. Denis,  
8th July 1810.**

The plan of attack was to effect two simultaneous landings. The 1st Brigade to land at Grand Chaloup, about 7 miles west of St. Denis, were to proceed direct for the town by a hill path and capture the jail and two redoubts on the shore. The other three Brigades were to land on the beach at St. Marie, about 6 miles east of St. Denis, and attack the town from that direction with the support of the ships.

To provide against the chance of the French getting news of the projected landing, all troops were embarked on frigates, and the transports followed afterwards. The French were accustomed to see men-of-war cruising round the islands and, in absence of transports, there would be nothing to indicate that they carried troops.



The force left Rodrigues on 3rd July 1810 and approached Bourbon on the 7th. The landings were to take place that evening and the attack to be carried out at dawn next day.


All went well with the 1st Brigade, which was landing on a lee shore, but at St. Marie only 150 men and a party of seamen were landed before bad weather put a stop to the disembarkation. Colonel Keating was greatly concerned for the small party ashore, particularly as he could get no orders to them. However, Lieutenant Foulstone, of the 69th Regiment, volunteered to swim through the surf with them, which he succeeded in doing though he was considerably battered in the process. These orders were to concentrate and capture St. Marie, and were duly carried out and the post occupied for the night.

At 10 p.m. Colonel Keating sent off the 2nd Brigade to Grand Chaloup, and next morning, as the sea was still running high, he followed with the rest of the 3rd and 4th Brigades and, landing at 11 a.m., pushed on to join Colonel Fraser, who with the 1st Brigade had succeeded in attaining his objectives.

To accomplish this he had had to attack the bulk of the French force single-handed, his Brigade charging home with the utmost gallantry and driving the French from their advanced positions. By 4 p.m. the whole British force, with the exception of the small party at St. Marie, was concentrated and preparing to attack the enemy's position covering the town, when they sent in a flag of truce.

Colonel Keating himself had not yet arrived, so a Sapper Officer was sent back with the flag of truce to explain matters to the French Commander. His description of the scene which followed is interesting as showing something of the personalities of the two Commanders.

Col. Keating's  
Bluff.



He says: "But no sooner had I reached the Commandant's, having previously gone through the operation of being blindfolded on passing the defences, than I met Colonel Keating in the act of entering the house, having come at full gallop from Grand Chaloup, and made his way, by some means or other, through the enemy's outposts into the town.

"He began in his usual brusque manner by informing the Commandant, in broken French, that he was the identical Colonel Keating commanding the expedition; and that he had, contrary to the ordinary practice of war, come in person, in order that he might preserve the town and garrison; for a column, with which he had not the power of communicating, was then advancing from St. Mary's, with orders to attack the town without delay; and that the only way



to prevent the consequences was to surrender at discretion. The French Governor, a mild, quiet kind of man, seemed not to understand this summary way of going to work. 'Mais Monsieur le Colonel,' said he, 'nous avons des bonnes postes.' 'Posts or no posts,' says Colonel Keating, 'if you don't surrender this minute, I can't answer for your life.' The Frenchman shrugged his shoulders, repeated his observations, and attempted to put on a determined air; but this would not do. 'There's a devil of a fellow commanding that column from St. Mary's,' added the Colonel, 'and your old friend Willoughby is there also.' At the sound of the latter name the Governor started. A distant shot was now heard. 'There they are close to your gates,' says Colonel Keating; 'you had better make haste; you shall have the honours of war, and private property shall be respected; but nothing more.' In short the poor Governor was fairly bullied out of his island. Not but what there were troops enough to take a dozen such islands."

The casualties in this action were:—

1 Officer and 17 men killed.

8 Officers and 71 men wounded.

Nearly all occurred in the 86th Regiment, who were in Fraser's Brigade; there were no casualties in the detachment of our Battalion.

St. Denis was at once occupied and the whole island surrendered, the 4th Brigade being sent to occupy St. Paul. The French Troops were made prisoners of war and despatched to the Cape of Good Hope and England.

Captain Imlach and the detachment of our Battalion was at once sent back to Rodrigues to take over command and to garrison the island in relief of the 6th Madras Native Infantry.

There now remained the Island of Mauritius to capture. It was known

**Failure of  
Preliminary  
Attack on  
Mauritius.**

that further reinforcements were on their way, both from India and from the Cape of Good Hope, but before their arrival it was decided to make a raid on Port Bourbon, at the south-east corner of the island, and capture the Ile de la Passe which covered the entrance to the harbour. The object to be achieved was to deny to the enemy one of their harbours of refuge, and so enable the blockade of the rest of the island to be more closely carried out. Unfortunately the enterprise was a failure, the naval forces getting very roughly handled and losing several ships, which endangered the British command of the sea until the balance was restored by vessels from the Cape of Good Hope.

As it was, the force nearly lost their new Commander, General Abercromby,

**Reinforcements  
under General  
Abercromby.**

who was on his way from India with reinforcements to take over command of the whole expedition. The frigate in which he was a passenger was captured by two French frigates, and it was only after a stern chase that he was rescued by the *Boadicea*, Commander Rowley's Flagship.

General Abercromby's orders were to take over the whole force and to capture Mauritius. The force was to assemble at Rodrigues, where further reinforcements were expected from the Cape of Good Hope. A small garrison was left on Bourbon; and the rest of Colonel Keating's force reached Rodrigues on 6th November 1810. General Abercromby and his reinforcements arrived on the 22nd November, but, as there was no news of the troops from the Cape, it was decided not to wait, and the whole convoy, 70 sail, set out for Mauritius, about 350 miles south-west. (See Map No. 5, p. 70.)

The point selected for disembarkation was Grande Baie, about 12 miles north-east of St. Louis; and the force anchored there at 10 a.m. on 29th November 1810. The troops were at once disembarked without loss or accident. The first 5 miles of the road to St. Louis lay through thick jungle, which it was decided to occupy that evening so as to forestall the enemy. This task was entrusted to Colonel Keating's Brigade, which included our detachment, and was successfully carried out with slight opposition, but with the loss of our Brigade Commander, who was wounded.

The heat was very severe and caused a great number of casualties. An Officer of the 84th Regiment,\* who took part in this advance, writes: "The day was extremely sultry and close and not a drop of water was to be had. Captain Yates of the 'City of London' Indiaman, who came with the army for his amusement, was knocked up almost before we entered the jungle, and died on the spot, as did Lieutenant Dove of the 14th Regiment.† . . . Notwithstanding that the march was only five miles . . . even our little Regiment were knocked up, although hardy dogs in general, and the Bengalese never suffered so much in their own country from fatigue and sun as they did in this."

The account of the subsequent operations is taken from General Abercromby's despatch.

"The force then halted for a few hours and moved forward again before daylight (30th) with the intention of not halting again till it reached Port Louis; but the troops having become extremely exhausted, not only from the exertion which they had already made, but from having been almost totally deprived of water, of which this part of the country is destitute, I was compelled to take up a position at Moulin à Poudre about 5 miles short of the town."

Early next morning, 1st December, Lieutenant-Colonel Macleod's Brigade was detached to capture the batteries at Tombeau and Tortue, and open up communication with the Fleet. This was effected without opposition.

The main body advanced toward the town and at once encountered the enemy who had taken up a strong position supported by several field pieces.

---

\* 2nd Battalion The York and Lancaster Regiment.


† The West Yorkshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales's Own).

The advanced guard under General Warde formed up and charged, capturing the guns and killing many of the enemy who were forced to retire to a second position.

The force then took up a position facing the enemy's second line of resistance, but just out of range of cannon shot. Here the night was spent but was disturbed by a false alarm that the enemy had got round in rear of the force. This led to a lot of indiscriminate firing, causing several casualties.

The next morning, 2nd December, just as General Abercromby was organizing a general attack, the French Commander, General de Caen, capitulated. Terms were drawn up by which it was agreed that the French Troops should retain their liberty and be sent, with their wives and families, to a port in European France. All

**French  
Capitulation.**



public property was to be handed over and the island surrendered unconditionally. The civilian inhabitants were free to remain or leave as they wished.

A large amount of shipping was captured, including 36 French, 5 British and 3 American vessels.

The total casualties in the attack were:—

- |                |                                       |
|----------------|---------------------------------------|
| <i>British</i> | Killed, 2 Officers and 23 men.        |
|                | Wounded, 5 Officers and 79 men.       |
|                | Missing, 14 men.                      |
| <i>Indian</i>  | Killed, 2 men.                        |
|                | Wounded, 8 men.                       |
|                | Missing, 1 Indian Officer and 33 men. |

The casualties in our detachment were: 1 Havaldar killed and 2 Sepoys wounded.

The announcement of the capture of Mauritius was celebrated in Bombay on 21st January 1811 by the firing of a Royal salute and *feu de joie* and the grant of three days' batta to all troops.

Our detachment returned to Bombay in April, leaving a small party under Lieutenant G. P. Seward at Rodrigues, where they remained until 24th May, when they handed over the island to the French Governor, having destroyed Fort Duncan and shipped all the stores to Mauritius.

Return to  
Bombay,  
April 1811.

The following General Order was published on 28th April 1811:

"The conduct of the detachment of the 2nd Battalion 2nd Regiment under the command of Captain Imlach, on foreign service to the Isle of France for a period of nearly two years, has been reported to the Governor in Council to have been marked on all occasions by a promptitude and willingness to meet the exigencies of the novel service on which they were engaged, and frequently under circumstances of great privation to their ordinary comforts, highly creditable to them as men, while their character as soldiers has been conspicuous for good order and gallantry. As a mark of the sense entertained by Government of the meritorious conduct of the detachment during the period of its employment in a foreign country, the Honourable the Governor in Council is pleased to direct that one month's full pay and field allowances be presented to the European and Native Officers and privates of the detail."

After the war with France was concluded, Captain Imlach, by that time promoted Major, was awarded the C.B. for his services in this campaign (*London Gazette* 17061, dated 4th June 1815).

To commemorate the part played by our detachment during these operations, two French Trumpet Calls, said to have been used by the garrison of the French islands, are still played as the first and second Mess Calls at the Officers' Mess on Guest Nights.

Prior to the return of the Grenadier Companies, the Battalion had received orders to march to Poona to join the Peshwa's Subsidiary Force. The escort with General Malcolm was recalled from Bagdad and the Battalion left Bombay on 29th March 1811 reaching Poona on 7th April, the flank Companies joining it there at the end of the following month.

## CHAPTER VIII

1811-1819

Formation of the Peshwa's Brigade. Field Service in Kathiawar. Flank Companies in Gujarat against the Pindaris. Operations in the Konkan.

*(See Maps No. 8, opposite p. 116, No. 20, opposite p. 270, and No. 6, opposite p. 80.)*

On the arrival of the Battalion in Poona on 7th April 1811, it was ordered to join the Sirur Field Force under Colonel Montresor and was engaged in watching the movements of the Mahratta Forces. No fighting took place and the Battalion remained in and around Poona until 14th February 1814 when it marched to Baroda in the ordinary course of reliefs. (See Map No. 8 opposite p. 116.)

In 1813 it was decreed that the Peshwa should raise and maintain a Brigade of Infantry, commanded and drilled by picked British Officers. In the training of this Brigade the Officers of our Battalion played a leading part. Captain John Ford, formerly of the Madras Establishment, was appointed Brigade Commander; while two of our Officers, Captains John Hicks and Nathaniel Betts, were appointed Battalion Commanders; Lieutenant Frederick Hicks, also of our Battalion, was appointed Adjutant of one of the Battalions and later commanded the 3rd Battalion.

**The Peshwa's  
Brigade.**

It was from the loyal elements of these Battalions, which so distinguished themselves at the critical battle of Kirkee, that the present 4th and 5th Battalions of the 6th Rajputana Rifles were originally formed. When this Poona Auxiliary Corps was broken up in 1820 to form the 12th Regiment of the line, all three of the above-mentioned Officers received the thanks of the Bombay Government for their zeal and ability as Battalion Commanders.

On the formation of the 1st Battalion 12th Regiment Native Infantry (our present 4th Battalion, Outram's), orders were issued for our Battalion to send a draft of 5 Jamadars, 10 Havaldars, 10 Naiks and 250 Privates. This order, however, was cancelled a few days later as a sufficient number of men had volunteered from the disbanded Battalions to bring them up to strength without our help. Major John Hicks, however, officiated as their first Commandant from the time of their formation until November 1820 when he rejoined our Battalion.

The 1st Extra Battalion (our present 5th Battalion, Napier's) received, as their first Commandant, Captain Nathaniel Betts, who had served over

eleven years in our Battalion, including six years as Adjutant, before going to the Peshwa's Brigade.

It may be considered a happy coincidence that two Battalions, with whose origins our Battalion was so intimately connected, should eventually have been linked with us, first in a Rifle Corps as the 23rd and 25th Rifles, and later in one Regiment as the 4th and 5th Battalions of the 6th Rajputana Rifles.

On arrival at Baroda on 3rd April 1814 our Battalion was specially selected by Colonel Holmes, commanding the Gaekwar's Subsidiary Force, to join the Kathiawar Field Force. A most harassing hot weather and rains were spent in the neighbourhood of the Rann of Cutch chasing marauding bands of Wagurs who were devastating the country. At the close of the rains fever became very prevalent and the sick list mounted rapidly. On the 4th October, Major Imlach, who was commanding the Battalion, wrote to Bombay Headquarters asking that another doctor might be sent as his was down with fever. He stated that all the Officers, except himself, were sick and that there were four hundred men *hors de combat*.

A week later he sends another hurried note for help, in which he says that now he too is sick and Gordon the Assistant Surgeon is not likely to live; that five hundred men are down with fever and both the Native Doctors are dangerously ill. He ends "plenty of medicine in the hospital, but not a soul to make up a pill." Another doctor was at once despatched and orders issued for the Battalion to move to Juria Bandar and embark for Varsovah, where they remained for two months to recuperate before moving into Bombay for duty.

Though there had been no fighting to speak of, the death-roll through sickness had been extremely heavy. The following had succumbed:

Captain J. Allan	3 Jamadars
Lieutenant and Adjutant Boulderson	1 Fife Major
Lieutenant B. Soppitt	7 Havaldars
Lieutenant N. Tanner	103 Rank and File
Lieutenant R. W. Cory	

The year 1815, in which the Duke, whose name we bear, crowned a glorious career with victory at Waterloo, was spent in Bombay doing garrison duty and filling up to strength. On 5th November 1815 the Flank Companies were again ordered to Baroda by sea to join a force assembling there under Colonel East for further operations in Kathiawar. On arrival in Baroda a Flank Battalion was formed of the Flank Companies of our Battalion, the 2/3rd\* and the 2/5th,† under the command of Brevet Major Kennett of the 2/3rd.

Flank Companies  
on Service against  
the Wagurs.

\* 6th Bombay Native Infantry, disbanded 3rd May 1882.

† 3rd Battalion 5th Mahratta Light Infantry.

This force was again to be directed against the Wagurs, who, in spite of the harrying they had received the previous year were still doing a lot of damage, as the Gaekwar's troops were not in sufficient numbers to guard the whole frontier. The Political Officer reporting on the situation stated that three-quarters of the cultivation in Kathiawar had ceased; that no man dared work in the fields without a gun; that seventy villages had been deserted; and that these bands acted with the connivance if not the help, of the Rao of Cutch, who thought that the British were afraid to cross the Rann. The loot of the Wagurs in the past three years was estimated at six lacs of rupees.

Colonel East, whose force numbered some 6,000 men, received orders to punish the Rao of Cutch and to break up and exterminate the bands of Wagurs.

He crossed the border into Cutch on the 2nd of December 1815 and crossed the Rann at Venasir on the 14th of the same month. Though unopposed by the enemy this was no light undertaking.

A contemporary letter, written by an Officer with the force, states that the Rann, where they crossed it, was  $10\frac{1}{4}$  miles broad and looked as though an arm of the sea had receded leaving a vast expanse of mud. This had a fairly firm surface encrusted here and there with salt which looked like snow. Below the surface was soft mud and in places there were treacherous quicksands. The Cavalry and Infantry got across without difficulty in about three and a half hours, but the Field Guns had, at times, to be man handled. The battering train took the whole day and the baggage and rear guard did not reach camp, some 7 miles from the far shore, till midday the following day.

The Raja of Wandia, a small fort on the far bank, at once surrendered unconditionally, and the force set out for Anjar, a square fort built of stone with a dry ditch flanked by towers. On the way there the garrison of Anjar tried to poison the water supply at one of the camps by putting a bag of arsenic into it. This was fortunately discovered before any harm was done. The garrison refused to surrender until batteries had been erected and the walls breached, when they threw in their hands on 23rd December 1815. The only casualties on our side appear to have been one British Officer and two Sepoys wounded. The fall of Anjar led to the immediate surrender of its seaport, the fortress of Toona, some 10 miles distant.

After a few days' halt at Anjar to replenish supplies and celebrate Christmas, the force made a move on Bhuj, the capital of Cutch. On arrival there, the place was given one day in which to accept the terms offered, but it was not until batteries had been erected and orders for an assault issued, that the Rao made his submission on the 4th January 1816.

This completed the operations in Cutch.

Leaving a part of the force to assist the Political Officer in settling the country, Colonel East now moved against the Wagurs with the bulk of his

**Capture of  
Anjar Fort,  
23rd Dec. 1815.**

**Submission of the  
Rao of Cutch,  
4th Jan. 1816.**

force which included our Flank Companies. The strong fortress of Kuntkote, the most formidable refuge of the freebooters, was the first objective. It was invested on the 3rd February but the garrison evacuated it during the night and many succeeded in slipping through our lines. Small parties were now sent out in all directions to harry and break up any remaining gangs, and on the 16th February 1816 the district was reported as completely cleared.

The next move was towards Dwarka on the coast, various forts surrendering on the way. The fort of Dinki, however, refused to surrender and had to be assaulted. As it was surrounded by a thick belt of cactus, some 500 yards deep, a day and a half were required to cut the necessary approaches, to enable the place to be rushed and the bandits cleared. Our Companies' casualties were one killed and two wounded. Dwarka surrendered on the 2nd March 1816; and the subjugation of Okamandal was completed by the capture of the island fort of Beit on 7th March, when the chief of the pirates was killed.

Okamandal was now handed over to the Gaekwar's officials and the force broken up. Our Flank Companies sailed from Gogo and joined the Battalion in Bombay on the 20th May 1816.

In September 1816 the Flank Companies were again ordered to Baroda for service under Colonel East. The formation of a force in Gujarat was necessitated by the proximity of large forces of Mahrattas to the northern border, while a formidable army of Pathans under Amir Khan was not far distant. In addition to this, the Pindaris were doing extensive damage, even as far south as Surat. This force did little more than guard the border and chase occasional marauding bands.

On 13th January 1817 the Battalion, after being inspected in marching order, embarked and sailed for Malwan, where it relieved the 2nd Battalion 7th Regiment Native Infantry.\* It was at once ordered to proceed to Chauk for the purpose of protecting the district from raiders from Sawantwari State.

The Flank Companies, which had remained in Gujarat, were sent out towards the end of the year with a small force under Colonel Elrington to the north-eastern border and took part in the capture of the forts or walled towns of Deesa, Palanpur, Verurumpur and Caranjah. Their losses during these operations were three sepoy killed and two wounded.

For some years past it had been recognized that some action must be taken to suppress the hordes of Pindaris who were carrying rapine and slaughter far and wide. Their numbers had been steadily increasing and by 1817 their strength was estimated at about 25,000. They consisted of bands of mounted marauders whose object was universal plunder. Any lawless man who could obtain a horse and spear was welcomed

\* 10th Battalion 5th Mahratta Light Infantry.



in their ranks, and even the more peaceful villagers were driven to join them of necessity, having no other means of maintenance once one of these bands had raided their neighbourhood. As the Pindaris received no pay but lived on plunder alone, their area of operations was continually extending.

The Governor-General had made many unsuccessful attempts to form alliances with the various Mahratta chiefs with a view to obtaining their co-operation in the suppression of this scourge. The chiefs affirmed that they were taking the necessary steps to suppress it themselves, but they did nothing, and there was no doubt that many of them obtained payments for affording asylum to bands who plundered over their borders into British territory and returned with the loot. Throughout the two previous years large forces had been maintained in the field to check their inroads, but no concerted action on a large scale had been possible.

The Marquis of Hastings had in view extensive operations to rid the whole country of these marauders, but to do so it was essential to penetrate Mahratta territory either with, or without, the chiefs' concurrence. For a time the Gurkha war, which started very badly for us, precluded any chance of such operations, and it was not until a successful issue had been reached in Nepal that the necessary mobilization of troops could be set in train.

The territory to be cleared comprised Bundelcund, Central India and Rajputana, and consisted chiefly of the states of Gwalior, Bhopal, Indore and those of the Rajput chiefs. The plan of action was for a converging advance from all quarters towards a common centre, with large reserves behind ready to deal with any parties who broke through between the advancing divisions. This was to be carried out as follows:

One division of the Bombay Army under General Grant-Keir was to advance from Gujarat in the south; five divisions of the Deccan Army under Sir Thomas Hislop were to move from the east; while Bengal sent four divisions, with two in reserve, to close in from the north. These latter were under the personal command of the Marquis of Hastings.

Our Flank Companies, which were still in Gujarat, formed part of a Flank Battalion in General Grant-Keir's division, whose movements we will now follow. (See Map No. 20, opposite p. 270.)

The Division was assembled at Baroda and commenced its march northwards on 4th December 1817, the first objective being Dohad. On the 8th December while passing through some heavy jungle the rear-guard was attacked and the baggage partially plundered, several men being killed and wounded. Rutlam was reached on 24th December and communication with the Deccan Army established. From here the 17th Dragoons and Flank Battalion were detached to join General Malcolm's division of the Deccan Army to assist in the pursuit of Holkar's troops who had just been defeated at Mehidpur.

They joined General Malcolm's force at Sita Mhow on 29th December 1817 after some hard marching. On 31st December the force reached Mundisor where the Cavalry, moving ahead, had overtaken and captured all Holkar's cattle and bazaars. Here Holkar tendered his submission and a treaty with him was signed on 6th January 1818. On the surrender of Holkar, the 17th Dragoons and the Flank Battalion rejoined the Gujarat division which was ordered to take up the pursuit of Chethu's band of Pindaris. This proved a most harassing task, and many long marches were made only to find that the enemy had slipped away. On the 19th January, however, a party of the 17th Dragoons and some 600 infantry, including our Flank Companies, surprised a party of the Pindaris at Mundapi, killing about 100.

Action against the  
Pindaris at  
Mundapi,  
19th Jan. 1818.

On 21st January the Division was collected together again with orders to organize the defence of the eastern frontier of Gujarat. They marched *via* Neemuch to Rutlam, arriving there on 1st February 1818; and were split up into three parties to guard dangerous lines of approach. It was necessary for the pursuit of these bands of Pindaris, that the Infantry should move as light as possible, and a grant of one rupee a month was sanctioned to enable knapsacks to be carried on transport. Throughout January and February the troops were pursuing Pindaris in light equipment without rest.

In February General Grant-Keir received orders to establish Holkar's authority in the neighbourhood of Indore. The force reached there on 22nd February and after remaining three weeks received orders to return to Baroda, where it was broken up and our Flank Companies moved by sea to join the Battalion at Chauk.

We will now revert to the doings of the rest of the Battalion which had arrived in Chauk early in 1817 to protect the Malwan District from inroads from Sawantwari State. (See Map No. 6, opposite p. 80.) The country on the border was very broken and covered with extremely thick jungle which rendered their task very difficult. There were also numerous small forts just over the border which furnished an asylum for the raiders. A great deal of time was spent in cutting roads, but in spite of this the raiding continued. It must be borne in mind that the Battalion's strength was much reduced by the absence of the Flank Companies in Gujarat.

Field Service  
in the Konkan,  
1818.

Major W. Imlach, C.B., who had left the Battalion in 1816 to command the 2nd Brigade of the Poona Field Force, rejoined it at Chauk in 1817 and was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel.

Towards the end of 1817 the raiding became more frequent and more daring, culminating in an attack by Sawantwari State forces on a post garrisoned by a detachment of our Battalion. This attack was beaten off without difficulty. This increased activity was instigated by the Peshwa who, while troops were being collected for the advance against the Pindaris, purported

to have joined the British cause. He had been asked to send a strong body of mounted troops to co-operate with the British force and, ostensibly for this purpose, he instituted an intensive recruiting campaign. It was not long before his duplicity was apparent, and it became evident that he intended to use these troops against, and not in co-operation with, the British forces. He ordered all *killadars* to increase the garrisons of their forts and encouraged the Sawantwari Troops in their hostilities.

There were two forts close to the border, Seedgarh and Bhagwantgarh, which Imlach was anxious to capture. The Bombay Government in giving him permission, rather reluctantly, to do so, impressed upon him that under no circumstances could he expect any help or reinforcements; and that he must not, on any account, allow his small force to become so scattered as to be open to defeat in the event of a serious attack by the Mahrattas.

On 16th January Imlach left his camp at Cutta to attack Seedgarh.

**Attack on  
Seedgarh Fort,  
19th Jan. 1818.**

His force consisted of about 300 men of our Battalion and two small brass field guns under an Artillery Officer. His despatch gives some idea of the difficulties he had to contend with. His first march was to Cusal, 7 miles, but it took him nine hours of heavy labour, clearing his way through thick jungle, cut up by ravines. The following day he made 5 miles to the base of the hill on which the fort was built, the jungle growing thicker as he approached the hill. The fort was called on to surrender, but refused. The whole of the next day was spent in clearing a track 3 miles up the hill to enable the guns to be brought within range, and in the evening a few rounds were fired in the hopes that the garrison would surrender. These were answered by a brisk fire from the fort, wounding one sepoy. During the night emplacements were built and at dawn fire was opened on the walls but without effect, the artillery officer stating that they were too strong to breach with his brass field guns.

Reliable information was now received that 500 Wari troops were advancing through the jungle to relieve the fort. Considering that assault by escalade would hazard the loss of too many men of his small force, and also give time to the relieving troops to cut off his retreat, Imlach decided to withdraw. In his first camp he was attacked all night by the Wari troops who were easily repulsed. He now returned to his previous position of observation and applied to Bombay for two or three hundred more men and some iron battering guns. These latter he was able to obtain from one of the coast forts, but the men were refused.

However, fortune favoured him for, on the 3rd March 1818 a detachment of His Majesty's 89th Regiment\* put in to Malwan as they

**Capture of  
Seedgarh Fort,  
10th Mar. 1818.**

had run short of water, and the boat they were in was in such a bad state that there was little hope of their reaching Bombay in it. Imlach decided to profit by the unexpected reinforcement to attack

---

\* 2nd Battalion The Royal Irish Fusiliers (Princess Victoria's).

Seedgarh again and set out on the 8th March. This time he was able to breach the walls, after which the garrison surrendered.

He now moved on Bhagwantgarh. This fort was built on the banks of the Mapoora River which was about 400 yards wide with a muddy bottom; it commanded the two available fords. Batteries were at once erected on the near bank, but when it was found impossible to breach the walls from that distance it was decided to attack some 600 enemy, who were holding the far bank, by sending across two columns, one by each ford. These columns were led by Captains Gray of our Battalion and Pearson of the 1/8th Native Infantry,\* who was attached to us for duty. Having crossed the river in the face of a brisk but ill-directed fire, they charged the enemy on the far bank and routed them with considerable loss; whereon the fort surrendered on the 29th March 1818.

**Capture of  
Bhagwantgarh  
Fort,  
29th Mar. 1818.**

The force was now split into two parties: the first, under Captain Pearson, moved to Ramgarh which surrendered to him on 6th April; the other under Imlach made for the fort of Deogarh which, after keeping up a heavy fire all night, was evacuated in the morning and occupied by our men on 8th April. Captain Pearson, who rejoined headquarters here, was left to garrison the fort while the rest of the troops returned to Chauk as the district of Salsee was now completely cleared.

A few days later a letter was received from Mr. Elphinston, Commissioner of the Deccan, addressed to the *Killadar* of Viziadrug (Gheria) Fort, instructing him to hand it over to Captain Pearson, who embarked a detail of a hundred men in the cruisers *Sylph* and *Prince of Wales* to garrison it. On arrival before the fort, the cruisers anchored and the note was sent in a row-boat to the *Killadar*. But as soon as the boat got near the fort, a heavy fire was opened on both it and the cruisers. These latter at once cut their cables and moved out of range, while the boat was chased out by a fleet of *pattimars*, but got away safely. As this was a very strong fort and contained nearly 300 guns and a large garrison, assault was out of the question. The party then

**Action on the  
Deogarh River,  
19th April 1818.**

returned to Deogarh where, a few days later, a strong body from the garrison of Viziadrug appeared on the opposite bank of the Deogarh River where they built a stockade. Before dawn on 19th April a party of 60 men under Captain Hughes of our Battalion was sent across the river to attack the enemy at daybreak while a demonstration was carried out by Marines under their officer, Captain Dominicetti, in boats which they rowed up the river. The attack came as a complete surprise and twenty-five of the enemy were killed and wounded, and several taken prisoner; the remainder fled back to Viziadrug. In this affair not a man of ours was touched.

Colonel Imlach was now ordered to clear the district of Rajapur in which

---

\* 15th Bombay Native Infantry, disbanded 3rd May 1882.

Viziadrug was situated. He marched with his whole force, now increased by the arrival of the Flank Companies from Baroda, but met with practically no resistance and by the beginning of June had occupied the forts of Viziadrug, Esswantgarh, Ombegarh, Karriapatam and Rajapur. The force now returned to Chauk for the rains.

At the beginning of 1819 a force under General Grant-Keir was assembled at Chauk to clear the Sawantwari State. It consisted of one British Battalion\* and three Native Battalions,\* of which ours was one. The force marched on 31st January, their first objective being the Fort of Newty. On the 2nd February Lieutenant Spratt with a detachment of our Battalion and some guns forced a crossing of the river at Bogi and drove the enemy's advanced piquets back into the heights of Newty. This was carried out with great dash, and preparations for the assault of the fort were commenced. The batteries were completed by the 4th February when the fort capitulated.

The next day the force left for the fort of Raree, which was reached on the 10th February 1819. A breach was effected by the 13th, when the fort was stormed in the evening by a force consisting of the Grenadier Companies of all the Battalions under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Clifford of His Majesty's 89th Regiment.

The breach was carried with a rush and heavy loss inflicted on the enemy. An attempt was now made to storm the inner fort. Two Officers of the 89th Regiment succeeded in entering one of the towers by a port-hole and this tower and an adjacent work were captured, but no further advance was possible as no scaling ladders were to hand. However, before dark the whole of the outer works and the pettah were cleared and during the night the garrison surrendered.

The total casualties were eight killed and twenty-five wounded, of which our Battalion lost one Havaldar killed and nine Rank and File wounded.

For the next two and a half months the force was scattered to round up small parties of the enemy. This was completed by the 2nd May when the force was broken up and our Battalion returned to its lines in Chauk.

When the Mahratta war broke out, some of our men were away on leave. A few, who were at Bancote, were taken into Colonel Kennedy's Force which was operating in that area. This party under Havaldar Baboo Surwah, with a few leave men of other units, was highly commended by Colonel Kennedy for the very gallant defence of the village of Kelole when considerably outnumbered. The Havaldar was promoted to Jamadar for his gallantry.


**Defence of  
Kelole Village.**

---

\* 89th Regiment, 2nd Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers.  
2/6th Native Infantry became 5th Battalion 4th Bombay Grenadiers, disbanded 18th October 1923.  
2/9th Native Infantry became 18th Bombay Infantry, disbanded 1882.  
2/2nd Native Infantry (our Battalion).











This ended the Battalion's part in the third Mahratta War and for its services in the Konkan it was granted three months' full pay and batta and Rs.11,862 as its share of prize money.

At the end of the year the Battalion said good-bye to their Commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel W. Imlach, C.B., on his appointment to  
Farewell to Lt.-Col. W. Imlach command the Southern Division of Gujarat. This fine officer  
C.B. had done much to earn the Battalion the good name it then enjoyed. He had joined it as an ensign in 1797 and remained with it throughout his service except for one year's duty with the 1st Battalion. He had commanded the Battalion at the siege of Bhurtpur when he was wounded in the assault. He gained fresh laurels in command of the detachment at the capture of the French islands, for which he received the C.B. He piloted them through very trying times in Kathiawar, and there is little doubt that he would have gone far but for his untimely death at Malegaon on 8th April 1822.

## CHAPTER IX

1820-1838

Operations against the Beni Boo Ali. Operations in Sirohi State. Renumbered  
4th Bombay Native Infantry. Minor operations on the Rann of Cutch and against  
the Ramosis.

(See Map No. 11, opposite p. 142.)

THE year 1820 passed without incident at Chauk until December, when the Flank Companies were ordered to Bombay for service in the Persian Gulf. (See Map No. 11, opposite p. 142.)

**Piracy in the  
Persian Gulf.**

In spite of the measures which had been taken in previous years to deal with the pirates, they had again been making heavy inroads into the commerce of the Gulf and had extended their activities as far east as Kathiawar and Cutch. By the end of the year 1818 their strength was officially estimated at sixty-four vessels carrying some seven thousand men. In 1819 a force, under General Sir William Grant-Keir, had been sent to deal with them. Numerous forts and villages along the coast had been captured and destroyed; and a British post had been established on the Island of Kishm where the 1st Battalion 2nd Regiment Native Infantry\* with eight field guns had been left as a garrison.

In the following year, 1820, Captain Thomson, 17th Dragoons, the Political Agent in the Gulf, had occasion to communicate with the Beni Boo Ali tribe in connection with further piracies. This tribe was notorious throughout the Gulf for turbulence and ferocity; and had just thrown off the authority of the Imam of Muscat. Thomson proceeded in the cruiser *Mercury* to Hashkarah with a letter to their chief. The surf being too heavy to permit of landing in a boat, the pilot swam ashore with the letter but was immediately cut to pieces on the beach.

Thomson at once decided to execute reprisals, and sent for six Companies of Infantry and eight guns from Kishm, with which he landed at Zoar, where he was joined by some 2,000 of the Imam's men. From here the force marched to the tribesmen's capital, Balad Beni Boo Ali, about 60 miles distant. When marching to attack the fort, they were suddenly set upon by the tribesmen and met with a severe reverse, losing their guns and having 270 men of the force killed, including six of their British Officers. The force retreated to the coast and returned to Kishm.

---

\* 1st Battalion 5th Mahratta Light Infantry.

Although the Bombay Government strongly disapproved of Captain Thomson's action in moving inland with such a small force, they now considered it essential for the restoration of national prestige that the Beni Boo Ali be taught a lesson. Consequently a force was mobilized in Bombay under Major-General Lionel Smith, C.B., who had had much previous experience of fighting in the Gulf. The force consisted of:

A Horse Battery of 12 pounders and two 18 pounders.

1st Brigade. Lieutenant-Colonel Cox.

The Bombay European Regiment.

1st Battalion 2nd Regiment Native Infantry\* (already at Kishm).

2nd Brigade. Lieutenant-Colonel Warren.

H.M.'s 65th Regiment.†

1st Battalion 7th Regiment Native Infantry.‡

A Divisional Battalion under Major Watson was composed of the Flank Companies of:

2nd Battalion 2nd Regiment Native Infantry (our Battalion).

1st Battalion 3rd Regiment Native Infantry.§

1st Battalion 4th Regiment Native Infantry.||

2nd Battalion 9th Regiment Native Infantry.¶

Our Flank Companies sailed from Malwan on 19th December 1820, reaching Bombay on the 24th of the same month.

The force was well equipped and all men provided with warm clothing. As no bullocks were available in the country to carry *pakhals* extra *bhistis* were sanctioned.

Major-General Smith received the following orders:

1. To obtain the surrender and public execution of the murderers of our messenger.

2. To put the Imam of Muscat in possession of the territory now held by the Beni Boo Ali.

3. To obtain the release of all prisoners and the restoration of all arms captured in the last action.

4. To obtain effectual security against any renewal of piracy by the Beni Boo Ali.

The force sailed from Bombay on 11th January 1821, reaching Zoar on the 27th where they made a camp some 2 miles from the fort. Here they waited for the transport camels which were to be supplied by the Imam.

Landing at Zoar,  
27th Jan. 1821.

\* 1st Battalion 5th Mahratta Light Infantry.

† 1st Battalion York and Lancaster Regiment.

‡ 10th Battalion 4th Bombay Grenadiers, disbanded 31st March 1930.

§ 2nd Battalion 5th Mahratta Light Infantry.

|| 1st Battalion Bombay Pioneers, disbanded 10th February 1933.

¶ 18th Bombay Infantry, disbanded 1882.

On arrival at Zoar General Smith issued orders for our Flank Companies to be attached to the 1st Battalion 2nd Regiment, who were very much under strength owing to their recent losses and who were without their Headquarters which had remained at Kishm. He directed that this Battalion was to be referred to as the Detachment Battalion.

The tribesmen, on hearing of the landing of a force at Zoar, despatched five hundred of their best swordsmen to attack the camp. **Attack by Tribesmen, 10th Feb. 1821.** Marching by a devious route, they reached a palm grove near the camp during the night of 9th-10th February and at once launched their attack. It is said that the Field Officer of the day, to guard against false alarms, had given orders that the outlying piquets were not to keep their muskets loaded, so it is little to be wondered at that the enemy were into the camp of the 1st Brigade before any alarm could be given.

The Bombay European Regiment, whose camp they first encountered, suffered heavily, and it was not until the inlying piquets could be turned out and part of the troops fallen in that they were driven out again, leaving behind them twelve killed and twenty wounded. They had done much damage with their spears and heavy two-handed swords, the Bombay European Regiment losing one officer, nine men and one *bhisti* killed, and three officers including the Brigadier, and twenty men wounded. The Detachment Battalion had three sepoy killed and six wounded, but there is no record to show if any of these belonged to our Flank Companies.

It took a long time to collect the camels, and it was not till the 24th February that it was possible to make a move. Even then **Advance of Force and Defeat of Pirates.** it was necessary to leave behind all tents, and to put the troops on a reduced scale of rations. The country inland was very rugged and water extremely scarce, consequently the march was very trying. At Beni Boo Hasan, a village belonging to the Imam, some 6 miles short of Balad Beni Boo Ali, the 18-pounder guns were left under an escort, so as not to hamper the movements of the force, which reached its objective on the morning of 2nd March 1821.

As soon as it came within range the Arabs opened fire with the guns which they had captured from the previous expedition. A date grove, about half a mile from the town, was occupied by the 1st Brigade and strengthened. Meanwhile the enemy appeared to be massing in another grove a few hundred yards away. The 2nd Brigade under Colonel Warren was ordered to attack them, while the 1st Brigade and Flank Battalion formed a second line in support.

As soon as the skirmishers reached the edge of the grove they came under heavy fire and retired to clear the front of the main body. The enemy then charged out of the grove, waving their heavy swords, and, outflanking the left of the 1st Battalion 7th Regiment, got round in rear of the line and did much execution. H.M.'s 65th Regiment, who were hotly engaged in front,

formed some of their companies to the rear and counter-attacking drove the enemy back through the palm grove with much slaughter. Though this phase of the engagement only lasted about fifteen minutes, the fighting had been very desperate and the casualties on both sides heavy.

Seeing that the enemy were now worsted, orders were given for a general advance of both Brigades to the fort, which was called on to surrender. The garrison hoisted a white flag, but as they refused to give up their arms, the guns were sent for to make a breach for the 1st Brigade to storm. During the parley the enemy were seen escaping in numbers from the rear of the fort, so a party was sent round to intercept them, after which the garrison surrendered. The prisoners bearing arms numbered 236 men, of whom 96 were wounded. As about 200 enemy dead had been left on the field, their total casualties were estimated at not less than 500. The chief and his brother were among the captives, both wounded, one during the night attack on the camp, and the other in the fighting that day.

**Surrender and  
Destruction of  
the Fort,  
2nd Mar. 1821.**

As the Imam refused to take the place over, it was, at his request, blown up and the force marched back to Zoar, where it embarked for Bombay, taking the prisoners with it. The guns which had been captured from Captain Thomson's force were all recovered, but General Smith failed to identify the murderers of the messenger although he held both chiefs in custody.

The casualties in the fighting on the 3rd March were confined almost entirely to the 2nd Brigade, and amounted to: Killed 2 Officers, 27 men; Wounded 7 Officers, 160 men. There were no casualties in our Companies.

On arrival in Bombay the force was broken up and our Flank Companies were sent to Baroda, whither the Battalion was under orders to move as soon as it had been relieved by the 1st Battalion 2nd Regiment.

Trooping in those days was not the comfortable affair it is now. On this occasion, as on many others, the Battalion was moved in native sailing craft. One of these vessels had a dreadful

**Trooping  
Arrangements.**

experience. The party was in charge of a Jamadar, and consisted of 1 havaldar, 2 naiks, 1 drummer, 42 sepoy, 1 *bhisti*, 31 women and 22 children. Cholera broke out on board and, when they had been nine days at sea and were a little north of Bombay, the boat ran into very heavy weather. She lost her masts and was so badly damaged that she had to run for shelter into Navsari Creek. Here she was wrecked and everything on board was lost, except the arms and accoutrements of the survivors and some of those of men who had died, which were carried ashore by their widows. The inhabitants of Navsari, from fear of the cholera, would render no help, in fact they deserted the village and disappeared. The Havaldar was then sent to Surat, the nearest cantonment, to report their plight, and returned a few days later with an Indian Medical Assistant and orders for the survivors to march to Surat. It was with great difficulty that the Jamadar collected

enough carts to move them, as most of them were too ill to march. Three more died on the way, and by the time they reached Surat they had lost, all told, 1 naik, 29 sepoy, 1 *bhisti*, 16 women and 5 children.

The Battalion reached Baroda on 14th May 1821, where they were joined by the Flank Companies and formed part of the Gaekwar's Subsidiary Force.

Although the Pindaris had been completely exterminated there was still a good deal of raiding going on, carried out chiefly by Bheels. To prevent this the Battalion was distributed in outposts during 1822, with Headquarters at Barnagar. The Battalion at this time was commanded by Lieutenant Finlay, Lieutenant-Colonel Kemp, the Commandant, having remained in command of the Subsidiary Force at Baroda.

During January and February of 1823 a party under Lieutenant Finlay was ordered to round up the Bheel villages of Techow and Goliawara, which was successfully accomplished; Lieutenant Finlay receiving the thanks of the Bombay Government.

On 10th May 1823, the Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Kemp, marched to Deesa, where it was again split up into detachments. It was while stationed here that sanction was received to bear on Colours and appointments the Battle Honour "Seringapatam."

On the 5th February 1824, the Battalion was inspected by General Sir Charles Colville, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, and three days later marched into Sirohi State as part of a small mixed force under Lieutenant-Colonel Kemp.

Sirohi State had recently come under British protection and the Rao had applied for help to enable him to assert his authority over certain *thakurs* who, though previously subject to him, had transferred their allegiance to Palanpur, as they said that the Sirohi troops did not offer them adequate protection. As a result of their defection, a great deal of raiding had been going on along the borders of these two States, each of which held the other responsible for putting it down.

Colonel Kemp received orders to bring the raiders to book and to re-establish the Rao's authority throughout the territory over which he had a legal claim. The raiding was carried out chiefly by Meenahs, who, though possessing a few blunderbusses, were mainly armed with bows and arrows, and the country being very broken and covered with jungle they proved an elusive rather than dangerous enemy. Water was very scarce and it must be remembered that the sepoy, in those days, did not carry a water bottle but was dependent on what was carried by the Company *bhisti* in his *mussack*.

Many long and thirsty marches were carried out only to find that word of their coming had preceded them and the enemy flown. Sometimes, however, they met with success, especially at Tallieta and Roera, where many Meenahs were killed and large numbers captured.

One of the refractory *thakurs*, Rai Singh, refused to come to terms and, on the approach of the force, shut himself up in his stronghold at Limbuj. Companies were sent to scale the heights to right and left of the fort, while a gun was run forward to blow in the gate. The outer gate was demolished after three rounds, and the second and third gates broken down by main force, after which the garrison surrendered. Our only casualty was one sepoy wounded by a swordcut at the third gate.

Having now completed their task in Sirohi State, the Battalion marched back to Deesa, arriving there on 9th May 1824.

In June of this year the army was reorganized. The Battalions of each Regiment were finally separated and the whole renumbered, when our Battalion became the 4th Regiment of Bombay Native Infantry and will hereafter be referred to as the Regiment.

As a result of the renumbering, Colonel Lewis was appointed Colonel on the 3rd September 1825. During this year a detachment under Lieutenant Chalmers was employed chasing marauders near the Rann of Cutch.

In March 1826 the Regiment marched to Ahmedabad sending one wing to Kaira. Shortly after their arrival cholera broke out at both these places and carried off Major Gray, who was commanding, and Ensign Bouchier, both at Ahmedabad, one Indian officer and forty-five men. This was followed by a severe epidemic of fever which so debilitated the Regiment that on the representation of Major Hughes, who had succeeded to the command, orders were received in December to move to Dapoli in the Southern Konkan to recuperate.

During the five years spent in this station the only incidents of note were a short spell of field service in 1827 rounding up Ramosis in the Western Ghats, when three sepoys were killed, and a similar duty in Rajapur District in 1829-30.

These Ramosis were a small predatory tribe inhabiting the jungles round Purandhar and between Poona and Ahmednagar. They were expert thieves and lived by dacoity and robbing travellers. To guard themselves against their raids, the villagers had deemed it prudent to employ many of them as village watchmen, which duties, in course of time, became hereditary.

This did not, however, put a stop to their depredations, and for many years their gangs were a source of considerable embarrassment and expense to the Government. Being very mobile and knowing the country thoroughly they had little difficulty in avoiding the troops which were sent to round them up; while the villagers, from fear of reprisals, would give no information of their movements and were forced to provide them with food. Numerous detachments of armed police and regular troops of the Bombay and Madras Armies were continually employed against them, but it was not until the end of 1831 that the capture of their chief leader, Naik Oomiah, put an end to their exploits.



In 1831 the Regiment was moved to Bombay where it remained for three years, and was then transferred to Ahmednagar for another four, after which it returned to Dapoli again.

In the year 1827 began a long spell of peaceful years for the Regiment, as **Regimental Training and Interior Economy.** it was not employed on active service again for over twenty years. Good use, however, was made of this period to concentrate on training and interior economy. It was indeed fortunate that for the greater part of that time they had as Adjutant an exceptionally fine officer, Lieutenant Robert Honner, who had been appointed to that post in Ahmedabad in 1826. Honner held this appointment for the unprecedented time of sixteen years, and it was very largely due to his zealous and unremitting work that the Regiment was selected in 1841 to be formed as the first Rifle Corps in the Indian Army.

That the Regiment gained a great reputation for efficiency is borne out by the fact that when, in 1833, the Bombay Government was organizing a force for service in Mauritius where an insurrection was feared, our Regiment was substituted for the Flank Battalion proposed, on the representation of the Commander-in-Chief that not only were they on the spot, but would prove equally efficient.

Again, an extract from the Inspection Report of Major-General Sleigh, C.B., dated 9th March 1837 is worth quoting in this connection:—

“It is equally pleasing to the Major-General to bring to view and record the very perfect state he found the 4th Regiment Native Infantry in. The Regiment turned out upwards of six hundred strong in the field and made a most excellent review. The internal management and general system in the Corps is an example to most regiments and what the Major-General would wish to see followed by all belonging to his Division.

“The manner in which the clothing is fitted; the state in which the books are kept and the unremitting attention that is given to all returns required from his Corps to Divisional Headquarters, show how well fitted the commanding officer, Major Hicks, and Adjutant Brevet Captain Honner, are for their respective situations.”

## CHAPTER X

1838-1848

The Regiment organized as a Rifle Corps. The 1st Sikh War. Major Honner appointed to Command. Facings changed from black to red.

*(See Map No. 20, opposite p. 270.)*

AFTER a nine months' stay at Dapoli the Regiment was ordered to Bombay, arriving there on the 4th November 1838. A year was spent at the Presidency after which it was sent at the end of November 1839 by sea to Baroda, where it remained for six years. In May 1841 the Regiment had the distinction of being made into a Rifle Corps.

For some years now the Rifleman, like the Light Infantryman, had been slowly coming into his own. In the British Army, as early

**The Origin of Rifle Corps.** as 1797, the 5th Battalion of the 60th Royal Americans (now the 60th Rifles) had been dressed in green and armed with rifles.

Three years later H.M.'s 95th Regiment (now the Rifle Brigade) were raised as an experimental corps, dressed in green, armed with rifles, and trained to fight in open order, their movements being controlled by the bugle-horn. They had no colours, as it was considered that these would hamper their movements, their duty being to move ahead of all troops in the attack and to be last in a retreat. Green was considered the most suitable colour for their uniform, as it was the colour of the Foresters' livery throughout Europe.

In the Madras Army for a great many years, in certain Regiments, one Company had been armed with rifles, so that at that period there were eight such Companies; but this system had never been introduced into either the Bombay or Bengal Armies, although its efficiency was generally acknowledged. In the year 1840 the Government of Bombay called on the retiring Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General Lord Keane, for his recommendation with regard to Riflemen and Light Infantry. In his memorandum he stated as his opinion that one-tenth of the Army should be Light Infantry, and the tenth Company of each Light Battalion should be Riflemen. He pointed out that although the rifle took a little longer to load, "when it is carefully loaded with a tightly fitting ball, it is more accurate and has twice the range of the best smooth bore musket."

Lieutenant-General McMahon, the new Commander-in-Chief, was also strongly in favour of having both Light Infantry and Riflemen, but, instead of having separate Rifle Companies attached to Regiments, he recommended the formation of an entire Rifle Corps.

On receipt of the General Order, Major Crawley, who was then commanding, published the following Regimental Order, dated Baroda, 24th May 1841:—

“ His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief with the concurrence of Government having directed the Regiment to be organized as a Rifle Corps, armed and equipped with rifles, and styled the 4th Regiment N.I. or Rifle Corps by General Orders of the 4th May 1841, it is so styled accordingly, and all arrangements to give effect to this order will be entered upon without delay.

Change of Title  
to 4th Regiment  
N.I. or Rifle  
Corps, 4th May  
1841.

“ Major Crawley most cordially congratulates all ranks on this happy occasion, and feels assured that they in an equal degree with himself, fully appreciate the great distinction thus conferred upon them; this honour has been gained by a long series of untarnished services in the field, and tho’ less brilliant, no less important, undeviating good conduct, steadiness, discipline and habits of subordination in quarters.

“ It is the first distinction of the kind that has ever been bestowed on Native Troops of the Indian Army, and this proud tribute holds up the 4th Regiment N.I., or Rifle Corps, as an example to be imitated by all others.

“ The Commanding Officer calls upon the numerous young soldiers in the ranks to emulate the high military bearing of their seniors and to sustain without reproach the character which has been so justly earned.

“ By order of the Commanding Officer,

“R. WILLIAM HONNER, Bt. Captain,

“Adjutant 4th Regiment N.I. or Rifle Corps.”

The following is an extract from an article published in the *Bombay Gazette* of 19th May 1841:—

“ The formation of the 4th Regiment of Native Infantry into a Rifle Corps and the 5th and 23rd into Light Infantry is a measure that will give great satisfaction to every well-wisher of the Army. It has been a subject of regret that some of the Native Regiments of this Presidency were not formed into Light Corps, as a branch of the service particularly adapted to the Sepoys, and the efficiency and utility of which in the field requires no comment. It is true of late all Regiments of the line were taught the Light Infantry exercise and the good effects of the system were soon felt, but the distinction of being a thorough light-bob was withheld. The suggestion of the present measure is, we believe, due to Lord Keane, but it was reserved for the present Commander-in-Chief to carry out the idea to perfection. The selection, too, of the Corps will not, we think, give rise to jealousy, the 4th and 5th are two old and tried Corps whose valour is attested by the words on their colours and appointments. . . .

“ However we wish the Corps joy of their new distinctions and shall be truly glad to hear that some head-dress is appointed for them, which will not, like

the present one, require to be held on when the bugle gaily sounds for the 'double march.'"

The Commanding Officer was ordered to submit indents for new arms and accoutrements, but it was some time before they could be complied with, as it was found that there was not a single rifle in the arsenals of Bombay or Calcutta, and only four in Madras; neither had the Military Board any details to enable them to make up the accoutrements. Consequently the Adjutant-General asks that "an emergent indent may be immediately made on the Honourable Court of Directors for a supply of rifles with new belts and rifle appointments to the extent required to complete the full establishment of the Corps, and that the arms, as well as the accoutrements and appointments, be made up of precisely the same pattern as those now in use in Her Majesty's Rifle Brigade." This was done and the articles were received from England early the following year.

The next four years were spent peacefully at Baroda, the time being employed in training the men to use their new arms and to manœuvre in extended order; not the least difficult part of which was to teach them to recognize the numerous bugle calls by which all movements in the field were directed. During this period the only notable events were the departure of Captain Honner in 1842, after completing sixteen years as Adjutant, to take over the command of the Recruit Depot at Poona; and the presentation of the Order of British India to the Subadar Major, Shamajee Bappoojee, in 1845. According to the autobiography of Colonel Maude, then an ensign in the Regiment, this Indian officer had been present at the capture of Seringapatam, so must have had at least forty-six years' service at that time. He was pensioned early in 1847.

In December 1845 the Regiment was ordered on Field Service to Karachi *via* Bombay. They arrived at Karachi on 25th January 1846 and Maude tells us that "on landing we were marched to the Cantonment, about 3 miles off, when we were met by a remarkable-looking personage of singularly Jewish physiognomy, with a long white beard, wearing a plain sourtout and while solar helmet.

First Sikh War.  
Move to Karachi;  
Inspection  
by General  
Sir Charles Napier.

He was alone, and galloping up to us, in a voice of authority he ordered us to halt and wheel in line, when he rode up and down the ranks, minutely inspecting us with his piercing eyes. This was none other than General Sir Charles Napier, the hero of Meeanee."

The move of the Regiment to Karachi was brought about by the outbreak of the first Sikh War. Although for some years war with the Khalsa had appeared inevitable, no adequate concentration of troops had been effected, partly owing to the opinion of the Governor-General, Sir H. Hardinge, that the Sikh Army would never dare to cross the Sutlej, and partly owing to his fear that preliminary movements of troops would precipitate a conflict which he hoped it might be possible to avoid. Consequently after the battles of Mudki

and Ferozeshahar at the end of December 1845, the British forces were in no position to follow up their dearly bought successes until they were reinforced.

A reserve Army of the Indus was to be formed in Upper Sind under General Napier, and our Regiment was ordered to move by forced marches to Sukkur to join it. (See General Map of India, opposite p. 270.)

They left Karachi on 8th February 1846 and marched by Tatta up the right bank of the Indus to Kotri, where they were ferried across to Hyderabad and there enjoyed a two days' halt. Leaving Hyderabad, they passed the battlefield of Meeanee and continued up the left bank of the Indus to Rohri, where they were again ferried across the river to Sukkur, which was the military cantonment. The march had been a tedious one and the going none too good, as there were no roads. The only incident which Colonel Maude deemed worthy of note was when, shortly before reaching Kotri, a large sounder of pig broke through the column, and Colonel Forbes, who was then commanding the Regiment and was a keen *shikari*, seizing a spear, which his *syce* was carrying, dashed after them and succeeded in spearing one which proved a welcome addition to the Mess table.

On reaching Sukkur early in March, news was received of the decisive defeat of the Sikhs at Aliwal and Sobraon which put an end to the war. The army of the Indus was broken up and the Regiment was sent into cantonments at Shikarpur, about 36 miles away where they relieved a Bengal Regiment on 15th March 1846. Here they remained for the best part of a year, furnishing a detachment of two Companies at Shahpur on the Baluchistan border to check the incursions of the Boogtees and Murrees, wild hill tribes, who raided their peaceful neighbours of the plains, carrying off their goods and cattle.

Their stay at Shikarpur was not a pleasant one, as the cantonment was situated in the sandy desert, and the heat in the hot weather was intense. It was with great relief that in February 1847 they received orders to return to Karachi, as Sir Charles Napier was anxious that they should profit by the presence there of the 60th Rifles to gain a further knowledge of their new *rôle*. They moved into Sukkur where they embarked on river steamers and flats which took them down to Tatta, whence they marched to Karachi, arriving there on 16th February 1847; and were brigaded with the 60th Rifles.

During the stay in Upper Sind, Colonel Forbes was transferred to the 3rd Regiment, and his place was taken by Captain Honner, who had rejoined post haste from Poona on learning that the Regiment had been ordered on Field Service. He was promoted Brevet Major in February 1847. A year and a half was spent in Karachi under this energetic Commanding Officer and much valuable training in conjunction with the 60th Rifles was carried out. During this period Sir Charles Napier, who was due to proceed home on retirement, was given by the station a farewell dinner which was held in our Mess as it was the largest in the cantonment.

Training in  
conjunction  
with 60th Rifles.



MAJOR-GENERAL SIR ROBERT WILLIAM HONNER, K.C.B., 1821-1861.  
Commandant 1846-1856.



Up to this time, the Regiment's facings had been black like those of the Rifle Brigade, but the scarlet facings of the 60th evidently took **Change from** Major Honner's fancy, for in February 1848 he asked for **Black to Red** sanction to alter them to red. In his letter he states "the black **Facings, 1848.** facings of the 4th Native Infantry or Rifle Corps, affording little or no contrast to the Rifle Green Jacket, give the men a most unfavourable and heavy look." As the Clothing Department had no objection to the change it was referred home to the Court of Directors, who sanctioned it in September 1848. They also directed that the ensigns be designated 2nd Lieutenants in accordance with the usage in Her Majesty's Rifle Regiments.



## CHAPTER XI

1848-1853

The 2nd Sikh War, storming of Multan. Execution of the murderer of Mr. Vans Agnew.

(See Map No. 7, opposite p. 102.)

IN October 1848 the Regiment received orders to march to Rohri to join the force assembling there for the siege of Multan. One Company went up by river as escort to Major-General Auchmuty, C.B., who had been appointed by the Bombay Government to command the Bombay Division.

**The Second  
Sikh War.**

Before following the doings of the Regiment further, it is desirable to glance briefly at the events which led up to the siege.

The immediate cause of the Second Sikh War was the cold-blooded murder in Multan of Mr. Vans Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson. Multan was a dependency of the Sikhs, to whom it paid tribute. The Governor, Mulraj, after clearing off arrears of payment, intimated that he wished to relinquish the post. So Vans Agnew, a Bengal Political Officer, was sent to install his successor, Khan Singh Man; and Lieutenant Anderson of the Bombay European Regiment was appointed his assistant. They proceeded to Multan in April 1848 with an escort of a Gurkha Regiment of the Sikh Army; but while leaving the Fort on 18th April in company with Mulraj, they were both cut down and escaped badly wounded to the Idgah, a building outside the city where they had put up; and here two days later they were murdered. Their escort then went over to the rebels. It is impossible to say whether Mulraj was the instigator of the murder, or whether he even had anything to do with it, but as soon as it had been perpetrated he was openly hostile and was soon joined by a numerous following of rebels.

At the close of the first Sikh War, though their Army had been completely defeated, there were still many Sikh Regiments in the west which had not been engaged at all, so that the spirit of the Khalsa was by no means broken. After the treaty had been signed, British officers were sent to various centres to settle the country, and though the Sikh Sirdars appeared to be doing their best to co-operate, it was evident that the rank and file was hostile and would take advantage of any opportunity to break out in rebellion. One of these officers, Lieutenant Edwardes, had been sent to settle the Derajat, and on receiving a message from the wounded Vans Agnew for help, he raised as many irregular troops as he could locally and, calling on Bahawal Khan of Bahawalpur to join him, he set out for Multan. After defeating Mulraj he succeeded in

containing him in Multan, so localizing the rising for a time. He was not strong enough to capture the fort himself, but realizing the importance of its early capture to prevent the rebellion spreading, he urged the Government to despatch a force as soon as possible for this purpose. The Commander-in-Chief, however, was averse to sending British troops as the hot weather had now set in, so that nothing was done until July when it became apparent that this vacillating policy was having a bad effect. Consequently, in that month Major-General Whish was ordered to march to Multan with a force and capture the fortress. After joining Edwardes' force he attacked the enemy's advanced position on 12th September 1848 and carried it with heavy loss, but the following day Sher Singh, one of the Sikh leaders who was thought to be loyal, went over to the enemy with some 3,000 troops. General Whish now came to the conclusion that to prosecute the siege more troops should be placed at his disposal, so he withdrew to a position about 5 miles to the south-east of the city and there awaited the advent of the Bombay Column.

Our Regiment left Karachi on 26th October 1848 and arrived at Rohri on 19th November, having covered the 332 miles in twenty-five marches with only two days' halt. The following day it was inspected by Major-General Auchmuty, C.B., who congratulated the Commanding Officer in no measured terms and concluded: "I beg you tell your Regiment in my own words that I consider it the best I have seen in the Division."

Here General Auchmuty was ordered to hand over command of the force to Brigadier Dundas, as he (Auchmuty) was senior to General Whish, who had been appointed by the Governor-General to command the entire operations against Multan.

The composition of the Bombay force was as follows:—

Brigadier the Honourable N. Dundas, C.B., Commanding the Division.

*1st Brigade.* Brigadier Capon.

3rd Troop Horse Artillery.

Sappers and Miners.

Scinde Irregular Horse.

H.M.'s 60th Rifles.

3rd Regiment Bombay Native Infantry.\*

9th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry.†

*2nd Brigade.* Brigadier Stalker, C.B.

Bailey's Battery.

Bombay Lancers.

1st Bombay European Regiment Fusiliers.

4th Bombay Native Infantry, Rifle Corps.

19th Bombay Native Infantry.‡

---

\* 1st Battalion 5th Mahratta Light Infantry.

† 4th Battalion 4th Bombay Grenadiers, disbanded 31st March 1930.

‡ 2nd Battalion 9th Jat Regiment.

The force marched from Rohri by Brigades, the 1st Brigade on 27th November and the 2nd Brigade two days later. The 2nd **Junction with the Bengal Force, 21st Dec. 1848.** Brigade crossed the Sutlej by a bridge of boats on 17th December and joined hands with the Bengal force on 21st December 1848 at Suraj Khund.

On the 23rd December the Regiment was sent out with a party of Cavalry and a wing of the Fusiliers on a reconnaissance, and though several shots were fired at them by the guns in the Fort, no damage was done.

On the 25th December General Whish inspected the Bombay Division. He found the troops looking so fresh, in spite of their march, and their equipment so complete that he decided to resume operations at once. After the inspection, camp was shifted to near the village of Sital ki Mari on the left of the Bengal Troops.

It is interesting to note the impression that the Bombay Troops made on Lieutenant Edwardes, a close and impartial observer, who was in command of the Irregular Troops. In his book *A Year in the Punjab* he says: "The rear of the Bombay Column arrived at Mooltan on 21st December. Finer troops than were in this Division never perhaps took the field in India. They had been long looked for, and our soldiers crowded out to welcome them as they arrived in Camp.

"They were the first troops of the Bombay Army which I had ever seen, and I beheld them with admiration. Their native material was inferior, but their marching order, dress and general *set up*, was a closer approach to the British soldier than I had ever seen made by the Bengal Sepoy. After seeing the two Divisions work side by side in the second Siege of Mooltan, I would also give the palm of discipline to the Bombay Sepoys."

He was also much struck by the fact that every man in the Division carried a canteen for water. (See Map No. 7, opposite p. 102.)

The ground between the Bombay Camp and the city was very broken, with two outstanding mounds which were occupied by the enemy. A large canal, known as Wali Muhammad's, took off from the Chenab some 10 miles upstream from Multan and, passing round the west of the city, continued due south to Suraj Khund. This canal was some 30 feet deep and about the same width, being about 10 feet below ground level, the banks being piled up about 20 feet on each side. From the main canal numerous smaller irrigation channels took off at right-angles. The canal had been dammed at the mouth and drained, and, together with the transverse cuts, formed a series of formidable positions which the enemy had strengthened with stockades and

#### First Plan of Attack.

batteries. The citadel of Multan was at the north-east corner of the city, and General Whish's original plan was to make an attack on the north-east corner of the citadel without previously entering the city, only occupying so much of the suburbs as were necessary for the erection of batteries and protection of the attacking troops.

To carry this into effect a forward movement was ordered for the 27th December. A Bengal Column was to form the main attack and capture some lofty brick-kilns and Mulraj's Garden, the Am Khas; while a second party was to follow them to escort forward the siege artillery. To divert the enemy's attention from this quarter, three other columns were to operate on the south and west of the city. Two of these were found by the Bombay Division: the right one, under Brigadier Capon, consisting of a wing of the 60th Rifles, the 3rd Native Infantry, a squadron of Cavalry, a light battery and some Sappers, was directed on the eastern mound, the Mundi Ava; the left one, under Brigadier Dundas, consisting of a wing of the Bombay Fusiliers, our Regiment, a squadron of Cavalry, a light battery and some Sappers, was directed on the western mound, the Sidi-lal-ki-Bed; while the third column, under Major Edwardes, consisting of such Irregulars as were not required for the protection of communications, was to operate along the Wali Muhammad Canal to the west of the city. The three left columns were to commence their attacks at twelve noon, while the Bengal Column was to move fifteen minutes later.

The Commanders of the Bombay Columns were ordered to capture the Mundi Ava and Sidi-lal-ki-Bed if possible, but were to use their discretion in pressing the attack in accordance with the opposition encountered.

It must be borne in mind that this was our Regiment's first experience of active service in their new rôle as a Rifle Corps. That their training had been sound is evident from the successful way in which they carried out their task. There was one lesson, however, which had not been thoroughly mastered, and this was the question of ammunition supply, always a difficult subject to teach in peace time even now, much more so in the days of muzzle-loading rifles, when caps, powder and ball were carried separately, and no pack mules were available from which to replenish supplies.

The following account of the part played by the Regiment in this action is taken chiefly from the despatches of Major Honner, who was commanding, and those of Brigadier Dundas who had the Regiment immediately under his eye.

The Regiment paraded 15 British Officers, 1 Sergeant Major and 748 Indian Ranks, and left Camp at twelve noon as the advanced

**Action in the  
Suburbs of  
Multan,  
27th Dec. 1848.**

guard of the left column, the vanguard of two companies being guided by Lieutenant Tollard of the Bengal Engineers. The line of advance was on a white mosque some way to the left of the Sidi-lal-ki-Bed. On encountering the enemy's advanced posts, the skirmishing line was prolonged to the left and reinforced, driving the enemy back until the old line of entrenchments of the first siege had been reached when the column was halted, the Fusiliers forming in the parallel, while the main-guard of our Regiment lay down behind a bank to their left and facing the white mosque, while the battery was brought into action against the Sidi-lal-ki-Bed. Here the skirmishers were again reinforced until the whole Regiment was in extended order. Brigadier Dundas in his despatch says: "A few

rounds were then fired at the mosque which was occupied by the enemy, and I directed Major Honner, commanding the 4th N.I. (Rifles) to advance against it, throwing forward his left and thus take it in reverse. Nothing could exceed the steadiness and good conduct of the 4th N.I. (Rifles), who moving in extended order, rapidly drove the enemy from the mosque and also from another large one, with adjoining buildings, where the enemy had two guns."

After this a general advance was ordered, the Fusiliers passing to the right of Sidi-lal-ki-Bed and our Regiment to the left. Honner says: "Our line then advanced with great animation, the enemy flying before them in force towards the suburbs and carrying along with them their dead and wounded; for a moment they halted to defend a strong stockade, made of date trees, across a hollow road, and commenced firing, but they were instantly turned on both flanks and again fled with loss. They made a second stand a good way ahead, at the gardens to the left of the Sidi-lal-ki-Bed, and the enclosures around, and were driven out of them by about two-thirds of the skirmishers on the left, the remaining portion of the skirmishers taking and holding possession of the garden. The skirmishers on the left continued advancing into the suburbs, and got entangled in the streets, when a very heavy fire from two guns and about 500 or 600 matchlock men mixed up with Cavalry checked their advance, and here the greater part of the casualties occurred. The greater portion of the ammunition having been expended, the halt and recall was sounded and they fell back under cover of the Fusiliers and continued to retire until they reached the left front of the garden which was occupied by the remainder of our men, and formed quarter distance column to the flank and rear of it and had their ammunition replenished."

Edwardes in his book says that one section of the 4th Rifles actually got in at one of the city gates. The fight had been a very strenuous one and had lasted from 12 noon till 3.30 p.m., covering several miles of very broken ground. There is no doubt that in the excitement part of the Regiment exceeded its orders in pursuing into the suburbs and, running short of ammunition, they suffered pretty heavily in the retirement, the total casualties being 19 killed, 19 wounded and 18 missing. The 18 missing appear to have got separated from the rest in the suburbs, where they were cut off and captured and were probably the section to which Edwardes refers. They subsequently rejoined the Regiment when the city was stormed on 2nd January.

After replenishing their ammunition, the Regiment again advanced to the garden, the Biji Bagh, and held it until they were relieved at 5 p.m. by the 19th Native Infantry, when they took up a position to cover the left flank and bivouacked, remaining under arms the whole night, which passed quietly.

Brigadier Dundas in his despatch writes: "I have great pleasure in expressing the satisfaction I experienced at the conduct of the Troops. The conduct of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers was most excellent, frequently charging the enemy with the bayonet and driving him within the city walls. The steadiness and

good conduct in which the 4th Rifles moved over very difficult ground deserves every commendation." Next morning the Regiment returned to camp.

The success of the left columns had so distracted the enemy's attention that the main attack came as a complete surprise and had no difficulty in occupying its objectives.

The next three days were spent in establishing the batteries while troops occupied the line of suburbs to cover their construction. Our Regiment's turn at this duty came on 29th December, when they occupied the line between the Mundi Ava and Sidi-lal-ki-Bed.

On this day the enemy made a Sortie in force against the Sidi-lal-ki-Bed, which had been taken over by the Irregulars so as to free the Bombay Troops for the siege. A lot of heavy fighting took place, but only the extreme left of the Regiment's line became involved and lost two men killed and three wounded. A similar duty was carried out on 31st December without incident.

The explosion of the enemy's chief magazine is thus described by Maude, one of our Officers who was present: "On 30th December a shell from one of our mortar batteries struck the Jumma Masjid, or Great Mosque, and another blew up a powder magazine with a terrific explosion, killing and burying under its ruins, it was reported, nearly one thousand souls, stores, etc. Never shall I forget the scene as, rushing out of my tent, I beheld a dark heaving mass rising slowly and imposingly from the interior of the Fort, amid dense volumes of smoke, till it reached a vast height, when it assumed the form of a pillar of gigantic proportions, which gradually spreading out became as it were an immense pall hanging mournfully over the doomed fortress, which seemed shaken as by an earthquake. As if by mutual consent, the firing on both sides ceased awhile, everyone gazing upwards with silent awe and wonder. Then from the British Camp arose one loud burst of triumph, which was speedily answered by a furious cannonade from our courageous and still unsubdued enemy."

The considerable success attained all along the line on the 27th December decided General Whish to modify his original plan of attack, and he now decided to assault the city first and then attack the citadel from the city side as well as from the north-east corner.

By the morning of 2nd January 1849, two breaches being reported practicable, orders for the assault were at once given. This was to be carried out by two columns: the Bengal Column to storm the right breach near the Delhi Gate; the Bombay Column to storm the left breach near the Khooni Burj (Bloody Bastion).


The Bombay Column, which consisted of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers, 19th Bombay Infantry and 4th Bombay Rifles, paraded at 1 p.m. and marched off in the above order in column to the Mundi Ava. One Company of our Regiment under Lieutenant Gordon was detailed to carry scaling ladders and to act in conjunction with Sappers and Miners.

After a short halt behind the Mundi Ava, the Column moved forward along the skirts of the suburbs to the point of formation which was about 200 yards distant from the breach. While waiting here for the signal to assault, which was to be a salvo fired from the Delhi Gate battery, one Bugler was killed and Lieutenant Warden and one Rifleman wounded. Shortly after 3 p.m., on the signal being given, the assaulting columns moved forward, the Fusiliers leading and our Regiment bringing up the rear. The road leading to the breach was a winding one and as a check occurred while the Fusiliers were engaged in a fierce hand-to-hand struggle in the breach, Major Honner led our Regiment to the right and over a rise whence they rushed to the support of the Fusiliers. The advance to the breach was carried out with very little loss, thanks chiefly to the admirable covering fire of the Bombay Artillery, under Lieutenant Keir, and that of the 60th Rifles. The enemy had dug a trench on the city side of the breach and built barricades where they fought stubbornly, but the gallantry of the Fusiliers carried all before them, though they lost heavily in the process. After clearing these obstacles the enemy was pursued right through the city to the ramparts on the far side.

Our Regiment on entering the breach took a line towards the grain market, a large open space in the centre of the town. Parties were detailed to proceed down the various streets, to clear them of the enemy, and posts were established at commanding points. The Regimental Headquarters with one Company eventually joined Column Headquarters at the Bohur Gate at about 6 p.m., and here they bivouacked for the night.

The night was spent in constant patrolling, to keep up communication with the various posts, and though the enemy made no attacks **Night Incident at Lahari Gate, 2nd Jan. 1849.** there was a good deal of spasmodic firing. One post near the Lahari Gate was for some time worried by a brass gun which was discharging grape at them until they made a sally and captured it. This was smartly carried out by 30 men of the Fusiliers under Lieutenant Cowper and 50 men of our Regiment under Lieutenant Sheppard, accompanied by Surgeon Ritchie, the Regimental Doctor. Ritchie, a tall, phlegmatic Scotsman, was a tremendous fire-eater. He had been in the thick of the show all afternoon and had had his ear snicked by a bullet during the street fighting.

During the night the Sappers were employed clearing the gateways, and at about 1 a.m. there was a tremendous explosion near the Bohur Gate, nearly all those working on the Gateway being killed and also a certain number of our men, though none of the Officers were injured. Maude in his book says: "All of us started up at once, fearing a mine had been sprung, and that we should momentarily be attacked; but, happily for us, no such attack was attempted. Never shall I forget the fearful scene, which is indelibly impressed on my mind. Amid the shouts of Officers earnestly calling upon their men to 'Be steady and Stand to your arms' were heard the heart-piercing cries and groans of those buried alive, imploring to be released from their sufferings.



### THE STORMING OF MOOLTAN, 2nd January 1849.

To Major-General Sir W. S. Whish, K.C.B., and his brave Comrades in Arms this plate is respectfully dedicated by their very obedient and obliged servant, Rudolph Ackerman. Shewell, H. W. Regiments and Native Troops gallantly entering the Breach, led by gallant Captain Leith, Bombay Fusiliers; the Union Jack being planted on the walls by Sergeant Bennett. Entering on his comrades and firing as he could till every man had mounted and remained till he was called away at the last moment. The Storming Party consisted of the 1st Bombay Rifle and 9th Foot, Bombay Column. In the foreground, within the Battery, are introduced General Whish and Staff, General Dundas, commanding the Bombay Division, Sir John Cheape, etc.

*Reproduced from a coloured print by kind permission of the Royal United Service Institution.*





. . I myself had rather a narrow escape, as I was lying on a native cot close up to the walls when I felt myself lifted up by the force of the explosion and thrown down violently with the cot providentially over me, for it served as a screen from the bricks and earth which fell around me, so that I escaped, though stunned and shaken."

Several prisoners and a green flag had been captured during the street fighting and the 18 men who had been taken prisoner on the 27th December were recovered.

On the morning of 3rd January the Regiment was relieved by the 60th Rifles and marched back to camp.

As soon as he saw that the British Troops had entered the city, Mulraj shut himself into the citadel with its picked garrison of between 4,000 and 5,000 men, and on the morning of the 4th January the 2nd Brigade moved to Hazari Bagh at the north-west angle of the citadel to complete its investment.

Investment of  
the Citadel,  
4th Jan. 1849.

Preparations for the assault of the citadel were now pushed on. Part of our Regiment was employed nearly every day as covering troops to keep down the fire of the defenders while batteries and trenches were being constructed. In this duty they had eight more men wounded.

The garrison were now reaching the end of their tether. They were continually bombarded from all sides, and the soldiers were reduced to grinding their own corn as all the *atta* had been destroyed in the explosion of the Jumma Masjid. Mulraj now made overtures for surrender, but at first hoped to do so on his own terms. These, however, were refused and, as his garrison were taking every opportunity to desert, he finally gave himself up on the 22nd January to General Whish, just as all preparations for the storm had been completed. The garrison numbering between 3,000 and 4,000 laid down their arms and the citadel was occupied by British Troops.

The total casualties sustained by our Regiment in all these operations was 29 killed and 74 wounded.

While the city was being cleaned up and preparations being made for the force to move to the assistance of the Northern Army, a solemn rite was performed, which created a great impression on all those who witnessed it. This was the burial inside the fortress of the murdered Mr. Vans Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson. The bodies were carried in state by a party of the Fusiliers up through the breach which had been made by British guns; all Officers attending to pay their last tribute to the memory of the dead.

Burial of  
Mr. Vans Agnew  
and  
Lieut. Anderson.

While the operations of the siege had been in progress, the costly battle of Chillianwala had been fought by the Northern Army under the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Gough, on 13th January; and as he did not consider himself strong enough to attack again, now that the Sikhs had been reinforced by the Afghan Horse, he dug himself in and awaited the fall of Multan which was

daily expected. The Bengal Troops, under General Whish, started on their march north on 31st January, followed two days later by the Bombay Column. Great was our Regiment's mortification at being left behind as part of the garrison of Multan. In point of fact they missed no opportunity of further distinguishing themselves, as, although the Bombay Column was present at the decisive victory of Gujrat on 21st February 1849, the Infantry were held in reserve the whole time, and never fired a shot.

On the departure of the other troops, our Regiment vacated the city, which was handed over to Irregular troops under General Courtland, and moved into the barracks of one of the Khalsa Regiments, to the south-east of the citadel.

On 22nd March a company of the Regiment formed the escort at the public execution of Gudhar Singh, a Mazbi Sikh, the murderer of Mr. Vans Agnew. This was carried out in front of the gate of the Idgah where the crime had been committed. A very dreary hot weather passed with nothing of note till August, when exceptionally heavy rain caused the Chenab to overflow its banks and flood the country for miles around. The water invaded the lines suddenly during the night, and by daybreak was waist deep in the men's huts. It was with the greatest difficulty that they succeeded in carrying their arms, accoutrements and kits to some higher ground near by, where a camp was pitched. A few days later this camp, too, was submerged, and they had to move into the citadel where the heat was unbearable. This state of affairs brought on fever which ran through the whole Regiment; on one occasion as many as 500 were on the sick list at once. It was not until 14th November 1849 that the ground had dried up enough to enable them again to camp outside, when they soon regained their fitness.

<b>Honours to Commanding Officer and Havaldar.</b>	While they were living in the citadel a garrison parade was held to witness the presentation of the Third Class Indian Order of Merit to Havaldar Ram Singh of the Regiment for gallantry during the action of 27th December.
--	---

The Commanding Officer, Captain and Brevet Major R. W. Honner, who had been twice mentioned in despatches, was promoted Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel in August 1849.


On 24th December 1849 our Regiment, relieved by the 41st Bengal Infantry, embarked on country boats on the Chenab; and on Christmas Day started their long river journey down the Chenab, Sutlej and Indus, reaching Tatta on 18th January 1850, whence they marched to Karachi. After a five days' halt they again embarked in country boats bound for the Konkan, disembarked at Vingourla and marched to Belgaum where the next three years were spent. The only incident of note during this period was the presentation of the Order of British India to Subadar-Major Laximan Singh who had been brought to notice for gallantry during the operations at Multan.





# SIEGE OF MULTAN

MAP No. 7





## CHAPTER XII

1853-1857

Field Service in Persia. Capture of Reshire Fort, occupation of Bushire, action of Khush Ab.

(See Map No. 11, opposite p. 142.)

ON 1st November 1853 the Regiment marched to Poona in the ordinary course of relief. Cholera broke out on the way, and caused a loss of 19 men and 150 followers and families, but a short halt in camp put matters right.

Nothing of note happened until October 1856, when the Regiment was detailed for service with the Persian Field Force.

Just before leaving Poona, Colonel Honner bid the Regiment good-bye, and handed over command to Major Manson. In a farewell order he stated: "Colonel Honner has served with the 4th Regiment N.I. or Rifle Corps, almost uninterruptedly since 10th March 1822—thirty-four years and a half, sixteen of which as its Adjutant and ten years as its Commanding Officer." That he left the Regiment in a very efficient state is borne out by the following extract from a letter from Army Headquarters to the Officer Commanding Poona Division: "With reference to the Review and Poona Inspection Return of the 4th Rifles for the years 1855 and 1856, I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to state that the perfect order in which you have again reported that excellent Corps to be, reflects the highest credit on Colonel Honner and the Officers, European and Native, under his command."

Colonel Honner had been appointed to command the 2nd Brigade of the Persian Field Force, and the Regiment were delighted to find that they had been posted to serve under him.

There had been difficulties with the Persian Government for some years. The chief cause of the trouble was the small State of Herat, which the British Government insisted should remain independent, forming, as it did, a valuable buffer State on their north-west frontier, and closing the easiest road into India. The Persians, on the other hand, claimed that Herat was a subject province and, egged on by Russia whose influence, at that time, was paramount in Persia and who was gradually extending her power eastwards, wanted to occupy it. In the year 1853 the Persian Government signed an agreement with England acknowledging Herat's independence, but when it came to giving effect to the terms,



they put every possible difficulty in the way. First, they objected to the appointment of Mirza Hashem as British Agent at Shiraz, threatening to arrest him if he set out for that place. They then seized and detained his wife; and, when the British Minister, the Honourable C. A. Murray, demanded her immediate release, they publicly accused him and other Officers of the British Mission of carrying on improper relations with the lady. This insult led to the withdrawal of the Mission from Teheran at the end of 1855, whereupon the Persians despatched a force to capture Herat in strict contravention of the treaty of 1853. For some months, further attempts at a peaceful settlement were made by the British representative in Constantinople, but the Persians maintained an obstinate attitude, in which they were encouraged by the exaggerated reports of the Russian success at Kars in November 1855, little notice being taken of the subsequent fall of Sevastopol. Eventually orders were sent to Bombay to hold a force in readiness to occupy the island of Karrak, which commanded the head of the Gulf, and the city and district of Bushire: and on 1st November 1856 the Government of India finally declared war on Persia, Herat having in the meantime fallen into Persian hands.

The Regiment marched out of Poona on 3rd November 1856, their baggage being carried on elephants and camels. They descended the Khandala Ghat to Kampoli, where they were delighted to find a train awaiting them, the line having been recently completed as far as that place. This was our sepoys' first experience of train travelling; and it caused great excitement and interest. Bombay was reached on the 8th and, after an inspection by the Governor, the Regiment embarked on the 12th and two subsequent days. They were distributed as follows:—

In the steam frigate *Firoze*, 9 British Officers, 1 Sergeant, 350 Indian Ranks.

In the steam frigate *Assaye*, 3 British Officers and 66 Indian Ranks.

In the steam transport *Bombay*, 2 British Officers and 198 Indian Ranks.

In the transport *Wansell*, 1 British Officer and 55 Indian Ranks.

In the transport *Futteh Sultan*, 25 Indian Ranks, the last two vessels being sailing boats. (See Map No. 11, opposite p. 142.)

The bulk of the fleet left Bombay on 13th November, the remainder following as soon as they were ready, all being bound for Bandar Abbas. The first arrivals reached there on 19th November where they waited for the rest of the force, which included troops that were embarking at Karachi, Porbunder and Vingourla. By the 27th the whole force was collected and set sail for Bushire where they anchored two days later.

The force consisted of General Stalker, C.B., Commanding.

1st Brigade. Brigadier Stopford.

H.M.'s 64th Regiment.\*

20th Bombay Infantry.†

---

\* 1st Battalion The North Staffordshire Regiment.

† 2nd Battalion 6th Rajputana Rifles.

2nd Brigade. Brigadier R. H. Honner.

2nd European Light Infantry.\*

4th Bombay Rifles.

Baluch Battalion.†

Divisional Troops.

3rd Bombay Cavalry, The Poona Horse and some Artillery.

On 3rd December, Brigadier Honner, who was on board the *Firoze* with half of our Regiment, was ordered to occupy the Island of Karrak, some 30 miles distant from Bushire. This was effected without opposition the following day, and the Union Jack hoisted to a salute of 21 guns. Leaving a company of the Baluch Regiment to garrison the place, the *Firoze* returned to Bushire.

The next task was the occupation of the district of Bushire, and to effect this it was decided to make a landing at Hallilah Bay, about 10 miles south, whither the whole force sailed on 6th December.

Landing at  
Hallilah Bay,  
7th Dec. 1856.

The following day an unopposed landing was effected by a force of 600 men under Brigadier Honner, consisting of 200 men from each of the 64th Foot, 2nd European Light Infantry and our Regiment; the few enemy seen being driven off by the fire of the gunboats of the fleet. The bulk of the force disembarked that day and then moved about three miles inland to the village of Hallilah, where they bivouacked.

Capture of  
Reshire Fort,  
9th Dec. 1856.

Having completed the disembarkation on the 8th, the force next day moved on the old Dutch Fort of Reshire, and on the way the advanced guard had a sharp encounter near Charbar.

On approaching Reshire, which was held by some 800 Tungistanis, Major Manson was ordered to move out with the Regiment to clear a village to his front and to support Captain Gibbard's Battery. This was speedily carried out; a mosque, occupied by the enemy, being smartly cleared by a bayonet charge led by 2nd Lieutenant Sangster. The Regiment then guarded the left flank of the force detailed to storm the fort which was captured after a stout resistance. In this engagement one Indian Officer and five men of ours were wounded.

The fort was then demolished, and the following day the force moved on Bushire which, being built on a narrow spit of land, was easily accessible to the Navy, who had pounded it for some hours with their guns. During the naval bombardment a

Surrender of  
Bushire,  
10th Dec. 1856.

good number of the garrison succeeded in escaping across the creek to the north of the city, although the Naval Commander had been asked by General Stalker to take steps to prevent this. On the approach of the troops, the garrison at once opened negotiations, which, after some delay, resulted in its unconditional surrender. While negotiations were in progress, some more

\* 2nd Battalion Durham Light Infantry.

† 4th Battalion 10th Baluch Regiment.

cavalry tried to escape. A correspondent to the *Times of India* describes the incident as follows: "As soon as the Men of War had ceased firing the 3rd Troop, Horse Artillery, commenced; the first shot brought down the flag staff of the Governor's house. When the cavalry prepared to make a sortie, those that left the gate were sent flying back by another round which brought down four men and a horse. . . . Another cavalry party that advanced from the redoubt, came riding out at so easy a pace and in such small numbers, that it was imagined that they were coming up to parley; but to the astonishment of the force, they had no sooner come up to the left flank of our line, than they set spurs to their horses and bolted at full speed, followed by some of our mounted Officers; among others I saw Brigadier Honner ride coolly up to a fellow and hit him a smart rap with his cane. Captain Aitcheson, the Brigadier's Staff Officer, succeeded in stopping him and brought him in prisoner." The Governor was made a prisoner of war and the garrison, some 1,500 strong, marched out of the main gate, laid down their arms and were permitted to depart to their homes. The arms surrendered consisted chiefly of good match-locks, but included quite a number of flint-locks of British manufacture.

The Force having now completed its task, withdrew two miles from Bushire and set to work to make a strong entrenched camp on the isthmus. This kept the men busy for some weeks. During this time frequent marches were carried out in the neighbourhood to show the flag and to keep the men fit.

Owing to lack of transport, the troops had had to disembark at Hallilah Bay lightly equipped, and found bivouacking very cold work; they were therefore delighted to get their tents and kits on the 13th December and make themselves comfortable. Duties were very heavy owing to the enormous extent of the camp and the strong outlying piquets which were deemed necessary in view of constant reports of the enemy advancing in large numbers.

Sir James Outram, who had arrived in India on 10th January 1857, with orders to take over the Command in Persia, was gazetted to the temporary rank of Lieutenant-General and, with the Second Division placed at his disposal, shortly set sail for the Gulf. They reached Bushire on 31st January 1857 and it was not long before active operations again commenced.

The enemy had a large force at Borasjoon, some 50 miles from Bushire on the Shiraz road, at the foot of the hills. Here he had collected a great quantity of stores, and intended to make it a jumping-off place for an expedition to drive the British force into the sea. They had got accustomed to our route marches, and put our continual return to camp down to our fear of encountering the Persian army. It was decided to exploit this idea and, by a sudden raid, to attack them in their camp before their preparations enabled them to take the initiative.

Consequently on 3rd February 1857 the whole force set out for Borasjoon, each Regiment leaving two companies to guard the camp. In order to admit

of their moving fast, nothing was carried on the transport beyond some extra ammunition and some rations, each man carrying his greatcoat, one blanket and two days' cooked food.

The march commenced at six o'clock in the evening, continued all through the night, very sandy going alternating with swamp, and the village of Charkota, about 26 miles, was reached at nine o'clock next morning. Here a halt was called for the day, Regiments piling arms where they were, and the men lying down beside them. The day was spent in extreme discomfort as a very high wind sprang up, bringing with it clouds of sand which permeated everything. At 4 p.m. the march was resumed, and by ten o'clock, having covered another 14 miles, the force halted and lay down to rest in the order of march. They had scarcely settled down, however, before a terrific thunderstorm broke over them, with hail and torrents of rain, which drenched everyone to the skin. This, followed by a piercing cold wind, made the night one of peculiar hardship, and sleep impossible.

This bivouac was supposed to be about 8 miles from the enemy's camp, and all were glad to get under way again at daylight. The precaution was taken of discharging and reloading all arms before moving off, in case the rain had damped the charges. Shortly before one o'clock the Persian camp came in sight and a short halt was made to get Regiments into their positions for the attack, while the Cavalry, Artillery and three companies of our Regiment advanced to cover the deployment. The force had now covered 46 miles in 41 hours under the most harassing weather conditions. All, however, were eager for the fray, and great was their disappointment to see the enemy retreat rapidly to the hills. Our Companies fired a few rounds at their rearguard, but it was only the Cavalry who succeeded in coming up with them when a sharp fight ensued. Brigadier Honner, who was with our companies, had a narrow escape here, a shot passing through his clothes and lodging in his saddle tree, but none of our men were touched.

**Capture of  
Enemy's Camp at  
Borasjoon,  
5th Feb. 1857.**

The force now occupied the enemy's camp which had been very hurriedly vacated, all their camp equipment and ammunition being left behind. The next two days, the 6th and 7th, were spent in collecting all the stores and destroying such as could not be carried off. There was a night alarm on the 6th, which at the time was considered to be a false one, as all reports received at this time showed the enemy to be still retreating through the hills. It was afterwards discovered that some enemy had been round the camp on the night in question, but, finding the troops on the alert, withdrew.

As no enemy were thought to be near and as the force was now encumbered by the captured stores, it was decided to take the return march at a more leisurely pace, and the force moved off at eight o'clock on the evening of the 7th February. Shortly after clearing camp they were halted to witness the explosion of the enemy's gunpowder, said to amount to some 36,000 pounds.

As the night was exceptionally dark, this proved a thrilling spectacle. After that the march was continued without incident until midnight, when the rearguard was attacked.

The rearguard was composed of a detachment of the 3rd Cavalry, Captain Gibbard's two Horse Artillery guns and our Regiment, the **Enemy attack the Rearguard, 7th Feb. 1857.** whole being commanded by Brigadier Honner. Captain Maude, of the Regiment, had been detailed, with two companies, to keep up communication with the main body by stringing out connecting files, and he was also put in charge of the captured grain wagons. These proved to be very slow moving, and just before the attack started he had reported to the Brigadier that his men were strung out to the utmost limit and that the distance from the main body was momentarily increasing. He was told to push along as fast as he could as there was no apprehension of attack. Even so it seems very unsound to have encumbered the rearguard of a retiring force in this manner. The attack, when it came, was a complete surprise to everyone, and but for the steadiness of the men and the fine handling of the situation by the Brigadier, in whom the men had implicit faith, the result might easily have been disastrous. Captain Hunt, 78th Highlanders,\* who was with the main body, in his account of the action says: "Shortly after midnight, however, a sharp rattle of musketry in the rear, and the opening of two horse artillery guns, put everyone on the *qui vive*, and that an attack in force upon the rearguard was taking place, became apparent to all. The column at once halted, and then moved back to extricate the baggage and protecting troops. These, however, were so ably handled by Colonel Honner (who was in command) as to need little assistance, save for the increasing numbers of the assailants.

"In about half an hour after the first shot was fired, not the rearguard only, but the entire force, was enveloped in a skirmishing fire. Horsemen galloped round on all sides, yelling and screaming like fiends, and with trumpets and bugles making as much noise as possible."

The Regimental records tell us that "At this time the Regiment was marching in column of subdivisions, with flank guards to cover the baggage. It was at once faced about to its proper front—the rear—and deployed into line; two rounds of file firing was now given with a cross fire of shrapnel on its flanks from Gibbard's guns. It then gradually moved down, occasionally halting and firing, to join the main column, from which it had become completely isolated, being encumbered with heavy baggage, sick and stragglers. In this manner the enemy were effectually kept at bay and the junction with the main column was at length successfully accomplished without the loss of a man or a particle of baggage."

During this time Sir James Outram met with a serious accident which Maude describes as follows: "While this affair lasted my Subaltern and

---

\* 2nd Battalion The Seaforth Highlanders.

I were galloping backwards and forwards, looking after our men, when, during the sudden flash of a gun in the darkness, I espied at some distance off—about three hundred yards—a riderless charger standing like a graven image beside a prostrate, motionless figure on the ground. I drew Lieutenant Sangster's attention to the same, and we at once galloped up to see who it was.

Accident to  
Sir James Outram.

“ ‘ Good God! It is the General! ’ exclaimed my companion.

“ We were horror-struck, and thought at first that he was killed.

“ ‘ I'm not wounded, but fell from my horse when galloping back on hearing the attack on the rearguard, ’ said a feeble voice, to our relief.

“ We gave Sir James some brandy, which revived him, as he seemed quite stunned and shaken, and I directed Sangster to report the matter at once to the Brigadier, and to procure a *doolie*, or litter, without delay, which he did; and he was eventually handed over to his staff, who had been in vain searching for him everywhere, having lost him in the darkness.”

The whole force was eventually formed into an immense hollow square, or rather oblong, with the baggage and followers in the centre; after a while the order was given to “ cease firing.” Later on the enemy's fire slackened off and towards dawn ceased entirely. Our Regiment only had three men wounded, most of the casualties occurring among the followers and transport herded inside the square, being caused chiefly by the enemy's guns.

With the dawning of day everyone expected to find the enemy gone, but was agreeably surprised to see them drawn up for battle,

Action of  
Khush Ab,  
8th Feb. 1857.

their right resting on the walled village of Khush Ab and their left on a small hamlet; their cavalry were posted on both flanks and their guns were in position on two mounds which commanded the centre of the field. Their numbers were estimated at 2,000 horse and 6,000 infantry.

The action commenced with an artillery duel, while the infantry were taking up their positions for the attack. Two lines were formed, the front line consisting of the 78th Highlanders and some sappers on the right, the 26th Bombay Native Infantry, the Bombay European Light Infantry and the 4th Bombay Rifles on the extreme left. In the second line were H.M.'s 64th Regiment, the 20th Bombay Infantry and the Baluch Battalion. The bulk of the cavalry were grouped on the right flank. The baggage and followers were collected in the rear and guarded by one company from each Regiment and by a party of the 3rd Cavalry.

As soon as the lines were formed, the advance started at a rapid pace, a few casualties being caused by the enemy's artillery. As the infantry progressed, our guns came forward to close range and almost silenced those of the enemy, thus making an opening for the mounted troops. The 3rd Cavalry and Poona Horse made a most gallant charge, sweeping right across the front, cutting down the gunners and driving the Persian Cavalry off the field. Their

infantry, seeing that ours was almost on them, turned and fled, casting away their arms and accoutrements. Though our infantry never succeeded in getting to grips with their opponents, the victory was decisive, the enemy leaving 700 dead on the field, while our casualties were small. The Highlanders and our Regiment, though both in the leading line, were fortunate to escape scot free.

The cavalry and horse artillery, who had taken up the pursuit, returned about 10 a.m. when the force moved clear of the battlefield and halted to cook some food and to rest. Little rest, however, did they get, as the rain started again about midday and soon all were soaked to the skin. As there seemed little prospect of its stopping, it was thought better to get on the move again rather than lie out in the rain all night without shelter, so at 8 p.m. the march was resumed, the going now heavier than ever and the pace little more than a mile an hour. The march dragged on all through the night until 4 a.m., when, as the guides had lost their way, a halt was called till daylight. Although the ground was a swamp and the rain still pelting down, the troops were so tired that they lay down where they were in the mire and tried to sleep. Daylight saw them on the move again, and at ten o'clock the small village and wells of Chagadak were reached, where another halt was made. As the rain showed no signs of abating, the bulk of the infantry started off again at 2 p.m., reaching Bushire shortly before midnight. The cavalry and artillery horses, however, were so spent with the exertions of the previous day, that they remained at Chagadak for the night with our Regiment and the Baluchis for protection, and marched into camp at Bushire at ten the next morning.

The next day or two were spent resting, as the hardship had told on everyone and caused a good deal of sickness. In our Regiment 180 men were admitted to hospital and the others were no better off, though everyone soon recovered.

About this time General Havelock arrived to take over command of the 2nd Division which was destined for an expedition to capture Mohammederah on the Karun River, but further reinforcements were awaited before the force set out. In the meantime steps were taken to strengthen the present camp by building four strong redoubts as it was thought likely that, on the departure of so large a force, the enemy would venture to attack those left behind. Consequently each Regiment daily furnished a working party of 300 men.

A period of strong north-westerly gales now set in, which greatly delayed the arrival of the expected troops, and in consequence our Regiment was transferred to General Havelock's Division to take part in the coming expedition. However, just as embarkation commenced, the 23rd Bombay Light Infantry, Outram's own Regiment (now our 4th Battalion) at last arrived, just in time to take their place in the force, much to the regret of our people, who were left behind.

After the expedition had sailed, our Regiment was sent into the town of Bushire on 13th March to garrison it, in relief of the 20th Native Infantry. The change was a welcome one, as they got comfortable billets in exchange for their tents. General Stalker, who was to command the troops at Bushire, appears to have remonstrated with Outram more than once at being left with so small a force, as the Persians were reported to be massing in great strength: however, he got no more troops allotted him, and much to the regret of all, shot himself. This delayed Outram's departure for some days, when another tragedy occurred, Captain Ethersey, who commanded the Indian Naval Squadron, taking his life in the same way. Eventually Outram sailed on the 21st March leaving Brigadier Jacob in command.

The expedition against Mohammerah was as successful as had been that to Borasjoon and Khush Ab and, a few days after a successful  
**Ratification of** Peace with Persia,  
**7th May 1857.** raid on Ahwaz, despatches were received to say that peace with Persia had been arranged, but that troops were to remain where they were until it was ratified by the Persian Government. Ratification was notified on 7th May 1857, when most of the British Troops were sent back to India, the remainder staying on in Bushire until the evacuation of Herat had been completed, which was one of the terms of the peace.

A very dreary hot weather was spent in Bushire, though our Regiment was better off than the troops in tents. The all-absorbing topic of conversation was, of course, the mutiny of the Bengal Army, about which each mail seemed to bring more and more depressing news.

On 31st July 1857 Brigadier Honner finally said good-bye to the Regiment on his appointment to command the Island of Karrak. He published a most complimentary farewell order from which the following extracts are taken:—

“ On the cold, dark, and gloomy night of Saturday the 7th February 1857 (the Regiment) formed part of the Rear Guard which covered the baggage and retrograde movement of the Force from Borasjoon, when it was attacked by 3,000 of the enemy's infantry against 750 men composing the Rear Guard. The violent and turbulent rush of the enemy was repulsed with a dignity, discipline, cool and self-reliant courage and steadiness beyond all praise.

### “ HONOUR TO THE BRAVE ”

“ It is difficult to find a perfect and highly disciplined native Regiment, but here it is.”

On 15th and 18th August the Regiment embarked on the transports *Had-dington* and *Saldana* bound for Bombay en route to Poona where the depot had been left. During the voyage Lieutenant Smith died on board the *Had-dington* and was buried at sea.



## CHAPTER XIII

1857-1860

Operations in the Bheel Country. The Satpura Field Force. With the Malwa Field Force in pursuit of Tantia Topi.

(See Map No. 8, opposite p. 116.)

By the end of September 1857 the Regiment was back again in Poona enjoying the luxuries of cantonment life after the discomforts of Persia. News of the massacre at Cawnpore and the fall of Delhi had just been received and the all-absorbing question was whether they would be given a chance of showing their loyalty in action against the mutineers.

**Operations  
against the  
Bheels.**

The south of India, however, had by now been pretty well denuded of troops, and more could not safely be spared, particularly as the Bheels and other marauders were not slow to take advantage of the state of affairs to renew their freebooting. The Bheels in the Sahyadri range had been rallying to the standard of Bhagojee Naik, a notorious brigand, and his following had now reached formidable dimensions. They included a large number of the recently disbanded Bheel Corps who had been well trained and disciplined and, therefore, as a fighting force, were not to be ignored.

As troops were hard to come by, it was decided to raise several new battalions of armed police, and Captain Graham of our Regiment was seconded for service with one of these. On 18th October 1857 a strong force of Police under Captain Henry had a long, but indecisive, encounter with the Bheels in which both sides lost heavily. Captain Graham was hit in the ankle and incapacitated for a long time.

It was now decided to stiffen these police forces with small detachments of regulars, who were to be under the direction of the Commissioner of Police. As no reports of their doings appear to have been sent to the Military Authorities, it is very difficult to trace their movements or operations. (See Map No. 8, opposite p. 116.)

On 15th November two companies of our Regiment under Captain Maude were sent to the Ahmednagar district, where they had several encounters. The most notable of these were first, at Mandwar on 20th January 1858, where a mixed force had encountered a large body of Bheels in a strong position in thick jungle. Lieutenant Noding was ordered to reinforce this party with his Company, but only arrived in time to take part in the last unsuccessful

attack and to cover the subsequent withdrawal. Casualties on both sides were heavy, though the Bheels lost three times as many men as the British Force. Our Company, though only engaged for a very short while, lost one killed and three wounded, Lieutenant Noding's horse being twice hit.

A month later at Bheelwara on 19th February 1858 Captain Maude's two Companies completely surprised a large party of Bheels, killing 30 of them and taking numerous prisoners. On another occasion during January 1858 Lieutenant Glasspoole, who was on outpost duty at Dindori with half a company, hearing that about a thousand Bheels were moving to loot the town of

**Defence of Peint** Peint, which was occupied only by a small body of police, by Lt. Glasspoole, set off on his own responsibility and, after a forced march of Jan. 1858.

some 40 miles, arrived at dawn on the 10th January just in time to save the treasury and to prevent the prisoners being released from the jail. Here he was besieged for a week by about 3,000 Bheels, but succeeded in keeping the rebels at bay until a force arrived to relieve him. For his timely and successful action he received the thanks of the Government.

Towards the end of February 1858 Captain Maude's detachment was sent to Nasik and, while there, was called on to furnish an escort at the public execution of a Brahman priest who had been convicted of stirring up rebellion and intriguing with the notorious Nana Sahib. The inhabitants were in a very excited state and it was feared that they would attempt to rescue the prisoner, but the steady bearing of the escort discouraged them, and the execution was carried out without any interference.

In February 1858 the Regimental Headquarters was moved from Poona to Malegaon, whence Captain Langston was sent out with another detachment to the north to join the Satpura Field Force, and was present at the hard-fought action of Amba Pani on 11th April. The Bheels, though hunted from pillar to post, had been joined by all sorts of desperados, who were willing to do anything for an opportunity of plunder; and a large number of these were well-armed and well-trained fighting men.

**Action at  
Amba Pani,  
11th April 1858.**

The following is compiled from the accounts of the action published in the Bombay daily papers:—

The Satpura Field Force had been operating in three small columns, to round up the rebels and bring them to action and, on the 10th April 1858, they got them more or less cornered at Amba Pani, a well-known spring on the southern slopes of the wooded ridge which forms the south bank of the Narbada Valley. The Headquarters Column under Major Evans of the 9th Bombay Infantry,\* consisting of a wing of his own Regiment, one Company of ours under Lieutenant Coghlan, detachments of the Bheel Corps and Poona Horse, and two guns, had arrived at Barwani, about 6 miles to the north of the rebels. Langston's Column, of the same strength and composition, our Company being

\* 4th Battalion 4th Bombay Grenadiers, disbanded 31st March 1930.

commanded by Lieutenant Hall, had reached Persool some 14 miles south of them. The third column, a small detachment of the 19th Bombay Infantry\* under Captain Sealy, was at Dubba Bowrie some 6 miles to the east. Orders were issued for a converging attack by all three columns at dawn next day.

The Headquarters Column and Sealy's Column, having the shortest distance to go, were the first to become engaged. Sealy's force met with very strong opposition and was eventually forced to retire to protect its baggage. Evans' Column, however, moved ahead, driving the enemy from successive positions in the jungle until in due course Langston's guns were heard. There was a very sharp fight till eleven o'clock as the enemy disputed every inch of the ground. Then, however, a lull seemed to indicate that they were making off, but being shortly after reinforced by the strong body that had driven back Sealy's Column, they returned to the attack in force. By this time Langston and Evans had joined hands, and the enemy, being outflanked and gradually driven back, as a last resort fired the jungle, thus delaying the advance for some time. As soon as the fire had burnt itself out, the troops pushed on again, and the burnt jungle affording no cover, the fight resolved itself into a series of hand-to-hand encounters from boulder to boulder. Now a great number of the enemy fled through the jungle, but a small party that was cut off made a final stand in a sort of natural fortress of rocks, which was carried at the point of the bayonet at 4 p.m., all the defenders being killed. The day had been an exceptionally hot one and the troops, who had been on the move since daylight and covered a great deal of ground, were very exhausted. The action had been a complete success and practically finished the Bheel Rebellion by dispersing the main body, though small parties were being hunted for some time longer. The total casualties were 23 killed and 56 wounded, of which our Companies had 3 killed and 1 Indian Officer and 10 men wounded. The enemy's losses were estimated at not less than 300, of whom 170 dead were counted near the final position. These consisted of 82 Mekranis, 11 Sidis, 19 Mussalmans and 58 Bheels; which shows how the spirit of revolt had spread.

On 28th April 1858 the Battalion Headquarters marched to Mhow where they again came under their old Commanding Officer, Major-General Honner, C.B. By the beginning of the rains all the various detachments rejoined, glad of a rest from the very strenuous duty on which they had been employed for the past seven months.

As soon as the rains were over, orders were issued for the formation of a second column to join the Malwa Field Force to help in rounding up the mutineers who were following Tantia Topi. The Regiment left Mhow on 2nd September 1858 and, marching *via* Indore and Ujjain, joined the first column at Nalkhera, where Major-General Michel, C.B., assumed command of the whole force.

---

\* 2nd Battalion 9th Jat Regiment.

Here information was received that Tantia was moving towards Rajghur and General Michel set off at 4 a.m. on 15th September and, **Encounter near Rajghur, 15th Sept. 1858.** marching all through the heat of the day, came in sight of the enemy pitching camp about four in the afternoon. The infantry, however, were so exhausted that they could go no farther, so both forces camped about three miles apart. A move was made at 3 a.m. only to find that the enemy had already gone. The General then pushed forward with the cavalry to find Tantia's position, while the infantry halted by the river for breakfast. After their meal they moved on again and at once ran into a party of rebels who had evaded the cavalry. These made for the river and were pursued and shot down in the water as they were trying to swim across. An advance was then made to join the cavalry who had found the enemy's guns in position on ground commanding the line of advance. As our guns were unable to silence those of the rebels, which were of much heavier calibre, the line was withdrawn a little, but as soon as the European Infantry came up, the whole line advanced, covered by the skirmishers of our Regiment and those of the 92nd Regiment.\* So as not to check the pace of the advance, General Michel gave orders that there was to be no firing, the troops pursuing hot-foot some two or three miles when our guns were run up into the line of skirmishers and did much execution. After a further pursuit of two or three miles this manoeuvre was repeated with similar success, and then our cavalry, who had been waiting on our right flank, was let loose to complete the destruction, carrying on the pursuit another four or five miles until men and horses were utterly exhausted. Tantia's force had been completely broken and the whole of his twenty-seven guns captured.

The heat had caused a good many casualties. Lieutenant Shaw of the Cavalry and two British Privates died from sunstroke and Lieutenant Noding of our Regiment had to be invalided from the same cause and, after two years' sick leave, had to retire.

The next day the whole force halted for a much-needed rest; and, the day after, our Regiment was ordered to escort the captured guns back to Mhow. This proved no light duty as the rain came down in torrents just after the start, and soon made the black cotton soil impassable. It took nineteen days of strenuous labour to cover the 130 miles to Mhow, which was reached on 3rd October 1858.

Meanwhile the chase of Tantia's band was taken up by column after column and many were the rough handlings he received. He tried to break through into Khandesh but was headed back; and towards the end of November he crossed the Narbada near the Bombay-Agra road where Major Sutherland's force took up the chase.

On 20th November Captain Langston of our Regiment had been ordered to join Major Sutherland with a strong company, and when, on the

---

\* 2nd Battalion The Gordon Highlanders.

24th November, news was received of Tantia having crossed the river, they set off after him. The account of the following operation is taken from Major Sutherland's despatch and from the account of an eyewitness, published in the *Bombay Standard* on 8th December 1858.

Pursuit by Major Sutherland's Force, 24th Nov. 1858.

Major Sutherland's small force consisted of 75 men each of the 71st\* and 92nd† Highlanders who were mounted on camels, and 110 men of our Regiment under Captain Langston, and a few Sikh horsemen. They were on the Agra road when news of Tantia's approach was received, and they at once set out for the bullock station of Than, only to find that it had been looted a few hours before by the rebels, who had made off in the direction of Rajpur. The force set off in pursuit as fast as they could go, being guided by the tracks of the gun wheels and elephants. After some eight miles of rapid marching they came on the rearguard streaming out of Rajpur. Here a five minutes' halt was called to let the enemy clear the town, as, had they decided to defend it, Major Sutherland's small force could never have dislodged them. Once they were clear the pursuit was resumed, Major Sutherland moving off at a trot with his few sowars and mounted Highlanders, ordering our Company, who were on foot, to follow as fast as they could. Having no baggage to protect, Sutherland decided to ignore all stragglers who took refuge in the jungle and to push after the main body at top speed. After another five or six miles, during which a quantity of abandoned stores, bullocks and baggage were passed and a few stragglers shot, the enemy was seen to be forming up on the far bank of a *nala* which crossed the road at right-angles. Sutherland writes: "I dismounted the Infantry, who were on camels, and was proceeding to attack when, to my surprise, the remainder of my men, who were on foot, appeared a few hundred yards in rear, having kept up with the camels at more than five miles an hour. Joined by them I attacked, but the rebels hardly waited to exchange shots." The pursuit was then resumed, the *Bombay Standard* says: "Again our Major ordered the Highlanders to mount and on we went cutting up the enemy in our onward career, till we arrived at the foot of the heights of Rajpur (some two miles farther), where Tantia and all his rebel army stood to receive us, they 3,000, and we only 150 Highlanders, 100 Rifles and 150 *Sadnee*‡ Sowars. The enemy now opened a hot fire on us with their guns, which were placed to command a narrow road with dense jungle on either side, through which nothing could pass, while their infantry kept up a fire from the jungles to our front. This state of things did not last long. Major Sutherland immediately ordered the Highlanders, Rifles and all present to make a dash, and take the guns at the point of the bayonet. Everything ready, a cheer was raised and forward we went up the narrow pass, the guns being fired right into us; but fortunately we heard the shot whizz over

\* 1st Battalion The Highland Light Infantry.

† 2nd Battalion The Gordon Highlanders.


‡ *Sadnee* or *Sarni* = female camel.





# GUJARAT AND KATHIAWAR

MAP No. 8







our heads, and the next moment the guns were ours." A further attempt was made to pursue, but it was not long before a halt had to be called as the troops were so exhausted by the heat. After a short rest they returned to Rajpur with the captured guns, and the baggage being brought up, camp was made for the night. The enemy's casualties were estimated at about seventy, while we only had one Officer and three men wounded, and three missing, none of which occurred in our Company. This fight had driven Tantia back again across the Narbada, and he now made for Udaipur, hotly pursued by another column under Colonel Parke, who again punished him severely.

The end was now near, and it was not long before Tantia was betrayed and captured and his band finally dispersed. For some months longer parties of the Regiment were sent to round up small scattered bands. By the rains the mutineers were practically done with.

In December 1859 the Regiment was ordered to Sehore where it remained fifteen months before returning to Indore and Mhow.

## CHAPTER XIV

1860-1885

The Afghan War. The Defence of Kandahar. The action of Kandahar. The Bozdar Column. Inspection by H.R.H. The Duke of Connaught.

(See *Maps No. 20, opposite p. 270, and No. 9, opposite p. 124.*)

AFTER a six months' stay at Indore, the Regiment moved to Mhow in October 1860.

For the past thirty-five years the Bombay Presidency had been settling down gradually under British control and the chances of Bombay Troops seeing active service within the province appeared year by year to be more remote. As military interest was now centred chiefly on the North-West Frontier, we find the Regiment relegated to another long spell of life in cantonments. It was stationed successively at Mhow for three years, Bombay three years, Sholapur four years, Baroda three and a half years, and Satara four and a half years, during which period there is nothing of special interest to record.

In November 1878 it moved to Poona. For some years past relations with Afghanistan had been getting strained, and in October 1878, owing to the Amir's refusal to receive a British Resident in Kabul, an ultimatum was despatched by the Viceroy demanding a satisfactory reply by 20th November, failing which an invasion of Afghan territory would be set on foot.

**The Afghan War.**

As our Regiment was not ordered on service until more than a year later, it is not proposed to make more than a brief survey of the early part of the operations. Suffice it to say that no satisfactory answer having been received, the advance into Afghanistan started on the 21st November by the Khyber, the Kurram and the Bolan Passes. These operations were completely successful and in May 1879 the peace treaty of Gandamak was signed by Yakub Khan, son of the late Amir, Sher Ali, who had died in February of that year. At the time of the treaty the British were in occupation of Kandahar and Gandamak, and Sir Louis Cavagnari proceeded to Kabul with a small escort as British Resident. He had been there little over a month when he and

**Murder of Cavagnari, 3rd Sept. 1879.**

all his escort were murdered by the Herat Regiments on 3rd September 1879. On receipt of this news, orders were issued for the occupation of Kabul which was successfully carried out by General Roberts on 12th October after some heavy fighting. Up to that date the Bombay Troops had taken little part in the fighting, but the Infantry

Brigade guarding the communications through the Bolan Pass had had a very severe time and had carried out some fine road construction work.

In December 1879 it was decided that Bombay Troops should take over Kandahar so as to enable the Punjab force, then in occupation, to return to India *via* Ghazni and Kabul. To this end, another Brigade was ordered to the front, and it was to join this Brigade that our Regiment received orders to mobilize. The war was now considered over and a new Amir, Abdul Rahman, had been established in Kabul; but it was not intended to hand him back the province of Kandahar, which was to remain, for the present, in British possession. (See Map No. 20, opposite p. 270.)

Our Regiment left Poona on 8th January 1880 and, embarking at Bombay on the *Dalhousie* and *Czarewitch*, reached Karachi on the 14th. Here the Brigade assembled under the command of General Burrows. On 8th February the Regiment moved up to Sibi and furnished a strong detachment at railhead, which was nine miles distant. A month later they were ordered to take over the fifteen posts which had been established to guard the Bolan Pass, while Headquarters was transferred to Quetta, and the rest of the Brigade moved to Kandahar.

Guarding the  
Bolan Pass.

At the end of June trustworthy information was received that Ayub Khan, brother of the Amir who had just been deposed, was marching on Afghanistan from Herat at the head of a large body of troops. The Government of India, fearing that the tribes might rise to join him, considered it essential that he be stopped at the Helmand River, and ordered a Brigade to be sent out from Kandahar for this purpose. To reinforce the depleted garrison our Regiment was ordered to march from Quetta at a few hours' notice, leaving the detachments, who occupied the Bolan Posts, to follow as soon as they could be relieved. Headquarters left Quetta on 8th July reaching Kandahar, 145 miles distant, on the 13th, the relieved Bolan piquets joining six days later. It was a very trying march as both water and transport were very scarce and the heat considerable. The Regiment camped in the cantonments, which were about one mile distant from the city, and the days were passed in local reconnaissance and searching the adjacent villages for arms. With the approach of Ayub Khan's force there was a growing feeling of unrest in the neighbourhood, and the people were decidedly hostile. On 18th July one of our men was attacked in the city bazaar by a *Ghazi*, but got off with a few cuts, the *Ghazi* being at once killed with the bayonet. (See Map No. 9, opposite p. 124.)

Arrival at  
Kandahar,  
13th July 1880.

A wing of the Regiment was under orders to escort rations to General Burrows on the Helmand on 28th July and to remain with him as a reinforcement, but at 2 a.m. that morning the first stragglers arrived bringing news of the rout of General Burrows' Brigade at Maiwand.

It was at once decided to move into the city, and half the Regiment under Major Marshall was sent off immediately to put the city gates into a state of

defence and to prepare to barricade them. A small force was sent out to Kokheran to help in the defeated Brigade, and the rest of the troops available were organized by Colonel Bannerman, our Commandant, for the defence of the cantonments until the remnants of the defeated troops arrived. At 6 p.m. the cantonments were evacuated and the whole force moved into the city.

It was expected that the Herat army might put in an appearance at any moment, and work to improve the defences and to destroy all buildings outside the walls was hurried on.

The city, which is almost a rectangle, was surrounded by a high wall of considerable thickness with seventy semicircular bastions at intervals all round. The east and west sides were about a mile long; while the north and south faces were each about three-quarters of a mile. The walls were loopholed, but the loopholes were so narrow as to be useless, so the top of the parapet was broken down and faced with sandbags between the bastions, to enable sections of riflemen to fire over the top. The southern section of the eastern wall, which included the Kabul Gate, was allotted to our Regiment. A first reserve of 200 men was stationed at the Charsee, where the two main roads through the city crossed one another at right-angles, and a second reserve of 100 men was located in the Top Khana Square.

As they were by no means friendly, the local inhabitants were all turned out of the city. After they had gone there was no anxiety about food for the garrison as there was sufficient for two months and *bhoosa* for twenty days. It was feared that the water supply might present some difficulty, but several excellent wells were found in the city and allotted to units.

Ayub's advanced guard put in an appearance on 5th August and by the 7th the main body had arrived and the city was besieged. The daily task of clearing cover in the vicinity of the walls continued under persistent sniping fire from the enemy, who also from time to time threw a few shells into the city, but with little effect. A wire entanglement, made of telegraph wire, was constructed all round the walls and abattis were placed to protect the various gates. It was known that the enemy was constructing a large number of scaling ladders but his siege works were neither extensive nor systematic.

To guard against a possible night attack all sentries were doubled at night with piquets sleeping on the walls ready to turn out at a moment's notice; while at each gate a supply of fire balls, live shells, blue lights and torches was collected.

No news from the outer world had been received since 28th July, when it had just been possible to wire through to Quetta the news of the disaster at Maiwand and to ask for help before the wire was cut at 9 a.m. On the 11th August, however, a messenger got through with letters from Sir Robert Sandeman and General Phayre saying that two strong Brigades were being assembled in the Pishin Valley and hoped soon to advance. It was stated

Occupation of  
Kandahar City,  
28th July 1880.

Siege of  
Kandahar,  
August 1880.

that General Roberts was due to leave Kabul with a strong force on 7th August and that more troops had started from England. This was good news and the garrison felt confident of being able to hold their own until the beginning of September, by which time it was hoped that one or other of the relieving forces might have reached them.

The large village of Deh Kwajah, about one thousand yards from the Kabul Gate, had been occupied in force by the enemy and considerably strengthened and thence they kept up a galling fire on any working parties sent out to clear the ground between it and the city.

As periodical bombardment of the village appeared to have no effect, it was decided, on the representation of the C.R.E., to clear it by a sortie on the 16th August. Our Regiment was ordered to cover the movement by fire from the walls and took no part in the actual sortie, which was badly planned and resulted in heavy casualties.

On 23rd August a movement towards the west of men, women and animals from the villages east and south of the city was noticed, and a transport *sowar*, who had been captured at Maiwand, escaped and brought news that there were rumours in the enemy's camp of the approach of General Roberts' force. This movement to the west continued the following day; and on the 25th a cavalry reconnaissance found the cantonment and all the villages round the city clear of the enemy. The siege was now at an end and the troops were able to move freely outside the walls and large quantities of *bhoosa* were collected from the neighbouring villages. The Regiment's losses during the siege were 1 Follower killed and 1 Follower and 1 Rifleman wounded.

On the 26th a letter was received from General Phayre from Quetta saying that he hoped to be before Kandahar on 2nd September.

The enemy had now occupied the Baba Wali Kotal and Pir Paimal ridge to oppose General Roberts' advance.

On the 27th at midday the flash of a helio was seen in the direction of Robat, which turned out to be the Advanced Guard Cavalry of General Roberts' force, his infantry being reported to be 18 miles in rear.

On 31st August the whole of the Kabul force, skirting the Pir Paimal ridge, reached the Sherpur Gate by 11 a.m. Here they halted for breakfast before moving out to reconnoitre the enemy's position.

Arrival of  
Gen. Roberts'  
Relief Force,  
31st Aug. 1880.

The relieving force, which left Kabul on 8th August, consisted of about 10,000 fighting men and 8,000 followers, and had covered the first 300 miles of their fine march in 20 days. Then having got into touch with Kandahar and found all well, two more easy stages brought them to the city walls. Although they had encountered no opposition, it was a splendid achievement for a force of that size; and it had not been thought possible by the garrison of Kandahar that they could arrive before 7th September.

The enemy were holding the ridge of hills, running roughly north-east

and south-west, which separates Kandahar from the rich Argandab valley. A track crosses this ridge by the Murcha Kotal due north of Kandahar and about five miles distant. South-west of this pass the ridge rises again and is very broken and precipitous till it drops sharply to the Baba Wali Kotal, where a road with easy gradients crosses it. The ridge then rises again to form the Pir Paimal Hill which, at its south-west end, drops several hundred feet almost sheer to the plain. Then occurs a large gap through which pass numerous water channels led off from the Argandab River. This gap is a network of walled enclosures and gardens.

Between the Pir Paimal ridge and the city there is a parallel subsidiary ridge of which the main features were known as Piquet Hill and Karez Hill. On the afternoon of the 31st August a reconnaissance was carried out by the 1st and 3rd Brigades of the Kabul Force and, after an infantry encounter lasting till dusk, this subsidiary ridge was occupied for the night, and it was decided to attack the enemy next day.

The general plan of attack was for the Bombay Troops to occupy the ridge, held overnight by the Kabul Force, and to make a demonstration against the Baba Wali Kotal to pin the enemy to his position. Meanwhile the Kabul Force would make a turning movement round the south-west end of the Pir Paimal ridge to take the Baba Wali Kotal position in rear; while their cavalry moved up the Argandab valley to cut off the enemy as they retired.

**Battle of  
Kandahar,  
1st Sept. 1880.**

At 9 a.m. the Bombay Troops moved out, our Regiment, in skirmishing order, covering the advance of General Burrows' Brigade. The Bombay Cavalry on the extreme right watched the Murcha Kotal. As soon as the troops moved out they came under the fire of four guns on the Baba Wali Kotal, but suffered no casualties. They were soon on the line they were ordered to take up, our Brigade being near Kalachi i Haidar. The foothills about 1,000 yards away were covered with tribesmen who contented themselves with waving banners and swords and firing long-range volleys, but made no attempt to attack. Here our troops built *sangars* and awaited the outcome of the turning movement.

As soon as the Kabul Force approached the cultivated enclosures they met with a very stout resistance, but by a series of dashing attacks and sharp hand-to-hand fighting, they drove the enemy before them and by 12 noon had turned the south-western end of the ridge.

When the Afghans realized that their right flank had been turned and their line of retreat threatened, they fled precipitately from the Baba Wali Kotal and the foothills and, after a short stand on the Kharoti ridge, retreated up the Argandab valley, leaving their camp standing, which the Kabul Force occupied without further opposition.

The Kabul Force Cavalry taking up the pursuit accounted for some 300 or 400 fugitives. They would probably have exacted a much heavier toll



HAVALDAR IN REVIEW ORDER, 1891.

*From a water-colour painting by Captain A. C. Lovet, The Gloucestershire Regiment, now in the Officers' Mess.*





but for the fact that at the outset they found themselves unable to force their way through the gap between Gandigan and Pir Paimal, and had to make a detour of nearly eight miles to reach the river. No pursuit by the Bombay Troops was permitted till nearly three o'clock, when the cavalry, crossing the Kotal, succeeded in cutting down about another hundred fugitives. The enemy were now completely routed and the whole of their camp captured. The guns which had been lost at Maiwand were all recovered, and the whole of the enemy's guns were captured together with a large quantity of ammunition.

The Bombay Infantry remained in their positions all day and at 7 p.m. returned to the city. Our Regiment suffered no casualties. The following day we and the 28th Bombay Native Infantry were moved out to Mazra, the site of Ayub Khan's camp, and remained there until 8th September clearing the camp and collecting the abandoned arms and equipment.

On return to Kandahar the Regiment was detailed as part of a force sent under General Daubeney to bury the dead on the field of Maiwand and to search the neighbouring villages for arms and prisoners. They moved slowly to Maiwand, searching the ground and villages along the line of retreat and burying all bodies found. Maiwand was reached on 15th September. Here the work of clearing the battlefield was organized by a committee presided over by Colonel Bannerman.

It was found that most of the bodies on the battlefield had already been buried in several large graves, but as, in many instances, they had not been properly covered some of the graves were opened and the bodies reburied, the names being recorded of all who could be identified. A cairn of stones was built in an open spot on the battlefield to commemorate the fallen. The troops returned to Kandahar on 23rd September and our Regiment was sent into camp at Kokheran some six miles distant.

By this time the Punjab Troops had left Afghanistan as Abdul Rahman had been safely established as Amir at Kabul, but the policy of the Government with regard to Southern Afghanistan had not yet been decided.

There was a strong party in favour of the military occupation of Kandahar as a foil to the spread of Russian influence, but the Home Government were opposed to any commitments which would necessitate an increase in the army and an expensive railway construction programme.

The reinstatement of Sher Ali as Wali of Kandahar was out of the question as he had no following and had shown himself unfit. Eventually it was decided to hand it back to the new Amir and the British Troops were withdrawn.

Our Regiment left Kandahar on 29th October 1880 with orders to proceed to Kach, a small post on the Quetta Railway. They had a detachment at another small post some 14 miles distant and furnished a company as escort to the Sappers in charge of the railway construction. This move was anything but a change for the better, as no quarters were available and the intense cold brought on fever and pneumonia. Although every available man was turned on to hutting, it was not

Clearing the  
Battlefield of  
Maiwand.

Rail Protection  
Duty at Kach.

until the beginning of February 1881 that all were got under a roof. After this the health improved, but the life was very dull and monotonous. In September another epidemic of fever, accompanied by scurvy, swept through the ranks making it very difficult to carry out the full duties. The worst cases were sent off to Quetta and by the middle of October the Regiment was quite fit again. They were none the less pleased, however, to receive, on the 17th October, orders to return to India to be stationed at Ahmednagar.

The way was not made easy for them as, on relief by the 24th Native Infantry, they had to march 160 miles to Thal Chothiali to join a column of all arms which was assembling under General Wilkinson to march to Dera Ghazi Khan through the unexplored Bozdar country, another 190 miles. Thal Chothiali was reached on 11th November, and ten days later the column started out. Although no opposition was encountered, the march was extremely arduous as, for a great part of the way, there was no track of any description and, the country being very difficult, many hours were occupied in making the way practicable for pack transport. Our Regiment received a special commendation from the Brigadier for good work on the road. Dera Ghazi Khan was reached on 11th December and the column broken up. Four days later the Regiment set out on its final march of 42 miles to Multan, where it entrained for Karachi. Here Christmas and New Year's Day were spent during a welcome halt of just over a fortnight. Bombay was reached on 10th January 1882 and Ahmednagar two days later. Here the best part of two years passed uneventfully, musketry, which appears to have fallen off considerably during the two years of field service, receiving the chief attention. The year 1882 is the first in which a detail of recruitment is noted in the records, and we find that out of a total of 71 enlisted, 39 came from Rajputana.

On 18th October 1883 the Battalion left for Aden. The seven days' voyage was not made more pleasant by finding on arrival that seven days had to be passed in quarantine on board the ship in Aden harbour before they were allowed to land. They were quartered in the Crater with two companies on the Isthmus and a detachment on the Island of Perim.

When at Aden the Regiment had the honour of being inspected by H.R.H. The Duke of Connaught on his way out to India. He expressed himself much struck by the smart appearance and soldierlike bearing of the men. During the same year orders were received for the colour of the facings to be changed from red to scarlet.

In May 1884 the Regiment paraded for the presentation of the Afghan medals by the Governor of Bombay, who was paying an official visit to Aden.

From August 1884 onwards detachments were furnished at Zaila and Berbera on the Somaliland coast, to reinforce the local garrisons, but no trouble was experienced.


The Regiment left Aden on 12th December 1885, reaching Mhow, its new station, on Christmas Day. Here the next two years passed uneventfully.





# KANDAHAR AND ENVIRONS

MAP No. 9





## CHAPTER XV

1886-1898

Formed into a Rifle Corps with 23rd and 25th Light Infantry. Reorganization with Class Companies. Field Service in East Africa.

(See Map No. 10, p. 132.)

IN October 1887 the Regiment, after two years in Mhow, moved to Bombay in relief of the 17th Bombay Infantry. Shortly after their arrival in their new station they were rearmed with the long Snider Rifle.

On 22nd September 1888 they celebrated their centenary with a Sports Meeting to which a large gathering was invited. This was **Centenary Celebration.** really the centenary of their renumbering as the 9th Battalion of Bombay Sepoys and not that of their actual formation.

This error doubtless arose from the fact that the Regimental records only commenced with the year 1796 and the earlier history had not been properly investigated.

In 1889 the Regiment was linked with the 23rd and 25th Bombay Light Infantry which also became Rifles to form the Bombay Rifle Regiment.

**Linked with 23rd and 25th as a Rifle Corps.** During the three and a half years that our Regiment remained in Bombay, they were quartered in the Crawford Market Lines which lay behind the present Crawford Market, between it and the G.I.P. Railway Line. These barracks were already hemmed in on all sides by the native bazaar and were very congested and unhealthy. As there were no facilities for carrying out training in Bombay, during the cold weather of 1890 they moved out to Santa Cruz for six weeks.

On 9th May 1891 the Regiment left for the Quetta District. The R.I.M. Ship *Canning* took them to Karachi whence they proceeded by train to Sharigh and marched to Shelabagh, where they relieved the 12th Bombay Infantry. Here they only remained seven months before moving to Chaman in December and to Quetta three months later. Just before leaving Chaman,

**A Ghazi Incident.** on 7th March 1892, a Ghazi Pathan killed Rifleman Chandika of H Company while sentry over the latrines. Lance-

Naik Daji Rao, who happened to be near, though quite unarmed attempted to seize the man but was very badly wounded. The Ghazi was subsequently shot by a man on guard at the gate. The Lance Naik, who was immediately promoted to Havaldar by the District Commander for his gallantry, unfortunately succumbed to his wounds the following day.



Shortly after coming into the Quetta District the Regiment was inspected by Sir George White, V.C., the District Commander, who noticed in the ranks several weakly men whom he ordered to be weeded out. This was done, and before the Regiment left Quetta the following year he was able to report it to be in a thoroughly efficient state. He had also noted that the standard of musketry was low, which is hardly surprising after three and a half years in Bombay with no opportunity of learning to handle their new rifles. That there were, however, some good shots among them is shown by the fact that Havaldar Issar Singh, in December that same year, carried off the Prince of Wales' prize at the Bengal Rifle Association Meeting at Meerut.

**Reorganization of Recruiting, April 1892.** In April 1892, as a prelude to the reorganization of recruiting, orders were issued to form the Battalion into Class Companies. This was effected as follows:—

- A Company Mahrattas of the Konkan.
- B Company Mahrattas of the Konkan and Deccan.
- C Company Mahrattas of the Konkan.
- D Company Hindus of other Castes, of the Konkan, Deccan and Hindustan.
- E Company Brahmans and Chattries.
- F Company Hindus of Rajputana, Central India and the Punjab and Sikhs.
- G Company Parwaris, Mochis, Jews and Christians.
- H Company Mussalmans.

On 11th April 1893 the Regiment left Quetta by train and, having been detailed to form part of the Khelat Field Force, detrained at Bellput where the troops were assembling. The Khan of Khelat, however, came into camp and gave himself up the following day, which made operations unnecessary, and the Battalion resumed its journey to Karachi *en route* for Poona, reaching its destination on 21st April.

That the efforts to improve the musketry had been successful may be gathered from the fact that, at the Bombay Presidency Rifle Meeting held at Poona in November of that year, the Battalion won the Bombay Army Purse and the Gillespie Memorial Cup, which latter is now in the Battalion Mess. An Indian Officer won the Gold Medal and a Havaldar the Silver Medal for the Grand Aggregate. The team, sent down to Bombay to compete in the Assault-at-Arms, won the Bayonet Fighting Competition.

**Reorganization with Class Companies.** In March 1895 the composition of the Bombay Army was completely reorganized and each Regimental Group was allotted definite areas for recruitment. The allotment for our Rifle Group was as follows:—

- 2 Companies Rajputs (Rajputana).
- 2 Companies Jats (Western Rajputana).
- 2 Companies Jats (Eastern Rajputana and Central India).
- 2 Companies Punjabi Mussalmans.

Nasirabad was selected as the Regimental Centre.

# GROUP OF OFFICERS, CHAMAN, 1893.



*Standing*—Jamadar Baban Set Tel, Hindu Tel. (Oil Merchant). Subadar Daji Moreh, Mahratta (Deccan). Jamadar Kasam Gaudha, Hindu Gaudha (Barva) (born in Regiment). Lieutenant C. A. W. Ford, Subadar Moti Chaudhri, Mahratta (Konkan). Lieutenant W. C. Walton, Adjutant Subadar Saad Khan, Hindu Mussalman (Deccan). Lieutenant A. B. Sangster, Quartermaster Subadar Mohd Khan, Mussalman, C. I. Subadar Sunak Pandhik, Sudia (born in Regiment) Jamadar Ganaji Bhagweh, Mahratta. Subadar Sundarsan Sing, Hindu Pardeshi. Surgeon Jenney, I. M. S. Captain D. C. W. Harrison, Officiating Commandant Subadar Narayan Savanth, Mahratta (Konkan), *Seated*—Captain Williams, Wing Commander Subadar Jan Muhammad, Mussalman (Punjab). Captain C. I. Fry, Wing Commander. Subadar Jan Muhammad, Mussalman (Punjab). Jamadar Shankar, Hindu Pardeshi Jamadar Mohd Khan, Mussalman (born in Regiment).  
*Front Row*—Jamadar Lakshman Savanth, Mahratta (Konkan).



The Regimental Centre was the training centre of Reservists only; each Battalion recruited and trained its own recruits at Battalion Headquarters.

In November of this year a very sad incident occurred. A party of our Regiment was carrying out its musketry training on the Poona range while a party of the 7th Bombay Infantry were on the next range to them. One of the privates of that Regiment ran amok and shot an Indian Officer and a Non-Commissioned Officer of his own Regiment. Lieutenant H. V. Riddell, who was in command of our party, at once went across to the other range and in a very gallant attempt to arrest the man he also was shot dead.

In December 1896 the Regiment moved to Mhow by train, leaving a detachment at the hill fort of Assirghar. Six months later they were sent to Ahmedabad on plague duty. While at Ahmedabad most unexpected and welcome orders were received for the mobilization of the Headquarters Wing of the Regiment for service in East Africa. The Companies selected were one Company of Rajputs, one Company Jats, one Company Punjabi Mussalmans and one Company Mixed Classes, which included half a Company of Sikhs. Major Quentin was in command and took with him six other British Officers, including the doctor, Captain Kilkelly, who proved himself invaluable as he was full of energy and enterprise. (See Map No. 10, p. 132.)

They were ordered to proceed to Mombasa to join the small Indian force which had already gone to Uganda to help suppress the rebellion of the Sudanese troops there.

In connection with their despatch, the following paragraph from the *Pioneer* of 3rd March 1898 is of interest:

"The warning that the wing of the 4th Bombay Rifles might be required to proceed to Mombasa only reached Army Headquarters, Fort William, late on the night of 19th February. On the 25th the four Companies, fully equipped for service, accompanied by a section of a Native Field Hospital, left Bombay in the R.I.M. Steamer *Dalhousie*. They are timed to reach their destination on March 7th, so that from the time of the first warning to the date of their arrival in Africa will be only 16 days. Their actual despatch has beaten the record."

They steamed into Mombasa Harbour on the morning of 7th March and the next three days were employed disembarking the stores and equipment and conveying them to the camp about one and a half miles away. As there was no wharf, everything had to be landed in barges and then conveyed on small hand trolleys to the camp.

The ground selected for the camp was sandy and swarmed with white ants which did a great deal of damage to kits during the first night. The men were later housed in sheds, but the British Officers had to remain in tents which were far from comfortable owing to the heavy rain which fell every

Death of  
Lt. H. V. Riddell.

Field Service in  
East Africa.

Landing at  
Mombasa,  
7th March 1898.

night. They were fortunate, however, in having the cricket pavilion placed at their disposal as a Mess.

On arrival in camp much confusion was caused by the receipt of three lots of contradictory orders. One from the Officer Commanding Troops in Uganda; a second from the O.C. Lines of Communication; and a third from the Base Commandant, who commanded all troops in Mombasa. After some discussion as to which lot of orders to follow, Major Quentin decided that, as he was out of touch with the first officer and senior in rank to both the others, he would issue his own orders.

At this time the Uganda Railway was under construction and railhead had just reached the notorious station of Tsavo. From there troops going to Uganda would have to march with porter transport, so Major Quentin and Lieutenants Will and Bickford went to railhead to try and collect the necessary porters. Here they spent three or four days during the time that the lion scare was at its height. At night, they slept in the railway carriage which, a few days after their departure, was cleared of its human occupants by lions as described by Patterson in his book *The Man Eaters of Tsavo*. As it was found impossible to raise any porters, the Protectorate Government decided to utilize our Headquarters Wing to punish the Ogaden Somalis in Jubaland.

Jubaland belonged to the Sultan of Zanzibar. In 1887 he had leased it to the British East Africa Company and eight years later Government took it over as part of the Protectorate. For some years past the Ogaden Somalis had been causing trouble, culminating in an extensive slave raid in 1896. The chiefs were called to Kismayu by the Commissioner to a durbar, but during the discussion one of the chiefs tried to murder him by throwing a knife at him. The Commissioner had been warned to expect something of this sort and had hidden, in other rooms of the house, a strong armed guard who rushed in and shot all the chiefs except a few who escaped by jumping out of the windows. It was then decided to take punitive measures to bring the tribe to order, but the outbreak of the Sudanese mutiny had made it impossible, heretofore, to spare any troops for the purpose.

Our Wing moved to Kismayu by boat in detachments, the first under the Adjutant, Lieutenant Ford, arriving there on the 4th April. After landing, it marched to Turki Hill on the Juba River to establish a post where Battalion Headquarters and another Company joined it on the 15th.

Kismayu, about 250 miles up the coast from Mombasa, was an open roadstead with a long sand bar running parallel to, and about 2 or 3 miles from, the shore and any vessels but small native dhows had to anchor outside the bar and pass their freight over it in small boats. To furnish transport for the expedition, 500 camels were sent to Kismayu and their disembarkation furnished a difficult problem. Eventually they were hoisted out into the

water, secured to boats and made to swim for the shore where they arrived half-drowned.

The first march inland, some 12 miles, was a very trying one as the going was heavy sand with large dunes, from 20 to 30 feet in height, and only a few camelthorn trees which gave no shade, nor was there any water. Turki Hill was a large sand mound on the banks of the Juba River, which constituted the boundary between Jubaland and Italian Somaliland. The river swarmed with crocodiles of the most savage type, which made it unsafe to draw water by hand direct from the bank. But, as this was the only water supply, it had all to be drawn with buckets on long poles until a space had been stockaded, when it became possible for men even to wash in safety.

On one occasion, however, a crocodile got through a chink in the stockade and when a party of Punjabi Mussalmans went down to wash very early in the morning, before *nimaz*, one of them was seized across both forearms and dragged helpless under water. An Indian Officer, who happened to be near, seized a loaded rifle from a sentry, rushed into the water and plunging the muzzle in where he saw the commotion of the struggle, pulled the trigger. The shot, which burst the rifle, fortunately without injuring the Officer, so frightened the crocodile that he released his victim who was rescued and subsequently recovered.

On 15th April Major Quentin moved out with a small column to reconnoitre Lake Deshek Wama and the surrounding country. This lake, which lay about 30 miles inland from Turki Hill, was a long shallow inundation on which the Ogaden tribesmen were chiefly dependent for their water supply after the close of the rains. No signs of the enemy were seen and the column returned a week later to Turki Hill. Their march had led them through beautiful park-like country with splendid grazing and teeming with game.

At the end of the month the rest of the Wing, which had remained at Mombasa, arrived under Captain Fry. They had a dreadful tossing on the boat to Kismayu and, in consequence, found the march out to Turki Hill more than usually trying. It must be remembered that they were marching practically along the Equator and, though the heat was not normally overpowering, yet when combined with the sandy going after a seasick voyage, it was a very severe test and one man succumbed to sunstroke.

Early in May Lieutenant Stevenson, of the 23rd Rifles, who was attached, was sent forward with one Company to establish a second post, some 12 miles farther up the Juba River, at Yonti. They had orders to stockade the place so that it could be held by a small garrison, leaving the main force free to move about. On arrival, however, they found that there were no suitable trees on their side of the river, though there were plenty on the Italian bank. The Italian Resident, Signor Perducchi, kindly gave permission for the troops to cross and cut what wood they wanted. The river here was about 100 yards wide, very deep and with a strong current which swept round a point on the

Italian side. It was also alive with crocodiles which watched every movement made. The only craft available were two dug-out canoes in which the parties paddled across and returned with the trees tied to the stern and floating behind.

A most unfortunate accident occurred during one of these trips. A party, which was in charge of Stevenson, after cutting the trees and securing them to the dug-outs, got in and pushed off from the bank. They had only got a yard or two out when the boat that Stevenson was in suddenly filled with water and sank, throwing all its occupants into the river. Some managed to scramble back to the bank, but Stevenson and Naik Chothu Singh were caught by the current and were never seen again. There is little doubt that they were seized by crocodiles the moment they got into the water.

**Loss of Lieut.  
Stevenson and  
Naik Chothu Singh  
in Juba River.**

By the middle of May Headquarters were transferred to Yonti, where they were joined by a Pathan Company of 27th Baluch Light Infantry under Captain Tanner. This Company had failed to get through to Uganda to join its own Regiment, so was placed under Major Quentin's orders. On 30th May a large party of Ogaden tribesmen appeared near Yonti, killed several of the camels that were grazing and wounded one *sarwan*. A force was at once sent out in pursuit and, in a running fight, killed some 25 of them without any casualties to themselves.


Next day, leaving a garrison at Yonti, the main force moved to Helishid on the southern shore of Lake Wama and patrols were sent out to scour the country round. By now it was evident that there was little chance of an engagement with the Somalis. They had no intention of coming out to fight, though they were always ready to attack any stragglers or small parties. As their chief source of wealth lay in their cattle, which were magnificent animals, it was decided to concentrate on raiding their flocks. On 13th June a small party under Subadar Isar Singh forded the lake and successfully surprised an Ogaden village on the far side, rounding up a number of cattle and taking a few prisoners.

On 22nd June a party of 41 men, nearly all Sikhs, under Jamadar Radha Singh, sent out on reconnaissance was ambushed by a large force of Ogaden and suffered very heavily, losing 27 killed, including the Jamadar, and 4 wounded. Apparently the party was caught without fixed swords and the enemy were among them with their spears before they had time to use their rifles. In this affair great gallantry was shown by Rifleman Buta Singh, who, though twice wounded, executed a very skilful retirement with four of his comrades, two of whom had also been wounded. There is no doubt that it was due to his action that

**Gallantry of  
Rfn. Buta Singh.**

Rifleman Maya Singh was brought into camp alive. Rifleman Buta Singh was at once promoted Naik and subsequently received the Indian Order of Merit for his gallantry.

The following day, fearing that Helishid might be attacked, Lieutenant



1. Puggri Badge, 4th Bombay Rifles, in use till 1903.
2. Pouch Belt Plate, 4th Bombay Rifles, in use till 1889.
3. Pouch Belt Plate, 4th Regiment (Rifles), (1st Battalion The Bombay Rifle Regiment), in use till 1905.





Bickford was sent forward from Yonti with 100 men. Passing over the ground of the disaster of the day before, he found that the enemy had carried off all the arms and ammunition of the men who had been killed.

Towards the end of July all posts were strengthened by the arrival of the 1st Battalion Uganda Rifles, a temporary unit which had been raised in India from volunteers from the Indian Army.

On 3rd August Captain Fry, who was then commanding at Helishid, received information that a large party of Ogaden Somalis with many cattle was camped at Yaka Dinta, not very far from the western end of the lake. He set out at nightfall with a force of 300 men and was accompanied by the Commissioner, Mr. Jenner. They forded the lake in the dark and, after a long night march, succeeded in surprising the Ogaden at dawn. A sharp fight ensued in which 62 Somalis were killed and many wounded. Over 400 head of cattle were captured and more than 100 shot dead. Our subsequent retirement was followed up by the Somalis who made several attempts to charge home, but owing to the steadiness of the men, and particularly of the Rajput Company, all the cattle were successfully driven off without our sustaining any casualties. This fight was by no means such a one-sided affair as might appear from the result as, although the Ogaden had no firearms, if they succeeded in getting to close quarters with their spears and knives they were a most formidable foe. Also be it remembered that our men had covered 20 miles before the encounter and, by the time they got back again, had completed 40 miles in 22 hours without a man falling out, no mean feat on the Equator. Captain Fry, who had led the enterprise, well deserved the Brilliant Star of Zanzibar which was subsequently conferred on him by the Sultan.

This was the turning-point in the expedition, as on the 13th August a deputation came in to say that the Ogaden wanted to make peace. They were ordered to send in their chiefs, who arrived on the 21st, when temporary terms were dictated pending the arrival of the High Commissioner.

Sir Arthur Harding reached Helishid on 15th September and, at a Durbar, announced the peace terms, which were:—

<b>Somalis</b> <b>accept Terms,</b> <b>15th Sept. 1898.</b>	A fine of 500 cattle to be paid within one month. All captured arms to be returned.
---	--

Two chiefs to be held as hostages until the terms had been fully complied with.


The terms were accepted and peace declared.

As the water in the lake was now becoming foul, the troops were withdrawn to Yonti where they remained until all the terms had been complied with. On the 9th November the Expeditionary Force was broken up and our Wing left Kismayu on the 18th for Mombasa. Here they spent a fortnight in their old camp at Naji Moja before embarking on s.s. *Canara* on 3rd December bound for Bombay. After a very slow voyage they disembarked at the

Sassoon Dock on 21st December and were inspected in marching order by the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, who congratulated them on the way they had carried out their arduous task. That same evening they entrained for Mhow, which was reached on the 24th, in time to take part in the Christmas festivities.

For their services on this expedition they were awarded the East African Medal with a yellow-and-orange ribbon and clasp bearing the date 1898.

Major Quentin was decorated with the Third Class of the Order of the Brilliant Star of Zanzibar and Captains Fry, Tanner and Kilkelly received the Fourth Class of the same order.



MAP No. 10.

## CHAPTER XVI

1899-1914

Renumbered 104th Wellesley's Rifles. The Mingal Rising in Las Bela State. The  
Mekran Expedition. Suppression of Bheel Rising in Sunth State.

(See Map No. 11, opposite p. 142.)

DURING the three years spent in Mhow, the only matters of interest to record are that in 1900 the Regiment had the honour of furnishing the Viceroy's Guard, which was commanded by Captain Walton; the Double Company system was adopted; and in 1901 the Martini-Henry Rifle was replaced by the Long .303 Magazine Lee-Metford Rifle.

**The Viceroy's  
Guard, 1900.**

Medals for the East African Campaign were presented on parade by General Sir R. Westmacott, K.C.B. In connection with the honour granted for the Campaign, the following extract from the *Times of India* dated 13th March 1901 is of interest:—

**Presentation  
of Medals for  
East Africa.**

“ You will doubtless have heard that the 4th, 24th and 27th Bombay Infantry are to bear upon their colours the words ‘ British East Africa ’ in consideration of their services during the years 1896-99, when they were engaged in connection with the mutiny of the Sudanese. But it should be of special interest to the Regiments named to learn that the late Queen, in sanctioning this distinction, practically speaking paid her last farewell to the Indian Army. It was one of her latest acts, and that circumstance will surround the Campaign honour with particular pathos and sentimental value.”

In March 1902 the Battalion moved to Fort Sandeman in relief of the 23rd Rifles, who had taken part in the Waziristan Blockade. The meeting of the two linked Battalions furnished an opportunity for discussing many points of mutual interest, and it was decided to adopt the same Regimental Bugle Call. The call selected was that of “ C ” Company of our Regiment, and it is now the Regimental Call of the Rajputana Rifles.

**The Regimental  
Bugle Call.**

Towards the end of the year a Durbar was held at Delhi in honour of King Edward's Coronation and, in recognition of the Battalion's loyal services during the Mutiny, it was represented by a Subadar, a Havaldar and a Rifleman.

In 1903 Lord Kitchener, the Commander-in-Chief, ordered the renumbering of the entire Indian Army, bringing all units on to a single roll, a reform which had far-reaching effect. Although Presidency Armies, as such, had been

abolished in 1894, the Presidency spirit was still very strong. For some years past both the Bombay and Madras Armies had been looked upon as backwaters, since chances of active service were so very small. Consequently, many officers who were keen on their profession took the first opportunity to transfer to the Punjab Army, which had practically monopolized service on the North-West Frontier. These conditions were detrimental to both Bombay and Madras Battalions. They, therefore, welcomed the scheme whereby all Battalions now became liable to serve in any station in India.

When the renumbering of Regiments was in contemplation, units were asked whether they had any suggestions to put forward regarding their new designations. The meeting with the 23rd Rifles offered an opportunity to discuss this, with the result that the 23rd proposed to ask for the title of "Outram's" and the 25th that of "Napier's" and Major Quentin, then commanding, decided to ask for the title "Wellesley's" to commemorate the gallant part played by our Battalion when serving under the Duke in the Deccan in 1800. On 2nd November 1903 our Battalion became 104th Wellesley's Rifles, the other Battalions of the group being styled 123rd Outram's Rifles and 125th Napier's Rifles.

Change  
of Title to 104th  
Wellesley's  
Rifles.

After two uneventful years at Fort Sandeman the Regiment left for Bombay. Twelve days' marching in delightful weather brought them to Harnai where they entrained for Karachi and thence moved in a troopship to Bombay, reaching there on 2nd May. Here the Regiment again found itself quartered in the old Crawford Market Lines which had been condemned, so rumour had it, at the time of the Mutiny. The barracks consisted of small square huts, each supposed to hold a section of 22 men. The roof, which was made of *kutch*a tiles, came down to within 4 feet of the ground. There were no windows. The hole in the wall, which served as the door, was the only means of admitting light and air. To enter, or go out, the men had to bend double.

Fortunately our stay here was not a long one as new lines were being built at Santa Cruz, 13 miles north of Bombay. On the 6th May, two Double Companies and the recruits marched out to the new station. In July Headquarters and the rest of the Regiment followed. A lot of work remained to be done, such as making parade grounds, paths, etc.

This year authority was given for the appointment of Colonels to units of the Indian Army and on 13th May 1904 General Sir H. H. A. Wood, K.C.B., was gazetted Colonel of our Battalion, but it was only a few months later that news of his death was received. He was succeeded by General W. Bannerman, C.B.

Appointment of  
Colonels.

In view of a relaxation of the orders for recruitment of the Jat Double Companies, it was decided that our Battalion should cease to enlist men from Bhurtpur, but work farther west into Jodhpur and Bikanir.



104th WELLESLEY'S RIFLES.

Shoulder Badge, Puggri Badge and Pouch Belt Plate, 1905.



In November 1905 Their Royal Highnesses George, Prince of Wales, and Princess Mary paid a visit to India and our Battalion moved into Bombay to assist in lining the streets. The men were again quartered in the Crawford Market Lines, while the British Officers were encamped in an empty compound fronting on the Queen's Road at Church Gate. All Officers were presented to Their Royal Highnesses at a Levee held at the Secretariat.

**Visit of The Prince of Wales, Nov. 1905.** In September 1906 the Regiment moved to Hyderabad, Sind, in relief of a Baluch Battalion. This move was very popular with the men as it brought them so much nearer their homes. The wonderful small-game shooting in the cold weather, moreover, made ample compensation to the British Officers for any hot-weather discomforts, and a very enjoyable three and a half years were spent here.

The British Detachment at the time of our arrival consisted of two companies of the 24th Foot, The South Wales Borderers, from Karachi, and the most remarkable friendship sprang up, not only between the Officers, but also between the men of the two units. This was most noticeable when our Regiment moved to Karachi in the cold weather for manœuvres, where this friendship grew and with it mutual respect. Also in 1908, when our Regiment won the newly inaugurated Quetta Divisional Hockey Tournament, the 24th Foot, who had just moved to Quetta, turned out in full strength to line the ground at every match that our team played and, when we won the final, they, led by their Colonel, chaired the whole team and carried them off the field.

While in Karachi for manœuvres in January 1907 our Regiment furnished a Guard of Honour under Lieutenant Manners for the Amir of Afghanistan, who was paying an official visit to India.

**Escort Duty to Las Bela, Dec. 1907.** At the end of 1907 a party of 100 men under Lieutenant James went to Las Bela as escort to Sir Henry MacMahon, A.G.G., in Baluchistan, who was paying the Jam an official visit. This was a very strenuous three weeks' duty as the A.G.G. travelled fast, with double camps so that he could ride straight from one to the other. As soon as he had left, the back one was packed up, taken a double march through the night and pitched first thing next morning to be ready for him on arrival. It gives some idea of the luxuriousness of the outfit and the amount of loading, unloading and tent pitching involved, when it is realized that for the A.G.G. and his Staff of four British Officers and their followers, 150 camels were required as compared with 30 camels for the escort who had to take their rations for three weeks and full-dress serge clothing for Guards of Honour at Las Bela. The party were complimented on the efficient way they carried out this duty.

The following year there was a rising of the Mingal tribe in Las Bela territory, and a strong column under Colonel Jacob\* was sent into the

---

\* Field-Marshal Sir Claud Jacob.



country from the north, from Quetta, while our Regiment was ordered to send a Double Company in from Karachi. They left Hyderabad on 3rd August 1908 under Captain Grant Smith and Lieutenant Chadwick. They completed the 119 miles from Karachi to Las Bela in six marches, a fine achievement at that time of year, particularly as 37 miles lay along the sea coast through deep soft sand. No opposition was met with, and on seeing the large force which had concentrated, the Mingals listened to reason and the rising was peacefully settled. Our Double Company rejoined the Regiment in November.

**The Mingal  
Rising in  
Las Bela, 1908.**

Just before they rejoined, Major Walton arrived to take over the command, left vacant by the sudden death of Colonel Tritton. Walton it was who, as Adjutant, had done so much to improve the shooting and general efficiency of the Regiment at Quetta in 1892. He came back now from the Intelligence Section at Army Headquarters, and in his first lecture to the British Officers on the international situation, he told them that Germany was going to make war by 1915 and that they had got to see to it that they were in all respects ready. It was with this end in view that he put the Battalion through a very strenuous five and a half years' training.

In 1909 brown leather bandolier equipment was received. Up to this time black leather equipment and ammunition pouches had been used for all purposes and permission was obtained to keep these for use on ceremonial occasions.

**Bandolier  
Equipment.**

The Sirhind rapid entrenching tool was also issued, the tool being carried on the back attached to the bandolier, while the helve was attached to the sword scabbard.

Up till this time, for guard duties and all ceremonial occasions the green puggri with scarlet kullah and green putties was worn, while for ordinary parade work a long khaki puggri, tied tight and looking rather like a top-hat, with a khaki kullah was worn by all classes. As this was regarded as being too heavy and cumbersome, it was decided to do away with the khaki kullah for Hindus and to reduce the length of the puggri for all by half. Each class was to tie the puggri according to its racial pattern. This change proved popular and very useful in helping to distinguish the different Double Companies in the field.

The Regiment was due to move to Ahmedabad in October 1910, but, while in Battalion Training Camp in February of that year, telegraphic orders were received for an immediate return to Santa Cruz. Though the move was not a popular one, the

**Santa Cruz,  
Feb. 1910.**

hunting during the cold weather was much enjoyed by the British Officers, who turned out in strength.

Owing to Regimental sea bathing weekly at Varsovah sands and the installation of a mill to grind the men's grain Regimentally, the health of the Indian ranks was exceptionally good, and Santa Cruz became comparatively



*W. C. Walton*

BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. C. WALTON, C.B., C.M.G.,  
Commandant from 16th November 1908 to 6th February 1914.  
Colonel from 18th February 1927 to 9th May 1937.



popular with all ranks. The sea bathing was a great success and the opportunity was taken to teach all non-swimmers to swim, a measure which proved invaluable when, in the following year, the Regiment was ordered on service to the Persian Gulf.

In 1911 the Regiment had a very memorable inspection by General Alderson who, incidentally, was master of the Poona Hounds.

**Inspection by  
Gen. Alderson.**

No one was pleased when a wire arrived to say that the General would inspect the Battalion on parade at 7 a.m. on a Thursday. Thursday was always a holiday for troops in India and a hunting day at Santa Cruz. Colonel Walton, however, wired offering to put up the General for the night if he would come overnight and take parade later after return from the hunt next morning. This he agreed to, saying that he would inspect the British Officers hunting first and then come back and see the men. It was a fine scenting morning and hounds killed after a splendid fifty minutes' run, when the Officers left to change for parade. The General said he would just see the second run started. When the parade hour arrived there was no sign of the General, but after waiting three-quarters of an hour a cloud of dust and clatter of hoofs announced his arrival at the far end of the parade ground. He was still in his hunting kit and, after apologies for having kept us waiting, he inspected the men and remarked that they stood as "steady as Guardsmen" in the ranks. The second run with the hounds had proved as successful as the first, so, needless to say, everything appeared *couleur de rose* and the Regiment got a very good report.

On 30th March 1911 orders were received to mobilize for combined naval and military operations in the Persian Gulf in connection with the gun-running between Muscat and Afghanistan. The force consisted of:—

**The Mekran  
Expedition,  
1911.**

2 Sections 32nd Mountain Battery,  
2 Sections 19th Company 3rd Sappers and Miners,  
104th Wellesley's Rifles,  
352 Pack Mules, 13th Mule Corps,

under the command of Colonel W. S. Delamain, D.S.O. There were also detachments of the Royal Marine Light Infantry and Royal Navy. The direction of the combined operations was in the hands of Rear-Admiral Slade. During mobilization Colonel Delamain came out to Santa Cruz to discuss details and ordered the Mess President, Major Scott, to arrange for the messing of all the British Officers of the landing force, twenty-seven in number, for which he would only allot two pack mules as Mess Transport.

The furlough season had just opened and Colonel Walton and Captain Butler had just gone home and were not to be recalled; the first batch of furlough men had also gone and orders were received to fill up to strength from 123rd Outram's Rifles, as there would not be time to get our men back again.

On 6th April at the Sassoon Dock a party of 123rd Outram's Rifles under Lieutenant Odell was awaiting the Battalion and the whole embarked on the Royal Indian Marine Ships *Northbrook* and *Hardinge*, each boat being self-contained. (See Map No. 11, opposite p. 142.)

The despatch of the expedition was due to information of a gathering of between 3,000 and 4,000 Ghilzais in Persian Baluchistan with the intention, under the leadership of Mir Barkat Khan, late Governor of Biyaban, of raiding some of the small detachments established for the protection of the personnel of the Indo-European Telegraph Company.

The Ghilzais had benefited by the arms traffic and monopolized the purchase and transport of such arms. During the past year or two the vigilance of the Navy had greatly reduced this traffic and, owing to the additional risk, the traders in Muscat were demanding much higher fees for attempting to run the blockade. The Ghilzais, being unable to get more arms, or the return of their money sent to Muscat as payment in advance, were now in a mood to deal summarily with anyone who thwarted them.

On 7th April both transports, escorted by H.M.S. *Highflyer*, left Bombay and at 11 a.m. on the 10th reached Galag, the spot selected for the first disembarkation. Owing to shallow water, the ships had to lie out some two or three miles from the shore and everything had to be landed in lifeboats, allotted in tows of three each, towed by a pinnace as far as the surf and then poled in by lascars, assisted by a swimming party from each boat. Thus the boats were run in as far as they could float and then everything carried some 500 or 600 yards by hand to the beach.

Disembarkation commenced as soon as the ships had anchored and was continued without a break till dusk, by which time the sea had risen considerably and a tow taking mules ashore had been capsized in the surf with the loss of six mules drowned. A halt was therefore called till the weather moderated. The unloading recommenced at 4 a.m. next day and everything was ashore by midday, when the force marched 10 miles to Rapsh where it bivouacked for the night. This march in the heat of the day through soft sand proved a very trying one for those men who disembarked that morning. Unfortunately Jack Sepoy is a very bad sailor and during the trip ashore most of them parted with the meal which they were given before they left the ship.

At 4 a.m. the next day the column was again on the march and covered the 14 miles to Chakai Band before the sun became oppressive. Here a two days' halt was made while a small party under Lieutenants Manners and Stoddart went back to Galag with the pack mules to bring up more rations. As the country produced nothing, not even forage for mules, no officers' chargers were allowed and the only kit carried was four pounds, or one blanket, per officer and two pounds, or one blanket between two men. During this two days' halt the Rapsh River was very popular with both British Officers

MEKRAN EXPEDITION, 1911.



1. Tow just leaving R.I.M.S. "Northbrook."  
3. 104th crossing the Rapsh River.



2. View of Camp, Chakal Band.  
4. 104th entering Pushak Defile.





and men, the washing accommodation for the latter having been very scanty on board ship. Reconnaissances were sent out and an attempt made to teach the Marines to ride camels, some thirty of which had been procured at Rapsh. As no riding saddles were available, our Jats were told off to pad the pack saddles with blankets and to give the necessary instruction. The experiment was not a success as the Marines had no experience of camels. They were glad enough to use them to carry their kits, which were decidedly bulky, but their methods of loading were hardly orthodox. When the force marched out of Chakai Band our rearguard came on a Marine trying, ineffectually, to get a loaded camel on to its feet. The wretched beast, besides the load on its back, had half a dozen *dekhis*, all containing food, strung over its neck by the handles and could not even lift its head off the ground.

As soon as the fresh supply of rations had arrived, the force moved up through the Chakai defile 6 miles to Zamin. That evening Sirdar Islam Khan of Bint arrived in camp to discuss measures to prevent the gun-running. He was nominally friendly, but kept in with both sides to his material advantage. It was known that a party of Ghilzais had been staying in Bint for some time, but they were now said to be retiring northwards.

Next day, 16th April, an early start and a 16-mile march brought the column to Burka Band by 8 a.m., and Colonel Delamain decided to make a dash for Bint with a small mounted column, starting the same evening. Some 80 rifles of all units, mounted on mules and camels, set out at 5 p.m., the party of Marines being mounted on mules with Captain Byrne, of our Regiment, taking the place of one of their men in the ranks in the hope of seeing a scrap.

The object of this move was to show the local inhabitants that Bint was not beyond the range of a small mobile force. After marching all night, Bint was reached at 6.30 a.m., and the little force halted in the grove of date palms that bordered the village. Early that morning the rest of the force moved out to occupy the Korandab Pass in case the Bint Column should meet with any opposition, but no enemy being encountered they withdrew the same evening.

Sirdar Islam Khan invited the column to enter the town to witness a *tamasha* to be held in their honour, but Colonel Delamain thought it wiser to remain outside as it was not certain that all the Ghilzais had left and the Baluchis were known to be fanatical. After a rest of eight and a half hours the party returned and reached Burka Band early the following morning, having covered 60 miles in thirty-two hours. That same evening the force set out for Chakai Band which was reached at 9 a.m. on the 19th and the mules were at once despatched to Galag for re-embarkation, the troops following the next day. The 21st was spent re-embarking, and in the evening the ships sailed for Jask. Here they lay in harbour the whole of the next day which was spent in reorganizing and preparing for the next landing. Mir Haji, the



Governor of Biyaban, here joined the force, as the next landing was to be made in his territory.

During the night the ships sailed for Sirik, the next landing-place, which was reached at 1.30 p.m. Disembarkation commenced early next morning and, thanks to better weather and the experience gained in the first landing, the whole force with its transport and ten days' rations was put ashore in ten hours and bivouacked 2 miles from the beach.

Landing at  
Sirik,  
22nd April 1911.

Next day parties were sent to destroy the crops and date palms of two neighbouring villages, Kalingi and Kardar, which had thrown in their lot with Mir Barkat, the deposed Governor. That evening Colonel Walton and Captain Butler joined the Battalion. On their arrival in London they had read in *The Times* of the Regiment's move. They at once decided to rejoin and caught the next boat from Marseilles; transhipped at Bombay into the Karachi boat and there into the Persian Gulf Boat which took them to Muscat, whence H.M.S. *Espiègle* brought them direct to Sirik, just in time to take part in what proved to be the more interesting of the two landings.


Next day a short march of 8 miles took the force to Sarzeh on the Gaz River, up which they were to move. Though very pleasant to bathe in, as there were natural hot springs, it was so strongly impregnated with sulphur that the doctor could carry an additional bottle of brandy instead of his supply of Mag. Sulph.

One of our Officers, who had not enjoyed the hard tack and plain fare provided by the Mess during the first expedition, had volunteered to relieve Major Scott of the duties of Mess President. He promised a slap-up tiffin to start off with. To this end he filled the Mess *yakdans* to bursting-point with all sorts of tinned luxuries. However, he had reckoned without our Force Commander, who, knowing how dependent he was on transport, always inspected it during a march. Colonel Delamain found the two Mess mules being urged along by the rearguard, staggering under their loads. The *yakdans* were at once off-loaded and the keys being in the Mess President's pocket at the head of the column, the lids were burst open and tin after tin of delicacies thrown out on to the sand. Meanwhile the Officers awaited the Mess mules in eager anticipation of the wonderful tiffin they had been promised. The situation of the Mess President can be better imagined than described when he learnt what had happened.

Next day, the 27th, a march of 7 miles up the Gaz River brought the force to Gwaj, where a letter from Mir Barkat was found awaiting them. In this he apologized for failing to come and meet the column at Sirik, but stated that he hoped to greet them at a snug little position in the Marak Gorge. This sounded hopeful, and a perimeter camp was made for the night.

At dawn next morning, leaving the transport in camp under a guard, the column made for the Marak Gorge only to find that the enemy had vacated

GROUP TAKEN 6th FEBRUARY 1914 WHEN COLONEL WALTON HANDED OVER COMMAND TO  
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CLERY.



*Standing*—Captain H. G. H. Grant Smith, Captain G. Tate, I.M.S., Subadar Harchand Jat, Lieutenant C. M. S. Manners, Subadar Ghulam Rasul, Lieutenant W. C. F. A. Wilson (Quartermaster), Captain F. J. Chadwick, Captain A. M. M. Checke, Major H. M. Butler, Captain E. G. J. Byrne, Lieutenant G. Stoddart (Adjutant), Lieutenant J. G. Dorrner, The Regimental Pandit.  
*Seated*—Captain O. T. MacR. Leckie, Captain W. P. M. Sargent, Subadar Sahal Singh, Lieut-Colonel C. B. L. Clery, Subadar-Major Hasan Muhammad, Colonel W. C. Walton, Subadar Nanwa Singh, Major G. Bailey, Subadar Shankar Singh, Major W. Scott, Subadar Ramu Singh, Jamadar Kahu Bakhsh, Jamadar Kalam Dad, Subadar Mukh Ram, Jamadar Chothu Singh, Jamadar Bachan Singh.  
*Front Row*—Jamadar Kahu Bakhsh, Jamadar Kalam Dad, Subadar Mukh Ram, Jamadar Chothu Singh, Jamadar Bachan Singh.



the position of the previous day and retired up the defile towards Pushak.

Action at  
Pushak,  
28th April 1911. The advance was continued up the bed of the stream and it was not long before the sun, beating down into the narrow defile, made it unpleasantly hot. With the passing of each mile hope of an encounter evaporated, and at 9 a.m., when an *Uriah* was seen on a near-by hill, it dwindled to practically nothing. At 9.20 a.m., however, a few shots were heard ahead and then a fusillade. The effect on the column was electrical; the whole pressed forward like one man.

The enemy had taken up a strong position on the right bank where the stream made a right-angled turn and the banks were almost precipitous. No. 2 Double Company (Jats), who were advanced guard under Major Turton, at once worked up to a fire position about 200 yards from the nearest *sangars*; while the section of Mountain Guns quickly got into position on the opposite bank and made some very pretty shooting at about 1,400 yards. Two or three direct hits on their *sangars* cleared the enemy out and they retired, peppered by the Maxim Guns, to a second position covering the mouth of the *tangi* where it opened out into a wide valley.

No. 4 Double Company were now sent to crown the heights above the first position and, as soon as they got there, the rest of the Battalion advanced along the river bed with No. 1 Double Company as a right flank guard. A rapid advance soon drove them from their second position when they retreated, splitting up into small parties, pursued by Mir Haji's followers, who had executed a turning movement.

Our casualties were 3 men of No. 2 Double Company wounded, while the enemy lost 8 killed and 24 wounded, one of whom was captured. The action lasted until a little after 12 noon and, as further pursuit was out of the question, the column spent the night in the gorge, returning next morning to Gwaj. Thence they returned to the coast, the troops of the *Northbrook* re-embarking at Sirik, while those of the *Hardinge*, under Colonel Walton, moved 50 miles farther east along the coast and embarked at Bunji.

During the re-embarkation at Sirik, the last tow, taking off the rear-guard just as it grew dark, failed to get through the surf which had suddenly risen considerably. The steam pinnace and all three lifeboats being swamped, everyone had to swim for the shore where a very cold and uncomfortable night was spent. The fact that there were no casualties from drowning is due chiefly to the training in swimming the men had received on the Varsova sands.

The force set sail on 4th May, reaching Bombay on the 8th.

Subadar Ruda Ram, 123rd Outram's Rifles, and Lance Naik Mewa Ram, of our Regiment, received the Indian Distinguished Service Medal for their gallantry at Pushak, while Colonel Walton, Major Turton, Lieutenant Manners and Rifleman Uda Ram were mentioned in despatches.

The Battalion was represented at the Coronation Ceremony of His Majesty

King George V by Major G. Bailey and Subadar-Major Hasan Muhammad, who went home with the Indian Contingent.

In December when His Majesty the King-Emperor visited India to hold a Durbar at Delhi, the Regiment marched into Bombay to line the streets and take part in the celebrations. On 5th December we provided a Guard of Honour at the Apollo Bunder under Captain Maclean, when His Majesty presented signed portraits of Himself and Her Majesty the Queen to Colonel Walton. These portraits now hang in the Officers' Mess.

In November 1912 orders were received to march to Baroda up the coast, as no troops had passed through that part of the country for nearly eighty years and the villagers were showing signs of disloyalty and unrest. As the only bridges over the creeks were Railway Bridges, and as there was no direct road, the Battalion followed the track of the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway line. The baggage was packed in railway wagons, which were daily attached to the slow train and shunted off at the next halting-place.

In November the following year, 100 men of No. 1 Double Company (Rajputs) under Major Bailey and Captain Leckie were suddenly ordered out in aid of the Civil Power to suppress a Bheel rising in Sunth State. They railed to Sunth Road Station and thence marched to Partabgarh Fort, a distance of 45½ miles in 22 hours, and not a man fell out. For the last half of the march, as the going was too bad for carts, each man carried 220 rounds of ammunition : quite a record march.

**Bheel Rising in  
Sunth State.  
Record March,  
Nov. 1913.**

Some 2,000 or 3,000 Bheels had sangared a position on Mangarh Hill, about a third of their number being armed with smooth-bores, while the rest carried bows and arrows. Assisted by two companies of the Meywar Bheel Corps, and a Machine Gun Section from the 7th Rajputs the party attacked, driving the Bheels to the northern end of the hill, where some 900 were captured, including their two headmen. This completely quelled the rising and our little party received the congratulations of the Commander-in-Chief for their fine exploit.

In February 1914 our Colonel, General W. Bannerman, C.B., died and was succeeded in August by Lieutenant-General W. M. Willoughby, C.S.I.


In February also the Battalion said good-bye to Colonel Walton, who handed over command to Lieutenant-Colonel Clery of 125th Napier's Rifles. He had done his utmost to prepare the Battalion for the Great War, and that they had profited by his training will, perhaps, become evident in the following chapters.





# THE PERSIAN GULF

MAP No. 11







## CHAPTER XVII

1914

Mobilization. The 16th Brigade. Bahrein. Disembarkation at Sanniya. Action of Saihan. Action of Sahil. Occupation of Basra.

(See *Maps No. 18, opposite p. 212, and No. 12, opposite p. 150.*)

THE outbreak of the Great War found the Regiment still at Baroda and, as one of the units detailed for internal security, their chance of seeing service did not seem bright. Few people imagined that the war would last more than three or four months. On 14th August, however, orders were received to mobilize to fill a vacancy in the 16th Poona Brigade. The reservists were called up, and here the benefit of Colonel Walton's policy was apparent. He had insisted on building up a strong Reserve and only sending the best young soldiers to it, and these now turned up almost to a man. Most of them were fine material and in every way fit to take their places in the ranks. In fact, our Regiment was one of the few that was able to complete to war strength without calling on a linked Battalion for men or Officers. Lieutenant Hebbert, 44th Merwaras, arrived to complete the strength of British Officers as Captains Butler, Sargent, Dormer and Manners were all home on leave and so far no news had been received of their movements. However, they were all aboard the troopship *Dongola* and joined up at Baroda on 6th September when Lieutenant Hebbert returned to his own Regiment.

Mobilization was completed by 2nd September and there was much speculation as to the Regiment's destination. It was first thought that East Africa was the most likely theatre and then France. The Officers detailed to proceed on service with the Regiment were:—

- Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. L. Clery, Commandant.
- Major G. Bailey, Second in Command and O.C. No. 1 Double Company.
- Major W. Scott, No. 3 Double Company.
- Captain H. M. Butler, No. 2 Double Company.
- Captain W. Sargent, No. 4 Double Company.
- Captain E. G. J. Byrne, Maxim Guns.
- Captain O. T. MacR. Leckie.
- Captain G. G. C. Maclean.
- Captain F. J. Chadwick, Transport Officer.
- Captain A. M. M. Cheeke.

Captain G. Stoddart, Adjutant.

Lieutenant W. C. F. A. Wilson, Quartermaster and Signalling Officer.

Captain G. Tate, I.M.S., Medical Officer.

Those left at the Depot were:—

Captain H. G. H. Grant Smith, Commanding.

Captain J. G. Dormer.

Captain C. M. S. Manners.

The Regiment was still armed with the Long Lee-Enfield Magazine Rifle

**Arms and  
Accoutrements.**

adapted for charger loading. This took the old ammunition with the round-nosed bullet.

The bandolier equipment consisted of a brown leather belt which carried four pouches to hold fifty rounds and a brown leather bandolier which held another fifty. The great-coat was carried in slings on the back with braces which hooked on to the top of the pouches on the belt in front. The Sirhind rapid entrenching tool was carried across the back, under the great-coat, attached to the bandolier, while the helve was strapped to the sword scabbard. The haversack and water-bottle, not being a Government issue, were of Regimental pattern. The former, made of khaki drill, carried the aluminium ration tin which contained a *lota* in which the emergency ration was placed. The water-bottle was very large and made of aluminium covered with felt and khaki drill. These were carried slung over the left and right shoulders respectively. Khaki shorts, which had been adopted during Hyderabad, Sind, days, were worn on field service. The Maxim Gun Section consisted of two Maxims with their complement of ammunition carried on twelve pack mules.

Before leaving Baroda, His Highness the Gaekwar entertained all the Officers to dinner and gave a feed to the whole Regiment. He also very kindly sent down some horses from which any British Officer in need of a charger was invited to take his pick.

On 30th September the Regiment, relieved by the 75th Carnatic Infantry, moved to Poona and was glad to find itself again under the Command of Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, D.S.O. The 16th Brigade at Poona, 30th Sept. 1914. 16th Brigade consisted of:—

2nd Battalion The Dorsetshire Regiment.



104th Wellesley's Rifles.

117th Mahrattas.

20th Duke of Cambridge's Own Infantry (Brownlow's Punjabis).

Ten days were spent in camp at Poona during which time the Regiment was inspected by the Brigadier. They left Poona on 10th October and, with the 13th Mule Corps, embarked at Bombay on the s.s. *Berbera* and *Masunda*, half in each. They still did not know their destination, so decided that the best form of money to take

**Embarkation,  
10th Oct. 1914.**



Havaldar Sedu Ram in Field Service Order, 1914.

Note: Shorts were worn in place of pantaloons in hot weather.



with them was golden sovereigns. The ships at once moved out into harbour where five days were spent waiting till the loading of the convoy was complete. They were glad to get off on the evening of the 16th, but it was not until a day or two later that they heard that they were to form part of the Indian Expeditionary Force "D" and that their immediate destination was the Island of Bahrein at the head of the Persian Gulf. On the 19th, Force "D," which so far consisted only of the 16th Brigade and No. 1 Brigade Indian Mountain Artillery, broke away from the rest of the convoy and, under the escort of H.M.S. *Ocean*, reach Bahrein on 23rd October.

Arrival at  
Bahrein,  
23rd Oct. 1914.

During the journey up the Gulf they encountered an enormous waterspout, the largest that the ships' captains had ever seen. It was estimated to cover an area about 300 yards in diameter. All the ships near it swung to port and went full speed to avoid it, while H.M.S. *Ocean* opened fire on it to break it up. This it succeeded in doing with the third round.

Owing to the fact that the bulk of the oil fuel used in the Navy at that time was supplied by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in which the British Government had a large holding of shares, the protection of the oilfield and the refinery at Abadan on the Shatt al Arab was of the greatest importance. Consequently the Imperial Government ordered the Government of India to despatch a force to the head of the Persian Gulf to act promptly should occasion arise.

Original Cause  
of the  
Expedition.

As war with Turkey had not yet been declared, no further move could be made and the days were filled teaching the men to row and practising loading the boats to full capacity with armed men. News of the declaration of war with Turkey was received on 2nd November when the ships left Bahrein. (See Map No. 18, opposite p. 212.)

The next two days were spent putting the ships into a state of defence, chiefly with bales of compressed *bhoosa*, two of which were found to be bullet proof. After a few rounds from H.M.S. *Odin*, Fao, at the mouth of the Shatt al Arab, the head of the telegraph cable for India, was occupied on the 6th.

Disembarkation  
at Sanniya,  
8th Nov. 1914.

The following day, the landing party having re-embarked, the force moved up the river and disembarked at Sanniya on the afternoon of the 8th. Beyond a little harmless sniping from the banks on the way upstream no opposition had been met with. Sanniya village was about 2 miles upstream from the Anglo-Persian Oil Works at Abadan and on the right bank of the river. Here a perimeter camp was made. The following day our Regiment was sent 5 miles downstream with orders to beat through the palm groves on the way back. Though no opposition was encountered, this proved no light task owing to the numerous irrigation channels which had to be crossed, some of them with water up to the men's armpits. One Arab in uniform was captured, the Regiment's first prisoner.

of which 100 rounds were carried in the pouches and bandoliers. As ammunition was not then packed in cloth bandoliers, but in cartons containing 20 rounds each, the second 100 rounds had to be carried entirely in the haversack. The whole of the additional weight then came on to one shoulder and wore out the haversack very quickly.

After a day in camp, during which the newly arrived Belgaum Brigade completed its disembarkation, the whole force moved out to attack the Turks 11 miles away, where the successful action of Sahil resulted in the complete defeat of the Turks, who held a strong position with 5,000 men and twelve guns; and sealed the fate of Basra.

The force marched out at 7.30 a.m., the 18th Brigade finding the advanced guard. The Dorsets led the 16th Brigade and our Battalion was in Brigade Reserve with one Company of No. 3 Double Company as left flank guard and No. 2 Double Company as rearguard. These latter had a very heavy task helping the guns and wagons which were continually sticking in the mud. The general run of the action is well described in a letter written by Captain Manners who had come out with the 18th Brigade attached to the 120th Rajputana Infantry. He writes: "The whole force marched off very gaily. At about 8 a.m. the rain came down in torrents. We could see the Advanced

Guard and Cavalry being very freely shelled and word was brought in where the enemy were. I have drawn a sketch to simplify matters.\* The Cavalry and Advanced Guard reported that they held a position about 3 miles long (A to B) with their left about 400 yards south of the Old Fort, which was a large building, walls about 20 feet high. Their right was near fort D, it was afterwards discovered. The existence of the gun emplacement E and trench F was not discovered till the firing line got there, nor was the strength of the enemy known, only about 300 having been seen and four or five guns located. . . . As far as I could

see the battle went as follows: The Poona Brigade advanced on the right with the Dorsets and 20th in front. The Dorsets got ahead advancing against the 'Old Fort' and did not see the concealed trench (F) which was about 800 yards west of it. The enemy lay 'doggo' and got them in enfilade from this trench at about 600 yards and also from the position south of Old Fort, and in front, from the fort itself. They lost very heavily there. . . . The gunners could not spot the trenches owing to the mirage. The ground was 6 inches deep in mud and you could not run quickly as every time you lifted your foot you brought about two pounds of mud with it. It had stopped raining but the sun hadn't come out. The 117th and No. 1 Double Company of the 104th came round their (the enemy's) left led by Delamain and eventually fought their way into the woods from the south and swept the enemy along in the woods relieving the pressure

\* This sketch has been incorporated in Map 12, facing p. 150.

on the Dorsets, who advanced. Subadar Sabal Singh was the first man into the Fort, and after the fight Delamain had him and a Lance Naik of No. 1 Double Company up and congratulated them and told them he would recommend them for a *bahaduri*."

**Our Turning  
Movement.**

When the Dorsets suddenly came under enfilade fire from the concealed trench, they swung round to meet it, and Colonel Clery was ordered to send one Double Company into the woods south of Old Fort and so, by turning the enemy's left flank, relieve the pressure on the Dorsets. No. 4 Double Company was detailed for this task, but on approaching the palms south of the Fort they found that the enemy's position extended farther south than was first reported. Consequently they found themselves drawn into a frontal attack.

Seeing them checked, Colonel Clery went forward to see what had happened; and to get them on the move again sent Chadwick with one Company farther to the right, where he succeeded in capturing the mud wall which ran along the edge of the palm grove.

In the meantime General Delamain, seeing what had happened and realizing the importance of turning the enemy's flank, took the remaining one and a half Double Companies of our Regiment, which was all that was left of his Reserve, and personally led them and part of the 117th Mahrattas into the palm groves where he swung them round in an attack on the Old Fort which they captured in gallant style, Subadar Sabal Singh and Lance-Naik Net Singh being the first two men into the Fort. They both subsequently received the Indian Order of Merit.

**Capture of  
Old Fort.**

Colonel Clery, as soon as he had made good the wall on the edge of the palm trees, collected all the men he could and also swung round on the Old Fort.

After the capture of the Fort, the rest of the Regiment, with the exception of the rearguard, and one Company still on the left flank, took part in the final attack which decided the day. The Maxim Gun Section, which kept close up with the advance, was able to inflict heavy loss on the retiring enemy, whose camp was captured. The Belgaum Brigade, which was out on the left, was deflected to the right to cut off the Turks' retreat, but the latter did not wait to let them get within striking distance.

**Capture of  
Turkish Camp  
at Sahil,  
17th Nov. 1914.**

Our casualties in this action were:—

Killed: 1 Rifleman.

Wounded: Major Bailey, Subadar Nanwa Singh, 1 Havaldar and 21 Rank and File.

After the action the force went into camp at Sahil, but a lot of wounded were left out on the desert that night with the Field Ambulances, and our rearguard had to remain out to protect them. It was a bitterly cold night with a



earing wind, and the tired rearguard had to dig trenches for both themselves and the wounded as the Arabs were out for loot. The Force stayed in Sahil Camp for four days and, as they were short of rations and fodder, they had to get them off the ships over a very bad and muddy landing-place. There was a small attack made on the right of our outpost line at 9 p.m. on the 18th but it was easily driven off, our casualties being three Riflemen wounded. After this there were no signs of the Turks, but the camp was sniped every night, probably by Arabs.


On 21st November news was received that the Turks had evacuated Basra and two Battalions were rushed on to river steamers and sent there at once, while the rest, including our Regiment, started off at 8 p.m. to march there across the desert, completing the 26 miles by noon the next day. Orders were issued by Brigadier-General Delamain that before starting all Officers were to shave off their beards, some of which had reached luxuriant proportions and were parted with regretfully. During the night of 22nd-23rd the Arabs were hard at work looting the Jewish shopkeepers, and at 3 a.m. General Delamain ordered Captain Cheeke to move to the Bazaar with one of our Companies to stop all looting, the men to be particularly warned not to carry off anything themselves. The Jews offered to give the troops anything they liked so long as they stopped the Arabs cutting their throats. Looting was soon stopped and the only things carried back were *razais* for the Brigadier and C.O. as they had no bedding. Our Regiment took part in the state entry into Basra on the 23rd and were quartered in the Ashar Barracks.





# ACTIONS OF SAIHAN AND SAHIL

MAP No. 12





## CHAPTER XVIII

### CAPTURE OF QURNA

Advance on Qurna. First attack and withdrawal. Arrival of Reinforcements.  
Turks driven from Muzaira. Gallantry of Sub-Assistant Surgeon Pandit. The  
Regiment crosses the Tigris. Attack on Qurna. Qurna surrenders.

(See Map No. 13, opposite p. 156.)

THE Regiment was glad to get under a roof again, but the Turkish barracks were filthy; and the next few days were chiefly occupied in cleaning them and landing stores from the ships. On 30th November, having got their kits ashore, they made themselves comfortable awaiting the next move.

The Turks, on vacating Basra, were said to be making for Amara, but  
Advance on gunboats sent up the river reported that they were holding  
Qurna, Qurna, at the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates. As our  
3rd Dec. 1914. occupation of this place was necessary for the security of  
 Basra, a force was sent off, on river steamers, on 3rd December with orders to capture it. The troops detailed for this were:—

1 Section R.F.A.,  
 Half-Company Sappers and Miners,  
 1 Double Company, The Norfolk Regiment,  
 104th Wellesley's Rifles,  
 110th Mahratta Light Infantry,

all under the command of Colonel Frazer of the 110th Mahratta Light Infantry. They were to be supported by warships, armed launches and the remaining two sections R.F.A. on river steamers. (See Map No. 13, opposite p. 156.)

Our Regiment embarked on the *Mejidieh* after putting it into a state of defence. This boat was commanded by Captain Charles Cowley who, sixteen months later, lost his life and gained a posthumous V.C. in a gallant attempt to run the blockade to bring food to the beleaguered Kut garrison. General Barrett came down to see them off and wish them good luck, and the force landed early next morning at Shwayib on the left bank of the river, some

4 miles from Qurna. They at once moved off to attack the  
First Day's enemy at Muzaira. G Company, under Captain Sargent, was  
Action,  
4th Dec. 1914. left behind, distributed among the river steamers as a guard.

Captain Butler gives the following account of the action in a letter:—

“We landed some 5 miles below Kurna and on the 4th we advanced. H.M.S. *Espiegle*, *Odin* and *Lawrence* were in the river, also a couple of armed

launches, and they helped with their fire, but owing to an obstruction in the river they could not get the ships up far enough to fire on Kurna itself which was hidden from view by palms. The Norfolks and 110th went ahead and the 104th were in Reserve. We had no maps and did not know how the ground lay and there was an awful mirage which distorted everything. We drove the enemy out of his first position on the edge of the palms and then I was ordered to take No. 2 Double Company (Jats) and push through the palms and see what was on the far side. I was told I would find a *maidan* there. I pushed through without any resistance and, seeing some buildings in front of me, I made for them. Then suddenly I found myself on the bank of a creek or river and the buildings on the far side. I saw a few men in Turkish uniform standing at a door so I told my fellows to poop at them, which they did. The effect was startling. From hidden trenches and from every door and window on the far side came a terrific and well-aimed fire and I began realizing that I must have bumped into Kurna and that the river in front was the Tigris. Directly the fire opened, I sent a *chit* to the C.O. saying what was in front of me and that nothing but Guns could do much good, but the man carrying the *chit* was bowled over and presently, to my disgust, I saw the rest of the Regiment boosting up to support me. We lined the bank and pooped away but could not advance owing to the river and eventually we were ordered to retire and did so under a very heavy fire. The men behaved splendidly all through. Poor old Ghulam Rasul was killed beside me and we lost some very good men."

On capturing the first position, our Regiment came on an old Turkish Battery Commander sitting in a chair behind one of his guns in an emplacement. His gold spectacles were on his nose and he appeared to be fast asleep, but was in fact dead, shot through the heart.

After capturing the first position, the Norfolks and 110th Mahrattas also pushed through the palms, reaching the river bank farther to the north where they too were held up. As the guns could not get within range and as there were no boats available, a crossing was out of the question and, as the force had no transport, it was necessary to get back to the landing-place to bivouac. Orders were therefore issued for a withdrawal, our Regiment being detailed to cover the movement.

The Maxim Gun Section under Captain Byrne did some very fine work this day. They were gallantly brought up on the extreme left of our position under a very galling fire and were most effective in keeping down that of the enemy. As soon as they were located they received a lot of attention from the Turkish guns but although several shells burst on the *bund* which they were holding, they kept their Maxims in action until the Regiment retired. When they withdrew, the guns had to be man-handled back some 250 yards to the mules under a very heavy fire. As there were not enough men with them to carry every-

**Fine Work by  
our Machine  
Guns.**

thing, a good many ammunition boxes had to be left behind. As soon as they reached the mules Captain Byrne called for volunteers to go back and fetch the rest of the ammunition. Four men, one Rajput, two Jats, and one Punjabi at once responded and succeeded in retrieving everything although, as all the troops had by this time left the position, they drew exceptionally heavy fire. All four men subsequently received the Indian Order of Merit. The men behaved splendidly throughout the day and particularly during the retirement, while the Buglers, who acted as runners, were especially conspicuous.

The casualties this day were, in the whole force, 20 killed and 54 wounded; and in our Battalion:—

**Casualties in  
Action of  
4th Dec. 1914.**

Killed: Subadar Ghulam Rasul, 2 Havaldars and 11 Rank and File.

Died of wounds: 4 Rank and File.

Wounded: 2 Havaldars and 26 Rank and File.

Our Regiment expended 23,841 rounds of ammunition and captured one Field Gun, six prisoners and a quantity of ammunition.

Shortly before leaving Baroda, Colonel Clery, who had been reading an account of the South African War and had been much struck by the magnificent conduct of the Guards, spoke about them at Orderly Room one day and said that if the Regiment had an opportunity of seeing service he hoped they would take them as their model and try and do as well as they had done. During this retirement, while they were collecting the wounded, Colonel Clery came on a Lance-Naik who had been badly hit through the stomach and went to speak to him while a stretcher was being fetched. The man begged the Colonel not to wait for him as he knew he was finished but said that before he went he would like him to say whether he considered that his conduct had been up to the standard of the Guards of whom he had told them. The man was brought in but died soon after.

After a night spent in bivouac, No. 4 Double Company was sent out next morning to reconnoitre and found that the enemy had reoccupied his position at Muzaira.

During the course of the day the rest of the Belgaum Brigade arrived under Brigadier-General C. I. Fry, a former Officer of our Regiment. The 6th December was spent in enlarging and strengthening the perimeter and in the evening the enemy made a demonstration against the outpost line but were easily driven off.

Early the following morning orders were issued for an advance. The Norfolks and 110th again led, 104th and 120th being in Reserve.

**Action on  
7th Dec. 1914.**

Under good supporting fire from the guns, the leading Battalions soon carried the enemy's position at Muzaira and south of it, between the village and the Shatt al Arab, but it was found that the enemy's left was echeloned back for some distance north of the village. Consequently at 12.5 p.m. our Regiment received orders to advance and



support the right of the attack. They came into action about 1 p.m. and, pushing through the unit in front of them, made a rapid advance, clearing the enemy out of their trenches with splendid dash at the point of the bayonet. During this advance Jamadar Chothu Singh was conspicuous for the gallant and enterprising way in which he led his company round the flank, taking the main Turkish trench in enfilade. Having got the enemy on the run, the Regiment pursued for about a mile and a half closely supported by guns. Then, finding themselves isolated from the rest of the infantry, Colonel Clery called a halt and reconnoitred towards the river bank on his left. On getting clear of the palm trees they saw some 2,000 Turks retiring upstream on both banks and sent back word to the guns who shelled them vigorously. A position was also found from which the Qurna river front could be enfiladed and the gunners managed to run up one gun and open fire. During this reconnaissance a lot of *mahelas* were seen tied up to the far bank which were to play an important part in the following day's operations. By now it was 5 p.m. and too late to effect a crossing, so troops were ordered to withdraw to Muzaira village to bivouac.

The Turks, who are said to have had 2,000 men on the left bank, lost 200 killed, 130 prisoners and several hundred wounded, while three of their guns were captured. They had put up a stout resistance and our Regiment's

**Casualties on  
7th Dec. 1914.**

casualties would have been much heavier but for the splendid support afforded by the guns, particularly by the 76th Field Battery commanded by Captain E. V. Sarson, an old friend of the Regiment at Hyderabad, Sind. They were: killed, 3 Rank and File; wounded, Captain Butler, Subadar Sabal Singh, Subadar Harchand Jat, 3 Havaldars, and 31 Rank and File.

**Gallant Conduct  
of  
Sub-Assistant  
Surgeon Pandit.**

During this attack our Sub-Assistant Surgeon, Pandit, a Brahman, who had been brought to notice for gallant work during the action at Sahil, again distinguished himself. While tending the wounded in Muzaira village, a wounded Rifleman was shot by an Arab hiding in one of the houses. Pandit and a sepoy of another Regiment were quite near the door of the house at the time and the Sub-Assistant Surgeon told the sepoy to go in and tackle him. As, however, he seemed reluctant to do so, Pandit, seizing the man's bayonet, broke in the door, which was locked, rushed into the hut and closed with the Arab himself, and, with the help of the sepoy who followed him in, killed him. For this plucky act he received the Indian Order of Merit.

**Crossing of  
River Tigris,  
8th Dec. 1914.**

The Turks fired a few shells over the bivouac in the evening but the night passed peacefully, though one of our men was wounded by a rifle bullet as he lay asleep. At 6 a.m. the following morning the Regiment was sent upstream to reconnoitre and to protect the flank of 110th Mahratta Light Infantry while they crossed by a flying bridge which the sappers had been ordered to construct nearly opposite

# MESOPOTAMIA.



1



2



3

1. Our last attack on Qurna. This position was held by the Turks.
2. "Mejidieh" with Dorsets on left. 104th on "Blosse Lynch." Gunboats "Espiègle," "Odin" and "Clio" in front.
3. Marching off before action at Qurna.



Muzaira village. After moving some 3 or 4 miles along the bank of the river without opposition, three of the *mahelas* seen the evening before were found to be still on the far bank and Captain Leckie called to the men on board to bring them across, whereon the crews all bolted over the plain leaving only one old greybeard at the tiller of each boat. It was these three old men who single-handed manœuvred the *mahelas* across the stream by means of their huge rudders. The *mahelas* were full of bricks which had now to be unloaded.

Meanwhile word was sent to the General to say that the Regiment could cross where they were, out of sight of Qurna, and sanction for this move was received by 12.30 p.m., half the Norfolks and 76th Battery being sent out to take over our duty of covering the flank. The big unwieldy sails had then to be hoisted, which took about ten men to each of them and proved no easy job as the men could not understand the instructions of the Arab owners and often pulled on the wrong ropes. By 1.30 p.m., however, with the exception of the Maxim Gun Section and a few transport mules and their escort, the whole Regiment was across and at once set off down the right bank towards

**Decisive Attack  
on Qurna on  
Right Bank of  
Tigris,  
8th Dec. 1914.**

Qurna. At 2.10 p.m. the advanced guard came under heavy fire in the open at 900 yards' range from a line of brick kilns held by the enemy whose one machine gun was particularly well concealed and caused most of the casualties. The rest of the Regiment was at once deflected to its left into the palm trees where it joined hands with some Companies of 110th Mahratta Light Infantry.

The two Battalions then continued the advance till about 3.30 p.m., when orders were received from Colonel Frazer, the senior Officer present, to break off the engagement and withdraw to bivouac near where the Mahrattas had crossed. Our casualties in this advance had been fifteen men wounded, nearly all in the open. Bugler Narsu Singh, who had been conspicuous for his gallantry in the action on 4th December, was again to the fore. When the order to withdraw to bivouac was given he went to the assistance of a rifleman who had been severely wounded out in the open, and carried him back 400 yards to cover under very heavy machine gun and rifle fire. For this he received the Indian Order of Merit while Jamadar Chothu Singh, Havaldar Mohru Ram, Lance Naik Teja Ram and Bugler Kala Khan all received the Indian Distinguished Service Medal.

**Gallant Conduct  
of  
Bugler Narsu  
Singh and Others.**

**Surrender of  
Turkish  
Garrison  
of Qurna,  
9th Dec. 1914.**

A quiet night was spent in bivouac during which the garrison of Qurna, finding themselves isolated, sent a boat downstream with a deputation to say that they were prepared to surrender. The finding of the *mahelas* and the crossing of our Regiment were in fact directly responsible for their surrender, as the flying bridge could not possibly have crossed over sufficient men to have enabled

an attack to be launched that evening, and it was this attack down the right bank of the river which convinced Subhi Bey, the Turkish Commander, that he could not escape.

Next day the 104th and 110th marched into Qurna at 1 p.m., and, in recognition of the gallant part it had played in the fight, our Regiment was granted the distinction of furnishing the Guard of Honour when the Union Jack was hoisted. Over one thousand of the enemy with four guns surrendered, including Subhi Bey, the late Wali of Basra. A lot of the men belonged to the 26th Stamboul Regiment, and a fine-looking lot they were. They were all put on the river boats and sent down to Basra under a guard furnished by our Regiment. During the voyage Subhi Bey presented his sword to Captain Cheeke. This sword now hangs in the Officers' Mess.

After a couple of days' reconnaissance of the Euphrates, during which no enemy were encountered, the Regiment embarked on the *Blosse Lynch* on 12th December, reaching Basra the following day, and returned to their old quarters in Ashar Barracks.

So far the Regiment had fought in every action and had suffered 148 casualties, and although some of the wounded were beginning to rejoin, they were glad to receive a draft of 40 men from the Depot on the 27th of December.

Return to  
Quarters in


Basra,  
13th Dec. 1914.





# CAPTURE OF QURNA

MAP No. 13







## CHAPTER XIX

### BATTLE OF SHAIBA

Occupation of Shaiba. The Turkish attack. The Regiment in support of the Cavalry Brigade. Capture of North Mound. Turks cleared from the Western face, death of Captain Leckie. Levelling Shaiba defences. Return to Basra.

(See Map No. 14, opposite p. 164.)

To cover Basra from the west, a small detachment of the 33rd Cavalry and a wing of the 20th Punjabis had been sent out at the beginning of December 1914 to Shaiba, an old fort and a few huts in the desert some 10 miles distant. Early in January 1915 reports showed that the enemy was concentrating in this direction; it was therefore decided to increase the Cavalry to a squadron and to send out one section of the 23rd Mountain Battery. At the same time No. 3 and 4 Double Companies of our Regiment under Major Scott were sent out to relieve the 20th Punjabis. This little force was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Stack, 33rd Cavalry.

Our Double Companies arrived in Shaiba on 5th January 1915, and on the 7th the force set out to reconnoitre the enemy outpost reported to be at Nukhaila some 16 miles north-west, starting in the evening and reaching Nukhaila at 4 a.m. As it was found unoccupied, the force pushed on to Allawi where 200 Arabs were found entrenched. These were soon turned out by the guns and cavalry, the infantry not coming into action at all. After destroying their camp, twenty-six rifles and a lot of ammunition, the column withdrew to Nukhaila, where they spent the night in bivouac, and returned to Shaiba the following morning.

Our wing occupied Shaiba Fort and a perimeter camp; and then set to work digging a position which could be held by a larger force if necessary. The monotony of the digging was varied by the task of supporting the cavalry on their daily reconnaissances.

The half Battalion which remained in Basra spent its time at company training. A small party of eighty men was formed into a camel corps under Captain Cheeke. These men took it in turn with the cavalry in Basra to reconnoitre across the desert. They only once came into action and had two casualties and one man was killed by his camel.

In case the force should have to operate up any of the creeks, a Brigade *Bellum* Squad was formed with a section from each unit, the whole under command of Lieutenant Wilson. These *bellums* were narrow punt-like boats used by the Arabs on the river

**The Bellum Squad.**

and creeks and were either poled or paddled. After a few involuntary dives Jats, Rajputs, Punjabis, Mahrattas and British Tommies all became remarkably efficient with their punt poles. This training was of the utmost value later when the floods cut off Shaiba from Basra. Captain Manners had now rejoined our Regiment.

Early in February His Excellency the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, visited Basra when the troops lined the streets. He afterwards drove out to Shaiba and inspected the troops there, Cheeke and his Camel Corps escorting him out and back again.

H.E. The  
Viceroy's Visit,  
February 1915.

Very shortly after this the Shatt al Arab flooded its banks and cut off Shaiba from Basra. The flood covered some 6 miles of the road to a depth, in places, of 4 feet. This spelt the doom of the camel corps, who again became foot-sloggers. On 13th February a report was received that Ajaimi, head of the Muntafik Arabs, with 5,000 Turks and Arabs and six guns was concentrating at Nukhaila. Consequently on 19th February the remainder of the 16th Brigade marched out in a blinding dust-storm to reinforce the Shaiba garrison who, a few days previously, had already been strengthened by two Double Companies of 44th Merwaras. The march was very tiring, as, although the route through old Basra was taken so as to avoid the deepest water, the troops were marching through knee-deep water and mud for most of the way. On arrival at Shaiba the Regiment was together again and covered the Brigade for the night.

A reconnaissance was carried out by the whole force on the 20th. They marched from bivouac at 6 a.m. in rain which made the ground very slippery and the going heavy. On arrival at Shwaibda, about 5 miles south-west of Shaiba, the infantry formed a perimeter camp while the cavalry pushed on and reported a large force in the enemy's camp at Nukhaila. Owing to the disparity of numbers General Delamain decided to withdraw to Shaiba. The following day the Brigade returned to Basra, leaving the whole of our Regiment at Shaiba where the garrison now consisted of:

1½ Squadrons 33rd Cavalry,  
1 Section 23rd Mountain Battery,  
104th Wellesley's Rifles,  
2 Double Companies 44th Merwara Infantry,  
all under command of Colonel Clery.

As it was now evident that the enemy was concentrating with a view to recapturing Basra, the rest of the 16th Brigade returned to Shaiba on the 24th and 25th with tents and kits. Half our Regiment provided a protective screen to the south to cover the march while the rest started making a new series of defences about 1,000 yards north of Shaiba Fort, near an old brick kiln which rose to a height of about 25 feet.

16th Brigade  
concentrate at  
Shaiba,  
25th Feb. 1915.

The Cavalry Brigade moved out to Shaiba and were daily employed in reconnaissances, the infantry units taking it in turns to support them. Though the cavalry often had small encounters with the enemy's mounted men our Regiment was never called on to support them actively and did not see any more fighting until April.

Shaiba was not an attractive camp as drinking water was scarce and mostly brackish. A strong wind blew continuously, raising clouds of sand which permeated everything. During the whole of March, when not employed supporting the cavalry, or guarding convoys from Basra, the Regiment dug trenches in the north and west works and a communicating trench to Kiln Post. Towards the end of March enemy reconnoitring parties were more often seen and more than once troops slept on their alarm posts fully accoutred. Early in April Arabs commenced sniping the camp at night from the direction of Barjisiya and twice early in the month our Regiment sent out a *chupao*\* to waylay them, but both nights passed without incident.

On 6th April the 18th Brigade arrived out from Basra and took over the line held by the 16th Brigade, who were then allotted a new defensive area farther north. This necessitated the digging of more trenches which kept our Regiment busy for the next week.

Before describing the operations at Shaiba let us take a glance at the situation of the two forces and the lie of the land in the vicinity.

**Dispositions  
at Shaiba.**

Our force was practically in a perimeter camp, protected on three faces by strong points linked by fire trenches and covered by a wire entanglement; while the fourth, the north-eastern face, was protected by the edge of the flooded area. There were two routes of communication with Basra, the direct *bellum* route, some 9 miles across the floods; and the marching route which crossed the water farther to the south towards Zubair and then turned north-west along the edge of the mud. This was some 4 miles longer and very vulnerable but the water was not quite so deep.

The enemy's line of communication lay near the edge of the floods, passing through Nukhaila, Shwaibda and Barjisiya Wood, where his final camp was situated, some 4 miles south-west of Shaiba.

Looking south-west from Shaiba the ground, which was devoid of cover, sloped very gently upwards for some 2,000 yards to a long ridge, about 25 feet high, which was about 2,000 yards in length lying north-west and south-east, terminating at its southern end in the South Mound. Behind this was another similar, almost parallel, ridge with the Watch Tower 1,500 yards south of South Mound at its southern end. Behind this ridge again the ground sloped gently down to the Turkish position at Barjisiya.

North-west of our camp at Shaiba and about 1,400 yards away was the North Mound, an isolated mound some 20 feet high, east of which some gardens and ruined houses afforded a little cover.

---

\* Ambush.

Turkish  
Reconnaissance  
in Force,  
11th April 1915.

On 11th April information was received that the enemy intended to attack our force that night. Tents were struck; all troops slept on their alarm posts and "stood to" at 4.30 a.m. Our Regiment was holding the north-west salient near Kiln Post with half 117th Mahrattas on our right and 119th Infantry on our left. At 5 a.m. a few shots were fired from some palm trees and gardens to the north of Kiln Post and the outpost piquets were withdrawn. Very shortly after, musketry fire opened from all along the ridge to the west of Shaiba. When it began to get light, a large body of enemy were seen to be advancing in the direction of Kiln Post, but our guns opened on them while they were still some 2,500 yards away and brought their advance to a halt. One small party, however, advanced down the slope and dug themselves in, presumably as an observation post. Colonel Clery subsequently, when in hospital, met the Turkish Officer in charge of this party who told him that he had been making a sketch of our position.

Shortly afterwards a body of Turks and Arabs detached themselves from the main body and, advancing towards North Mound, made for the low ground behind it. Fire was opened on them with rifles and machine guns when they were about 1,200 yards distant to prevent them gaining the cover of the mound. A certain number turned back but the larger portion reached their objective. From here they made several half-hearted attempts to advance against the northern part of the defences but made no headway. During the whole of that day and the following night they kept up a desultory fire on the Regiment and there were several false alarms but no attack developed. Our only casualties this day were two riflemen severely wounded.

Arrival of  
General Melliss,  
12th April 1915.

Late that evening, General Melliss arrived at Shaiba and took over command of the whole force. The 30th Brigade which he had just brought from Egypt attempted to march out through the floods, but finding the water too deep, they returned to Basra to collect *bellums* in which the 24th Punjabis succeeded in getting out during that night, the remainder following a day or two later.

General Melliss, on taking over command, found that his force was surrounded by the enemy except on the flooded side, but as their attack appeared to have spent itself, he decided to take the offensive next morning without waiting for the arrival of the 30th Brigade. The action was successful and by the evening the Turks were driven from all their positions and retired to Barjisiya Wood.

Our Regiment  
in Support  
of Cavalry,  
13th April 1915.

During this offensive our Regiment was at first placed at the disposal of the Cavalry Brigadier and at 7.25 a.m. received orders "to be in such a position by 7.30 a.m. that from it they can assist by fire action the operations of the cavalry from the direction of the Mud toward North Mound."

Colonel Clery at once sent forward two Double Companies, Major Scott's

and Captain Leckie's, as firing line and supports to advance on North Mound, moving to the left and right respectively of House "C," while the rest of the Battalion followed as reserve. As soon as the leading Double Companies passed House "C" they came under heavy fire from the North Mound and from the ruined, loopholed house almost immediately behind House "C" and from gardens to their right front.

When they got within a few hundred yards of the North Mound, one squadron of cavalry, led by Major Wheeler, charged across their front in a gallant attempt to capture the Mound. The charge was met by a very heavy fire from the Mound and from the enemy entrenched behind it, who were out of sight of our Regiment. The charge was not successful, only Major Wheeler and an Indian Officer actually reaching the Mound where both were killed. The remainder of the squadron wheeled about and, as General Kennedy had been ordered not to commit his Brigade if he encountered serious opposition, and as he had already lost 21 men and 81 horses, the whole Cavalry Brigade at once withdrew to camp.

As Colonel Clery was uncertain what numbers of the enemy were concealed behind the North Mound, and as the Regiment was now in the open and quite unsupported, he stopped the advance and at once sent a message back to the Brigade Major, Cavalry Brigade, asking for orders. After some little delay, these were received ordering a withdrawal to camp.

As soon as the cavalry retired, the Arabs on North Mound again turned their attention to our Regiment, and with banners flying  
**Arab Counter-Attack repelled.** started to advance to the attack. When the retirement commenced, the Regiment was assailed by both mounted and dismounted men, but thanks to the steadiness of all ranks and the good work of our machine guns, which were splendidly handled by Captain Chadwick, the attack was driven back and the retirement to our trenches carried out without mishap.

Our casualties in this action were:—

Killed: 6 Indian Rank and File.

Wounded: Captain Leckie (slightly), Subadar Bachan Singh (mortally),  
 20 Indian Rank and File.

About an hour later orders were received that the Regiment would take part in an infantry attack by part of the 16th Brigade on North Mound. Supported by the concentrated fire of the whole of the British Field and Mountain Artillery in Shaiba, this was successfully accomplished with little opposition, the Arabs retiring very quickly. As soon as the Regiment reached the high ground near North Mound they could see hundreds of Arabs in flight scattered all over the plain beyond. Unfortunately on this occasion the cavalry, who were watering their horses, were not at hand to take advantage of this wonderful opportunity.

Early in the morning General Melliss had gone to Kiln Post from which commanding position he was able to follow the progress of the fight, particularly in the north-western area.

When General Delamain had captured the North Mound and the high ground in its vicinity, seeing that this area was now clear of the enemy, General Melliss decided to use this same force to continue the clearing movement in a south-westerly direction where a considerable number of the enemy were in evidence, and where he could see two Turkish mountain guns which appeared to have been abandoned.

At about midday, therefore, he ordered General Delamain to resume the advance and to bring in the Turkish guns. Leaving the Dorsets to occupy North Mound and protect his right rear, Delamain issued orders for an advance to the south of west, the direction in which the abandoned guns were supposed to lie. These guns, though clearly visible from Kiln Post, were obscured from view of the Brigade by the mirage which was then at its worst.

**Continuation of  
Attack by  
16th Brigade  
at 12 noon,  
13th April 1915.**

Our Regiment led the advance with half a Battalion each of the 24th Punjabis and 119th Infantry echeloned back on our right and left flanks respectively. During the first 1,000 yards or so the little opposition encountered was easily driven off, but shortly afterwards a strong body of Turks, entrenched in successive lines, opened a heavy fire on the Regiment from their left front, taking the advance somewhat in enfilade.

Just at this time Colonel Clery received an order to change direction a quarter right, but this could not be complied with until these enemy trenches had been cleared, so swinging round slightly to his left he attacked the trenches. With the support of the artillery in Shaiba, three successive lines of trenches were captured with splendid dash at the point of the bayonet, and a determined counter-attack driven off. The Regiment here captured 150 prisoners including 6 or 7 Officers, most of them belonging to the Turkish 104th Regiment, a lot of arms and ammunition and also a Turkish Flag, which now hangs in the Officers' Mess.



**Capture of  
Turkish  
Entrenchments.**

It was here that an incident occurred which cast a gloom over the whole Regiment. As Captain Leckie, who was commanding No. 2 Double Company, was charging the line of the Turkish trenches, the Turks in front of him began putting up their hands in token of surrender. Leckie at once tried to hold back his men from bayoneting the Turks, when one of the enemy immediately in front of him shot him at two or three yards' range.

**Death of  
Captain Leckie.**

It is just possible that this was not done treacherously as the Turkish trenches were very broken and irregular, and it may be that the men in that particular section of trench had not put up their hands or a white flag. At any rate his Jats, seeing their Officer shot treacherously, as they thought,

MESOPOTAMIA.



1. 104th trenches at Shaiba. Kiln Post to extreme right.
2. Some trophies captured by the 104th at Shaiba.
3. 104th marching back from Shaiba to Basra.





went straight in with their fixed swords and killed every Turk in that section of the trench.

Ever since the first action at Saihan, there had been much discussion in the Mess as to what was the correct thing to do when passing through enemy who had surrendered or had been wounded. Many cases had occurred of men, after passing through, being shot in the back by enemy who had surrendered or been left wounded, and consequently the men were very loath to take this risk. In these discussions Leckie had always contended that men who had surrendered or had been wounded must be protected and he forfeited his life while trying to give effect to this humane principle. It is only fair to explain that in order to make them stauncher in the fight, the Turkish soldiers had been told that our men would take no prisoners.

Having cleared this system of trenches Colonel Clery now changed direction half right and continued the advance with the now retreating enemy streaming across the desert in front of him where the cavalry, operating wide on our right flank, were able to ride down and spear a considerable number.

The advance continued until 3 p.m. by which time the ground to the west of Shaiba had been completely cleared of the enemy who had been considerably shaken. The 24th Punjabis who encountered practically no opposition came on the abandoned guns which they brought in together with their gun crews whom they found sheltering near by. The force was now ordered to return to camp. Though the action had only lasted a very short time our Regiment's losses had been heavy. Besides Leckie, we had also lost Chadwick who had been handling his machine guns with such notable success throughout the day. He was hit in the groin, the bullet severing an artery, and he died in Hospital that evening. Stoddart, also, was severely wounded, while of the Indian ranks 2 were killed and 15 wounded, making our total casualties for the day 45.

The Regiment had given a very good account of itself and, in his report on the operations, General Delamain refers to "the remarkably good work done by the 104th Rifles on every occasion on which it has been engaged." On our return to Camp General Melliss, who had been able to watch all the fighting from his commanding position, came and addressed the Regiment and congratulated them on the splendid way in which they had fought throughout the day.

At 7 o'clock the following morning Leckie and Chadwick were buried in the Shaiba Cemetery, Officers of all units in the Force attending the funeral. All the graves at Shaiba were subsequently moved to the war cemetery at Makina Masus near Basra. After the service was over General Melliss announced his intention of moving out to attack the Turks that morning, without awaiting the arrival of the 30th Brigade and told units to consider that as a warning order. He told Colonel Clery that, as our Regiment's casualties had been far heavier than

**Action at  
Barjisiya Wood,  
14th April 1915.**

those of any other unit the previous day, he was leaving us as a Reserve to guard the camp. Consequently our Regiment played no part in the hard-fought action at Barjisiya Wood, their chief duty being to take over the prisoners that were sent back. It is of interest to note that Turks and Arabs had to be put into separate enclosures to prevent them fighting amongst themselves.

Second Lieutenant Lemon, I.A.R.O., who had joined our Regiment at Shaiba, acted as Orderly Officer to General Melliss throughout the action at Barjisiya and received a mention in despatches.

When the Force returned to Shaiba that night they expected to have to renew the attack the following day and it was not until the cavalry reconnaissance returned the following morning that it was known that the Turks had abandoned their camp and were retreating.

Our Regiment was at once sent out with A.T. carts to clear the battlefield. They saw no sign of the enemy, nor did the Arabs give any trouble, most of them being more profitably employed plundering their erstwhile allies during their retreat.

The defeat of the Turks was so decisive as to remove all danger of a threat to Basra from the west. General Nixon therefore decided to withdraw the Force from Shaiba leaving only a few troops under General Fry near Zubair. The withdrawal commenced on the 17th when our Regiment was left behind to demolish the defences of which they had dug the lion's share. This work was completed by the 28th when, after a tedious march through the water, they pitched camp at Makina Masus.

Early in May orders were issued for Officers to wear the same equipment as the men so as to render them less conspicuous. Up to date the black Sam Browne Belt and Sword had always been worn. These were now discarded and Officers wore the men's Bandolier Equipment, while the cases of their field glasses and revolvers were covered with khaki drill.

On the 6th May floods burst the embankment in many places near the camp, and the whole Regiment spent the night working in the water trying to stem the flood. At 2.30 a.m. it was decided to abandon camp, and all the tents and kits were carried by

**Floods in  
Basra,  
May 1915.**

hand to some higher ground about 1,000 yards away. Later in the day a move was made into billets in the Custom House at the mouth of the Ashar Creek. As the weather was now very hot and as the roof of the Custom House was made of glass, it proved by no means a comfortable billet for the men. However, being on the water-front, they were able to spend much of their time bathing, which afforded a pleasant change after their long stay in dusty Shaiba. This opportunity was taken to resuscitate the training in swimming which had been instituted with such good effect by Colonel Walton at Santa Cruz in 1910.

During this time the Regiment was rearmed with the Short M.L.E. Rifle and the rest of the month was spent in firing range practices and learning to






To illustrate fighting near Shaiba  
*Contours and Form lines only approximate*  
*Heights in feet*

Scale

MILES 5 4 3 2 1 0 5 MILES

MAP No. 14





pole *bellums* in preparation for the next forward move. On 7th May Second Lieutenant L. S. Bell Syer, I.A.R.O., joined the Regiment and on 27th a very welcome draft arrived under Captain A. K. Norris, of 123rd Outram's Rifles, and Second Lieutenant R. E. Alderman, I.A.R.O., consisting of 74 men of the 123rd Rifles and 7 men of 104th Rifles.

During the month the Regiment was inspected by the new Divisional Commander, General Townshend, who had come to replace General Sir Arthur Barrett.



## CHAPTER XX

### BATTLE OF KUT AL AMARA

Occupation of Amara. Battle of Kut al Amara. The Turkish Position. General Townshend's plan. Clery's Post. Night march. The Regiment captures new redoubt. Turkish main body defeated. Turkish Reserves defeated. Move to Kut al Amara.

(See Map No. 15, opposite p. 176.)

HAVING secured Basra from attack, General Nixon was now able to turn his attention to the reopening of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's pipe line which had been interrupted for some weeks. This was effected by General Gorringe by the end of May. Meanwhile preparations had been put in hand for a further advance up the Tigris to Amara.

As a great deal of the country between Qurna and Amara was flooded, intensive training in the use of *bellums* was continued. To the 17th Brigade was allotted the task of attacking the first objectives across the flooded area in *bellums*, the 16th Brigade forming the Reserve.

Our Battalion embarked on the *Blosse Lynch* and two barges at Basra on 28th May and steamed up to Qurna where the 16th Brigade concentrated. As there was no room for the troops on shore, they had to remain for two days on their boats. A temperature of 112° in the shade, with iron decks, a single awning and not a breath of wind, did not make for comfort, and all were glad to get under weigh again on the 31st May. During this advance, popularly known as Townshend's Regatta, what fighting there was fell to the lot of the 17th Brigade who successfully carried all their objectives without very much opposition. The 16th Brigade, as Reserve, remained on their boats, and, moving slowly up the river, were able to watch the progress of the action. It was during this advance that the Regiment saw the first British aeroplane, which was flown by Major Reilly.

Fighting having died down shortly after midday, the 16th Brigade anchored for the night. That evening orders were received for an attack to be made next morning on the Island of Abu Aran. The 16th Brigade were to make a landing from their boats, led by the Dorsets and our Regiment, while the 17th Brigade made a turning movement wide to the east. At dawn the following

morning the island was heavily bombarded. Aeroplane reconnaissance then reported that it was unoccupied and that the enemy were retreating. As a landing was now unnecessary, the boats anchored off the island awaiting further orders and watching the Naval Flotilla clearing obstructions and exploding mines.

In the afternoon the 16th Brigade were ordered to land on the island and pitch camp, and as there was only sufficient shipping to take one Brigade at a time, the 17th Brigade went on board the vacated steamers and moved off in pursuit.

The following day was spent by the Regiment levelling an aerodrome, while No. 2 Double Company was sent in *bellums* on a reconnaissance to some sandhills on the left bank where a party of enemy had been reported. Finding the entrenchments abandoned, they returned in the evening without incident. Abu Aran was a terribly smelly and mosquito-ridden island, and everyone was glad to leave it on the 3rd June when the ships returned from Ezra's Tomb where the 17th Brigade had disembarked. General Townshend himself, with the Naval Flotilla, had continued upstream.

The 16th Brigade re-embarked, and, passing Ezra's Tomb during the night, reached Qala Salih at 6 a.m. on the 4th. Here a short halt was called while No. 3 Double Company, under Major Scott, was landed to take over the administration of the place.

The Union Jack was hoisted in the presence of a Guard of Honour of the Dorsets and our Regiment and General Delamain addressed the local Arab chiefs. Among the prisoners who surrendered here were the first three German combatants that the Regiment had yet met. They had all been wounded by Arabs after the Turks had started retreating.

In the meantime General Townshend and the Naval Flotilla, pushing on from Ezra's Tomb, came within range of the retreating Turks just as it was getting dark. They sank the Turkish steamer *Marmaris* and captured several boats. The following morning,

the 3rd, preceded by the armed launch *Shaitan*, the General pushed on to Amara, arriving at 1.30 p.m. Here, by the most amazing piece of bluff, he received the surrender of the town and its large garrison, giving out that a large British Force was just round the bend of the river, though in reality the nearest unit was almost twenty-four hours' steaming distance away. It was not until daylight on the 4th that the Norfolks arrived just in time to save the town from the Arabs, who, having just realized the extent to which they had been duped, had started attacking and looting. Order was quickly restored by the Norfolks and the arrival of our Regiment in the afternoon made the place secure.

Our Regiment at once disembarked on the right bank and bivouacked for the night in a palm grove just above the bridge of boats. Here three hot days were spent improving defences and cleaning kit. On the 8th Captain Cheeke and his Double Company, which had been left to garrison Abu Aran,

rejoined the Regiment, which now crossed to the other bank and were glad to get into good billets on the Juhala Canal.

While the VIth Division was thus moving up the Tigris, a column moved out from Ahwaz to keep in touch with the Turkish troops retiring from the Persian front and prevent them helping to oppose General Townshend's advance; also to punish the hostile Arab tribes in that area. This move was of considerable assistance to Townshend, as the retreating Turks, on reaching Amara, were forced to surrender.

**The Ahwaz Column.**

It was known that the Ahwaz Column, marching very light, was undergoing extreme hardships owing to the intense heat and lack of transport, so it was decided to establish a supply dump for them 24 miles east of Amara, along the Mushara Canal. This duty fell to our Regiment, and a party under Second Lieutenant Lemon was sent with the Political Officer to select the site of the dump and to guard it, while parties of fifty men were sent out daily with *bellums* full of stores. They were towed most of the way down by launch and, having dumped their loads, the men poled the empty *bellums* back the same

**Salvage of Turkish Gun,  
6th June 1915.**

evening. On the second day the party under Second Lieutenant Alderman, when returning empty in the evening, salvaged a Turkish gun which had been thrown into the canal, also the limber, found in a near-by swamp, and thereby gained the commendation of the Divisional General.

On 8th June Major Scott with No. 3 Double Company rejoined from Qala Salih. During this month the Regiment was chiefly employed improving the defences of Amara. Arab thieves crawled into camp every night. Our Regiment was probably the only unit that did not lose a rifle, though one night on the right bank Second Lieutenant Bell Syer, while sleeping, had the whole of his kit stolen from his tent. On the alarm being given, it was found that the thieves had removed all Officers' shoes to prevent the possibility of pursuit.

For the security of rifles in our Regiment, each Double Company posted a sentry at each end of the Double Company and sentries were relieved half-hourly throughout the night, while every man dug a slit in the ground in which he placed his rifle, over the top of which he placed his bedding and slept, having the bolt wrapped up in his clothing.

On 8th July the Regiment moved into camp on the right bank of the river for a week to put the defences into good order. The men kept very fit in spite of the heat; a plentiful supply of melons and fresh vegetables doubtless contributing to this end. Back again in their old billets they settled down to musketry and machine-gun training.

During this lull in the operations on the Tigris, General Gorringe had been busy forcing his way up the Euphrates to Nasiriya which he successfully captured on 24th July. While his operations were in progress the Turks, to distract attention, had been very active on the Tigris, moving troops down as far as Kumait, only about 40 miles by river from Amara. Now, however, that

Nasiriya had fallen, it was decided to consolidate our occupation of the Basra Vilayet by moving on to Kut al Amara, which was opposite to the northern extremity of the river Hai. This would close that avenue of approach to the south and allow the force to remain more concentrated without having to keep a large body of troops at Nasiriya.

**The Decision  
to advance to  
Kut al Amara.**

On 27th July news was received that the Regiment would shortly be moving up river again and on the night of the 29th the men slept on the river bank alongside the boats and barges on which they were to embark early next morning. At 5 a.m. the 16th Brigade moved upstream, reaching Kumait the same evening to find that the Turks had gone. Here half our Regiment was landed as outpost while the rest of the troops slept on their boats.

Another early start was made next day and on approaching Fulaifila, some 25 miles farther upstream, in the evening, the leading ships were fired on. The force therefore disembarked in the right bank at Um Charish, where the sandflies banished sleep. At 3.15 a.m. next morning our Regiment led the attack on the enemy's position with No. 3 Double Company under Major Scott as advanced guard. After a short while the advance came to a full stop and General Delamain sent Second Lieutenant Bell Syer forward to Colonel Clery to enquire what he was stopping for. It was found that the Battalion was halted on the river bank and that the enemy's position was on the other side. The position had been vacated and the Turks had slipped away during the night. The troops at once re-embarked and reached Ali Gharbi

**Camp at  
Ali Gharbi,**

**1st August 1915.**

without opposition the same evening, the 1st August. Here six busy weeks were spent while the VIth Division concentrated. Signallers had to be trained to fill vacancies, another Maxim Gun Section was needed to take over two more guns. These latter, when they arrived, turned out to be .450 in. on parapet mountings and were relegated to the defence of L. of C. posts. Forty-eight men were put under training as snipers, while the scouts were trained in throwing hand grenades. These were of the jam-pot variety with a fuse to be lit by hand.

Up till this time all replacements of clothing had been of Regimental pattern, supplied by the Regimental depot. But the best part of a year's campaigning had worn kit out much faster than the depot could supply it, and it was with the greatest

**Clothing  
Supply.**

difficulty that the necessary replacements were now obtained from Government supply.

Ali Gharbi was a very unpleasant camp. The heat was overpowering, and there was no shade in which tents could be pitched; a tearing hot wind laden with sand blew all day, while the nights were made uneasy by the sandflies and, on moonlight nights, by parties of Arab snipers. Green vegetables could not be had for love or money, though the Quartermaster scoured the country for miles around.

The Officers' Mess benefited from the skill of Signalling Havaladar (later Jamadar) Budeh Shah, who proved a very expert fisherman. Sandgrouse, too, were in plenty and proved a very welcome alternative to the scraggy ration mutton.

At the end of the month everyone was pleased to hear that General Townshend, who had left Amara for India a very sick man in the early days of June, was back again.

On 13th September the Division marched to Shaikh Saad, No. 1 Double Company under Major Bailey being left as temporary garrison at Ali Gharbi. On reaching Shaikh Saad General Townshend decided to move on at once to Sannaiyat where he could watch the Turks more closely and complete his preparations. Here two days later Major Bailey's Double Company rejoined.

**Advance to  
Sannaiyat,  
15th Sept. 1915.**

On arrival at Sannaiyat, some 12 miles from the Turkish position, it was soon evident that the enemy were by no means vacating their position, as had previously been reported, but were doing all they could to strengthen it, and when, on 21st September, the first maps of it, compiled from aeroplane photos, were issued, it was evident that our force was up against a far more formidable proposition than any heretofore.

During the ten days spent at Sannaiyat the Air Force were out daily taking photographs of the enemy's position and, considering that they were poorly equipped for the purpose, the results were sufficiently accurate to be invaluable. Reconnaissance was also carried out by the Naval Flotilla and the cavalry.

The Turkish position at Es Sinn extended for some 12 miles north and south astride the river and was held by a Division on each bank and a reserve about 3 miles in rear on the left bank, near a bridge of boats. The enemy's strength was estimated at from 10,000 to 12,000. Although many of their guns were of an obsolete pattern, they had two efficient batteries of Krupp quickfirers. (See Map No. 15, opposite p. 176.)

**The Turkish  
Es Sinn Position.  
September 1915.**

On the right bank the trenches, strengthened by redoubts and protected by sunken wire, ran south from the Tigris for 5 miles continuously into the desert, ending, at their southern extremity, in a very strong redoubt. Behind these trenches were the ruined banks of a high-level canal, some 30 feet high, which hid their guns and afforded cover for the animals and shelter for the men.

On the left bank the defences were constructed in three sections between impassable intervening marshes. The section between the river Tigris and the Horse-Shoe Marsh consisted of trenches and a redoubt, arranged so as to cover an obstruction to river navigation and cross-river approaches. The centre section completely filled the gap between the Horse Shoe and Suwada Marshes; and consisted of a series of fire trenches and gun positions strongly protected by wire and spiked pits. The left section, the largest of

the three, lay between the Suwada and Ataba Marshes. It consisted of three very strong redoubts, supported by gun emplacements, connected by a system of fire trenches and a maze of communication trenches. Behind this position, two large depressions gave cover from view. The whole was strongly wired. All the trenches were well made and most carefully concealed; they had an open field of fire giving no cover to the attack; north-east and east of the Ataba Marsh was the immense inundation known as the Suwaikiya Marsh.

At a first glance it would appear that the Turkish right flank offered the best hope of a flanking movement and doubtless General Townshend banked on this to spring his surprise. It was reported that the Ataba Marsh was drying up and leaving a daily widening gap, practicable for the movement of troops, between the marsh and the Turkish left.

**Battle of  
Kut al Amara,  
Gen. Townshend's  
Plan of Attack.**

General Townshend's plan was to concentrate the whole of his Division on the left bank and to envelop the Turkish left. Then the turning movement was to swing round and drive the enemy south on to the river. It was essential to keep him in doubt where the blow was to fall and, if possible, to persuade him that it was to come on the other side of the river.

On 26th September the Division moved forward to Nukhallat, 4 miles from the Turkish position. The 16th, 17th and half 30th Brigades, all under General Delamain, marched up the right bank and camped at Chahela Mounds where every available tent was pitched in full view of the Turks. To guard their

**Preliminary  
Advance to  
Nukhallat,  
26th Sept. 1915.**

right flank, a small force had already marched up the left bank, consisting of our Regiment, a troop of cavalry, two R.F.A. guns under Lieutenant Wilson and some pioneers and sappers, all under Colonel Clery. This party carried two days' rations for two Brigades and had orders to establish a post at the south-east corner of the Suwada Marsh, some 3 miles from the enemy's trenches. This was known as Clery's Post, and here the little

**Clery's Post.**

force dug itself in and kept as quiet as possible, hoping to escape observation. They had left Sannaiyat three days ahead of the rest of the Division, and Colonel Clery was informed that he could expect no assistance or reinforcements if he were attacked. The troop of 7th Haryana Lancers under Lieutenant Hunt did yeoman service. They were out continuously during the daytime and sustained quite a number of casualties, but they prevented the enemy's cavalry patrols from getting near enough to find anything out about us. Only once did they have to call on our guns to help them when they were being driven in by superior numbers.

The 18th Brigade moved up on the 26th September on river steamers, disembarking on the left bank; and a bridge of boats which had been towed up in completed sections was available for use by 4 p.m.

That evening the 103rd Mahrattas advanced 2 miles up the right bank

and dug themselves in for the night, while the Turks shelled the camp without doing much damage.

On the left bank the 18th Division advanced at dawn on 27th and entrenched themselves within 2,000 yards of that part of the enemy's position which lay between the Horse Shoe and Suwada Marshes.

On the right bank a further spectacular advance was made and a pretence of digging in preparatory to an attack. As soon as it was dark, leaving the two battalions of the 30th Brigade to hold these trenches, the remainder withdrew to camp and the whole of the 16th and 17th Brigades, with their guns, crossed the river and marched to Clery's Post. Our Regiment, being now relieved by half a battalion of 117th Mahrattas, furnished outposts to cover the concentration.

The distribution of troops after dark on 27th September was as follows:

<b>Distribution of Troops on Night of 27th Sept. 1915.</b>	On the right bank there only remained two Battalions of the 30th Brigade. On the left bank the 18th Brigade were dug in about 2,000 yards from the enemy's position, south of the Suwada Marsh, to carry out a holding attack next morning; the 16th and 17th Brigades, assembled at Clery's Post, were formed into two columns under General Delamain to carry out the turning movement.
--	---

Column B, under Delamain himself, consisting of the Dorsets, half Battalion 117th Mahrattas and 22nd Company Sappers and Miners, was to attack the Turkish left from the east.

Column A, under General Hoghton, consisting of the 17th Brigade with the addition of our Regiment and the 20th Punjabis, was to force its way through the gap between the Turkish left and the Ataba Marsh and then swing round and attack from the north.

<b>The Night March, 28th Sept. 1915.</b>	At 2 a.m. the night march started with Column A leading. Battalions moved in column of route, two Battalions abreast. It was a very sultry night and the air was laden with thirst-raising dust. Three hours brought them to the position of deployment 5,000 yards due east of the northern redoubt. Here Column B halted to give Column A time to complete its turning movement. The cavalry and armoured cars were to move between the Ataba and Suwaiqiya Marshes and protect the right flank and the rear.
--	---

Here Column A deployed into two lines of Battalions. In the front line, the 20th Punjabis on the right, then the Oxfords, then the 22nd Punjabis. In the second line, our Regiment on the right, then 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry, then 119th Infantry, with the guns and the 17th Brigade Machine Guns in rear. The left flank was to direct. C.O.s were called up and, as time was getting on, General Hoghton issued hurried verbal orders ending by pointing out a very bright star on the horizon as the general direction of the advance.

By the time Colonel Clery and Captain Stoddart had found their way

back to our Regiment on the extreme right flank, the movement had begun.

**Loss of  
Direction.**

Colonel Clery called up Double Company Commanders to issue orders and ended by saying "the general direction of advance is on that very bright star," and turning to his Adjutant asked: "Stoddart, where has that star gone to?" To which Stoddart replied, "It has set, Sir." This did not appear to be a matter of any importance at the time, as our Regiment had only to keep touch with the unit on its left and follow the 20th Punjabis who were in front, but it may have had something to do with the loss of direction by Column A.

After moving for half an hour or so it was discovered that Column A had marsh on both flanks, and when the sun rose at 6 a.m. it was evident that it was following the cavalry between the Ataba and Suwaikeya Marshes.

At 6.30 a.m., General Delamain, seeing the loss of direction, ordered General Hoghton to swing round the Ataba Marsh and attack.

**Advance  
to Attack.**

At 7.40 a.m. he decided to launch his own attack on the northern redoubt and ordered General Hoghton to press on and attack the main body of the enemy who were reported to be in the depression behind the southern redoubt.

The going was now spongy, the sun was making itself felt, and a tearing wind sprang up bearing with it clouds of dust which increased everyone's discomfort and thirst. Our Regiment, being on the outside of a continuous left wheel of a line of Battalions, had to step out in order to keep position. Even so they got echeloned a bit back on the flank. On and on they plodded, wondering if the wheel would ever end.

At 8.30 a.m., having got well round the Ataba Marsh, the column halted to prepare for an attack southward. When it moved on again the 17th Brigade Machine Guns, which were in rear of us, swung wide out to their right and just about 9 a.m., while still in mass formation, were suddenly fired on at about 800 yards' distance from an unknown redoubt. The first burst of fire hit a number of mules and caused a good deal of confusion, though their Maxim guns were soon got into action.

The rest of the column by this time had got well past the redoubt without either having seen it or having been seen from it, owing to a slight rise in the intervening ground. Our Regiment being the rear unit on the extreme right was, at the time, the nearest infantry to the redoubt which was now about 1,200 yards away to our right rear and appeared to be held by about a Battalion. The situation called for rapid action, so Colonel Clery, without awaiting orders, swung the whole Regiment round and at once attacked.

**Capture of  
Unknown  
Redoubt.**

To have something to do after that long trek came as a relief, and the men went at it with a will. They carried out an attack which, had it been staged during manœuvres, would have been criticized as "impossible under active-service conditions."

The men went straight in without a halt and in a few minutes had captured



the redoubt and 104 prisoners with practically no casualties. The 76th (Sarson's) Battery in rear, seeing what was happening, quickly came into action and caused heavy losses amongst those Turks who bolted before our attack got home. Captain Stoddart, writing to General Walton shortly after the fight, describes this action as follows:—

“As for the Regiment, we were on the extreme right and our first fighting was to switch off to help a Brigade of Machine Guns which had been taken on by an enemy's redoubt on our right flank. No. 2 (Jats) were pushed in, then No. 4 (P.M.s) and then the other two. It would have done your heart good to see them, there was no bally having to lead them, we started at 1,200 yards and our chaps never halted till that redoubt was ours—not a stop, and not a shot! . . . Of course I don't think we could have done it without the Machine Gun fire, but all the same it was good combination and also the quickest show I've seen. The redoubt was a new one not quite finished, but all the trenches were completed, only no barbed wire, etc., round.”

The rest of the column by this time had gone a long way ahead and our Regiment hurried on to catch it up. Communication between Generals Delamain and Hoghton had now ceased as the telephone cable had run out, and the dust and mirage made visual signalling impossible.

The 103rd, 119th and the Oxfords were now detached to attack the northern and central redoubts and came under General Delamain's direct orders, while the remaining three Battalions pushed on south to attack the main body. After going about a mile a large force of the enemy was seen approaching from the south-west. These were evidently the people we were looking for, so bringing up our left shoulders a bit we set out to attack them. The attack at once came under very heavy rifle and shrapnel fire which caused many casualties. On the 76th Battery moving up in close support, the infantry pushed on, driving the enemy in front of them and beating off a mounted attack on the right flank. By 12.15 p.m. the hollow behind the southern redoubt had been reached. Here a halt had to be called as the men were exhausted and ammunition was running low. The men had now been marching and fighting continuously since 2 a.m., our Battalion with only one short halt and after having been on outposts all night. They had set out carrying 200 rounds of ammunition a man and, being on the outside of a continuous wheel, had had to move very fast.

But orders were received to push on again to the south so as to help General Fry's 18th Brigade. The advance continued slowly with parties of the enemy passing across the front. These were the men retiring from in front of General Delamain's attack, now in complete possession of the northern section of the defences. By 3.30 p.m. when we had reached a position clear of the Suwada Marsh and

**Continuation  
of Advance.**

**Action against  
Main Body.**

**Halt West  
of Suwada  
Marsh, 3.30 p.m.**

due west of the defences in front of the 18th Brigade, General Hoghton had to halt again to rest the troops who were now completely exhausted. The men's water-bottles were nearly empty and the marsh water made those who drank it ill.

They had no sooner halted than the Turks to the south opened very heavy shrapnel fire, causing a good number of casualties, especially among the gunners, and stampeding the water and ammunition mules. So a retirement was made out of range, round the corner of the Suwada Marsh. Here General Delamain, who, having reorganized his troops, was again advancing south, seeing how exhausted the men were, ordered an hour's halt to rest.

The time passed all too quickly and at 4.50 p.m. they were on the move south again, a message having just been received by aeroplane from General Fry to say that his attack was held up until the flank attack could be developed.

General Delamain's troops were now in the lead, followed by General Hoghton's, with the guns and machine guns in rear. At 5.30 p.m., just as they were preparing to attack the rear of the Turkish Reinforcements, the Turkish position between the Suwada and Horse Shoe Marshes, a large body of enemy reinforcements was seen

advancing from the south-west. All units were at once swung round to the right to face this new force; the guns and machine guns, now on the extreme right flank, were well placed for covering fire. As soon as they were on the new alignment, a general advance of all units commenced. The ground over which they were moving was covered with long grass and, as they were going straight into the eye of the sun, very little could be seen of their opponents, but the hum of bullets disclosed that there were plenty of them. In a few minutes the sun set and then all that could be seen was a long line of flashing guns and rifles. Weariness and thirst were for the moment completely forgotten and the men swept forward at a wonderful pace. It was not long before our guns had to cease fire for want of light and the infantry, fixing swords at about 400 yards, went straight in with the cold steel. Our casualties were comparatively few, but our British Officers, who had so far escaped that day,

had more than their share. Second Lieutenant Alderman was hit through the chest, Lieutenant Wilson through the knee, Captain Stoddart through the liver, and a bullet passed through Colonel Clery's ear. The Turks' losses were heavy; many prisoners, also a battery with its Commander and a couple of machine guns were taken by our Regiment.

Night had now closed down, and there was no possibility of pursuing the Turks, who had slipped away in the dark over ground that was a network of *nalas*. Furthermore, now that the excitement was over, reaction set in and the men were ready to drop. The captured Turkish position ran almost north and south at right-angles to the river, along the line of a dry *nala*. The troops hoped that this might be the river itself and that they would get a

Action against  
Turkish  
Reinforcements,  
5.30 p.m.

Wounds and  
Trophies,  
28th Sept. 1915.

drink at last, but no such luck. No one knew how far away the nearest drinking water was. British Officers each received a cup full of oily, rusty-tasting water from the machine guns; it seemed to them like nectar and was replaced in the guns by marsh water. Our Battalion had marched 21 miles and fought three actions. Communication with Headquarters and the rest of the force had failed.

The troops bivouacked where they were, but defence had to be organized and the wounded collected, with difficulty, in the darkness from the long grass. The temperature dropped 50 degrees and everyone spent a very miserable night, particularly the wounded, as they had to remain with their units. There was no fighting during the night, and shortly after dawn an aeroplane brought orders to move at once down to the river as the Turks were in full retreat. It was a great relief to men and animals alike to get a drink at last of the muddy Tigris water.

**The Night  
Bivouac,  
28th-29th Sept.  
1915.**

This was by far the stiffest fight the VIth Division had had, and was a very severe test, not only of fighting spirit, but of endurance and discipline.

**Casualties.** Our Regiment had come through it all with an enhanced reputation. Our total casualties were:—

Killed: 12 Indian Ranks.

Wounded: 4 British Officers, 70 Indian Ranks.

But now to return to the evening before. When General Delamain's attack had suddenly to be switched off to deal with the Turkish reinforcements, the 18th Brigade were unable to press their attack home and had to be content with digging themselves in where they were. The Turks on the right bank vacated their positions during the afternoon and made off to their shipping, but owing to the dust and mirage and the lack of sufficient aeroplanes, this was not known. Those on the left bank, opposed to General Fry, withdrew during the night and slipping silently through the gap between General Delamain's force and the river, got clean away.

**Turkish  
Withdrawal.**

**Pursuit by the  
Cavalry.**


On the morning of the 29th as soon as this was all discovered the cavalry, who to some extent were tied to the steamers for lack of land transport, started in pursuit and overtook the enemy on 1st October 40 miles above Kut; but finding that the Turkish force was making an orderly retreat, covered by a strong rearguard of all arms, they halted until the river column caught them up. This was not until 3rd October. The river column consisted of the Naval Flotilla and the 18th Brigade which had been embarked as soon as the necessary ramps had been completed and left the scene of the fight on the afternoon of the 29th.

On the 3rd October his aeroplanes reported to General Townshend that the enemy had occupied a prepared position at Ctesiphon and it was obvious that further pursuit would be useless, so the 18th Brigade disembarked at Aziziya on 5th October.




To illustrate the Battle of Kut-al-Amara  
28<sup>th</sup> September 1915

MAP No. 15



To illustrate the Battle of Kut-al-Amara  
28<sup>th</sup> September 1915

MAP No. 15





The 16th Brigade marched off to Kut, arriving on the afternoon of the 29th, while the 17th Brigade remained behind to clean up the battlefield. It was expected that Kut would be a permanent camp as no further move was then anticipated, so great pains were taken to lay it out well and to make the troops comfortable. Units settled down to await reinforcements to bring them up to strength again. They were soon disillusioned, however, for on 6th October orders were received to concentrate at Aziziya.

General Nixon had reported to Army Headquarters in India that the enemy would stand and fight at Ctesiphon but that he was strong enough to open the road to Bagdad. It appears in the light of after knowledge that only an immediate advance could have had any hope of even initial success, as the Turks at Bagdad were being heavily reinforced, whereas we had no reserves at hand and our over-long line of communication was ill adapted to modern war requirements. But the lack of organized land transport and the inadequacy of the water transport compelled delay and a slow advance.

In this connection a letter written by Sir Charles Munro on 10th October 1916 when he visited Mesopotamia on taking over the Commander-in-Chiefship of India is of interest. It is quoted by Sir G. Barrow in his *Life of Sir Charles Munro* as follows:—

“A glimpse of Basra gave one furiously to think. It brought before one's eyes the appalling difficulties which the troops who went there first had to face—a roadless country, no water except by the river, no stone, no timber, no labour except the Arab nomads, terrific heat, very little transport and so forth, *ad lib.*”

Whatever misgivings there may have been in the minds of the Superior Commanders as to the outcome of a further advance, the Regimental Officers and the rank and file had such complete confidence in their Commanders that they never doubted success, and the next chapter will show that it was no faint-heartedness on the part of our troops that closed the road to Bagdad.



## CHAPTER XXI

### BATTLE OF CTESIPHON

Turkish position and strength. Plan of attack. Attack on V.P. The Regiment detached to assist Column B. Gallant leading by Major Bailey. Junction with Column B. Withdrawal to V.P. Turkish counter-attacks repulsed. Retreat to Kut al Amara.

(See Map No. 16, opposite p. 188.)

THE orders for the advance from Kut with Bagdad as the objective were received on 6th October, and the following day the 16th and 17th Brigades marched up the left bank by double marches for Aziziya (54 miles) where the Division was to concentrate. Aziziya was reached on the 9th and the troops went into camp to await the arrival of the remaining units of the Division.

Our Regiment left Kut very much under strength owing to their heavy casualties in the late Es Sinn battle, but on the 21st October received a very welcome reinforcement of 200 men, nearly all Punjabi Mussalmans under Captain Dormer with Second Lieutenant Gordon, I.A.R.O.

Up to this time Dormer had been doing splendid work at the Depot, renewing kit and clothing, and training recruits. He had recently tapped Poonch District as a new recruiting area for Punjabi Mussalmans, and had reported very favourably on the results. The men, though not as tall as the P.M.s we had been accustomed to enlist, were stocky and keen. They had proved satisfactory in other units, and this first draft of them to reach our Regiment did well. About this time Second Lieutenant R. E. Alderman, who had been wounded in the battle of Kut al Amara, rejoined from Hospital.

When the Turks found that their retirement from Kut was not being pressed, they sent back a force to Kutuniya, some 10 miles from Aziziya, and there established an advanced post. The 16th and 17th Brigades therefore moved by night to attack them at dawn on 28th October.

Our Regiment led the 16th Brigade in the attack, but the enemy, having got information of our move, withdrew their main body during the night, leaving only a small covering force, which retired after sending over a few shells. Though there was no fighting, this outing was valuable in enabling the newcomers to shake down and learn how a battalion moved under artillery fire. There were no casualties, and, after burning the Turkish Camp, the

whole force withdrew without opposition to Aziziya, covered by our Regiment as rearguard.

On 11th November the 18th Brigade and the cavalry again occupied Kutuniya, where they were joined by the rest of the Division four days later. Here a three days' halt was called during which time General Nixon inspected all units.

The Turks were now holding an advanced position at Zor, some 15 miles farther upstream, where the first real opposition was expected. To carry out an attack on both banks simultaneously, the 17th Brigade crossed over to the right bank while the troops remaining on the left bank were all put under General Delamain, the Command of the 16th Brigade devolving on Colonel Clery, and of our Battalion on Major Scott, Major Bailey being in temporary command of the 17th Brigade. On 19th November the whole Division advanced, but again the Turks, offering very slight opposition, evacuated the position before our troops could get within striking distance. The 17th Brigade were again brought back to the left bank and the following afternoon the whole Division marched to Lajj, about 10 miles from the main Turkish position at Ctesiphon. (See Map No. 16, opposite p. 188.)

As at Es Sinn, the Turkish position was astride the river, extending about 3 miles on the right bank and 6 miles on the left. The front and flank of the right bank defences, being guarded by a partly dried marsh, the old bed of the Tigris with deep fissures and a mass of canals, were extremely difficult to approach. The left bank front-line defences consisted of fifteen redoubts connected by continuous fire trenches ending with a large redoubt and a network of trenches on some high ground which was known to our troops as V.P. (Vital Point). Except for the central section which lay in a southerly loop of the river, the trenches were very thoroughly wired; being low-sited and without any overhead cover, they were invisible to attackers. To clear the field of fire the low scrub, with which the plain was covered, had been burnt for a considerable distance. An ample water supply in pipes leading to all the trenches from a central pumping station had been laid on.

Some 2 or 3 miles behind the front line ran a second system of trenches, the extreme left flank of which was thrown back facing north-east; while some 5 or 6 miles in rear again, where the Diyala River joined the Tigris, a third line had been partially constructed on the northern bank of the Diyala to cover the crossing, which consisted of a single boat bridge. If the Turkish left flank could be turned there was every prospect of rounding up a large part of the force before they had time to cross the Diyala.

General Townshend proposed to hold the Turkish left centre with one Brigade while he threw the whole of the rest of his force against their left flank in order to roll it back on to the river. The

**Capture of  
Position at Zor,  
19th November  
1915.**

**Turkish  
Defences  
at Ctesiphon.**

**Plan of Attack.**

defences on the right bank were to be engaged by the Naval Flotilla alone, no infantry being employed there at all.

General Townshend, whose force numbered 13,756 men and 30 guns, estimated the Turkish strength at between 10,000 and 12,500, which proved, on the day of the battle, to be an underestimate.

**Turkish  
Strength.**

For some time the intelligence reports had spoken of large Turkish reinforcements approaching Bagdad, but so far none of these had put in an appearance on the battlefield. The day before the fight Major Reilly, our best pilot, while reconnoitring over the Turkish position, saw that a new Division had arrived, the LIst Division, and noted it on his map, but unfortunately he was shot down and captured so that this vital information never reached General Townshend.

According to the Official history the Turkish combatant strength at Ctesiphon on the 21st November was as follows, viz.: 400 Cavalry, 2 Regiments Camelry, 52 Guns, about 18,000 Regular Infantry, 19 Machine Guns, 2 ancient Mortars, and a few thousand Arabs in two Tribal Brigades under retired Turkish Officers. These latter, with 7 guns, held the Diyala line. The XXXVth and XXXVIIIth Divisions, 3,800 and 3,100 rifles respectively, were in better condition than at Es Sinn, but their morale was not good. The LIst Division of Anatolian Turks, 5,800 rifles, had a fine reputation, but two of their Battalions did not reach the battlefield till 23rd November. They held the redoubt called V.P. with thin local reserves between it and their second line. They were reported at Turkish Headquarters about midday on the 22nd as practically destroyed. The XLVth Division, of 6,300 rifles, included good material.

To carry out his plan of attack General Townshend formed his force into four columns.

**Our Total  
Strength and  
Distribution,  
21st Nov. 1915.**

*Column A.*—Strength 3,650 rifles, 10 guns, and 12 machine guns. 16th Brigade and half 30th Brigade under General Delamain, to carry out the decisive attack on V.P.

*Column B.*—Strength 2,693 rifles, 6 guns, 8 machine guns. 18th Brigade under Brigadier-General Hamilton, to carry out the turning movement and attack the second line from the north-east.

*Column C.*—Strength, 3,154 rifles, 8 guns, 10 machine guns. 17th Brigade under General Hoghton to carry out the holding attack.

*Flying Column.*—Under General Melliss consisting of the Cavalry Brigade 977 sabres, armoured cars, Brigade of 16 machine guns and 715 rifles of 76th Punjabis in A.T. carts, to move on the right of Column B, and, in the event of the attack proving successful, to make for the boat bridge over the Diyala.

The action was to be commenced by Column C with the holding attack and by the Naval Flotilla against the right bank defences. As soon as

Column C was well engaged, Column B and the Flying Column were to launch their flank attack. General Townshend hoped that the Turkish Commander would think that his plan was the same as at Es Sinn and, taking this for his main attack, would move part of his reserves to counter it. He hoped that his real main attack by Column A on V.P., which was to be launched when the flank attack was well engaged, would come as a surprise.

**Plan of Action,  
22nd Nov. 1915.**

Now to return to the troops at Lajj. Sunday the 21st was spent in forming dumps and making final preparation. At 2.30 p.m. Column C marched off along the caravan route for Bustan, and at 8 p.m. the remaining three columns started north across the desert by a track which skirted the Turkish position. At 2 a.m. Column A halted, having reached its position of deployment in an old disused canal about 4 miles due east of V.P. Here light entrenchments were dug in case of shell fire, while the other two columns moved on in the dark to get to their respective positions on the enemy's flank. The rest of the night passed quietly, but it was so bitterly cold that few managed to get any sleep. At dawn an Arab Cavalry Regiment moved out from behind the enemy's position for the morning reconnaissance. It broke up into squadrons and these into smaller patrols. One of the latter rode straight at the dry canal behind which Column A was lying. When fired on at about 200 yards all the Arab Cavalry galloped away and their Officers could be seen gazing through glasses at a spot whence fire had been opened. The Regiment then re-formed and withdrew behind the position, leaving the battleground quiet once more.

**Night March  
from Lajj,  
21st Nov. 1915.**

**Attack on  
Ctesiphon  
Position,  
22nd Nov. 1915.**

It was a misty morning and nothing could be seen of the enemy, nor was the great Ctesiphon arch, which was behind the Turkish centre, visible. Shortly after 7.30 a.m. the mist lifted, but there were no signs of the enemy, nor could any sound of fighting be heard in front of Column C who were to advance at 6.30 a.m. Both the flank columns had reported that they were in position awaiting orders to attack, and shortly before 8 a.m., though Column C was still not engaged, General Townshend decided not to delay the flank attack any longer, and ordered Generals Hamilton (Column B) and Melliss (Flying Column) to move. Their advance got under way about 8.15 a.m. and they were soon hotly engaged.

Shortly after this, numbers of Turks were seen retiring from the vicinity of V.P. and it was thought that they were vacating their first-line system. General Delamain, reporting this movement, which had also been seen by Headquarters, asked for permission to launch his attack, which was at once granted.

Column A advanced about 9 a.m. with the 117th Mahrattas, 7th Gurkhas, 66th and 24th Punjabis in the front line, and the Dorsets and our Regiment in reserve. At first V.P. seemed to be offering very little resistance, so General Delamain ordered half the Dorsets and the whole of our Regiment to move to the right and advance to

**Column A  
attack V.P.,  
9 a.m.**

the assistance of Column B who were meeting with very stout resistance. Just as we were moving off, however, the Turks in V.P. came to life and opened a very heavy fire. It was at once evident that they had no intention of vacating their first line, but had been withholding their fire until our troops came really close, so the Dorsets were recalled.


Our Regiment went on and in a short time came under very heavy rifle and enfilade shrapnel fire, the latter from Turkish batteries in the direction of the arch, which caused many casualties. **Our Regiment pushes in between Columns A & B with heavy Casualties.** However, they pushed on about another 1,000 yards, during which time Colonel Clery (twice), Major Scott, Captain Norris (123rd Rifles), Second Lieutenant Lemon (six times) and Captain Tate, I.M.S., were all wounded. Major Bailey now assumed command of the Regiment.

As Column B on our right was advancing very slowly and as "V.P." on our left was still fighting hard and threatening to enfilade us, our Regiment was halted until "V.P." was captured. We then moved forward again, but some Turks who had withdrawn from "V.P." occupied another lot of trenches to the north of it and again enfiladed us. The Regiment was therefore swung to the left to clear them out. In doing so we lost several more men from rifle and gun fire and Major Dormer wounded. The "V.P." position was now completely in our hands.

At about 12 noon Column A passed through eight abandoned Turkish guns and took up a position some 400 yards farther on to reorganize. The last attack had drawn our Regiment right away from their original objective which was the left flank of Column B and they now found themselves on the extreme right flank of Column A, some 400 to 500 yards away from the other units, and the nearest troops to the enemy's second line.

It was not long before the Turks commenced a very heavy fire attack. In this attack Second Lieutenant Gordon was killed and Major **Turkish Counter-attack.** Bailey was severely wounded while lying behind a very low bank. The bullet went through his forearm, then his upper arm, under the skin above his ribs and came out at his back. Several more men were also killed and wounded. After a while the enemy's fire died down and Major Bailey withdrew the remnants of the Regiment, now little more than a Double Company in strength, to behind the abandoned Turkish guns to reorganize and to get into a better position.

At this time Column A also withdrew and as the original orders for our Regiment to help Column B had not been cancelled, Major **Gallant Leading by Major Bailey.** Bailey decided to carry them out. This involved a further withdrawal, but before moving farther back he decided to try and drag away some of the Turkish guns which were not far off. Though feeling his wound badly he refused to leave the remnants of the Regiment and gallantly led them forward again.



THE ARCH OF CHOSROES  
ON THE SITE OF THE BATTLE OF CTESIPHON,  
22nd November 1915.

*From a water-colour painting in the Officers' Mess.*



They were met by a heavy fire which again caused serious casualties, including Major Bailey who was killed, shot through the head. Our Regiment, which had marched into action with 10 British Officers, 14 Indian Officers and about 600 men, was now reduced to 2 British Officers, Captain Manners and Second Lieutenant Alderman, 4 Indian Officers and about 70 men. The guns were reached and our men endeavoured to drag away two of them and got them back about 400 yards. Turkish Infantry, supported by guns, then advanced in another counter-attack. The attempt to remove the guns had to be abandoned and a firing line rapidly formed. The Turks were checked temporarily about 700 yards away and a fire fight ensued. It was during this fire fight that Havaldar Allah Ditta of our Regiment performed a very gallant act for which General Townshend subsequently recommended him for the

**Gallantry of  
Havaldar  
Allah Ditta.**

Victoria Cross. A wounded man of Column A, who had been left behind during the first Turkish counter-attack and who was now lying between the two lines, was seen to rise and stumble towards us. Twice he fell and again rose but when he went down the third time he appeared to have been hit again. Havaldar Allah Ditta ran across the open to him, over 200 yards distance, put him on his back and carried him in, being heavily fired on the whole time. It seemed a miracle that he was not hit. He was subsequently decorated with the Indian Order of Merit and promoted Jamadar.

After a short while the Turkish attack increased in severity, which made withdrawal still more difficult. Our Battalion was entirely isolated and not in communication with anyone. However, by means of vigorous flag and helmet waving we caught the eye of the 1/5th Hants Howitzer Battery about a mile in our rear. They grasped our dilemma very rapidly and opened Battery fire on the Turks in front of us. This continued for two minutes, completely hiding the Turkish line in dust. When it cleared, it was seen that the Turkish attack had melted away and our men were able to withdraw unmolested. Once behind

**Our Regiment  
reaches Column  
B.**

the battery which had just been so helpful, they reorganized, moved to the right and then advanced again on their original orders to join Column B, whom they found held up about 1,000 yards from the enemy's second line busily engaged in a fire fight. Here they received orders to prolong the left flank. During this advance Second Lieutenant Alderman was wounded, leaving Captain Manners the sole British Officer with the Regiment. Column B was reached at about 5 p.m. and our small party, taking up a fire position, remained firing till darkness put an end to the fighting.

At 7 p.m. Column B received orders to withdraw to "V.P." where it

**The Division  
re-formed at  
7 p.m. on  
22nd Nov. 1915.**

was intended to concentrate the whole Division. Our Regiment and the Sappers and Miners were detailed to cover the movement which was carried out without opposition. Collecting all wounded that they could find, our men reached "V.P."



at 9 p.m. It was impossible in the dark to find the rest of the Brigade and, dog-tired, they lay down where they could find an empty space and slept. There was little or no water to be had and the night turned intensely cold, so that they did not get much rest and the wounded, who were still lying with their units, suffered very severely.

The 17th Brigade (Column C), who had attacked the Turkish centre in the morning, finding that they could not make any headway in the frontal attack, were ordered to move to their right and join up with Column A. This they succeeded in doing and captured the two redoubts south of "V.P.," but in doing so they lost nearly 50 per cent of their strength. After this they conformed to the movements of Column A. During the night the Turks vacated the whole of their first-line trenches and withdrew under cover of darkness to their second line, leaving the British force in undisputed possession of the whole of their first line on the left bank of the river.

At dawn the next morning, the 23rd November, the 16th Brigade moved to Water Piquet which was in the Turkish front line just south of "V.P.," but it was not till 9 a.m. that our Regiment got in touch with them and then rejoined the Brigade. In the meantime several men, who had got separated from the Regiment during the fighting the previous day, were collected, bringing our service strength up to about 200. Our wounded Officers were also found collected in "V.P." where they had spent the night; the Mess *yakdars* provided them with a very welcome hot breakfast. The day was spent improving the defences but no fighting took place till after dark, when the Turks launched attack after attack all of which were beaten off with heavy loss. The brunt of the fighting fell on the left and centre of our line, and our Regiment, being on the extreme right of the Brigade, was not involved. As many as possible of the wounded had been sent back to Lajj during the day, but the A.T. carts, which were the only means of transport, were quite inadequate to deal with the enormous numbers, so that many still lay with their Battalions all through the anxious hours of the night attack.

At dawn the next day the 16th Brigade moved south to High Wall, which was also in the Turkish front line, but nearer the river. It was so named on account of two walls 20 feet high at right angles to one another. Here Major Bailey and Second Lieutenant Gordon were buried. Orders were issued for the whole Division to concentrate here and the day was spent in organizing and improving the defences. The 17th Brigade which was still at "V.P." found it could not withdraw without assistance owing to the accurate fire of some 500 Turkish snipers, so that in the afternoon the 16th and 18th Brigades were ordered to move out and help them back. This was easily effected, and, collecting wounded on their way back, the whole force reached High Wall by 6 p.m. During the day the transport had brought out more ammunition and supplies and taken back as many more wounded as they could carry.

**Turkish  
Night  
Counter-attack  
repelled,  
23rd Nov. 1915.**

**Concentration  
of the Division,  
24th Nov. 1915.**

Casualties at  
Ctesiphon.

The total Divisional casualties in the three days' battle of the 22nd, 23rd and 24th November 1915 were 4,593. The casualties of our Regiment numbered 423, i.e. 61.5 per cent. The Turkish account of their losses on these dates placed them at over 9,500. This includes many deserters and 1,200 prisoners taken on the first day. Their actual fighting casualties were estimated at 6,188.

The battles of Kut al Amara on 28th September and Ctesiphon on 22nd November provide valuable food for reflection. It must be concluded, from the original disposal of our Force on both these occasions, that the Commander, General Townshend, had the utmost confidence in the fighting qualities of his troops and the capability of his Column Commanders to carry out his original plans as, on neither occasion, did he retain any General Reserve. Consequently, he was not in a position personally to influence the course of the fight once the troops had been set in motion. That his confidence in the fortitude and efficiency of his troops was justified is proved by their conduct, on both occasions, under very difficult circumstances. From this it may be deduced that the strength of the Reserve may rightly be modified by such an assurance; but the fact remains that the use of his Reserves is the only means by which a Commander can control a battle.

In both these cases the plans of attack were complicated. Each Column Commander was dependent on the action of some other Column Commander with whom he was unable to keep in touch owing to defective means of communication; consequently the plans could not be modified to meet unexpected situations. Furthermore, by dispersing his columns as he did, General Townshend risked defeat in detail, and, in the case of Ctesiphon, only the staunchness of the troops staved off disaster.

In this case the Turks, though defending, lost half as many men again as the British did. It may be a fruitful subject for debate whether the concentration of the bulk of the Force in a surprise attack on "Vital Point," with a General Reserve in hand to deal with the unexpected, might not have proved less costly in casualties and more fruitful in results.

On the 25th another quiet morning was experienced and the last of the wounded got away. At the time the reason for the Turkish inactivity was not known, but it appears from the Turkish account that the advance of the 16th and 18th Brigades the evening before, to cover the move of the 17th Brigade, had been reported to the Turkish Headquarters as a general advance of the whole British force to outflank them, whereupon orders were issued for the evacuation of the second line and retirement to the Diyala, and it was not until the following afternoon that the Turks came forward again when they learnt that this report was incorrect.

Decision to  
retire after  
dark,  
25th Nov. 1915.

About 3 p.m. the Turks could be seen massing behind some sandhills about 3 miles away and were reported to have been heavily reinforced. As the Division was now so greatly

reduced in numbers, General Townshend decided to withdraw to Lajj after dark and issued orders that all ammunition that could not be carried was to be buried and all kits abandoned.

Among the things which the Transport had brought up the day before were two cart-loads of Quartermaster's and Mess Stores belonging to our Regiment. Among the Mess Stores was a complete Christmas dinner, in tins, for all the British Officers, which at the suggestion of Colonel Clery had been specially ordered out from Fortnum and Mason by that Prince of Mess Presidents, Major W. Scott, which they had hoped to eat in Bagdad. As there was no chance of getting this away, it was all buried at the bottom of one of the Turkish trenches in the hopes that it might be dug up and enjoyed at their next advance. Unfortunately, this opportunity did not arise, and that Christmas dinner may still lie buried and may cause surprise to some archæologist in the future.

At 9 p.m. the Division set out for Lajj which was reached by midnight without any opposition, the 16th Brigade being rearguard and our Regiment the rear unit. Next morning under cover of a cavalry screen a perimeter camp was dug, and the day was spent getting the wounded on to the boats and barges to go downstream. Our Regiment here received a very welcome reinforcement in the shape of 50 P.M.s who had been guarding the Hospital, and a small party under Second Lieutenant Bell Syer who had been given A.T. carts and detailed to act as a salvage party for equipment, etc., behind the fighting line at Ctesiphon, so had taken no part in the actual battle. During this day the Turks reoccupied their front-line trenches but advanced no farther.

The following morning reconnaissance reports showed the Turks to be advancing some 12,000 strong, and General Townshend decided to move back to Aziziya where dumps had been formed when the Division advanced. Covered by the 16th Brigade as rearguard, the Division left Lajj at 4 p.m. and marching all through the night with one halt of two hours at Kutuniya, reached Aziziya (22 miles) at 11 a.m. on 28th. Hostile Arabs had followed for a short way, but soon left for the more profitable occupation of looting the abandoned stores at Lajj; there were no signs of the Turks.

On reaching Aziziya the 14th Hussars and half Battalion 2nd Royal West Kent Regiment joined the force, a most welcome reinforcement. Shallow trenches were dug to form a perimeter camp. The kits of Officers and men left at Aziziya had been looted; whatever remained was now recovered. The 29th was spent halted at Aziziya and the men cleaned and rested as much as possible. Our Cavalry Brigade had an encounter with the enemy's cavalry and repulsed them with heavy loss.

As the Turks were now advancing in such great numbers it was decided to retire to Kut where large dumps of ammunition and food were stored. No

immediate move, however, could be made as the boats with the wounded and the Naval Flotilla had not yet caught up. The distance by river was more than twice that by road and owing to the shallow water the boats were constantly delayed by running aground. On the 28th the armed launch *Shaitan* had run aground and had to be abandoned to the Turks, though her guns and stores were salvaged under a heavy fire by the *Shushan* and *Firefly*. During the forenoon of the 30th the ships were got moving ahead again and at 4 p.m.

Retirement to  
Umm at Tubul,  
10 miles,  
30th Nov. 1915.

the Division started on its march to Kut. All tents were left standing and all stores that could not be taken were set alight. The moment the Division marched off, the Arabs, who had collected in large numbers, were on to the camp like a swarm of locusts and were so intent on looting that they did not worry the column at all. As stores could be had for the asking, all our men had received an extra ration consisting of 1 lb. *Gur* and  $\frac{1}{2}$  lb. *Ghi*. After covering 10 miles a halt was called at Umm at Tubul to allow the ships to catch up, but the 30th Brigade, who were required urgently in Kut to help open the lines of communication which were being harried by the Arabs, marched straight on.

That night a few snipers fired into the camp and a few shells were sent over but did no harm. Before dawn, however, it was known that the Turks had caught us up and the troops were warned to be ready to attack at dawn. An urgent message was carried back to the 30th Brigade by volunteers from the 7th Hariana Lancers ordering them to turn about and rejoin with all speed. When day broke the Turkish camp could be seen

Action of  
Umm at Tubul,  
1st Dec. 1915.

little more than a mile away. They had come up during the darkness and pitched camp little knowing that we were so close. Their surprise was evident and we could see men standing around their tents.

Our transport was got away at once and our artillery opened a heavy fire at about 1,600 yards' range, while the Division deployed for attack: the 16th Brigade then advanced to carry it out, but it had not gone far before it was halted. The artillery fire caused heavy casualties and at first a good deal of panic in the Turkish force, but they presently got an attack organized and made a great effort to outflank us on the desert side. The situation was looking very grave indeed when it was relieved by a very gallant charge by the whole Cavalry Brigade. This gave General Townshend the opportunity of breaking off the engagement and withdrawing, the timely arrival of the 30th Brigade on the extreme right facilitating the movement. The Division fought a hard rearguard action for several miles, the 16th and 18th Brigades

Retirement to  
Qala Shadi,  
26 miles,  
1st Dec. 1915.

holding back the pursuit alternately. The Turkish Infantry were eventually shaken off after about 12 miles, but it was another 8 miles before their cavalry and the Arabs could be outdistanced, after which the march continued without incident to Qala Shadi. The retirement for some distance had been through thick

bushy country and our Regiment lost touch with the rest of the Brigade. It continued its withdrawal unmolested for a considerable distance, but actually was well in rear of the Brigade, and it was with considerable relief that eventually some signalling flags were seen being waved behind a small dry canal, and a message came to say it was the Brigade Headquarters. The total distance was 26 miles and the main body got in at about 9 p.m. but it was past midnight before the weary rearguard arrived.

The Turkish strength was 12,000 and they suffered 748 casualties. Our Division had 37 killed, 281 wounded and 218 missing, chiefly lost wounded on barges. Our Regiment's casualties during this retirement were 10 men wounded. The movement of our Regiment during this retirement was much helped by two private soldiers of the Dorset Regiment. Owing to the heavy casualties throughout the force no officers were available for temporary transfer from other units, and the Brigadier, whilst at Aziziya, asked the Officer Commanding the Dorset Regiment, the British Regiment of the Brigade, if he could help our Battalion in any way. His Battalion had suffered severely, but he produced two privates of some service who were sent to us. They knew very little Urdu, but that did not hinder their dealings with our men in the least, and throughout the retreat their assistance proved invaluable. These two men rejoined their Battalion on arrival at Kut. A miserable night was spent at Qala Shadi as it was bitterly cold and there was no food available beyond what the men had carried in their haversacks from Aziziya.

They were off again at dawn the following morning, had a two hours' halt from 2 p.m. to 4 p.m., and by 6 p.m. had arrived within 3 miles of Kut and halted for the night, food having been sent out to meet them. The day had been uneventful as there had been no sign of the enemy at all.

**Retirement  
from Qala Shadi,  
15 miles,  
2nd Dec. 1915.**

Early next morning the Division marched into Kut and our Regiment spent the day resting in bivouac near the north-eastern corner of the town. The men were dreadfully tired as all the way from Ctesiphon they had been carrying 150 rounds of ammunition and their great-coats and had had very little rest and very little to eat. During the whole of this march only 12 men of our Regiment fell out; considering that the 44 miles from Umm at Tubul had been covered in 36 hours, this was a particularly good record. Subadar-Major Hasan Muhammad set a fine example by marching along and refusing to ride on a spare horse until the last 10 miles, when he was ordered to.

**Marched 3 miles  
into Bivouac at  
Kut al Amara,  
3rd Dec. 1915.**


On the 4th December General Townshend issued the following Special Order:—

**Special Order by  
General Townshend,  
4th Dec. 1915.** "I intend to defend Kut al Amara and not to retire any farther, reinforcements are being sent up at once from Basra to relieve us. The Honour of our Empire and Mother Country demands that we work heart and soul in the defence of this place. We must dig in and dig in





# TO ILLUSTRATE THE BATTLE OF CTESIPHON.




Much accidented  
and intersected by  
water cuts

Much accidented and  
cut up by dry  
water courses.

OLD COURSE OF RIVER (SANDY)

YARDS  
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000

YARDS  
10000







quickly and then the enemy's shells will do little damage. We have ample food and ammunition, but Commanding Officers must husband their ammunition and not throw it away uselessly.

"The way you have managed to retire some 80 or 90 miles under the very noses of the Turks is nothing short of splendid and speaks eloquently for the courage and discipline of this force."

Our Regiment was this day moved to a position in rear of the centre of the front line and the work of digging trenches was started with a will. At this time there was an east and west line of block houses joining the elbows of the loop of the river above and below the town, which lay within the loop. The outer walls of the town had been prepared for defence.

The Turks were reported to be massing about 10 miles away and the siege may be said to have commenced the following day, 5th December.

## CHAPTER XXII

### THE SIEGE OF KUT

Turkish attack on North-West Sector. Gallantry of the Indian Ranks. The Relief Force. Rain and floods. Preparations to join Relief Force. Reduction of rations. S.S. *Julnar*. Surrender of Kut al Amara.

(See Map No. 17, opposite p. 200.)

WHEN the Division left Kut at the beginning of October the place had been taken over by the Lines of Communication Troops. As the only trouble anticipated was from the Arabs, who had no artillery, a line of block houses was built across the loop of the river enclosing the neck of land on which the town of Kut al Amara was situated. These together with an already existing fort were regarded as adequate defence works. The fort was situated at the north-east end of the line of block houses on the left bank of the river, and down-stream and about 2 miles distant from the town. The block houses were joined by a line of wire entanglements.

**The Siege of Kut.**

**Sixth Division occupies Kut al Amara, 3rd Dec. 1915.**

Consequently, when the Division marched in again on 3rd December, after a short day's rest, every man had to turn to and dig. Our Regiment was given an area which was about 500 yards behind the eventual front line. The ground was baked hard and digging was difficult, but by dark the Regiment was completely entrenched. The block houses were blown up and their places taken by a series of strong redoubts, joined up by traversed fire-trenches behind the line of the existing barbed wire. This constituted the front line and was supported by two other lines of trenches, eventually known as the "Middle Line" and "Second Line" Trenches. The fort was retained, but its design modified to suit the altered circumstances.

The defence was organized in four sections:—

**Organization of Defences.**

(1) The north-east sector, from the Fort to Redoubt B (exclusive) and part of Middle Line, held by the 17th Brigade throughout the siege.

(2) The north-west sector, from Redoubt B (inclusive) to the river bank upsteam of the town and the remainder of Middle Line, held alternately by the 16th and 30th Brigades.

(3) Woolpress Village, Kut town and most of the river piquets down-stream of Kut, held continuously by the 18th Brigade.

(4) The 2nd Line Trenches, held by the General Reserve found alternately by the 16th and 30th Brigades.

The last steamers, taking the most seriously wounded, left Kut on the 5th December and the following day the Cavalry Brigade crossed the river by a bridge of boats near the fort and moved off downstream to join the relief force. At this time it was expected that the relief of Kut would be effected by the end of the month.

Our Regiment, on arrival in Kut, was officered by:—

	Captain C. M. S. Manners, Commanding,
<b>Battalion</b>	Second Lieutenant L. S. Bell Syer, I.A.R.O.,
<b>Strength.</b>	Subadar-Major Hasan Muhammad,
	Subadar Pema Ram,
	Subadar Chothu Singh, I.D.S.M.,
	Jamadar Kalu Ram,
	Jamadar Tiku Ram, I.O.M.,
	Jamadar Barkat Ali,

while the following, most of whom had been wounded at Ctesiphon, rejoined within a week of our arrival:—

Subadar Mukhram, I.O.M.,  
 Subadar Harchand Jat,  
 Jamadar Kishna Ram,  
 Jamadar Ramdyal Ram,  
 Jamadar Karam Dad,

and totalled:—

2 British Officers,  
 11 Indian Officers,  
 and about 380 Rank and File and 50 Followers.

Of this 380 men about 150 had been wounded at Ctesiphon and were still in hospital at Kut. The actual strength of Indian Ranks in the trenches was about 230.

For the first week the 16th Brigade was in General Reserve and our Regiment spent the days digging trenches, whilst at night they moved up in close support of the troops in the front line. As there were no communication trenches yet available this proved a hazardous duty and cost us during this week one Indian Officer and 12 men wounded.

**Turks closing  
in.**

The Turks soon started closing in and a line of sandhills, some 400 yards from the north-west sector, afforded a good position for their snipers who soon became a nuisance. On the 9th orders were issued that all work outside the trenches was in future to be done at night. The digging was extremely arduous as most of the ground was subject to yearly inundation and the mud was now baked by the sun as hard as brick.

On the 10th December the 16th Brigade moved up for its first spell in the front line, our Regiment being held in support. On the 12th the enemy launched their first serious attack on the defences and selected as their objective the north-west sector, recognized to be the most important one as it was only a mile distant from the town. If forced, the north-east sector and fort would be cut off.

The attack opened with very heavy rifle fire directed on Redoubt D. Under cover of this fire parties moved up to assault the trenches. Our Regiment was ordered to send a Double Company to reinforce the Dorsets and another to the 117th Mahrattas. A little later the rest of the Regiment moved up into the front line in further support of the Dorsets. Although our guns, firing shrapnel, took a heavy toll, small parties of the enemy succeeded in getting right up to the line of our wire where they were wiped out. The attack went on for the best part of two hours until the Turks, having learned that the morale of the force was as stout as ever, withdrew in the darkness, having suffered very heavy casualties.

As our communication trenches were still incomplete, our men, moving up in support, had to go over the top and lost heavily. Our casualties during the week in the line nearly all occurred in repelling the attack, and amounted to:—

Killed: 2 Indian Officers, 5 Rank and File.

Wounded: 2 Indian Officers, 30 Rank and File, and 1 Follower.

On 15th December our Regiment returned to its old reserve bivouac, except for the Machine Gun Section which remained in the front line without relief from the 5th December to 22nd January. They were manning four Maxims with only nine men, so had a very strenuous time.

On arrival in bivouac on the 15th, Second Lieutenant C. H. C. Munroe, a Cavalry Officer and candidate for the I.A.R.O., reported for duty. The week in reserve did not afford much rest as the days were usually spent in digging and at night one or more Double Companies were often sent up to reinforce points in the front line or to hold some of the river piquets.

During their next spell in the front line our Regiment was on the right of the Brigade and extended their trenches to the right to join up to the north-east sector, to which the enemy had now turned their attention. They were now issued with periscopes and periscopic rifles made up locally by the sappers and miners who bought up every looking-glass in the town. Very pistols and hand grenades were also taken into use for the first time against the Turks who were now sapping up close to our trenches all along the line. The Turks used to shell the defences, for about an hour at a time, two or three times every day, but at this period most of their fire was directed at the fort, thus indicating the probability of an attempt to capture it by assault.

Our Brigade was now back again in reserve and our Regiment had just received two more British Officers in Second Lieutenants **Turks attack the Fort, 24th Dec. 1915.** A. C. Lock and F. N. Punchard who were badly needed as Bell Syer had been admitted to Hospital with pneumonia on the 22nd.

The attack on the fort commenced about midday on Christmas Eve and led to the bitterest fighting of the whole siege. Three separate assaults were launched under cover of heavy bombardment and in the second, just after dark, a party actually got a footing in the north-east bastion for a time, but were gallantly driven out about midnight. The last attack at 2.30 a.m. on Christmas morning was more easily repelled. Our Regiment spent the whole night moving from point to point ready to reinforce the fort garrison but was never actually called into action and the honours of the defence rested with the 17th Brigade who fought with utmost gallantry. Though their casualties were heavy, those they inflicted on the Turks were many times more. This was the last serious attempt made to penetrate the defences.

On Christmas Day the welcome news was received that General Aylmer's troops were now ready to advance and it was confidently predicted that relief might be expected about the middle of January. **First News of Relief Force, Xmas 1915.**

The last week of 1915 was spent by our Regiment in the front line. The Turks had now sapped up to within 100 yards of our trench in places; and as the barbed wire which had originally been 40 yards away was much damaged and now formed very little obstacle to an assault, listening posts used to lie out all night in pits on the line of the wire to give timely warning of any move on the part of the enemy. The Turks were constantly endeavouring to drag away the remains of our wire so that at this period there was more or less continuous night firing and bombing.

The arrangements for sentry duty in the front line at this time in our Battalion were for half the Battalion to remain on sentry duty for one hour, to be relieved by the other half and so on throughout the night.

During the night of the 26th-27th December there had been a lot of movement in front of us, and at dawn on the 27th it was seen that the enemy had succeeded in tying a stout rope to a bit of our wire, the rope being hauled tight from their trench. As soon as it was dark that evening Naik (afterwards Subadar-Major) Ganesha Ram of our Regiment and Lance-Naik Bega Ram of 123rd Outram's Rifles volunteered to crawl out and cut the rope. This they succeeded in doing, the cut end jumping back into the enemy's trench, whereon a heavy fire was opened on them, but both succeeded in getting back unscathed and were subsequently decorated, Ganesha Ram receiving a clasp to his Indian Distinguished Service Medal awarded for gallantry at Ctesiphon. **Gallantry of Indian Ranks.**

This night was the first occasion on which our Battalion used one of the

trench mortars, which had been made by the sappers and miners from cylinders of Gnôme aeroplane engines. With a little practice, it was found very accurate up to about 150 yards.

On the night of the 29th a party in one of our listening posts heard the enemy moving about by our barbed wire, so opened fire on them and threw three bombs. The Turks retaliated and one of their bombs, bursting in the post, severely wounded all four men. Three of them managed to crawl back and report that the enemy were just outside our wire, but the fourth man could not move. Riflemen Bachan Singh of our Regiment and Kalyan Singh of 123rd Outram's Rifles volunteered to crawl out and bring him in. Though the Turks were only a few yards away and there was quite a heavy fire running all up and down the line at the time, they succeeded in getting him back, though he shortly afterwards succumbed to his injuries. Both these men were decorated with the Meritorious Service Medal.

The Turks had apparently been trying to remove more of our wire, as, the following morning, it was seen that they had again tied a stout rope to it, but appeared unable to drag it away. After dark Lance-Naik Jhonta Singh, who had rejoined the Regiment from the Reserve on the outbreak of war, and Rifleman Mahdeo Singh crawled out and cut it. The Turks had evidently been expecting some such move so they had a very lively time and were lucky to get back without being hit and well deserved their I.D.S.M.s.

Our casualties from the beginning of the siege up to the end of the year amounted to:—

**Casualties up  
to Dec. 31st.**

Killed: 2 Indian Officers, 14 Rank and File.

Wounded: 3 Indian Officers, 76 Rank and File, and  
1 Follower.

Four men had also died from disease.

It was now very cold at night and the men, having nothing warmer than their thin khaki drill, suffered considerably on sentry duty, and from now onward scarcely a week passed without one or more men succumbing to disease, chiefly pneumonia.

However, the year 1915 closed on a note of optimism. It was known that the relieving force was concentrating at Ali Gharbi; there was plenty of food and ammunition in Kut; and the garrison had no doubts about being able to keep the Turks out.

When the Regiment went into reserve on 1st January they were sent to a new improved bivouac in the town. Here there were several good dug-outs for Officers and men, and the houses gave protection from snipers; the cookhouses were also under cover. The men were still employed during the day in digging communication trenches and often went up to Middle Line at night. All such movements were now carried out by the communication trenches and although Middle Line was only a mile distant, it took an hour to get there in fine weather and more than two hours after rain.

**Bivouac in  
the Town,  
1st Jan. 1916.**

On the night of the 4th January we find Second Lieutenant A. C. Lock taking the Regiment up to the "Middle Line" as all the other British Officers were on the sick list. As our Regiment was due to go up into the front line on the 7th, Captain W. Price of the Supply and Transport was temporarily appointed to command till Manners was fit again. As the Turks had now sapped up to the wire opposite the left of our Regiment's bit of line and their main trench was less than 100 yards from our centre, a company of British Infantry was sent up every night to support us.

On the 7th the guns of the relieving force were distinctly heard for the first time and the following day news was received that the relieving force had attacked 1,500 Turks at Shaikh Saad and driven them back. This was good news, but the fact that the Turks had organized a defensive position as far downstream as Shaikh Saad pointed to further delay and the end of January was now considered the earliest possible date for the relief.

On the 10th January Manners came out of hospital and took over command again. At about 9 p.m. on the 14th, the Turks in the trench opposite our Regiment's left sent up two Very lights and cheered lustily. It was at first thought that this was the prelude to some new move on their part and the whole Regiment stood to arms. After waiting about ten minutes, a loud explosion occurred near our barbed wire, but no movement followed. As nothing further happened, after three-quarters of an hour's wait the normal duties were resumed, but a desultory fire was kept up on the place where the explosion occurred. Next morning it was seen that a large hole had been opened in what remained of our barbed wire, but no work appeared to be in progress. Later when the Turks abandoned their trenches owing to floods, it was found that a hole had been blown in the roof in the middle of a Turkish sap and it looked as though something had gone wrong with the explosion.

On the 15th large parties of Turks were seen in the distance retiring from the direction of Es Sinn and news came through that the relieving force had captured the Wadi position. Unfortunately there now came a change in the cold but dry weather. The wind veered to the south, clouds gathered and on the 16th down came the rain in torrents, making a sea of mud which checked the forward movement of General Aylmer's troops, and caused the failure, with heavy loss, to break through the Turkish Hanna position on the 21st. On the 19th January the Turks made their last attack on the Kut defences when, after dark, they made a determined attempt to capture Woolpress Village on the right bank, and were driven off with loss.

It was now impossible to keep the water out of the trenches, and even the dug-outs in bivouac were flooded. On the 21st the left of the front-line



trenches had to be abandoned and troops withdrawn to the Middle Line. The north-east sector was still tenable and was eventually joined up to the Middle Line by a zigzag trench.

The Turks, too, had been flooded out of their trenches and had to retire about a mile. Lieutenant Lock took out a patrol early the morning after the Turks were flooded out, to reconnoitre, and was able to go about half a mile beyond our original front line before he was fired on. During the next three days it was quite safe to wander about in the open up to the Turkish trenches and the sandhills 400 yards beyond our north-west sector. We found that the Turkish trenches had been very well constructed; they were deeper and narrower than our own. They had removed everything they could before they left, and nothing remained but the materials of trench construction. Parties were sent out to collect all beams and sandbags from our front-line trenches and also from those of the enemy.

**Turks evacuate  
their Trenches.**

On the 18th January the men felt the first of many privations when the issue of tea and sugar ceased. Up to this date, though meat and vegetables had not been available, the Indian ranks had received their full ration of other things. Now, in lieu of tea, ginger was issued and the water in which it was boiled was drunk like tea, but was not popular.

The daily digging was now replaced by the more unpleasant task of baling out the muddy water. But in spite of continuous work the men in the Middle Line trenches were always standing in a foot or two of water. Consequently a wall and thick parapet were built 3 feet in front of the trenches with the dual purpose of keeping out flood water and giving a high command fire position, while positions were prepared in the *parados* of the abandoned front-line trenches which were occupied each night by piquets. The work of constructing this wall and parapet took many nights of hard labour to complete. The parapet was very broad at the bottom and sloped up to a width of about 6 feet at top. It was known that this part of the position was flooded by the river and by rain most years, and consequently, the bank had to be built very firmly. As soon as six inches or so of earth had been laid, it was trampled down as hard as possible, then more earth was laid, and the process repeated, and so on until the required height was reached. This "bund" was successful, as when the floods did come, no water penetrated through it.

**Construction  
of High  
Command  
Parapet.**

Wood for cooking, which had always been scarce, gave out on 12th February and fuel oil was issued instead. Until a satisfactory type of cooker was evolved and the cooks had gained experience it was difficult to prevent the food becoming tainted, but this was eventually overcome. Units invented their own pattern of cookers. Ours was a central flue with small tunnels of earth leading into it, the cooking being done over holes in the top of these tunnels. It was quite successful,

**Cooking with  
Oil Fuel.**

and without any extra expenditure of fuel we were able to provide a limited amount of boiling water as well, which was invaluable for washing and purifying clothes. The main drawback was the sooty smoke, which made the unfortunate cooks look like stokers. After the Turks had first surrounded the force, the chief consideration was the completion of the defences and keeping the enemy out. After the repulse of the attacks on the north-west sector and the fort, it was felt that the Turks would never force an entrance and the all-absorbing question became the probable date of relief. As this date receded, the food question increased in importance until it became the most insistent problem.

On the 13th February a Turkish aeroplane flew over for the first time and dropped two bombs. In the absence of anti-aircraft weapons the plane could fly quite low with safety. The sappers and miners, however, got busy and, by the 19th, two anti-aircraft guns and four machine guns were ready, after which the Turk maintained a greater height and was less accurate with his bombs.

**First Turkish  
Aeroplane,  
13th Feb. 1916.**

On 17th February all ranks were greatly heartened by a gracious message which General Townshend received from His Majesty the King-Emperor which read as follows:—

**Gracious  
Message from  
H.M. the King.**

"I, together with your fellow countrymen continue to follow with admiration the gallant fighting of the troops under your Command against great odds, and every effort is being made to support your splendid resistance.—George R.I."

On the 24th February 16 ounces barley meal was substituted for the atta ration. The Officers had for some time been trying to vary their meat ration by shooting the sparrows and starlings that came to roost in the palm trees in the evening. As ammunition was scarce a good return per cartridge was required. For a long time twenty-six starlings with one shot held the record.

**Barley Meal  
substituted  
for Atta,  
24th Feb. 1916.**

From 4 p.m. on 1st March till dark the Turks kept up a very heavy bombardment on Kut and two monoplanes dropped bombs causing a good many casualties. The planes flew over daily but did not usually do much damage.

On the nights of the 6th and 7th very heavy firing was heard downstream, the prelude to another desperate attempt by General Aylmer to win through. On the 8th the 16th Brigade, which had been detailed to hold Kut, took over all the defences while the other three Brigades stood ready to march out and join in the fight. This was the occasion of the night march to surprise the Turks in the Sinn Abtar position and Dujaila redoubt which was so very nearly crowned with success. Shortly after midday, however, news came through that the attack had been repulsed and normal defence duties were resumed at 3 p.m. Two days later the Turkish Commander, Halil Bey, sent in a letter demanding the surrender of the garrison.

**Attack on  
Dujaila Redoubt,  
8th March 1916.**

From now onwards the tale of the siege resolves itself into a succession

of hopes and fears. Hopes, which rose when each intense bombardment by the relieving force was heard; fears, when the news of each successive check was received. Each such check brought in its train some new privation to sap the defenders' strength. Lieutenant Lock was slightly wounded on the 17th. On the 18th March news was received that General Gorringe had taken over from General Aylmer. At this time the river had risen considerably and the flood water had reached the parapet of the Middle Line.

The men's rations had been further reduced to 8 ounces of barley, which they ground themselves, and 4 ounces of parched barley. A great effort was made to induce them to eat horse or mule flesh. But although a letter had been received from the Imam of the Jama Masjid at Delhi stating that it was lawful food, both Mussalmans and Hindus declined. One method of increasing the scanty ration was by collecting various kinds of green stuff and cooking it as a vegetable. Whenever a party left our own trenches for any "fatigue," an eye was kept open for any place which might have been cultivated in the past. The ground was most unsuitable for agriculture, but in one or two places could be found, very scattered, a root with leaves like a small turnip. These leaves, boiled, were quite palatable. Green grass of which there was a small amount, was not so good as it boiled down to practically nothing, and its chief effect was to make one feel rather distended for half an hour, and then emptier than ever. But any of these things were very hard to find and were only got in very small quantities. The most acceptable discovery in the food line was a case containing a dozen tins of butter. This was found by the post office in their dump, addressed to the Regiment. As butter had been non-existent for two months, its appearance was greatly welcomed. Three large tins of bully beef were discovered by a Hindu party which was working where there had been, when we first got back to Kut, a tented camp, and were brought back by the party in triumph for the Officers by whom they were much appreciated.

The town and defences were now constantly bombarded and the Turkish planes flew over every day and night dropping bombs. The water was now seeping up into the trenches from below and parties had to work continuously baling it out. The men, however, were losing strength and could not do more than an hour's work a day. Towards the end of the month the floods started to recede and hopes rose again. But on 31st March heavy thunderstorms soon filled the trenches with water again. On 12th April when our Regiment was due for relief from the Middle Line trenches they elected to remain where they were to avoid the exertion of moving back to bivouac, and there they stayed till the end. Next day the General Officer Commanding called a meeting of all Commanding Officers to discuss the desirability of issuing an order to eat horse flesh. It was decided not to issue such order, but to continue to use persuasion. The Mussalmans of our Battalion, largely owing to the influence of Subadar-Major Hasan Muhammad, had agreed the night before to eat mule,

but it was not until the following evening that the Hindus could be persuaded to do so. There is no doubt that had they not eaten mule flesh few of them would have had enough strength to survive the hardships of their captivity.

The garrison was now kept in touch with events in the rest of the world by means of newspapers which were dropped in Kut by our aeroplanes from the relieving force. The Brigade used to intimate when they were available, when the Officers would meet at an open dug-out at Headquarters and the papers were read from cover to cover. These meetings provided the further advantage of enabling Officers to meet one another, a thing it was very difficult to do otherwise, owing to the underground existence they were compelled to lead.

On 20th April the bread and barley meal ration came to an end and the men had to eat their emergency ration of parched barley which lasted for two days. Telegrams had been received from General Gorringe giving accounts of the fierce fighting on the Bait Isa position and of the Turkish counter-attacks on the night of 17th-18th in which they lost very heavily. He assured the garrison that they would be relieved in a day or two and begged them not to relax their gallant efforts to hold out.

During the last few days the aeroplanes of the relief force had been dropping food into Kut, but during the twelve days up to the 27th April they only succeeded in dropping sufficient for four days' rations at 3 ounces a man. This was issued on the 26th and subsequent days.

On the 25th the *Julnar* with a volunteer crew commanded by Lieutenant-

**"Julnar"**  
**attempts to**  
**bring Food,**  
**25th April 1916.**

Commander C. H. Cowley, R.N.V.R., made its gallant attempt to run through the Turkish lines with a month's rations for the garrison. Though it succeeded in passing through the Es Sinn position under a hail of bullets from both banks, it was finally forced aground and captured at Magassis where it could be seen from Kut on the morning of the 26th. This sealed the fate of the gallant defenders.

The same day a Turkish Officer came to deliver a message to General Townshend who met Halil Pasha, the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, that night to discuss terms of surrender. Next day, the 27th, hostilities definitely ceased,

**Armistice,**  
**27th April 1916.**

an armistice having been arranged while terms were further discussed. It was a great pleasure to everyone to be able to walk about in the open, and the absolute quiet after the continuous noise of the past months was a wonderful relief.

The destruction of superfluous gun ammunition commenced on the 27th, all unnecessary gear was also destroyed. Three or four parcels kept for delivery to their owners were now opened. One of them was an immense boon, two hundred Burma cheroots addressed to Second Lieutenant R. E. Alderman who had been seriously wounded at Ctesiphon. No one had seen tobacco in any shape or form since the end of 1915. After sending a few to the other units in the Brigade the cheroots were divided out in the Regiment. Men

smoked them in all sorts of ways, chopped up in *chillums*, handed round a circle like a cigarette, and so on. But though an absolutely new experience to the men, they were very greatly appreciated, and were smoked to the last ash.

On the 28th all units received orders to destroy 50 per cent. of all arms and only to retain a few rounds of ammunition a man. General Townshend issued a long *communiqué* to the troops stating that he had been authorized to arrange the terms of surrender. After thanking all ranks for their loyal services, he stated that he hoped to arrange for an exchange of prisoners and permission for them to return to India on parole. Though all were despondent at the idea of surrender to an enemy who had been unable to defeat them, the thought of an early return to their homes and families gave them new heart and hope. The Turks, however, demanded unconditional surrender, and all hopes were dispelled the following morning when an urgent message was sent to all units to destroy everything immediately.

About 2 p.m. a Regiment of Turkish Infantry marched in to take over the town and defences and the gallant garrison became prisoners of war. Their stubborn and successful defence lasting 143 days will for all time remain a testimony to the heroism and discipline of the troops engaged.

The strength of the Regiment at the time of surrender, excluding sick in hospital was:—

Turkish  
Infantry  
enter Kut,  
29th April 1916.  
Battalion's  
Strength at  
End of Siege.

British Officers, 5:—

Captain C. M. S. Manners, Commanding.

Second Lieutenant L. S. Bell Syer, I.A.R.O.

Second Lieutenant C. H. C. Munroe, I.A.R.O.

Second Lieutenant A. C. Lock, I.A.R.O.

Second Lieutenant F. N. Punchard, I.A.R.O.

Indian Officers, 9:—

Subadar-Major Hasan Muhammad.

Subadar Mukh Ram, I.O.M.

Subadar Harchand Jat.

Subadar Pema Ram.

Subadar Karam Dad.

Jamadar Kalu Ram.

Jamadar Ganpat Singh, I.O.M.

Jamadar Rahim Dad Khan, I.D.S.M.

Jamadar Sharaf Khan, I.D.S.M.


Hospital Assistant Rasul Shah.

Rank and File, 288. Followers, 43.

Captain Manners and Second Lieutenant Bell Syer were subsequently gazetted temporary Lieutenant-Colonel and Major respectively, for the period that they acted as Commandant and Second in Command.











## CHAPTER XXIII

29TH APRIL TO 31ST DECEMBER, 1916

Camp at Shumran    Hardships of the march to Turkey.    Distribution of Prisoners.  
Loyalty of Subadar-Major Hasan Muhammad.    Movement of detachments not with  
the Regiment in Kut al Amara.

A TURKISH Regiment from downstream marched into Kut al Amara on 29th April and, leaving one Company at the fort as garrison, went on to the town where they posted guards. This Anatolian Regiment, who were considered the flower of the Turkish Army, were in a very ragged state, few of them had any water-bottles or haversacks, and such boots as they had were much worn. Consequently, it was little to be wondered at that they did some looting to make good their deficiencies, although, when a case of looting was reported to a Turkish Officer, he at once had the articles returned, dealing out justice to the offenders with a heavy hand. Our men were amazed to see that the Turkish Officers, trained on the German model, seemed to look on their men as an inferior class of being, and thought nothing of slashing them across the face with a cane for any trifling offence. The Turks were disappointed to find that nothing of military value had been left by us.

Next day our 16th Brigade assembled in the Serai to await boats to take them up to Bagdad. So far no rations had been issued, as the Turks made no arrangements to feed our troops, although they must have known that surrender was due to lack of food supplies.

Early the same afternoon the Brigade were told that no boats being available they must march at once to Shumran, some 6 miles upstream. The march commenced at 4 p.m., but, so weak had the men become through starvation that it took them three and a half hours to cover the 6 miles.

On arrival at Shumran Turkish rations were issued consisting only of Turkish biscuits at the rate of two a man. The Turkish army biscuits, about five inches across and over half an inch thick, made of barley with a considerable proportion of husk and grit, were so hard that the only way to make them digestible was to pound them up and boil them in water to make a kind of porridge. Most of the men, however, had had nothing to eat since the previous morning, and were ravenous. The biscuits as issued brought on a kind of cholera which caused many deaths during the first few days.

The troops at Shumran were very crowded and a strong guard was placed over their camp on the desert side, but the Turks did not interfere in the running of the camp by our own Generals and Staff.

On the 1st May a ship with barges was sent upstream from the relief force under a white flag, with rations, mess stores and medical comforts. The rations did not go so very far when distributed among so many. The fifteen cases of mess stores addressed to our Regiment consisted of five cases of port wine, two of beer, one of Office Stationery, one of boot polish, two of flannel shirts and towels from the ladies of Bombay, one of plum puddings which had already gone mouldy, and the remaining three contained tinned milk and condiments, but no solid food. Next day most of the wine was exchanged for food with other units.

On the evening of 3rd May when General Townshend came upstream in an armoured launch, all the troops lined the banks and greeted him with rousing cheers, and again later when he left on his way to Bagdad.

Orders were now issued that all Officers were to go to Bagdad by boat while the rank and file marched. When our men set off on the 6th on their severe march to Asia Minor the parting from their Officers was a sad and moving scene; many of them went off in tears, particularly the Hindus, who had good grounds for apprehending the worst.

On the 10th our Officers, British and Indian, embarked for the three days' voyage to Bagdad. The Arabs in masses along the banks jeered at the captives, making signs of slitting throats. On arrival at Bagdad on the morning of the 13th, all the Officers in the party, including the Generals, were made to march through the city in the manner of a Roman Triumph. The march ended at the Turkish Barracks, where they stayed a couple of days. A few, including Lieutenant Bell Syer, found their way to the American Consul who gave them refreshment and a little money which were very welcome. Before the surrender each British Officer had been given two sovereigns, and few had anything more. News of these visits to the American Consul soon reached the Turks, who at once put the Consulate out of bounds.

On the 16th the Officers marched to the station and entrained for Samara where they bivouacked at the station at eleven at night. Two days later the first batch of Indian ranks arrived having covered 180 miles in twelve days, with a daily ration of only one Turkish biscuit. They were in a dreadful state and had been selling their water-bottles and clothing for food. Their guards were Arabs, who treated them with the utmost brutality; those lagging behind were beaten with rifle butts and left to die of exhaustion; there were no medical arrangements.

Two men of this party, Rifleman Dewa Ram of our Regiment and a sepoy of another unit, escaped from the guards the first night after leaving Shumran Camp. Putting on some dirty Arab rags which they had acquired, they slipped past the sentries in the

**Condition of  
Men on Arrival  
at Samara,  
18th May 1916.**

**Escape of  
Rifleman  
Dewa Ram.**

dark. They had no food to take with them and, during the four days it took them to reach the British Lines, they had to subsist on any green food they could find growing. They could only move at night, and during the day hid up in the reeds on the edges of the swamps. Fighting was still in progress and they decided to work round the Turkish left flank; but on nearing the Turkish lines they were very nearly captured and had to retrace their steps and make a wider detour into the desert before eventually reaching the 92nd Punjabis. Rifleman Dewa Ram was taken before General Gorringe who complimented him on his plucky escape and promoted him Naik.

On the 19th May the second batch of Indian Ranks marched into Samara in an even worse state than the first. The Officers who were there could do nothing to help them as they were in little better plight themselves; and after they had marched off the next day they never saw the men again till the War was over. The Officers had a terrible march to Ras el Ain, the Turkish rail-head, which was reached on the 11th June. Here they entrained and passed through Konia, where the Hindu Officers were, though they were not allowed to see them; then Eski Shahir, where they found the Mussalman Officers who

**Arrival of  
Officers at  
Kastamuni,  
4th July 1916.**

were very despondent; and finally reached Kastamuni on the 4th July. Here they remained until three Officers escaped, after which they were sent to Changri for about six weeks.

Later they were split into two parties, one, which included Captain Manners, being sent to Konia, and the other, which included Bell Syer, Munroe and Punchard, to Ouchak, where they remained till the end of the War.

Within a week or two of arrival in Kastamuni, Lieutenant A. C. Lock of our Regiment died. He had done splendid work during the siege and was much liked and respected by all ranks.

During their captivity the British Officers found it hard to kill time because they had little opportunity for taking exercise, though latterly they got a football and played three days a week; mail days were few and very irregular and they were only allowed to write letters limited to three lines.

On one occasion Captain Manners, who wanted to write a long letter to the Adjutant about various things during the siege, got hold of a piece of paper about a yard long and two inches broad. By writing very small right across it he managed to crowd his long letter into three lines. The Censor, who must have had a sense of humour, duly passed it and it reached its destination.

About August 1918 Manners joined a large party who were planning to escape. They succeeded in breaking out at night and evading their guards but were waylaid by brigands who handed them over to the Turks again, after which additional restraint was put on all prisoners.

**Treatment of  
Indian Ranks.** The Indian ranks were employed chiefly on railway construction in the Taurus Mountains and had a particularly hard time during the first winter, as they had sold all spare clothing to obtain food during the march, little realizing how cold it was going

to be later on.

The Mussalmans fared better than the Hindus as is shown by the following statement of those who returned at the end of the War.

<i>Caste</i>			<i>Taken prisoner</i>		<i>Released</i>
Rajputs	..	..	..	64	25
Jats	..	..	..	99	43
Mussalmans	..	..	..	125	103

All the Indian Officers survived their captivity and several served on in the Battalion afterwards.

The Turks made great efforts to win over the Mussalmans, both Officers and men, but met with very little response. In this respect, our Subadar-Major, Hasan Muhammad, set a fine example. **Loyalty of Subadar-Major Hasan Muhammad.** Being far removed from the support of any British Officers he acted entirely on his own responsibility from a deep sense of loyalty to the British Raj.

While at Eski Shahir about June 1917 two Indians in the Prisoners of War Camp went over to the Turks. Discussing this, Hasan Muhammad remarked that he would rather shoot them with his own hand than approve such disloyalty. His words were apparently overheard and carried to the Camp Commandant who paraded him, abused him and sentenced him to 18 days' solitary confinement on bread and water.

A few days after his release he was appointed to the Camp Management Committee, one of his duties being to pay out to the men the money received through the Red Cross. This he agreed to do but refused to pay any out to the two men in question as he said that, being the Senior Officer present, he held himself responsible to Government and refused to pay out the King's money to His Majesty's enemies. As a result, a few days later he was sent to the punishment camp at Afion Kara Hissar where he was again confined and only released on representations made by senior British Officers in the British Camp there.

Later on, all Mussalman Officers were taken before His Majesty the Sultan of Turkey, who endeavoured to persuade them to transfer their allegiance, remarking that they were now released from all obligations of loyalty to the British Government and ought to take up arms on behalf of the Kalipha. In token of his favour he presented each of them with a sword of honour. Subadar-Major Kitab Gul of the 120th Rajputana Infantry, now our second Battalion, who, as senior, was on the right of the line and the first to receive his sword, at once flung it away and Subadar-Major Hasan Muhammad, who was next to him, threw his down and stamped on it; the rest followed their example. The two senior Officers were at once marched off to three weeks' solitary confinement.

When the released prisoners reached the Depot at Mhow there were very few of the rank and file who were fit enough to serve on. The majority,

after a well-earned furlough, were invalided out of the Service, or retired on pension.

We must now return to Mesopotamia again as the Regimental history would not be complete without some mention of the doings of the Officers and men who were not with the Regiment during the Siege of Kut.

#### History of Regimental Detachments in Mesopotamia.

Throughout this time drafts had been despatched from the Depot as fast as men could be trained, while many who had been wounded were again fit for service. These parties were collected at various rest camps along the river awaiting an opportunity to join up.

Early in December 1915 Major Butler, who had been severely wounded at Muzaira, reached Basra and having taken over some five hundred details, including many of our own men, equipped and marched them up country. Captain Grant Smith and Second Lieutenant Kiddle, I.A.R.O., were with this party. Collecting another party of our men at Amara they moved on to Ali Gharbi where the relief force was concentrating. From here large numbers were drafted off to Battalions which were under strength. All available men in the Depot there were then taken in their place and formed into No. 1 Provisional Battalion, and detailed to escort the Supply *mahelas* up the river and to furnish rear outposts. Later on the whole Battalion was drafted off to various units to replace casualties and many of our men fell in the fierce fighting of the relief force.

Of the fifty men attached to the 102nd Grenadiers nearly all were either killed or wounded, whilst of those attached to 125th Napier's Rifles, in the fighting at Sannaiyat we lost many more including Second Lieutenant R. C. Burton whose death was a great loss to the Regiment.

Major Butler had been detailed, with a staff of one Somali interpreter from Aden, to organize the fleet of 170 *mahelas* with crews numbering about 1,500 in all. Captains Grant Smith and Dormer, the latter recovered from his Ctesiphon wound, went with a draft to the 97th Deccan Infantry. Captain Maclean, who had been severely wounded at Saihan, was back again as Military Secretary to General Gorringe, the Corps Commander.

Captain Stoddart was road making down the river; Lieutenant Wilson was doing Political Work under Major A. T. Wilson, while Major Sargent and Captain Cheeke were at the Depot at Mhow.

Captain James, who was seconded when war broke out, was still in East Africa in command of a Volunteer Maxim Gun Company and had been awarded the Military Cross after the action at Taveta.

The road-making party, which Captain Stoddart was with, consisted of reinforcements for the VIth Division and included a large draft for our Regiment from the 123rd Outram's Rifles under Captain Odell and Lieutenant Durnford. They were first employed near Qurna and afterwards near Amara.

At this time, owing to the enormous number of sick and wounded, the

Medical Officer who had been with our party was withdrawn and efforts to get him replaced, even by a Sub-Assistant Surgeon or Dresser, met with no success. Medicines were no easier to procure. While Odell and Stoddart were having a very heated interview about this with a Senior Medical Officer, Durnford, who was waiting for them outside, had succeeded in purloining a very complete medical case which appeared to contain drugs and implements to cope with almost any complaint.

Each party now appointed one British Officer to be in medical charge of their camp and to do the best he could with the help of the Field Service Pocket Book. Lieutenant Durnford was detailed as Medical Officer of his party by Captain Stoddart. He held sick parade every morning and the men soon had great faith in his remedies. One morning he reported to Stoddart that he had a man with smallpox, so the man and contacts were segregated and they tried to get a Medical Officer to come and see him. As Amara was out of reach they tried to signal to some of the paddle boats going downstream to stop, but without success. As it was essential to get expert opinion, they lined six men up along the river bank and, when the next boat came down, opened rapid fire across her bows. There was a quick response to this drastic action, a boat coming alongside. A doctor came off, confirmed the diagnosis, giving instructions for further treatment, and leaving the case in the hands of Durnford who had the satisfaction of bringing the man safely through.

On the fall of Kut the *mahelas* were paid off and an application was made to re-form the Regiment from Officers and men in Mesopotamia. Although we could muster larger numbers than many of the other Battalions, very few Indian Officers and followers and no staff of clerks were available. Consequently orders were issued for all our details to be posted to 125th Napier's Rifles, but the British Officers were scattered to the four winds. Major Butler took over command of the 125th Napier's Rifles for a time, while Lieutenant Wilson joined the Political Department. Captain Stoddart was invalided back to India and subsequently appointed Brigade Major, and Captain Dormer became Staff Captain at Amara.

There now occurred a lull in the fighting while both sides were reinforced and reorganized. When the successful advance on Bagdad took place, the 125th Napier's Rifles, who took part in it, had a large proportion of our men of whom 4 were killed and 16 wounded in the attack on Sannaiyat on 21st February 1917. Later, at the hard-fought action of Istabulat on 21st April 1917, out of the 229 casualties suffered by that Battalion, no less than 10 killed and 92 wounded were our men. So that, although as a Regiment we did not share in these honours, our Officers and men played a gallant part in upholding the Battalion's reputation.

## CHAPTER XXIV

1917-1919

The Regiment re-formed. Mobilization for Mesopotamia. Training at Nasiriya. With the 56th Brigade on the Euphrates. Railway construction work. Return to India. The Delhi Riots.

ON the 1st January 1917 orders were received for re-forming the Regiment at Mhow and Captain Cheeke was appointed temporary Commandant. On the 18th January Major Scott, who had been commanding the 2/125th Rifles, rejoined and took over acting command, with Major Butler and Captain Cheeke as his wing commanders; Second Lieutenant Ambrose as Adjutant; and Second Lieutenant A. G. Butler as Quartermaster.

The old Double Company system was now discarded and the Regiment was organized with a Headquarters Company and four Rifle Companies each of four Platoons. It was armed with the short rifle, but still had the old bandolier equipment.

A Company consisted of Rajputs.

B and C Companies consisted of Jats.

D Company consisted of Punjabi Mussalmans.

The training of teams for the Vickers guns which had replaced the old Maxims, and for Lewis guns and of a new signalling section was put in hand. There were only a few old hands, most of whom were promoted to non-commissioned rank, the remainder were recruits. Though some 500 men of our Regiment were at this time serving in Mesopotamia with other units, these could not be recalled.

About the middle of April the Battalion moved from Mhow to Jubbulpore, and Colonel Clery, with his Brevet and C.B. for distinguished service in Mesopotamia, rejoined and resumed command. As fast as Officers were posted they disappeared again to take out drafts for other Battalions, or to other appointments. Captain Stoddart passed through in March to take up the appointment of Brigade Major of the 45th Brigade; Second Lieutenant Ambrose went with a draft to 123rd Outram's Rifles, with whom he served for the rest of the war in Palestine, winning the Military Cross; Second Lieutenant C. S. Harper, I.A.R.O., now took over the duties of Adjutant.



On 7th July orders were received to mobilize for Mesopotamia. All available Officers were recalled and Captain James, who had just returned from East Africa, was amongst those who re-joined. A draft of Kumaonis, consisting of 2 Indian Officers and 100 Rank and File, was received from the 38th Dogras for the Rajput Company which was under strength. This party, when fully trained, was intended to form the nucleus of a Kumaon Battalion. At that time, however, the men were all recruits and had no experienced N.C.O.s; consequently our Rajputs were formed into two Platoons and the spare Rajput N.C.O.s were placed with the Kumaonis as Section Commanders and had Kumaoni under-studies. This plan worked extremely well and without friction.

The Regiment entrained on the evening of 14th July. Early that morning an entire new set of rifles of the 1914 pattern had been received and issued. Experience showed that they did not stand nearly so much hard wear as the short rifle. Although with the peep back-sight they were extremely accurate they were not easy to manipulate in rapid fire, as the longer bolt was apt to cut the right cheek when reloading at the shoulder.

On the morning of the 16th of July, the Regiment detrained at the Alexandria Docks in Bombay and went straight on board the transport *Edavana*. As the monsoon was at its height the voyage up the Gulf was not pleasant, and at Basra the temperature was 126° in the shade. The vessel drew alongside the wharf soon after midday on 22nd July, but no disembarkation was permitted till after sundown. Bivouac at Makina Masus was reached about midnight and tents were pitched at daylight next morning. A grilling week was spent under canvas completing Field Service Equipment, which included the first issue of sixteen Lewis guns.

After a night's journey by train the Regiment relieved the 10th Gurkha Rifles on the 30th July and became part of the Nasiriya Front Force. Here intensive training, particularly in trench warfare, was the order of the day. Under supervision of the Sappers and Miners, barracks of mud bricks, to house the whole Battalion, were built on the bank of the Euphrates. The opportunity was taken of training all non-swimmers. A short course was fired with the new rifle; while instruction in bombing was carried out by Lieutenant W. Webb, who had had much practical experience with the Naval Division in Gallipoli. Meanwhile the Depot, which had been left at Jubbulpore under Major Butler, had moved to Mhow. In November Major Butler departed to raise a new battalion, the 2/72nd Punjabis, taking with him Second Lieutenant Davies as his Adjutant. Captain Dormer who was Staff Captain at Amara, returned to India and took over command of the Depot again.

Officers were still continually changing: Captain Stoddart rejoined the Battalion and took over command of the Rajput Company; Captain Cheeke,

posted to the 125th Napier's Rifles as a Company Commander, went with them to Palestine where he served the rest of the War, eventually commanding that Battalion. Major Byrne returned to India to a new Battalion of Baluch Infantry; and in December Colonel Clery left to command the 35th Infantry Brigade, handing over command of the Regiment to Major Scott, who, a few days later, was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel.

At the end of the year a large draft, received from the 1/9th Bhopal Infantry, composed of Gaur Brahmans, Eastern Rajputs and Brahmans, was posted to the Jat Companies.

With the new year, the Kumaon Detachment, having been fully trained, left to form the 4/39th Kumaon Rifles, which later did fine service in Palestine. At the end of January a complete company of Manipuris under Captain F. B. Blackie, I.A.R.O., was attached to complete its training with the Battalion. As the men could neither understand nor speak Urdu this Company was kept separate under its own Officer. Consequently the Battalion was now organized with a Headquarters Company and five Rifle Companies. Training was completed during a pleasant cold weather, and good small-game shooting was much appreciated by the Officers.

On 20th March the Regiment moved to Bagdad to join the 56th Brigade which was being formed of units of the Nasiriya Front Force.

**Bagdad,  
March 1918.**

Two records were nearly surrendered on one evening on the way upstream from Basra. The Regiment was justly proud of never having lost a rifle during the War, and never having lost a man from drowning by falling off a barge. As these barges had flat iron decks with no protection round the edge, men, particularly when wearing ammunition boots, were liable to slip and fall off. Troops had frequently lost men overboard on occasions when a barge bumped against the bank, a sandbank, or the towing boat. In our Regiment the orders forbade any man to go to the edge of a barge without a second man holding on to him. On this evening when the barge struck a sandbank one of our men was jerked overboard, taking his rifle with him. It was dark, the river was running very high and only after fifteen minutes someone, through glasses, fortunately saw him just as orders to go ahead were being given. He had got ashore and managed to retain hold of his rifle. He was soon picked up and so both records are still held.

On reaching Amara all were very sorry to say good-bye to Captain Shanks, I.M.S., who had come with the Regiment from Jubbulpore and had looked after the health of the men wonderfully well. He had also been a most enterprising, and popular Mess Secretary, with a wonderful repertoire of cocktails, prescribing the right one for every complaint from which any British Officer suffered.

On reaching Bagdad the Regiment went into camp at Iron Bridge and on the 9th April the 56th Brigade set out by road for Hillah on the Euphrates, our Regiment moving on to Kufa, a few miles distant from the holy city of Nejf, where a rising had

**March to  
Kufa,**

**7th April 1918.**

only just been quelled. Here an uneventful hot weather was spent in billets, the time being chiefly devoted to education, gas and bombing instruction, and the training of runners. Now that the Regiment was in a Field Brigade, orders were received from Headquarters to reorganize into four rifle companies by amalgamating the Rajputs and Punjabi Mussalmans. One Platoon in this Company was thus over 100 strong, and promotion was blocked.

In October the Brigade was ordered to join the IIIrd Corps for the final advance on the Tigris. They moved *via* Bagdad to Abu Rajash, just north of Tekrit. Here they came into corps reserve, but took no part in the fighting at the Fateh Gorge.

Abu Rajash,  
Oct. 1918.

They were now employed on railway construction work with the object of bringing railhead as near to the gorge as possible in the shortest possible time. The standard task to date had been 20 cubic feet per man per diem. After a couple of days to get the men into trim and their hands hardened, our Regiment applied for an increased allotment and in a few days were doing 60 cubic feet a man. The other units of the Brigade followed suit with the result that no other Brigade working on the line could touch the standard of the 56th. Finally to get the last day free to rest and clean up, our Regiment rolled two days' work into one and actually completed 120 cubic feet a man, with the two-mile march to and from their work thrown in. A fine achievement of organization and endurance.

When war with Turkey came to an end the Brigade moved to Mirjana, halting a day or two in Bagdad where our Regiment held Athletic Sports on 19th November.


End of War,  
11th Nov. 1918.  
Athletic Sports  
at Bagdad,  
19th Nov. 1918.

Again there had been many changes amongst the British Officers. Among others Major James had gone to the 52nd Sikhs, Second Lieutenant Jones to Knox's Mission in Siberia, Lieutenant Carrall to the Flying Corps, Second Lieutenant O'Connor to the 1/10th Jats, Captains Webb and Shuldham to the Political Department. In connection with the final transfer of the last named, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilson, acting Civil Commissioner in Mesopotamia, wrote: "I take the liberty of adding that it has been my privilege to have four Officers of, or attached to, the 104th Wellesley's Rifles serving under my orders during the past four years, namely:—

Brevet Major W. C. F. A. Wilson,  
Captain R. E. Alderman, O.B.E. (I.A.R.O.),  
Captain W. F. Q. Shuldham,  
Captain W. F. Webb.

No single Regiment of the British, or Indian, Army has contributed so many, and no single Regiment has contributed such a capable batch of Officers. They have well upheld the reputation of their Regiment whilst serving with this Administration and I am glad to have this opportunity of placing the fact on record."

# BATTALION WAR MEMORIAL.



Stained Glass Window put up by the Battalion in the Mesopotamian Memorial Church, Bagdad, in memory of those who gave their lives in the Great War.



Mirjana proved a very pleasant camp and the time was spent chiefly in recreation, hockey grounds being plentiful and good. On 22nd February 1919 the Regiment left Mirjana to return to India. The journey was made by train to Kut al Amara, thence by boat to Amara and again by train to Nahruma, some 12 miles north of Basra, where all troops were collected to await transport. After a wait of nearly three weeks they embarked on

**Disembarkation at Bombay, 28th March 1919.** 22nd March and six days later arrived at Bombay where they parted with Captain Blackie and the Manipuri Company and Captain King, the doctor, who went with them. Mhow was reached the following day and, after ten days in quarantine camp, the Regiment moved into barracks and amalgamated with the Depot.

So ends the tale of the gallant part played by our Regiment in the Great War, in which 6 British Officers, 7 Indian Officers, 459 Non-Commissioned Officers and men and 27 followers gave their lives. To commemorate their sacrifice the Regiment put up a stained-glass window in the Mesopotamian Memorial Church at Bagdad.

The Manipuri Company on their way home had some further excitement in store. On Sunday, 31st March 1919, in answer to an appeal **The Delhi Riots.** by Gandhi for the observance of a day of fasting and prayer as a protest to the passing of the Rowlatt Bill, the agitators in Delhi decided to enforce a *hartal*. Crowds collected and endeavoured to prevent anyone from using the trams and tongas; and a large mob moved to the Railway Station where, at about 1 p.m., they tried to prevent the contractor selling food to third-class passengers. On his refusal to meet their wishes he was assaulted, and two of his assailants were arrested by the Railway Police. This was sufficient provocation for the rest of the mob to invade the station, where they did much damage and brought all work to a standstill.

At that time our Manipuri Company happened to be halted in a train in a siding of the station. A police officer called on Captain Blackie to clear the station of rioters which he and the Doctor very quickly did; the only other troops present were about a dozen men of the Bedfordshire Regiment who were invaluable. The rioters were driven into the Queen's Road where they assumed a very threatening attitude, and it was not until two rounds had been fired that they were driven through the Queen's Gardens on the far side of which the Manipuris were posted in groups to prevent them breaking in again. The mob was still very hostile and kept stoning the police and troops, and later surged over the railings into the Gardens again. Firing had been resorted to for a second time before they were finally evicted. Our Company, however, had to remain on duty in the Gardens without relief until the following day.

Early next morning an amusing incident occurred. One of the rioters tried to snatch his rifle from one of the Manipuri sentries. The Manipuris were armed with *kukris* like the Gurkhas. The sentry, in his excitement, drew his

*kukri* and, discarding his rifle, jumped the small wall in front of him and chased after the rioter. Dashing round a corner, he collided with a senior police officer on a horse who persuaded him to go back to his post which he did most reluctantly, very angry at having been baulked of catching his man.

Arrangements for sending the men on furlough had just been completed when serious rioting broke out at Ahmedabad. All leave was stopped and a composite Battalion was formed under command of Colonel Scott. Our Regiment found the Headquarters and one Company, the other companies being furnished by the 123rd Outram's Rifles, 102nd Grenadiers and 7th Rajputs. The rioting had been quelled by the time the "Mhow" Battalion arrived in Ahmedabad and their only duties were to find piquets and patrols about the city.

Events were now moving on the North-West Frontier where an Afghan Force was threatening to cross the border. The "Mhow" Composite Battalion was recalled from Ahmedabad, and our Regiment was ordered to mobilize for the Afghan War. On 21st June orders were received to proceed to Quetta as soon as train accommodation could be made available, only to be cancelled two days later. For a further three weeks the Regiment remained ready to move at twenty-four hours' notice. Towards the end of July demobilization orders were received and a proportion of men was allowed home on a month's short leave.

The Regiment was now well over 1,200 strong, and there was heavy work in settling the men's field accounts, particularly those who had served with other units.

Moreover the British Officers were nearly all temporary commissioned Officers awaiting demobilization, few of whom had any administrative experience, and scarcely any of whom could make themselves understood in Urdu. Very short notice was received about sending home representatives to the Peace Celebrations in London, consequently Subadar-Major Hasan Muhammad, who had gone home on furlough after release from captivity, could not be recalled in time. Our Regiment was represented by Subadar Sabal Singh, *Bahadur*, I.O.M., who had officiated as Subadar-Major since the fall of Kut. He was accompanied by a Jat N.C.O. and a Punjabi Rifleman.


In September orders for sending the men on furlough and opening leave home to British Officers were again received. Major Dormer and Lieutenant Butler went off home at once, but the day before the men were due to leave, orders were again received, for the second time within three months, to mobilize.

Four British Officers including the Adjutant and Quartermaster had left the day before to be demobilized and could not be recalled, consequently the Regiment left Mhow for Kohat on 21st September with only six British Officers, three of whom could not speak Urdu.











## CHAPTER XXV

1919-1937

Field Service in Waziristan    The Tochi Column    The Derajat Column    Formation  
of 6th Rajputana Rifles    Jhansi    Razmak    Unveiling of the Regimental War  
Memorial    The Viceroy's Guard    Mhow    Ahmedabad    The Khyber    Aurangabad  
Saidpur.

(See Map No. 19, opposite p 224 )

THE North-West Frontier tribes had been restless ever since the commencement of the Great War, though no serious occurrence took place until March 1917, when the Militia post at Sarwakai was attacked. Though punitive action to restore the immediate situation was taken, the Indian Government had neither the troops nor the money available at that time to enforce a final settlement. Consequently the tribes took advantage of the situation and raiding increased in frequency and daring.

Turkish agents, moving freely about the border, incited the tribes to invade India, spreading false news of Turkish victories and promising Turkish reinforcements. When, in 1919, war with Afghanistan broke out it appeared to the tribes that their time had come, and the invasion of British territory by Afghan troops was the occasion for raising the standard of revolt.

Our withdrawal of the Waziristan Militia from the Upper Tochi, Gomal and Wana Districts had led to their desertion in large numbers. The tribes thus acquired a valuable reinforcement of some 1,500 trained soldiers, armed with modern rifles, and a large supply of ammunition. Miranshah and Jandola Posts were attacked and there were several encounters in the Derajat, resulting in some regrettable incidents.

Government, in September 1919, decided to issue terms to the tribes and, in the event of their rejection, to take decisive action against them, dealing first with the Tochi Wazirs and afterwards with the Mahsuds.

This was the situation when our Regiment entered the District, having detrained at Kohat, and marched the 79 miles to Bannu, arriving on the 1st October 1919. Terms were to be announced to the Wazirs at Miranshah on the 9th November and an advance made to Datta Khel to hear their answer on 17th November.

After a couple of days, completing Field Service Equipment, orders were received to escort convoys to Dardoni where fifteen days' reserve rations were to be collected for the column that was to deal with the Wazirs.

The meeting system was adopted and our Battalion found the escorts from Bannu to Idak. Consequently "B" Company under Captain Whitley went to Idak, "A" and "C" Companies under Major James to Saidgi, while "D" and "Headquarter" Companies remained at Bannu.

The convoys, composed of slow-moving country bullock carts and pack camels, occupied three or four miles of road. The men were out every day at dawn and seldom got back in time for a wash before night duties had to be mounted. The days were hot and the roads deep in white dust which permeated everything. The camp at Saidgi was occasionally sniped at night.


On the 22nd October the Convoy from Saidgi to Idak, escorted by "C" Company, was emerging from the Shinki defile, and the leading bullock carts were crossing a bridge, not far from the meeting point at Kajuri, when about 300 Wazirs opened a heavy fire from hills commanding the road killing several bullocks, completely blocking the road and bringing the whole Convoy to a halt.

**Attack on Convoy  
at Shinki,  
22nd Oct. 1919.**

Owing to the length of the Convoy the Platoons of the escort were great distances apart. The Advanced Guard Platoon, covered by their Lewis Gun Section, advanced to a position on rising ground and succeeded in keeping the raiders off the Convoy. Captain Robins, M.C., who had just been attached to the Regiment for duty, was commanding "C" Company and at once hurried forward to direct operations. Unfortunately he was hit in the chest almost immediately and although our men kept the enemy at a distance, the situation was dangerous until reinforcements arrived from Idak in lorries, when the Wazirs withdrew. A half Battalion of 55th Rifles, who were camped at Shinki for local protection, had been prevented from partaking in the fight by the clever piqueting of the Wazirs. No damage resulted to the Convoy beyond the loss of a few bullocks and six drivers wounded. Our Regiment's casualties were one Rifleman killed and Captain Robins and eight men wounded. Captain Andrews, I.M.S., who was travelling with the Convoy, was killed whilst gallantly attending the wounded under heavy fire. He was awarded a posthumous V.C.

On the 24th October Battalion Headquarters and "D" Company left Bannu and, picking up the companies at Saidgi and Idak, marched to Dardoni where they came into the 67th Brigade under Brigadier-General F. G. Lucas, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O. During the next fortnight, while the rest of the column was concentrating, our Regiment was training hard at mountain warfare, which was new to the junior officers and to most of the men. Before leaving Bannu the complement of British Officers had been brought up to strength by postings from India, but none of the newcomers had any frontier experience. While at Dardoni the Battalion was delighted to meet a former Commandant, now Brigadier-General Walton, C.B., C.M.G., who was in command of the Bannu Lines of Communication.

INDIAN RANKS



Jat in Summer Mufti.

Rajput in Winter Mufti  
(Green Serge Coat)

P.M. in Summer Mufti.



On the 9th November the terms were issued to the Wazirs at a *jirgah* at Miranshah and on the 12th the column moved off, reaching Datta Khel three days later without incident. Major-General Chmo, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding the Waziristan Force, arrived on the 17th to hear the Wazirs' answer. The *jirgah* was fully representative, except for the Madda Khel, and accepted our terms. The Madda Khel were bombed by 17 aeroplanes the next day and the same evening made complete submission. The ten days at Datta Khel were spent in training and in reconnoitring the country round. But as it had been decided not to reoccupy the Upper Tochi, the force withdrew to Dardom, the 67th Brigade moving by the Tut Narai pass.

The column was now renamed the "Derajat Column" and marched in echelons *via* Pezu and Tank to Khirgi (132 miles), to concentrate there for action against the Madsuds, who had rejected our terms *in toto*.

Our Regiment on reaching Khirgi on 9th December was ordered to take over three of the Permanent Piquets on the road to Jandola and for ten days furnished an escort to the Convoys moving up the line. This was very cold work as it involved continual wading through the Zam River which was well over knee deep in places.

On the 17th December the striking force under General Skeen left Khirgi and, two days later, our Regiment marched to Jandola, handing over permanent piquets *en route*. They now came into the 58th Brigade under Brigadier-General Gordon, C.B., and were employed entirely on the Lines of Communication. Though taking no part in the heavy fighting experienced by the striking force, Line of Communication duties were found to be no sinecure. The work consisted chiefly in escorting convoys to Palosina and building and holding some of the Permanent Piquets in that area. As the first move out from Jandola involved wading through the icy waters of the Zam each man carried a spare pair of socks in his haversack to enable him to change them as soon as he reached his final position for the day. The Madsuds were too busy opposing the striking force to make any serious attack on the communications, but there was frequent sniping during February and March. The men, however, were by now so well trained that they lost only one man killed and four wounded during those months.

To lighten the task of the daily piqueting troops the Permanent Piquets used to send out small groups to occupy commanding points while the convoy was on the road. On one occasion, at the end of May, a day group, sent out from "E" Piquet near the Hinnis Tangi, was heavily attacked while withdrawing. The group Commander, Lance-Naik Nawab Khan, was killed while covering the retirement of the rest of his group and received a posthumous award of the Indian Order of Merit.



The striking force under General Skeen having reached all its objectives and having broken the enemy's resistance, active operations came to an end on the 7th May and all energy was concentrated on the construction of a motor road up the Zam Valley. This made little change in the duties of the Lines of Communication Troops, nor could they safely relax their vigilance.

In June our Regiment moved up to Kotkai, being still employed on protective duties. On only one occasion were any casualties sustained, when a piquet of "C" Company was heavily attacked while withdrawing and lost the piquet Commander killed and seven men wounded. They were effectively supported by "D" Company and succeeded in bringing in all the casualties and their arms and accoutrements. On this occasion Captain Whitley (attached), Subadar Rahim Dad Khan, I D S M, and Havaldar Barkurdar were all commended for gallantry, Barkurdar receiving the I.D.S.M.

It was while the Regiment was at Kotkai that Subadar-Major Hasan Muhammad, *Sardar Bahadur*, retired with the honorary rank of Captain. He had returned to the Depot because he had not quite recovered from the hardships he had undergone as a prisoner of war. A Punjabi Mussalman from Jhelum District, he had soon attracted attention by his efficiency. It was owing to his skill as an instructor of recruits that he missed the opportunity of seeing active service in East Africa in 1898, and though his chance came so late in life, he soon justified the high opinion that everyone held of him. He had an attractive personality and great influence with all classes in the Battalion and he leaves behind him a record of thirty-four and a half years' service of great loyalty and devotion to duty.

In September the Regiment moved to Sorarogha and, though sniped occasionally, incurred no further casualties. Six months later they moved back to Khirgi in relief of the 102nd Grenadiers and remained there till the end of 1921. On the march down, at Kotkai, the Regiment bade good-bye to Colonel Scott who was going home on leave pending retirement. He had steered the Regiment through a very difficult period and given them a very thorough training in hill warfare. He handed over Command to Major James, M.C., who was granted the local rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.

At Khirgi, in addition to holding a large perimeter, the Regiment garrisoned five permanent piquets and daily found convoy escorts up to the Hinnis Tangi, and also half-way to Manzai, about 4 miles in the opposite direction. The Hinnis Tangi is a very narrow gorge through a precipitous ridge, pierced by the Zam River about a mile below Jandola; after breaking through the ridge, the river passes down a narrow valley, commanded from the ridge, and through contiguous mountains until it debouches about 5 miles lower down at Khirgi. Occasional raids were still made on the convoys, the most serious of which occurred on the 4th May when the protection troops under Subadar Rahim Dad Khan,

**Kotkai,  
June 1920.**

**Attack on Road  
Protection Troops  
at Hinnis Tangi,  
4th May 1921.**

I.D.S.M., were approaching the formidable Hinnis Tangi. The leading Lewis gun, which had moved up in a Ford Vannette, had just taken up a position to cover a piquet into its sangar when the enemy, who were hidden in position on the hills north of the road, opened a heavy fire which immediately killed the Vannette driver and both men with the Lewis gun, wounded a third man of that Section and also one of the piquet. A party, which had been lying in wait in a side *nala*, then made several attempts to rush the Vannette which still contained a lot of Lewis gun ammunition. This party was driven off with rifle bombs, and rifle and Lewis gun fire, the Section Commander fighting his Lewis gun single-handed. Eventually Rifleman Nawab Ali, who had been severely wounded, succeeded, with great gallantry, in getting all the ammunition away from the Vannette. When reinforcements were hurried out in lorries from Khirgi the enemy withdrew. The Convoy, which had not come under fire, was then able to proceed without interference. Our casualties were the Gurkha Vannette driver and two Riflemen killed and Subadar Rahim Dad Khan and two Riflemen wounded. The Lewis Gun Section Commander, Lance-Naik Sher Muhammad and Rifleman Nawab Ali were both awarded the I.D.S.M. The enemy's casualties were not ascertained but it is known that they did not escape unscathed.

Towards the end of May the railhead was brought up to Khirgi. The perimeter was enlarged to accommodate the numerous sidings and dumps, and wired in. Most of this work was done by our men.

During the hot weather, when the Indian Cavalry Regiments were amalgamated, many of the surplus Officers were sent up to Waziristan as all units there were short of Officers. Five of them were posted to our Regiment, including Lieutenant G. C. Fry, whose father, General C. I. Fry, C.B., had previously served with the Regiment.

Whilst at Khirgi a section of 10-pounder mountain guns was manned by our Regiment, Lieutenant Wilkinson and a party of men having been trained by the Mountain Battery at Jandola. Two 3-inch Stokes Mortars with pack equipment were also received and more than once proved of value in dispersing snipers from the hills near the Hinnis Tangi. Men were also trained to operate a searchlight which was installed when the camp was enlarged to enclose the railhead.

In September 1921 the reorganization of the Indian Infantry took place.

Formation of  
6th Rajputana  
Rifles,  
September 1921.

The old system of Battalion Service Depots, enrolling and training their own recruits, had broken down under the strain of the Great War. Battalions were now formed into Regimental Groups, each Regiment consisting of one Training Battalion and from three to five active Battalions, all of identical composition. The Active Battalions of our Regiment, the 6th Rajputana Rifles, were to consist of.—

One Company of Rajputana Rajputs.

Two Companies of Western Rajputana Jats.

One Company of Punjabi Mussalmans.

So that for our Battalion there was no change in the composition which had proved its worth in the Great War.

Our Regiment was composed of —

1st Battalion . . . 104th Wellesley's Rifles.

2nd Battalion . . . 120th Rajputana Infantry.

3rd Battalion . . . 122nd Rajputana Infantry.

4th Battalion . . . 123rd Outram's Rifles.

5th Battalion . . . 125th Napier's Rifles.

10th (Training) Battalion . 13th Rajputs (the Shekawati Regiment).

The training centre Nasirabad.

The Training Battalion comprised a Headquarter Company, and one Training Company for each Active Battalion in the Regiment. Each training company had four platoons whose classes corresponded with those of the Companies of its Active Battalion. Our Depot proceeded from Mhow to Nasirabad for amalgamation.

The Battalion's total casualties while in Waziristan amounted to 8 killed and 25 wounded. A great deal of experience had been gained and they left the District with a reputation for efficiency and hard work. Major James, Captain Butler and Captain Pinto, I.M.S., had all been awarded the O.B.E., Subadar Rahim Dad Khan the M.B.E.; and Captains Hamilton (Quartermaster) and Knocker (Adjutant) were mentioned in despatches.

The Battalion left Khirgi by train on 1st January 1922, and arrived at Jhansi, Jhansi on the 12th. Here they were met by Major Maclean, C.I.E., who took over Command. They were glad to meet again the 24th Foot, The South Wales Borderers, old friends of Hyderabad, Sind, days, who had very kindly sent their band down to the Station to play the Battalion up to Cantonments. In April Lieutenant-Colonel H. St. G. McRae, D.S.O., O.B.E., joined as Commandant, but left a month later to command his old Regiment, 3rd Battalion 11th Sikh Regiment. He was replaced in June by Lieutenant-Colonel B. L. Cole who came from the Training Battalion.

While at Jhansi the Battalion had the pleasure of greeting Hon. Captain Hasan Muhammad, *Sardar Bahadur* and Subadar Mukhram, I.O.M., both of whom had received *Jagirs* as an acknowledgment of their splendid services during the War. The occasion of their visit was a presentation to them of the Croix de Guerre awarded for gallantry during the Siege of Kut.

Four very pleasant years were spent at Jhansi, largely devoted to individual training, opportunities for which had been lacking for so long. During this period the pre-war Review Order Khaki, with green puttees, and puggris was reintroduced for

Review Order :  
Khaki  
reintroduced.



**6RR**



**6th RAJPUTANA RIFLES.**

**Shoulder Badge, Puggri Badge and Pouch Belt Plate 1923.**



guards and ceremonial occasions, and the Bandolier Equipment was exchanged for the more serviceable Webbing Equipment. Green hosetops were adopted for Drill and Field Service Dress.

In March 1925 news was received of the death of Lieutenant-General M W. Willoughby, C.S.I., who had been Colonel of the Battalion since 1914. He had joined the Battalion in August 1850 and died within a few days of his ninety-second birthday.

In December 1925 the Battalion again went to Waziristan, this time as a peace move to Razmak. This cantonment consisted of two

**Razmak,  
1st Jan. 1926.**

adjoining camps surrounded by barbed-wire entanglements. The upper camp boasted stone barracks but the lower one contained only tents, which were struck whenever the Razmak Column moved out. The total strength of the garrison was six Battalions of Infantry, one of Pioneers, a Section of Sappers and Miners, two Mountain Batteries and a section of 6-inch Howitzers. Units spent two years there, the first in the lower camp in tents, and the second in barracks up above. Life was much like that in any large frontier station, except that full active-service conditions were adopted whenever troops moved outside the perimeter, and at night there were always perimeter guards and patrols. The road-protection duties were carried out by the Duty Battalion whose turn came round every six weeks.

Our Battalion reached Razmak on New Year's Day 1926 and went into tents in the lower camp, and a few days later was inspected by Major-General A. Le G Jacob, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., C.B.E., D.S.O., Commanding Waziristan District. Early in January 1926 Lieutenant-Colonel B. L. Cole went home on leave, handing over Command of the Battalion to Major F. H. James, O.B.E., M.C., who, later in the year, was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel and appointed Commandant. To make the tents more comfortable during the winter, mud bricks were made with which to build walls and fire-places for each tent. This work was completed before February which proved to be the coldest month. Later in the year under the direction of Honorary Lieutenant and Subadar-Major Lal Singh, *Bahadur*, I.D.S.M., a large vegetable garden was made which provided the men with an unlimited supply of vegetables throughout the summer. A hockey ground, levelled by our men, was subsequently taken over by the Brigade.

At the end of August 1926 our Battalion formed part of a small column which went out to Tauda China for three weeks to protect the Sappers and Miners building the last three bridges of the circular road which connects Bannu with Razmak and thence down the Zam Valley with Tank. On one or two occasions piquets were sniped but there were no casualties.

At the end of October when H.E. The Viceroy, Lord Irwin, paid a visit to Razmak, our Jats formed the Guard of Honour, commanded by Major J. G. Dormer. The Rajput Company under Captain G. A. Quayle found the Guard and Sentries on the Viceregal quarters.

**Visit of H.E. The  
Viceroy,  
29th Oct. 1926.**

Early next month our Battalion moved into barracks in the upper camp and found them much warmer and more comfortable than tents.

At the end of January 1927, a representative party went to Nasirabad for the unveiling of the Regimental War Memorial. Besides Officers, each Battalion sent a guard of nine N.C.O.s and men; those from our Battalion, having all served through the Great War, included six men who had been through the Siege of Kut al Amara and captivity in Turkey.


**Unveiling of  
Regimental War  
Memorial,  
28th Jan. 1927.**

The Memorial was unveiled on 28th January 1927 by Lieutenant-General Sir John S. M. Shea, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C., and consists of a Chatrī, 20 feet high, with a grey Makrana marble dome supported by six pillars, representing the six Battalions of the Regiment, each engraved with the crest appropriate to its Battalion. The Chatrī overlooks the recruits' parade ground. A complete Roll of Honour is buried beneath the central plaque on which are engraved the twenty-three battle honours earned by the Regiment in the Great War. A bound copy of the Roll of Honour on vellum was placed in the Training Battalion Mess. Over 350 pensioners of all ranks attended the ceremony.

At a Band Meeting held at Razmak on 9th February 1927, it was decided to do away with the Battalion's Brass Band in favour of a Pipe Band. Before the War, our Battalion had an exceptionally good Brass Band composed entirely of Parwaris, descendants of the old fighting stock of the Bombay Army, many of whose families had lived in the Battalion for several generations. Under the Bandmastership of Mr. W. S. Walcott, who had been Band Sergeant of the 2nd Battalion The Suffolk Regiment, the Band had soon attained a high standard of efficiency and was much in request for entertainments in Bombay, thus reducing the maintenance charges which fell on the Officers. When war broke out in 1914 the bandsmen took their place in the field and did fine work as stretcher-bearers; few, however, survived their captivity after the fall of Kut. Another effort was made, when war ended, to build the Band up again, but the unsettled conditions were a handicap. Furthermore, brass bands had lost their popularity for entertainments and the expense to the British Officers became prohibitive. To the Indian Ranks a brass band had little appeal, whereas the pipes, resembling their native music, were appreciated, consequently the change was popular with everyone.

**Brass Band  
abolished  
and Pipes  
substituted,  
9th Feb. 1927.**

Our 5th Battalion most helpfully undertook the elementary training of the pipers and subsequently transferred to us their Pipe Major and a senior drummer. After a further period of training in Mhow under these Non-Commissioned Officers, the whole band was sent to the Seaforth Highlanders who took an immense amount of trouble with them and sent them back fully trained and efficient. It only remained to fit them out in a suitable Review Order Dress. For the sake of uniformity, and with the 5th Battalion's per-



THE REGIMENTAL WAR MEMORIAL AT NASIRABAD.  
Unveiled by Lieut-General Sir John S. M. Shea, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C., on 28th January 1927.





mission, it was decided to adopt the kit worn by their pipers, which consisted of green knickerbockers, puggis and puttees, a white coat with a plaid of the Urquhart Tartan. This was held on the shoulder by a silver brooch bearing our Battalion's crest and battle honours.

Early in March 1927 our Battalion was given twenty-four hours' notice to move from Razmak to Damdil owing to trouble having arisen there through thefts of arms from that camp. Damdil was a single-battalion camp, some 3,000 or 4,000 feet lower than Razmak with a rather trying hot weather. Here the work of improving the defences and straightening things out was taken in hand. Three weeks later, on inspection by General Sir K. Wigram, C.B., C.S.I., C.B.E., D.S.O., Commanding Waziristan District, he said how sorry he was to have had to order the move from the more congenial camp at Razmak just as the weather was getting nice there; that it had been decided to select a reliable Battalion and he was more than gratified at the fine spirit in which they had tackled their task and at the improvements they had effected.

In April 1927 it was notified that His Majesty The King had approved the appointment of Colonel and Honorary Brigadier-General W. C. Walton, C.B., C.M.G., as Colonel of the 1st Battalion 6th Rajputana Rifles (Wellesley's) with effect from the 18th February 1927. After handing over Command of the Regiment to Lieutenant-Colonel Clery at Baroda in February 1914, Colonel Walton went home and was on the unemployed list when war broke out. He received orders to raise the 8th Battalion The Royal Berkshire Regiment and subsequently took them out to France where he commanded them in the costly battle of Loos, where his Battalion's casualties were extremely heavy, Colonel Walton, two subalterns and about 220 men alone escaping unscathed. He was mentioned for gallantry in this action and was decorated with the C.M.G. He was then appointed to command the Aden Field Force where he remained for nearly two years, receiving the C.B. for his services. Then after a short spell on leave in India, he assisted in raising the 2nd Battalion 129th Baluchis till he was appointed Inspector of Infantry. In 1919 he was appointed to the Command of a Brigade for the Operations in Waziristan, where the Regiment met him again at Dardoni. In February 1920 when the appointment of Inspector of Infantry was abolished he went home on leave and retired on 1st April that year.

Before leaving Damdil at the end of November our Battalion was inspected by H.E. the Commander-in-Chief, Sir William Birdwood, and also by the District Commander who, in bidding the Battalion good-bye, said that in recognition of their good services in Waziristan, he had selected them for the honour of furnishing H.E. the Viceroy's Guard at Simla the following year. Mhow, always a popular station, was reached in December 1927 when most of the men went home at once on furlough.

At the end of April a very smart detachment, 184 strong, left for duty at Simla as the Viceroy's Guard. It consisted of Jats from "B" and "C" Companies and was Commanded by Captain R. D. Ambrose, M.C., and well upheld the Battalion's reputation. On completion of their duty, H.E. the Viceroy, Lord Irwin, as a mark of his appreciation, presented a handsome silver cigarette box to the Officers' Mess; and General Sir W. Birdwood presented a signed photograph in a silver frame.

During the two and a half years spent at Mhow the reorganization of Infantry Battalions to comprise a Headquarters Company, three Rifle Companies and one Machine Gun Company, necessitated a redistribution of classes within Battalions.

A Conference of Battalion Commanders at Nasirabad decided that each Rifle Company would consist of one Platoon of Rajputs, two Platoons of Jats and one Platoon of Punjabi Mussalmans, and that the classes be equally represented in the other two Companies.

While at Mhow our Battalion won the District Hockey Tournament and the District Cross Country and Athletic Trophies.

In March 1930 our Battalion received sudden orders to move to Ahmedabad where the activities of the "Congress party" threatened trouble. They arrived there on the 12th March 1930, the day on which Gandhi set out to rouse opposition to payment of Government Salt Tax. Though it was necessary to take a few precautionary measures, the trouble never came to a head and the year and nine months in that station proved uneventful.

During this time our Subadar-Major Rahim Dad Khan, *Sardar Bahadur*, M.B.E., I.D.S.M., had the privilege of proceeding to England as Orderly Officer to His Majesty King George. He was one of the few of our Battalion's remaining survivors of the Siege of Kut and had a distinguished record both in Mesopotamia and Waziristan.


In September 1930 Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. James, O.B.E., M.C., retired, handing over Command to Lieutenant-Colonel G. Stoddart, O.B.E., who in 1912 had similarly succeeded Lieutenant James as Adjutant.

On relief by the 2nd Battalion 6th Rajputana Rifles, our Battalion left on 9th February 1932 for the Khyber, where, during the next two years, they garrisoned the posts of Shagai, Landi Kotal and Jamrud in the Khyber Pass and Fort Salop in the Kajuri Plain. Though at that time there was a good deal of unrest amongst the tribesmen, our Battalion saw no fighting.


During this period twice in succession they won the Brigade Machine Gun Cup and in 1934 the Peshawar District Athletic Trophy after having been "runners up" in both the preceding years.

In March 1934 they moved down to Aurangabad where two and a half uneventful years were spent. Here Lieutenant-Colonel A. L. Skinner suc-

PIPE AND BUGLE BAND, 1936.



Drummer Ali Gaur.



REVIEW ORDER  
Pipe-Major Sarwar Khan



Bugler Sardar Ali.



ceeded Lieutenant-Colonel G. Stoddart, O B E , as Commandant in September 1934 and was in turn succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel G A Quayle in July 1936. During 1936 the Battalion won the Brigade Inter-Battalion Hockey Cup and in September the same year moved to Saidpur in Bengal as part of the additional garrison detailed for that Province on account of political unrest.


In 1937 Subadar Ganesha Ram, *Bahadur*, O B I , I D S.M , one of the few remaining survivors of the siege of Kut al Amara, had the honour to represent the Battalion at the Coronation of Their Majesties King George VI and Queen Elizabeth and received the Coronation Medal at the hands of His Majesty the King

In these pages it has been the endeavour, however inadequately, to trace through more than a hundred and fifty years the part played by our Battalion, under its varying designations, in building up the India we know to-day. Those who criticize the British Raj seldom appreciate the conditions under which the people lived in those times when our Battalion first came into being. When pirates ravaged the coastal trade, and internal feuds and famine devastated the countryside. How many realize that when Tipu Sultan subdued Coorg in the year 1784, he enslaved and forcibly converted to Islam 60,000 of its inhabitants; and that as late as the year 1843, when the Indian Abolition of Slavery Act was passed, about a tenth of the population of Southern India were slaves? In righting all this our Battalion played an honourable part. From its service overseas, whether on the shores of the Persian Gulf, fighting against the French at Bourbon, or against the Turks in Mesopotamia, it has always returned with fresh laurels. From beginning to end a tale has been unfolded of unfaltering gallantry and loyalty in peace time as well as in the most trying crises of war.

So ends this first volume of the history of our distinguished Battalion. May it prove an inspiration to all who read it, especially to those who now and in the future have the honour and responsibility of making the history to be recorded in years to come.

# WAZIRISTAN

MAP No. 19



## APPENDICES





## APPENDIX I

### DESIGNATIONS OF THE BATTALION

- 1775 5th Battalion Bombay Sepoys.  
Bombay Public Consultations of 10-1-1775.
- 1788 9th Battalion Bombay Sepoys.  
G.G.O., 18-9-1788.
- 1796 2nd Battalion 2nd Regiment Bombay Native Infantry.  
G.G.O., 8-7-1796.
- 1824 4th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry.  
G.G.O., 7-6-1824.
- 1841 4th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry (or Rifle Corps)  
G.G.O., 10-5-1841.
- 1888 4th The Rifle Regiment (1st Battalion).  
G.G.O. No. 507 of 27-10-1888.
- 1889 4th Regiment (Rifles) (1st Battalion the Bombay Rifle Regiment).  
G.G.O. No. 424 of 23-8-1889.
- 1901 4th Bombay Rifles.  
G.G.O. No. 837 of 13-9-1901.
- 1903 104th Wellesley's Rifles.  
I.A.O. No. 181 of 2-10-1903.
- 1922 1st Battalion 6th Rajputana Rifles (Wellesley's).  
I.A.O. No. 878 of 5-12-1922.

## APPENDIX II

### ORIGIN OF, AND TRADITION WITH REGARD TO, RIFLE DRESS AND CUSTOMS

DURING the eighteenth century the advent of the rifle, with its greater accuracy and longer range, suggested the necessity of a change in the tactics and training of the Infantryman. Continental armies had not been slow to recognize this, and had trained special light corps. The British Army hesitated to recommend adequate action in this respect, and Governments were content, when the field was to be taken, to hire Hanoverian, or Hessian Mercenaries to carry out the duties of Skirmishers.

True, it was the custom, when sending a force on field service, to collect the " Flank Companies " (i.e. Grenadier or Light Companies) from several Battalions to form " Flank Battalions," which provided fine bodies of troops, but without special training in Light Infantry duties. Furthermore, this procedure, though favoured by the Generals, was very unpopular with the Battalion Commanders whose units were thereby reduced, not only in strength, but also in efficiency.

It needed the experience of the American War of Independence to drive home the necessity for specially trained light troops. The Americans were quick to realize that irregular and open formations were the best tactics for fighting over a wild and sparsely populated country, much of which was wooded. A large proportion of their men were marksmen armed with rifles which enabled them to pick off our Officers and Sergeants. To counter the American tactics, light Companies, many of them armed with rifles, were specially trained in all Battalions on service there.

It was gradually realized that fire-power was of major importance, and one of the first orders issued after the return of the troops from the American War was to speed up the " Manual Exercise." To provide for the increased expenditure of ammunition entailed by this, orders were issued for men armed with the rifle to wear a belt over the left shoulder to provide a second pouch for cartridges. Thus originated the " Pouch Belt " now worn by Officers in Review Order.

Training in irregular tactics met with fierce opposition, particularly from the Senior Officers and from those who had not served in the American War, and it was not until 1797 that the 5th Battalion 60th Royal American Regiment (now the 60th Rifles) was organized as the first rifle corps in the British Army. One of the staunchest advocates of the new training was General Sir John Moore, who had served in America as a Colonel. In 1803 at Shorncliffe Camp he trained the Battalions which won such fame in the Peninsular War as the " Light Division "

The Rifleman, like the Light Infantryman, was trained to skirmish, and also to carry out those rapid movements which, in the Cavalry, would have been the role of the Hussars. For this reason Officers of the Rifle Corps were, in the early days, dressed in a uniform modelled on that of the Hussars. We still retain the " Cap Lines," the globular buttons, the Straight Spurs in Mess Dress and the Charger's " Throat Plume." For the same reason Rifle Regiments march past in faster time than the Infantry of the Line.

So as to render the men inconspicuous when taking advantage of cover, the red coat was discarded in favour of a green one, green being the recognized uniform of foresters throughout Europe in those days.

As orders could not be given verbally to men in extended order, the forester's bugle horn was adopted to control movements. Hence the bugle device which we wear as

BRITISH OFFICERS, 1936



Capt Guerden  
in Field Service Order.

Lieut Inwood  
in Review Order.

Lieut Brack  
in Drill Order.

INDIAN OFFICERS, 1936




Jamadar Feroz Khan  
(P.M.) in Field Service Order.


Subadar Ganesha Ram  
Bahadur, O B L, I D S M  
(Jat) in Review Order.

Subadar Mul Singh  
(Rajput) in Drill Order.


REVIEW ORDER, INDIAN RANKS, 1936.



Rifleman Dost Muhammad (P M.).




Havaldar Ranjit Ram (Jat).



Rifleman Govind Singh (Rajput).

INDIAN RANKS, 1936.



P M. in F.S. Order

Rajput in Drill Order

Jat in Drill Order, shirt-sleeves

Jat in F S Order.

a puggrî badge and on the pouch of the pouch-belt. The reason for the introduction on the pouch-belt of the Maltese Cross is obscure, it is probably of Hanoverian origin.

To enable the Sergeants to control their divisions, they wore a whistle and chain, which at one time was the only mark to distinguish them from the Rank and File. This is commemorated by the silver whistle and chain worn in Review Order by our Havaldars.

The Green Coat remained the Field Service Dress till about the middle of the nineteenth century. It was in green that our Riflemen fought at the Siege of Multan in 1849. Later when green was superseded by khaki for field service, and the shako by the puggrî, green gaiters, or puttees, and green puggrîs were worn as a distinguishing mark, but now are worn only in Review Order. The distinctive green colour has been perpetuated lately, however, by the adoption of green hosetops in Drill and Field Service Order.

In the early days the Rifleman, besides his rifle, carried a sword which, like a bayonet, could be fixed to the rifle. This is why the Rifleman now speaks of his bayonet as a sword.

In the days of close-order fighting, the flanks, being the danger-points, were guarded by picked troops and were regarded as the posts of honour. So in the Battalion, the Grenadier and Light Companies, composed of picked men, fell in on the flanks of the Battalion and were known as the "Flank Companies". It is for this reason that Rifle Regiments on Review Parades are accorded the honour of falling in on the extreme left of the line.

When fighting in extended order the Regimental Colours became exposed and were therefore discarded, the Rifleman being taught that his rifle took the place of Colours to be guarded with his life. This is why our recruits, when taking the oath on attestation, lay their hand on, and salute piled rifles.

Throughout his training the Rifleman was taught to live up to the Rifle motto "Celer et Audax" and always to be on the alert. For this reason the order "Attention" was deemed superfluous. The Rifleman is to be always ready.



### APPENDIX III

#### BATTLE HONOURS OF 1ST BATTALION 6TH RAJPUTANA RIFLES (WELLESLEY'S)

<i>Honour</i>	<i>Authority</i>	<i>Service for which granted</i>
MYSORE	Bombay General Order No. 232 dated 29-4-1889	Campaigns in Mysore in 1780-84 and 1790-92.
SERINGAPATAM	Bombay General Order dated 20-5-1823	Storming and capture of Seringapatam in 1799.
BOURBON	Bombay General Order No 167 dated 20-2-1855	Capture of the Island of Bourbon in 1810.
BENI BOO ALLI	Bombay General Order No 72 dated 11-2-1831	Expedition to Arabia in 1820, commanded by Major-General Sir L. Smith, K.C.B.
PUNJAB	Orders of Governor-General dated 2-4-1849	Punjab Campaign of 1848-49.
MOOLTAN	Orders of Governor-General No. 302 dated 8-4-1853.	Storming and capture of Multan on 2-1-1849.
PERSIA	Bombay General Order No. 997 dated 13-10-1858.	Expedition to Persia in 1856-57
RESHIRE	Bombay General Order No 997 dated 13-10-1858	Capture of Reshire on 8-12-1856
BUSHIRE	Bombay General Order No 191 dated 11-4-1861	Capture of Bushire on 8-12-1856
KHOOSHAB	Bombay General Order No 997 dated 13-10-1858.	Action at Khushab on 8-2-1857
CENTRAL INDIA	Indian Army List 1-7-1876.	Operations in pursuit of the rebels in Central India
AFGHANISTAN 1879-80	Orders of Governor-General No 418 dated 29-7-1881.	Campaign in Afghanistan.
KANDAHAR 1880	Orders of Governor-General No 418 dated 29-7-1881.	Siege of Kandahar.
BRITISH EAST AFRICA, 1898	Orders of Governor-General No 65 dated 25-1-1901.	Operations against Ogaden Somalis
BASRA SHAIBA KUT AL AMARA 1915 CTESIPHON DEFENCE OF KUT AL AMARA MESOPOTAMIA 1914-18	Gazette of India No. 194 dated 20-2-1926	Campaign in Mesopotamia during the Great War.

## APPENDIX IV

### HONOURS AWARDED DURING THE GREAT WAR

#### C.B.

Bt. Colonel C. B. L. CLERY. (Mesopotamia.)

#### C.I.E.

Major (Temp Lieut-Colonel) G. G. C. MACLEAN. (India.)

Captain R. E. ALDERMAN. (Mesopotamia.)

#### O.B.E.

Captain (Acting Major) G. STODDART. (Mesopotamia.)

Captain (Temp. Colonel) R. E. ALDERMAN, C.I.E. (Mesopotamia.)

Captain (Temp. Major) T. G. LEMON. (India.)

#### D.S.O.

Captain C. M. S. MANNERS. (Mesopotamia.)

#### M.C.

Captain F. H. JAMES (East Africa) (With Volunteer Maxim Gun Company)

Captain C. M. S. MANNERS, D.S.O. (Defence of Kut al Amara)

Lieutenant R. D. AMBROSE. (Palestine) (With 123rd Rifles)

Second Lieutenant J. A. C. KIDDLE (Mesopotamia) (With 125th Rifles.)

### ORDER OF BRITISH INDIA

Subadar-Major HASAN MUHAMMAD. (Mesopotamia.)

Subadar SABAL SINGH, I.O.M. (Mesopotamia)

Subadar HARCHAND JAT. (Mesopotamia)

### INDIAN ORDER OF MERIT

- Subadar SABAL SINGH. (Battle of Saïhan)
- 2336 L /Naik NET SINGH. (Battle of Saïhan.)
- 2317 L /Naik GUMAN SINGH. (Capture of Qurna)
- 2866 Rifleman KHETA RAM. (Capture of Qurna)
- 2578 Rifleman DHANNA RAM. (Capture of Qurna)
- 2090 Rifleman MAULA DAD. (Capture of Qurna)
- 2263 Naik NARSU SINGH. (Capture of Qurna.)
- 282 1st Class S A.S. PANDIT (Capture of Qurna)
- 2694 Rifleman MAGEJ SINGH. (Battle of Kut al Amara.)
- 3291 Naik MALIK KHAN. (Battle of Kut al Amara.)
- Subadar MUKH RAM. (Battle of Ctesiphon.)
- 2241 Cr Havaldar GANPAT SINGH. (Battle of Ctesiphon.)
- 2793 Havaldar ALLAH DITTA. (Battle of Ctesiphon.)
- Subadar TIKU RAM. (Defence of Kut al Amara.)

## HISTORY OF THE 1st BATTALION

## INDIAN DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

- 2463 Bugler KALA KHAN. (Capture of Qurna )  
 2435 Havaladar MOHRU RAM (Capture of Qurna )  
 Jamadar CHOTHU SINGH. (Battle of Shaiba.)  
 2898 L /Naik TEJA RAM (Battle of Shaiba )  
 Subadar RAHIM BAKHS. (Battle of Kut al Amara )  
 2245 L /Naik KHIU SINGH. (Battle of Kut al Amara )  
 3205 Rifleman CHANDGI RAM (Battle of Kut al Amara )  
 2907 Rifleman CHOKHA RAM. (Battle of Kut al Amara )  
 1628 Rifleman UDA RAM. (Battle of Kut al Amara )  
 3087 L /Naik RAMLAL RAM (Battle of Kut al Amara )  
 1625 L /Naik MAULA BAKHS (Battle of Kut al Amara )  
 1912 Havaladar RAHIM DAD KHAN (Battle of Ctesiphon )  
 1170 Cr Havaladar SHARAF KHAN (Battle of Ctesiphon )  
 3069 Naik GANESHA RAM (Battle of Ctesiphon )  
 2538 L /Havaladar HARI SINGH (Battle of Ctesiphon )  
 1615 L /Naik JHONTA SINGH (Defence of Kut al Amara )  
 3766 Rifleman PARSIA RAM (With 125th Napier's Rifles in Egypt )  
 Subadar LAL SINGH (Mesopotamia )

## BAR TO INDIAN DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

- 3069 Havaladar GANESHA RAM (Defence of Kut al Amara )

## INDIAN MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDAL

- 2547 Rifleman BACHAN SINGH. (Defence of Kut al Amara )  
 1039 L /Naik FATEH DIN (Defence of Kut al Amara )  
 2408 Havaladar ABDULLAH KHAN (Defence of Kut al Amara )  
 2716 Havaladar FAZAL ILAHI (Defence of Kut al Amara.)  
 2756 L /Naik GANPAT RAM. (Defence of Kut al Amara )  
 2170 Havaladar UDEY SINGH (Mesopotamia )  
 2608 Naik SHEONATH SINGH (Mesopotamia )  
 2337 L /Naik JODH SING (Mesopotamia )  
 1926 Rifleman JORAWAR SINGH (Mesopotamia.)  
 2082 Rifleman CHANDER SINGH (Mesopotamia )  
 1628 Rifleman UDA RAM (Mesopotamia )  
 2992 Rifleman JABBAR RAM. (Mesopotamia )  
 2884 Havaladar JAISUKH RAM. (Mesopotamia )  
 2414 Havaladar CHANDRA RAM. (Mesopotamia.)  
 2962 Rifleman RUDA RAM (Mesopotamia )  
 2471 Havaladar BHOPAT RAM (Mesopotamia.)  
 2365 Cr. Havaladar SAMELA RAM (Mesopotamia )  
 2997 Cr Havaladar JUWARA RAM. (Mesopotamia.)  
 2172 Havaladar JIT SINGH. (Mesopotamia )  
 3240 Cr Havaladar BHURA RAM. (Egypt with 125th Rifles )  
 1158 Qr.-Mr. Havaladar FARMAN ALI. (India.)  
 1687 Havaladar RAJARAM SAKHARAM. (India.)  
 1360 Havaladar GYAN SINGH (India.)  
 3341 Havaladar GANPAT LAKHSHUMAN. (India )  
 608 Naik ITTOO MIT BOUKER. (India.)

## CROIX DE GUERRE (FRENCH)

- Subadar Major HASAN MUHAMMAD, Sardar Bahadur (Defence of Kut al Amara )  
 Subadar MUKH RAM, I.O.M (Defence of Kut al Amara.)

## BREVET OF COLONEL

- Lieut.-Colonel C B. L. CLERY. (Mesopotamia.)

## BREVET OF MAJOR

Captain E. G. J. BYRNE (Mesopotamia )  
 Captain G. G. C. MACLEAN, (Mesopotamia )  
 Captain W. C. F. A. WILSON (Mesopotamia )

## ORDER OF THE CROWN OF ROUMANIA

Major A. M. M. CHEEKE (With 125th Rifles in Palestine )

In addition to the above, the following Officers, N C O s and Riflemen were mentioned in despatches for gallantry and good service in Mesopotamia.—

Lieut.-Colonel W. SCOTT.  
 Major G. BAILEY  
 Major H. M. BUTLER (twice)  
 Major F. H. JAMES, M C  
 Captain F. J. CHADWICK  
 Captain A. M. M. CHEEKE  
 Captain J. G. DORMER  
 Second Lieutenant G. T. LEMON  
 Second Lieutenant A. C. LOCK.  
 Jamadar KISHNA RAM  
 Jamadar BAHAWAL KHAN  
 Jamadar SEDU RAM  
 3727 Havaldar PIRU RAM  
 3277 Havaldar JASSU SINGH  
 1624 Havaldar RAOTAN SINGH  
 2442 Havaldar BIJE SINGH.  
 3368 Havaldar JIWAN RAM.  
 2270 Naik LAKDIR SINGH.  
 2714 L./Naik DATA RAM.  
 570 Rifleman NANAK RAM  
 776 Rifleman HANS RAM  
 2206 Rifleman NANU RAM  
 3110 Rifleman NEK MUHAMMAD.  
 3132 Rifleman WAHAB DIN.

## APPENDIX V

### CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF STATIONS

<i>Year</i>	<i>Station</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
1775	Bombay . . .	Detachment on F.S. in Gujarat.
1776-77	Surat	
1778-79	Bombay ... .	F.S. in Deccan.
1780-82	Surat . . .	F.S. in Gujarat Capture of Dabhoi and Ahmedabad.
1783-84	F.S. in the Deccan.	Capture of Bednore Battalion made Prisoners of War by Tipu
1784-86	Bombay .	Became 9th Battalion on amalgamation.
1786-88	Tellicherry	
1789-94	Bombay . .	1790, F.S. with Captain Little's Detachment in Mysore. 1794, Detachment on F.S. Gulf of Cambay.
1795-97	Calicut ... .	Reorganized as 2nd Battalion 2nd Regiment N I
1797-99	Angaripur ...	F.S. in Wynaad and Mysore Capture of Seringapatam.
1799	Tellicherry	
1799-1802	Goa . . .	1800, F.S. in Deccan under the Hon Colonel Wellesley 1801, F.S. in Wynaad.
1802	Cannanore ..	F.S. in Mysore.
1803-04	Goa	
1804-05	Field Service in Gujarat, attack on Bhurtapore.	
1806	Sirur	
1807-08	Baroda ... .	F.S. in Kathiawar
1808	Varsovah	
1809-11	Bombay ... .	F.S. in Persian Gulf F.S. in French Islands. " Bourbon."
1811-14	Poona	
1814	Baroda . . .	F.S. in Kathiawar.
1815-16	Bombay ... .	Flank Companies on F.S. in Kathiawar.
1817-21	Chauk .. .	Flank Companies on F.S. in Gujarat. Battalion on F.S. in Konkan 1820, Flank Companies on F.S. in Persian Gulf. " Beni Boo Ali."
1821-23	Baroda . . .	Detachment on F.S. against Bheels.
1823-26	Deesa ... .	F.S. in Sirohi State. Renamed 4th Regiment Bombay Infantry.
1827-31	Dapoli ... .	Detachment on F.S. in 1827 against the Ramosis
1831-34	Bombay	

# 1st BATTALION 6th RAJPUTANA RIFLES (WELLESLEY'S) 235

<i>Year</i>	<i>Station</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
1834-38	Ahmednagar	
1838	Dapoli	
1839	Bombay	
1839-45	Baroda ... ..	Became a Rifle Corps.
1845-49	On F S. during Punjab Campaign.	Multan.
1850-53	Belgaum	
1853-58	Poona ... .	F.S. in Persia, 1856-57.
1858-59	Mhow .. ...	F S in Central India, 1857-58.
1860	Sehore	
1860-63	Mhow	
1863-66	Bombay	
1867-70	Sholapore	
1871-74	Baroda	
1874-78	Satara	
1878-81	Poona ... ..	F.S. in Afghanistan Siege of Kandahar, 1880.
1882-83	Ahmednagar	
1883-85	Aden	
1885-87	Mhow	
1887-91	Bombay	
1891-93	Quetta District .	Shelabagh, Pishin, Chaman, Quetta.
1893-96	Poona	
1896-1902	Mhow .. ..	1898, Headquarters Wing on F S in British East Africa.
1902-04	Fort Sandeman ...	Renumbered 104th Wellesley's Rifles.
1904-06	Santa Cruz	
1906-10	Hyderabad (Sind) ...	1908, Detachment on F S. in Las Bela
1910-12	Santa Cruz ... .	1911, F S with Mekran Expeditionary Force
1913-14	Baroda	
1914-16	Mesopotamia ...	On F.S. Regiment captured at Kut al Amara
1917	Mhow ... .	Regiment re-formed.
1917	Jubbulpore ...	Regiment mobilized
1917-19	Mesopotamia ..	On F.S. 16-7-1917 to 28-3-1919
1919	Mhow .	Detachment on Riot Duty in Ahmedabad
1919-21	Waziristan ...	On F.S. with Waziristan Field Force, Tochi Column, Derajat Column Renumbered 1st Battalion 6th Rajputana Rifles (Wellesley's).
1922-25	Jhansi	
1926-27	Razmak	
1927	Damdil	
1928-29	Mhow	
1930-32	Ahmedabad	
1932-34	Khyber	
1934-36	Aurangabad	
1936-37	Saidpur (Bengal)	
1937-	Chittagong	

## APPENDIX VI

### COLONELS OF THE REGIMENT

T. BROWNRIGG	...	..	.	.	.	..	.	1796-1799
S. W. S. WADDINGTON	...	.	..	.	.	..	.	1799-1800
T. BROWNRIGG	...	...	..	..	.	.	..	1800-1804
C. REYNOLDS	...	...	...	.	..	.	..	1804-1805
K. MCPHERSON	.	.	.	.	.	.	..	1805-1806
J. KERR	.	.	.	..	..	.	.	1806-1810
R. GORE	.	..	..	.	.	...	..	1810-1815
H. OAKES	...	..	..	.	...	..	.	1815-1818
T. MARSHALL	..	...	.	...	...	...	..	1818-1822
A. ANDERSON	..	...	..	..	...	...	...	1822-1824
R. LEWIS	..	..	.	..	..	.	...	1824-1837
V. KENNEDY	..	..	...	.	..	.	...	1837-1847
C. B. JAMES	...	...	...	.	..	..	...	1847-1863
Major-General Sir H. H. A. WOOD, K.C.B.	...	.	..	...	.	..	...	1904
General W. BANNERMAN, C.B.	...	...	.	..	...	.	...	1906-1914
Lieutenant-General M. W. WILLOUGHBY, C.S.I.	..	...	..	...	...	...	...	1914-1927
Brigadier-General W. C. WALTON, C.B., C.M.G.	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1927-1937
Colonel (Temporary Brigadier) C. M. S. MANNERS, D.S.O., M.C.	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1938

## APPENDIX VII

### LIST OF COMMANDANTS

NOTE.—Officers whose names are shown in italics never joined the Battalion as Commandant.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Remarks and Officiating Commandants</i>
1775-79	Captain	James Stewart	Killed in action at Karli 4-1-1779.
1779	Captain	Alexander Cadger	Died in 1779
1779-82	Captain	S W S Waddington	Transferred to 14th Bn Sepoys.
1782-83	Captain	Richard Eames	Poisoned by Tipu at Caveldrug while prisoner of war in 1783.
1784-88	Captain	James Bannatyne	Transferred to 1st Bn. Bombay European Regt
1788-94	Captain	John Riddell	Promoted Major and transferred to 1st Bn Bombay European Regt
1794-96	Captain	T S Tydd	Died at Bombay, 13-6-1796.
1796-97	Lt.-Colonel	F. W Bellis	Retired 12-4-1797.
1797-1801	Lt -Colonel	T Marshall	Transferred to Bombay European Regt
1801-05	Lt.-Colonel	J Burrows	Transferred to 3rd Regt. N I
1805-06	Lt -Colonel	R. T. Heath	Transferred to 2nd Bn. 7th Regt N I
1806-07	Lt -Colonel	<i>J Patterson</i> (furlo )	Retired 23-12-1806. Officiating Commandant Capt W. Imlach.
1808-10	Lt -Colonel	S Wilson	Transferred to 1st Bn 1st Grenadier Regt. N I
1810-12	Lt.-Colonel	<i>A Disney</i> (furlo )	Promoted Major-General Officiating Commandant Capt. W. Imlach
1812-15	Lt -Colonel	<i>W. Williamson</i> (furlo )	Transferred to 9th Regt N I Officiating Commandant Capt W. Imlach
1816-17	Lt -Colonel	W Boyé	Transferred to 6th Regt. N I.
1817	Lt -Colonel	F Gifford	Transferred to 2nd Bn 3rd Regt N I.
1817-20	Lt -Colonel	W. Imlach, C B.	Transferred to 8th Regt N I
1820-21	Lt -Colonel	A. Hogg	Transferred to Bombay European Regt



<i>Date</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Remarks and Officiating Commandants</i>
1821-24	Lt.-Colonel	G. R. Kemp	Transferred to 13th Regt. N.I.
1824-25	Lt.-Colonel	A. Hogg (furlo.)	Transferred to 11th Regt. N.I. Officiating Commandant: Major C. Gray.
1825-29	Lt.-Colonel	A. Robertson (Collector of Khandesh, 1827) (Resident at Satara, 1828-29)	Transferred to 13th Regt. N.I. Officiating Commandants: Major Gray, 1825-26; Major Hughes, 1827; Capt. Robinson, 1828-29.
1829-30	Lt.-Colonel	J. Morse (furlo.)	Transferred to 3rd Regt. N.I. Officiating Commandant: Capt. Robinson.
1830-32	Lt.-Colonel	P. Lodwick (Resident at Satara)	Transferred to 11th Regt. N.I. Officiating Commandant: Capt. Robinson.
1832	Lt.-Colonel	S. Hughes, C.B.	Transferred to 15th Regt. N.I. Officiating Commandant: Capt. Robinson.
1832-33	Lt.-Colonel	E. Pearson (furlo.)	Died 9-7-1833.
1833-35	Lt.-Colonel	D. Wilson (furlo.)	Died in 1835. Officiating Com- mandant: Major F. Hicks.
1836-38	Lt.-Colonel	J. H. Dunsterville (furlo.)	Transferred to 7th Regt. N.I. Officiating Commandant: Major W. Spratt.
1838-45	Lt.-Colonel	C. Ovens (Resident at Satara)	Transferred to 1st Bombay Euro- pean Regt. Officiating Com- mandant: Major C. Crawley.
1845	Lt.-Colonel	C. Crawley	Transferred to 7th Regt. N.I.
1845	Lt.-Colonel	(Bt. Col.) J. H. Dunsterville	Transferred to 19th Regt. N.I.
1846	Lt.-Colonel	D. Forbes	Transferred to 3rd Regt. N.I.
1847-49	Lt.-Colonel	J. R. Woodhouse (sick leave)	Died in Europe 27-5-1849. Offi- ciating Commandant: Bt. Maj. R. W. Honner.
1849	Lt.-Colonel	G. Moore	Promoted Colonel and struck off. Officiating Commandant: Major R. W. Honner.
1849-50	Lt.-Colonel	C. Benbow (furlo.)	Retired 4-5-1850. Officiating Commandant: Major R. W. Honner.
1850	Lt.-Colonel	D. Forbes	Transferred to 8th Regt. N.I. Officiating Commandant: Major R. W. Honner.
1850-55	Lt.-Colonel	G. I. Jameson (Dy. Auditor-Genl.)	Transferred to Pay Department. Officiating Commandant: Major R. W. Honner.
1855-61	Lt.-Colonel	R. W. Honner	Promoted Brigadier and trans- ferred to 30th Regt. N.I.
1861-64	Lt.-Colonel	A. R. Manson	


<i>Date</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Remarks and Officiating Commandants</i>
1864-73	Lt.-Colonel	C. M. Barrow	
1873-76	Colonel	H. H. A. Wood	Promoted Brigadier.
1876-77	Colonel	T. S. Warden	Retired 16-7-1877.
1877-83	Colonel	W. Bannerman	Vacated appointment 24-9-1883.
1883-88	Colonel	F. P. Forteath	Vacated appointment Aug. 1888.
1888	Lt.-Colonel	F. F. Comyn	Retired 23-11-1888.
1888-91	Lt.-Colonel	J. T. Watling	Appointed A.A.G. Sind District.
1891-98	Lt.-Colonel	J. Grant	Retired 12-6-1898.
1898-1905	Major	W. Quentin	Promoted Lt.-Colonel 27-1-1902. Retired 3-9-1905.
1905-08	Lt.-Colonel	C. Tritton	Died 29-4-1908.
1908-14	Lt.-Colonel	W. C. Walton	Vacated appointment 6-2-1914.
1914-18	Lt.-Colonel	C. B. L. Clery	Promoted to Comd. 35th Inf. Bde.
1918-22	Lt.-Colonel	W. Scott	Retired 4-2-1922.
1922	Lt.-Colonel	H. St. G. M. McRae	Transferred to 3/11th Sikh Regt.
1922-27	Lt.-Colonel	B. L. Cole	Vacated appointment 21-8-1926.
1927-30	Lt.-Colonel	F. H. James, O.B.E., M.C.	Retired 24-9-1930.
1930-34	Lt.-Colonel	G. Stoddart, O.B.E.	Retired 24-9-1934.
1934-36	Lt.-Colonel	L. A. Skinner	Retired 6-7-1936.
1936	Lt.-Colonel	G. A. Quayle	

## APPENDIX VIII


### LIST OF ADJUTANTS

1775-78	Lieut. THOMAS DAWSON.
1779-83	Lieut. JOHN WISEMAN.
1784-87	Lieut. and Bt. Captain ANDREW ANDERSON.
1788-89	Lieut. JOHN CAPON.
1790-94	Lieut. E. MOORE.
1794-99	Lieut. WILLIAM SHOLL. (Killed in action at Seedaseer, 6-3-99.)
1800	Lieut. JAMES SMITH.
1801-05	Lieut. ANDREW AITCHESON.
1806-07	Lieut. DANIEL H. BELLASIS.
1808-13	Lieut. NATHANIEL BETTS.
1813-14	Lieut. GEORGE BOULDERSON. (Died 13-12-14.)
1814-22	Lieut. WILLIAM SPRATT.
1822-26	Lieut. GEORGE J. JAMESON.
1826-42	Lieut. ROBERT W. HONNER.
1842-43	Bt. Captain C. C. LUCAS.
1844-46	Lieut. A. MORRIS.
1846-48	Lieut. R. GORDON.
1848-49	Lieut. A. R. MANSON.
1849-51	Lieut. F. E. HUNTER.
1851-53	Lieut. R. J. CASTELL.
1854-57	Lieut. J. L. SHEPPARD.
1857-61	Lieut. R. J. CASTELL.
1861-64	Lieut. J. D. HALL.
1864-69	Lieut. W. S. SETON.
1869-78	Lieut. S. CARTER.
1878-86	Lieut. D. C. W. HARRISON.
1886-87	Lieut. W. QUENTIN.
1887-89	Lieut. C. I. FRY.
1890-91	Lieut. K. C. KEOWN.
1891-95	Lieut. W. C. WALTON.
1895-99	Lieut. C. A. W. FORD.
1899-1904	Lieut. W. W. BICKFORD.
1904-08	Lieut. H. M. BUTLER.
1908-12	Lieut. F. H. JAMES.
1912-16	Lieut. G. STODDART.
1917	Lieut. R. D. AMBROSE. (Officiating Adjutant.)
1917-19	Lieut. C. S. HARPER, I.A.R.O. (Officiating Adjutant.)
1919	Captain G. WILLIAMS. (Officiating Adjutant.)
1919-21	Lieut. W. E. WILKINSON. (Officiating Adjutant.)
1921-22	Lieut. J. B. KNOCKER. (Officiating Adjutant.)
1922	Captain G. C. FRY. (Officiating Adjutant.)
1923-27	Captain R. M. DAVIES.
1928-31	Captain G. C. FRY.
1931-35	Lieut. T. E. WILLIAMS.
1935	Lieut. L. C. FORBES.


# SUBADAR-MAJORS.



Honorary Lieutenant Sedu Ram,  
*Bahadur*, O.B.I.  
Subadar-Major from 1933 to 1937.



Honorary Captain Lal Singh,  
*Sardar Bahadur*, O.B.I., I.D.S.M.  
Subadar-Major from 1920 to 1926.



Honorary Captain Rahim Dad Khan,  
*Sardar Bahadur*, O.B.I., M.V.O., M.B.E., I.D.S.M.  
Subadar-Major from 1927 to 1932.



## APPENDIX IX

### LIST OF SUBADAR-MAJORS

<i>Name</i>	<i>Date of Appointment</i>
SHAIK AHMED ... ..	27-11-1818
LUXIMON SINGH ... ..	... 4-12-1826
DOWJEE ISRAEL ... ..	24-12-1834
SHAMAJEE BAPOOJEE ... ..	... 1-1-1839
LUXIMON SINGH. <i>Bahadur</i> ... ..	... 1-1-1847
SHAIK ABDOOLLAH ... ..	... 13-5-1851
BABJEE MORUSKER. <i>Sardar Bahadur</i> ... ..	... 19-1-1859
DANIELJEE ISRAEL. <i>Bahadur</i> ... ..	... 1-1-1878
ITTOO BAGWEH. <i>Sardar Bahadur</i> ... ..	... 3-10-1879
KASIRAM BANEH. <i>Bahadur</i> ... ..	... 10-1-1889
JAMALUDIN ... ..	... 11-6-1900
MOHIDIN KHAN ... ..	... 1-12-1904
Hon. Captain HASAN MUHAMMAD. <i>Sardar Bahadur</i>	2-11-1908
Hon. Captain LAL SINGH. <i>Sardar Bahadur</i> , I.D.S.M.	18-6-1920
Hon. Captain RAHIMDAD KHAN. <i>Sardar Bahadur</i> , M.V.O., M.B.E., O.B.I., I.D.S.M. ... ..	... 1-1-1927
Hon. Lieutenant SEDU RAM. <i>Bahadur</i> , O.B.I. ... ..	... 1-1-1933
GANESHA RAM. <i>Bahadur</i> , O.B.I., I.D.S.M. ... ..	... 1-1-1938

Acted as Subadar-Major during the War while Subadar-Major HASAN MUHAMMAD was prisoner in Turkey:—

Subadar SHIUJI RAM.

Subadar SABAL SINGH. *Bahadur*, I.O.M.

Subadar RAHIM BAKHSH, I.D.S.M.

## APPENDIX X

## ALPHABETICAL LIST OF BRITISH OFFICERS.

NOTE.—The dates shown in the columns "Joined" and "Struck Off," are the first and last dates on which the Officer in question was with the Battalion, but, prior to 1824, this must not be taken to mean that service with the Battalion between those dates was continuous, as transfers were very frequent and have not been shown.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Joined</i>	<i>Struck off</i>	<i>Appointments, Transfers and Field Service while with the Battalion</i>
ADAMS, ROBERT	Ensign, 4-4-1802	Lieutenant, 6-10-1804	Ensign from 1st Bn. 4th Regt. Bn. N.I.; F.S. in Wynaad Nov. 1802-April 1803; died at Ujjain, 6-10-1804.
AITCHESON, ANDREW	Lieutenant, 21-3-1800	Major, 6-5-1820	Adjutant, 21-3-1800; Bde. Major, Left Bde., Field Army, 1805-06; Agent for Clothing 1816; Adj. Genl. Bombay Army 1817-20; F.S. in the Deccan under Col. Wellesley 1800-01; Gujarat, Central India and Bhurtpur, 1805-06.
AKED, JOHN SNOW	Ensign, 10-2-1838	Lieutenant, 11-5-1845	Died at Baroda, 11-5-1845.
ALDERMAN, ROBERT EDWARD	2nd Lieutenant, 12-5-1915	Captain, 12-5-1926	I.A.R.O.; joined at Basra; F.S. Action of Kut al Amara, 28-9-1915, wounded; action of Ctesiphon, 22-11-1915, wounded; Despatches and C.I.E., 1-1-1918, and O.B.E., 3-6-1919; Trfd. to Political Dept., 1916; Confirmed 13-11-1916 and struck off the strength, 12-5-1926. Major 1933. Died 1934.
ALLAN, JAMES	Captain, 1-6-1814	Captain, 13-12-1814	Died at Bombay, 13-12-1814.
AMBROSE, ROBERT DENIS	2nd Lieutenant, 18-4-1916	Still serving	F.S. with 123rd Rifles in Palestine, 1917-18 (Despatches, M.C.); Waziristan, 1937 (Despatches and O.B.E.); South Waziristan Scouts, 1923-26 and 1931-33; Commandant Tochi Scouts, 1933-35.
AMBROSE, SAMUEL BERTIE	Ensign, 3-4-1810	Lieutenant, 19-5-1816	From 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I.; Struck off by the Court of Directors for absence without leave, 19-5-1816.
ANDERSON, ANDREW	Lieutenant, 1784	Captain, Sept. 1788	Brev. Capt. and Adj., 1784; Trfd. to 1st Bn. Bombay European Regt. in 1788.
ANSTRUTHER, ROBERT DURHAM	2nd Lieutenant, 13-6-1857	2nd Lieutenant, 3-5-1860	From 7th Regt. N.I.; F.S. Malwa Field Force in pursuit of Tantia Topi; action of Rajghur, 15-9-1858; Trfd. to 10th Regt. N.I., 3-5-1860.
ARMSTRONG, EDMUND	Captain, 28-12-1800	Captain, 23-12-1803	From 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I.; Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 9th Regt. N.I., 23-12-1803.
ATHERTON, THOMAS GEORGE	2nd Lieutenant, 10-6-1921	2nd Lieutenant, 31-12-1921	From Royal Deccan Horse; Attached for duty in Waziristan, June 1921; Rejoined 20th Deccan Horse, 31-12-1921.
ATKINS, HENRY	Surgeon, 6-2-1863	Surgeon, 5-8-1866	No record.
ATKINSON, CLAUDE MILNES	Lieutenant, 8-4-1920	Lieutenant, 28-7-1920	Joined the Depot; Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 76th Punjabis, 28-7-1920.

ATKINSON, NORMAN EVANS	Lieutenant, 1-6-1917	Lieutenant, 29-9-1918	I.A.R.O.; Joined Depot; Adjutant of Depot, 1917-18; Invalided, 29-9-1918.
AUCHINLECH, WILLIAM	Lieutenant, 1791	Lieutenant, 1793	From 1st Bn. Bo. European Regt.; F.S. in Deccan, 1791-92; Siege of Dharwar; Action of Simoga, 29-12-1791.
AUSTEN, AUGUSTUS BAILEY, GILBERT	Ensign, 10-2-1838 2nd Lieutenant, 2-9-1892	Ensign, 5-6-1838 Major, 22-11-1915	Exchanged into 8th Regt. N.I. From Middlesex Regt.; Assam Milly. Police, 9-10-1897 to 27-5-1900; Recruiting Staff Officer A.H.O. 12-3-1908 to 16-3-1912; Represented the Regt. at King George V's Coronation, 1911; F.S. Mesopotamia; Actions of Sahil, wounded, 17-11-1914; Qurna, 7-12-1914; Shaiba, 13-4-1915 (Despatches); Battle of Kut al Amara, 28-9-1915; Ctesiphon, killed in action, 22-11-1915.
BAIRD, JAMES BAKER, EDWARD	Captain, 18-12-1799 Ensign, 30-4-1793	Major, 23-12-1799 Lt.-Colonel, 6-11-1817	Transferred to Bombay European Regt. From 2nd Bombay European Regt.; F.S. Gulf of Cambay, 1794; Capture of Seringapatam, 1799; Appointed Commissary General, 1817.
BANNATYNE, JAMES	Captain, 1784	Major, 6-9-1788	Posted as Commandant on reorganization, 1784; Trfd. to 1st Bn. Bombay European Regt. on promotion to Major, 6-9-1788.
BANNERMAN, WILLIAM	Colonel, 16-7-1877	General, 10-2-1914	From 21st Regt. N.I.; F.S. Afghanistan, 1879-80; Commanded the Regt. in the defence of Kandahar, Battle of Kandahar, 1-9-1880; Good Service Pension, 1882; C.B.; 21-6-1887; General, 1-4-1894; Col., 22-6-1906; Died 10-2-1914.
BANNISTER, GEORGE BARKER, JAMES	2nd Lieutenant, 5-10-1855 Ensign, 2-8-1777	2nd Lieutenant, 25-2-1856	Trfd. to 10th N.I., 25-2-1856.
BARNARD, JOHN BARRA, RICHARD THOMAS	Ensign, 13-4-1797 Surgeon, 7-10-1835	Lieutenant, 1798 Surgeon, 11-5-1836	No record. Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 4th Regt. N.I. in 1798.
BARRON, ROBERT MACPHERSON	Lieutenant, 1902	Lieutenant, 1903	Trfd. to 1st Battery of Artillery, 11-5-1836.
BARROW, CHARLES MALCOLM	Lt.-Colonel, 7-12-1864	Colonel, 30-7-1873	I.M.S.; Trfd. to Civil Employ. in 1903.
BARRY, JOHN PATRICK BARTON, ARTHUR ELLIOTT	Surgeon Capt., 18-5-1888 Lieutenant, 12-10-1888	Surgeon Capt., 30-9-1892 Lieutenant, 12-12-1891	From 18th Regt. Bombay N.I.; Posted as Commandant; Vacated the appointment, 30-7-1873. Trfd. to Civil Employ., 30-9-1892.
BATEMAN, THOMAS	Ensign, 1782	Ensign, 1783	From Yorkshire Light Inf.; Quartermaster, 9-12-1891; Civil Employ., 12-12-1891.
BAXTER, ROBERT HUGH NEVILLE	2nd Lieutenant, 23-5-1915	2nd Lieutenant, 1917	F.S. Malabar, 1783; Capture of Mangalore, Siege of Bednore; Died as Prisoner of War at Chitaldrug in 1783.
BAYLISS, BERTRAM	Captain, 1-10-1923	Still serving	I.A.R.O.; Trfd. to Mesopotamian Railway Corps, 1917.
BAYLY, ALFRED WILLIAM LAMBERT	Lieutenant, 12-4-1879	Lieutenant, 11-1-1882	From 4th Bn. 2nd Punjab Regt.; Administrative Commandant 11th Bn. 6th Rajputana Rifles (Provincial Bn.), 1937.
			From 108th Foot. F.S. Afghanistan, 1879-80; Defence of Kandahar, 24-8-1880; Battle of Kandahar, 1-9-1880; Resigned Staff Corps, 11-1-1882.



*Appointments, Transfers and Field Service  
while with the Battalion*

<i>Name</i>	<i>Joined</i>	<i>Struck off</i>	<i>Appointments, Transfers and Field Service while with the Battalion</i>
BAYNE, CHARLES HAY	Ensign, 25-6-1841	Ensign, 23-10-1844	Died at Baroda, 23-10-1844.
BELL, DANDESON COATES	Surgeon, 21-12-1838	Surgeon, 31-12-1838	Attached for duty.
BELL, THOMAS	Ast. Surgeon, 7-4-1796	Ast. Surgeon, 30-12-1796	Died at Callicut, 30-12-1796.
BELLASIS, DANIEL HUTCHINS	Ensign, 19-2-1802	Major, 5-6-1824	Adjutant, 20-1-1806; A.D.C. to G.O.C., 23-5-1807; A.Q.M.G., 1808; A.D.C. to Rt. Honble. the Govr. of Bombay, 1813; Bde. Maj., Poona, 1815-17; D.A.G. with rank of Major, 1818-21; Agent for Clothing, 1821-24; Trfd. to 3rd Regt. N.I., 5-6-1824.
BELLIS, FRANCIS WILLIAM	Lt.-Colonel, 7-4-1796	Lt.-Colonel, 21-3-1797	Posted as Commandant from 1st Bn. Bombay European Regt.; Resigned, 21-3-1797.
BELL SYER, LESLIE	2nd Lieutenant, 4-12-1914	Still serving	I.A.R.O.; joined at Basra; F.S. Mesopotamia; Battle of Kut al Amara, 28-9-1915; Ctesiphon, 22-11-1915. Siege of Kut al Amara; Prisoner of War in Turkey, 1916-18; Waziristan, 1920-21; Mahsud.
BENBOW, CLIFTON	Lt.-Colonel, 16-8-1849	Lt.-Colonel, 4-5-1850	Appointed while on furl., never joined the Regt.; Retired, 4-5-1850.
BENNETT, HUGH	Surgeon Capt., 30-4-1897	Captain, 22-6-1902	I.M.S.; F.S. Tirah Campaign, 1897; Civil Employ., 22-6-1902.
BESNARD, NICHOLAS	Lieutenant, 29-2-1801	Lieutenant, 1803	F.S. in Wynaad, defence of Psyche Fort, July 1803; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 9th Regt., 1803.
BETTS, NATHANIEL	Ensign, 28-11-1801	Capt.-Lieut., 3-7-1813	Adjutant, 1808-13; Promoted Captain-Lieutenant and posted to Peshwa's Brigade, 3-7-1813; Commandant 1st Extra Bn. (now 5th Bn. 6th Rajputana Rifles), 1820; F.S. in Wynaad, 1802-03; Battle of Kirkee, 1817 (with Peshwa's Brigade).
BICKFORD, WILLIAM WILFRED	Lieutenant, 22-7-1896	Captain, 19-10-1904	From Queen's (Royal West Surrey) Regt.; Adjutant, 29-7-1901 to 19-10-1904; F.S. East Africa, 1898; Trfd. to 106th Hazara Pioneers on formation.
BLACKIE, FRANK BURNETT	Captain, 20-1-1918	Captain, 28-3-1919	I.A.R.O.; joined at Nasirya in Command of Manipuri Company for training; F.S. Mesopotamia, 1918; Demobilized, 1-5-1922.
BLONDIN, FRANÇOIS JULIAN GRAVELET	Lieutenant, 15-10-1919	Lieutenant, 1-3-1921	Tempy. Comm. I.A.; joined at Bannu; Quartermaster, 1920-21; F.S. Waziristan, 1919-21; Tochi Column and Mahsud; Left for Demobilization, 1-3-1921.
BOALTH, WILLIAM HARRY	Captain, 22-8-1910	Captain, 11-8-1913	I.M.S.; F.S. Mekran Expedition, 1911; Trfd. to Civil Employ.
BODDAM, ERNEST BERKELEY CHARLES	Lieutenant, 7-4-1890	Lieutenant, 15-10-1890	From 2nd Bn. The West India Regt.; Trfd. to 2nd Sikh Infantry, 15-10-1890.
BODEN, JOSEPH	Lieutenant, 1788	Lieutenant, 1792	F.S. in Deccan, 1791-92; Siege of Dharwar; Action of Simoga, 29-12-1791; Became a distinguished Sanskrit Scholar and founded "The Boden Sanskrit Scholarship" at Oxford University.
BOULDERSON, GEORGE	Lieutenant, 2-7-1811	Lieutenant, 2-12-1814	From 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I.; Adjutant, Jan. 1813; Died at Sirur, 2-12-1814.
BOULTER, HERBERT GEORGE	2nd Lieutenant, 19-3-1922	Still serving	From U.L.; With South Waziristan Scouts, 1928-31.

BOURCHIER, HENRY STUKELEY	Ensign, 20-9-1825	Ensign, 13-4-1826	Died of cholera at Ahmedabad, 13-4-1826.
BOURCHIER, ROBERT	Ensign, 7-6-1824	Lieutenant, 25-9-1831	F.S. in South Konkan against Ramosis from Dec. 1827 to June 1828; Died at Bombay, 25-9-1831.
FRANCIS	Captain, 31-12-1926	Captain, 12-9-1927	From 4th Bn. 2nd Bombay Pioneers; Cashiered by G.C.M., 12-9-1927.
BOWDEN, CHARLES HENRY	Lieutenant, 17-1-1799	Lt.-Colonel, 5-1-1817	From 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I.; F.S. in Mysore; Capture of Seringapatam, 4-5-1799; Commandant, 7-10-1815 to 5-1-1817; Trfd. to 6th Regt. N.I.
BOYÉ, WILLIAM		Still serving	From U.L.
BRACK, CHRISTOPHER MARTIN	2nd Lieutenant, 12-3-1935		
ATHELHAMPTON			
BRADY, JOHN	Captain, 18-12-1799	Captain, 12-3-1800	From 1st Bn. 4th Regt. N.I.; Trfd. to Bombay European Regt., 12-3-1800.
BRICKWELL, THOMAS	Asst. Surg., 31-5-1841	Asst. Surg., 18-12-1841	Trfd. to 20th Regt. N.I., 18-12-1841; Killed in Afghanistan, 1842.
BROOMHALL, MICHAEL	Lieutenant, 19-1-1797	Lieutenant, 18-12-1800	F.S. in Command of 5th and 6th Companies at reduction of Fort Jamalabad, July 1800; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 6th Regt. N.I., 18-12-1800.
BROWN, GEORGE	Lieutenant, 17-1-1799	Lieutenant, 18-12-1799	From Bombay Eur. Regt.; F.S. in Mysore; Capture of Seringapatam, 4-5-1799; Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 3rd Regt. N.I., 18-12-1799.
BROWN, GEORGE ST. BARBE	Ensign, 2-8-1819	Lieutenant, 1-12-1819	Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 4th Regt. N.I., 1-12-1819.
BROWN, WILLIAM	Lieutenant, 1793	Lieutenant, 9-5-1797	Malabar Paymaster; Killed in action on service against Pyche Raja, 9-5-1797.
BROWN, WILLIAM	Major, 21-3-1800	Major, 27-5-1801	Retired, 27-5-1801.
BRUCE, ARTHUR NEIL	2nd Lieutenant, 29-5-1856	Lieutenant, 8-6-1869	From 21st Regt. N.I.; F.S. Persia, 1856-57; Capture of Reshire, 9-12-1856; Capture of Bushire, 10-12-1856; Action of Khushab, 8-2-1857; Central India, 1857-59; Malwa Field Force in pursuit of Tandia Topi; action of Bheelwara, 19-2-1858; Trfd. to the Staff Corps, 1862; Died at Deoli, 8-6-1869.
BUCHANNON, MOSES	Ensign, 1784	Ensign, 1785	No record.
BUDDEN, RICHARD	Lieutenant, 1782	Lieutenant, 1784	F.S. in Malabar, 1783; Capture of Mangalore, 1783; Siege of Bednore; Taken Prisoner of War by Tipu, 1783; Trfd. to 3rd Bn. Bombay Sepoys, 1784.
BULL, GEORGE HENRY	Surg. Major, 1893	Major, 30-4-1897	I.M.S. from 3rd Q.O. Bombay Light Cav.; Appd. Staff Surgeon, Poona, 30-4-1897.
BURROWS, JOHN	Major, 10-11-1797	Lt.-Colonel, 1-11-1805	Commandant, 30-1-1801; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 3rd Regt. N.I., 1-11-1805.
BURTON, REGINALD COOKSEY	2nd Lieutenant, 1915	2nd Lieutenant, 9-4-1916	I.A.R.O.; Attached to 125th Napier's Rifles in Mesopotamia; Killed in action at Sannaiyat, 9-4-1916.
BUTLER, ALFRED GEORGE	2nd Lieutenant, 17-1-1917	Still serving	F.S. Mesopotamia, 1917-18; Waziristan, 1920-21; Despatches, O.B.E.
BUTLER, CHARLES GREENVILLE	Lieutenant, 21-3-1800	Lieutenant, 22-6-1802	Trfd. to Marine Battalion, 22-6-1802.
BUTLER, HENRY ALLEN	2nd Lieutenant, 7-6-1936	Still serving	From U.L.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Joined</i>	<i>Struck off</i>	<i>Appointments, Transfers and Field Service while with the Battalion</i>	
			From U.L.;	Adjutant, 20-10-1904 to 1908; F.S. Mekran Expedition, 1911; Mesopotamia, 1914-17; Actions of Sahlan, 15-11-1914; Sahil, 17-11-1914; Qurna, 4 to 7-12-1914 (severely wounded); Despatches; Commanded Mahelas on the Tigris, 1916 (Despatches); Commanded the Depot, 1917; Raised and Commanded 2/72nd Punjab, later Commanded 2/123rd Rifles; Retired on account of ill health, 29-4-1921.
BUTLER, HENRY MAURICE	2nd Lieutenant, 25-3-1898	Lt.-Colonel, 29-4-1921	From U.L.;	Adjutant, 20-10-1904 to 1908; F.S. Mekran Expedition, 1911; Mesopotamia, 1914-17; Actions of Sahlan, 15-11-1914; Sahil, 17-11-1914; Qurna, 4 to 7-12-1914 (severely wounded); Despatches; Commanded Mahelas on the Tigris, 1916 (Despatches); Commanded the Depot, 1917; Raised and Commanded 2/72nd Punjab, later Commanded 2/123rd Rifles; Retired on account of ill health, 29-4-1921.
BYRNE, EDWARD GAVIN JOHNSTONE	Lieutenant, 8-4-1903	Major, 29-10-1921	From U.L.;	Adjutant, 20-10-1904 to 1908; F.S. Mekran Expedition, 1911; Mesopotamia, 1914-17; Actions of Sahlan, 15-11-1914; Sahil, 17-11-1914; Qurna, 4 to 7-12-1914; Shaiba, 13-4-1915 (Despatches); Brev. Major; Retired, 29-10-1921.
CADGER, ALEXANDER	Capt.-Lieut., 1778	Captain, Nov. 1779	Commandant, 5-1-1779; F.S. in Decan, 1779; Promoted Captain for gallantry in the field; Died about Nov. 1779.	Commandant, 5-1-1779; F.S. in Decan, 1779; Promoted Captain for gallantry in the field; Died about Nov. 1779.
CAMPBELL, ALEXANDER	Ensign, 13-4-1797	Lieutenant, 1-11-1797	Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 1st Regt. N.I., 1-11-1797.	Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 1st Regt. N.I., 1-11-1797.
CAMPBELL, DAVID	Ensign, 1-10-1798	Ensign, 23-11-1798	Trfd. to Engineer Corps, 23-11-1798.	Trfd. to Engineer Corps, 23-11-1798.
CAMPBELL, WILLIAM	Ensign, 1-1-1815	Lieutenant, 26-9-1819	Attd. for duty from Marine Bn.; F.S. Southern Konkan, 1818; Rejoined his Bn. on 26-9-1819.	Attd. for duty from Marine Bn.; F.S. Southern Konkan, 1818; Rejoined his Bn. on 26-9-1819.
CANNING, JOHN CAPE, THOMAS	Ensign, 10-4-1810 Captain, 18-12-1799	Lieutenant, 9-10-1811 Captain, 12-3-1800	Trfd. to 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I., 9-10-1811.	Trfd. to 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I., 9-10-1811.
CAPON, JOHN	Lieutenant, 1788	Lieutenant, 1789	From 1st Bn. 1st Regt. N.I.; Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 7th Regt. N.I., 1800.	From 1st Bn. 1st Regt. N.I.; Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 7th Regt. N.I., 1800.
CARTER, STANLEY	Lieutenant, 22-7-1868	Major, 27-5-1881	Posted as Adjutant; Trfd. to 1st Grenadier Bn., 1789.	Posted as Adjutant; Trfd. to 1st Grenadier Bn., 1789.
CASSIM SHAH (AGA)	Major, 10-6-1921	Major, 1-1-1922	From 10th Regt. N.I.; Adjutant, 9-8-1869 to 22-11-1878; Trfd. to 27th Light Inf. (1st Baluchis), 27-5-1881.	From 10th Regt. N.I.; Adjutant, 9-8-1869 to 22-11-1878; Trfd. to 27th Light Inf. (1st Baluchis), 27-5-1881.
CASTELL, JOHN HENRY	2nd Lieutenant, 16-6-1852	Captain, 29-8-1861	From 3rd Skinner's Horse; Attached for duty in Waziristan.	From 3rd Skinner's Horse; Attached for duty in Waziristan.
CASTELL, RICHARD JOHN	Ensign, 13-6-1846	Major, 30-5-1872	From 21st Regt. N.I. (by exchange); F.S. Persia, 1856-57; Capture of Reshire, 9-12-1856; Capture of Bushire, 10-12-1856; Action of Khushab, 8-2-1857; Central India, 1857-59; Malwa Field Force in pursuit of Tania Topi; Action of Rajghur, 15-9-1858; Trfd. to Staff Corps, 29-8-1861.	From 21st Regt. N.I. (by exchange); F.S. Persia, 1856-57; Capture of Reshire, 9-12-1856; Capture of Bushire, 10-12-1856; Action of Khushab, 8-2-1857; Central India, 1857-59; Malwa Field Force in pursuit of Tania Topi; Action of Rajghur, 15-9-1858; Trfd. to Staff Corps, 29-8-1861.
CAUNTER, JOHN HOBART	Ensign, 8-3-1812	Ensign, 24-11-1812	Adjutant, 5-5-1851 to 9-1-1854 and 19-5-1857 to 24-3-1861; F.S. Punjab Campaign, 1848-49; Storming of Multan, 2-1-1849; Persia, 1856-57; Capture of Reshire, 9-12-1856; Capture of Bushire, 10-12-1856; Action of Khushab, 8-2-1857; Central India, 1857-59; Malwa Field Force in pursuit of Tania Topi; Action of Rajghur, 15-9-1858; Died at Baroda, 30-5-1872.	Adjutant, 5-5-1851 to 9-1-1854 and 19-5-1857 to 24-3-1861; F.S. Punjab Campaign, 1848-49; Storming of Multan, 2-1-1849; Persia, 1856-57; Capture of Reshire, 9-12-1856; Capture of Bushire, 10-12-1856; Action of Khushab, 8-2-1857; Central India, 1857-59; Malwa Field Force in pursuit of Tania Topi; Action of Rajghur, 15-9-1858; Died at Baroda, 30-5-1872.
CHADWICK, FREDERICK JAMES	2nd Lieutenant, 15-11-1904	Captain, 13-4-1915	Trfd. to 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I., 24-11-1812.	Trfd. to 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I., 24-11-1812.
			From U.L.;	From U.L.;
			F.S. Mekran Expedition, 1911; Mesopotamia, 1914-15; Actions of Sahlan, 15-11-1914; Sahil, 17-11-1914 (Despatches); Qurna, 4 to 7-12-1914; Shaiba, 13-4-1915; Died of wounds, 13-4-1915.	F.S. Mekran Expedition, 1911; Mesopotamia, 1914-15; Actions of Sahlan, 15-11-1914; Sahil, 17-11-1914 (Despatches); Qurna, 4 to 7-12-1914; Shaiba, 13-4-1915; Died of wounds, 13-4-1915.

CHALMER, ROBERT	Ensign, 1784	Lieutenant, 7-2-1791	F.S. in Deccan, 1791; Killed in action at siege of Dharwar, 7-2-1791.
CHALMERS, JAMES HENRY	Lieutenant, 7-6-1824	Captain, 23-11-1844	F.S. in Southern Konkan as Acting Adjutant against the Ramosis from Dec. 1827 to June 1828; Adjt. the Veteran Bn., 1830; Comdg. Marine Bn., 30-7-1838 to 23-11-1844; Died in Bombay, 23-11-1844.
CHAPMAN, ERIC HALDANE	Lt.-Colonel, 1-1-1933	Lt.-Colonel, 20-2-1933	From Bombay Pioneers, on sick leave, never joined. Retired, 20-2-1933.
CHARTER, GEORGE EDWARD	2nd Lieutenant, 20-3-1937	Still serving	From U.L.
CHEEKE, ARTHUR MARCUS MOSSELEY	2nd Lieutenant, 10-11-1904	Major, 19-8-1923	From U.L.; Guardian to the Minor Chief of Miraj Junior, 24-6-1908 to 27-2-1909; F.S. Mesopotamia, 1914-17; Actions of Saiban, 15-11-1914; Sahil, 17-11-1914; Qurna, 4 to 7-12-1914; Shaiba, 13-4-1914 (Despatches); Commanded the Depot, 1915-16; Attached 125th Napier's Rifles for service in Egypt (Despatches). Order of the Crown of Roumania; Retired, 19-8-1923.
CHEEKE, THOMAS	Lieutenant, 1778	Lieutenant, 1779	No record.
CHESHYRE, AUGUSTUS PHILIP	Lt.-Colonel, 12-7-1875	Bt.-Col., 18-8-1878	Appointed 2nd in Command; Retired, 18-8-1878.
CHRISTIAN, JOHN BERESFORD	Lieutenant, 6-11-1903	Captain, 31-8-1908	I.M.S.; Trfd. to Civil Employ., 31-8-1908.
CHRISTIE, HENRY	Lieutenant, 22-7-1904	Lieutenant, 3-7-1905	From R.F.A.; Trfd. to S. and T. Corps, 3-7-1905.
CLARKSON, WILLIAM HENRY	Lieutenant, 30-5-1821	Lieutenant, 3-10-1823	From Bombay European Regt.; Trfd. to 1st. Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I., 3-10-1823.
CLERY, CARLTON BUCKLEY LAMING	Lt.-Colonel, 6-2-1914	Bt. Col., 18-12-1917	From 125th Napier's Rifles as Commandant; F.S. Mesopotamia, 1914-18; Actions of Saiban, 15-11-1914; Sahil, 17-11-1914; Qurna, 4 to 7-12-1914; Shaiba, 13-4-1915; Kut al Amara, 28-9-1915 (wounded); Ctesiphon, 22-11-1915 (twice wounded) (Despatches); C.B., Brevet Colonel; Apptd. to Comd. 35th Brigade, 18-12-1917; Subsequently Major-Genl.; Died 26-11-1937.
CLELAND, WILLIAM DOUGLAS	Ensign, 17-1-1799	Ensign, 18-12-1799	F.S. in Mysore; Capture of Seringapatam, 4-5-1799; Trfd. to Artillery, 1799.
COCKE, JOHN	Lieutenant, 5-12-1814	Bt. Captain, 1819	Apptd. Linguist; F.S. in Kathiawar, 1815-16; Capture of Anjar, 23-12-1815; Kunfkote, 3-2-1816; Dinki, 2-3-1816; Best, 7-3-1816; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I. in 1819.
COGHLAN, EDWARD	2nd Lieutenant, 7-9-1852	Captain, 30-7-1862	F.S. Persia, 1856-57; Capture of Reshire, 9-12-1856; Capture of Bushire, 10-12-1856; Action of Khushab, 8-2-1857; Central India, 1857-59, with Satpura Field Force; Action at Amba Pani, 11-4-1858; with Malwa Field Force in pursuit of Tantia Topi; Action of Rajghur, 15-9-1858; Trfd. to 106th Foot, 30-7-1862.

*Appointments, Transfers and Field Service while with the Battalion*

<i>Name</i>	<i>Joined</i>	<i>Struck off</i>	
COLAN, HENRY NORMAN	Captain, 1915	Captain, 1916	From 76th Punjabis; Took a draft out to the Battalion in Mesopotamia, but never reached them; Rejoined his own Battalion, 1916.
COLBATCH, JOHN	Lieutenant, 1778	Lieutenant, 1779	No record.
COLE, BRIAN LYTTON	Lt.-Colonel, 5-7-1922	Lt.-Colonel, 21-8-1926	From 10th Bn. 6th Rajputana Rifles; Commandant, 1922-26; Vacated Appointment to take up duties of Recruiting Officer Rajputana and Central India, 21-8-1926.
COLLET, RICHARD	Asst. Surg., 17-1-1799	Asst. Surg., 6-6-1802	F.S. in Mysore; Capture of Seringapatam, 4-5-1799; Died at Cannanore, 6-6-1802.
COLLIER, THOMAS	Ensign, 29-2-1801	Lieutenant, 11-10-1802	F.S. in Wynaad, 1801; Died at Cannanore, 11-10-1802.
COMYN, FREDERICK FITZWILLIAM	Lieutenant, 9-11-1864	Lt.-Colonel, 23-11-1888	F.S. Afghanistan, 1879-80; Defence of Kandahar, battle of Kandahar, 1-9-1880; Commandant 2-8-1888; Retired, 23-11-1888.
COOKE, HENRY	Lieutenant, 8-12-1820	Lieutenant, 7-6-1824	Trfd. to 3rd Regt. N.I., 7-6-1824.
CORSELLIS, THOMAS	Lieutenant, 17-1-1799	Lieutenant, 18-12-1799	On leave in Europe; Never joined.
CORY, RICHARD WILLIAM	Lieutenant, 11-12-1804	Lieutenant, 27-9-1814	F.S. Persian Gulf, 1809-10 in Command of Detachment, Capture of Ras-el-Khaimah, 13-11-1809; Left, 27-11-1809; Shinaas, 3-1-1810; in Kathiawar against the Waguers, 1814; Died in Kathiawar, 27-9-1814.
COX, CHARLES LEWIS HAMILTON	Lieutenant, 17-10-1884	Lieutenant, 16-7-1888	From 5th Regt. N. Light Inf.; Resigned, 16-7-1888.
CRAWLEY, CHARLES	Lieutenant, 10-4-1820	Lt.-Colonel, 29-8-1845	From 1st Bn. 2nd Regt.; Commanded the Regt., 1838-45; F.S. Persian Gulf, 1820-21, Beni Boo Ali; in Sirohi State, Capture of Limbuj Fort, 4-4-1824; Trfd. to 7th Regt. N.I.
CRISPIN, GEORGE BELL	2nd Lieutenant, 15-11-1853	Lt.-Colonel, 24-10-1880	F.S. Persia, 1856-7, Postmaster to the Field Force; Afghanistan, 1879-80; Defence of Kandahar; Action at Kandahar, 1-9-1880; Died at sea <i>en route</i> to England, 24-10-1880.
CROWLEY, JOHN	2nd Lieutenant, 7-3-1919	2nd Lieutenant, 1-9-1921	Tempy. Comm. I.A.; Adjutant of Depot, 21-9-1919; Demobilized, 1-9-1921.
CROMBIE, DAVID LESLIE	Lieutenant, 10-6-1921	Lieutenant, 31-12-1921	Attached for service in Waziristan.
CROZIER, JOHN DEMPSTER	Ensign, 19-2-1802	Captain, 1-11-1816	A.D.C. to the Governor of Pulo Penang, 1807; Doing duty with Pioneer Corps, 1811; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I., 1-11-1816.
CUERDEN, FREDERICK GORDON	2nd Lieutenant, 5-5-1926	Still serving	From 1st Bn. 3rd Madras Regt.; Quartermaster, 20-10-1927.
CUPPLES, WILLIAM	Ensign, 8-10-1804	Ensign, 24-4-1805	Trfd. to 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I., 24-4-1805.
DALE, RAYMOND	2nd Lieutenant, 10-11-1918	2nd Lieutenant, 22-12-1918	From 2nd Bn. 56th Rifles; Quartermaster of Refugee Camp, Bakubah, 22-12-1918.
DALLAS CONTÉ, NORMAN	2nd Lieutenant, 15-10-1919	Lieutenant, 5-12-1922	From U.L.; F.S. Waziristan, Mahsud, 1919; Retired, 5-12-1922.
DALLEY, JOHN POMEROY	2nd Lieutenant, 4-12-1914		I.A.R.O.; Served with Depot.

DARKE, FRANCIS CHARLES	Lieutenant, 7-6-1824	Major, 10-1-1846	Resigned after sick leave to Europe, 10-1-1846.
DAVIES, CHARLES	Captain, 17-1-1799	Captain, 22-12-1800	Struck off by order of the Court of Directors 22-12-1800.
DAVIES, JOHN QUENTIN	2nd Lieutenant, 4-3-1856	Lieutenant, 23-7-1865	F.S. Persia, 1856-57; Capture of Bushire, 10-12-1856; Action of Khushab, 8-2-1857; Central India, 1857-58; Satpura Hills, 1858; Adjutant Nasik Police Corps, 29-7-1858; Died at Bombay, 23-7-1865.
DAVIES, ROLAND MARSHALL	2nd Lieutenant, 18-7-1917	Still serving	Adjutant, 4-1-1923 to 3-1-1927.
DAWSON, THOMAS	Lieutenant, 10-1-1775	Lieutenant, 1778	Adjutant, 10-1-1775 to 1778; F.S. in Gujarat; Action of Arras, 18-5-1775 (wounded); Trfd. to 4th Bn. Sepoys in 1778; Retired, 1788.
DEDMAN, JOHN JOHNSTONE	Captain, 1-9-1921	Captain, 25-12-1922	From the Border Regt. on probation for I.A.; Retired, 5-12-1922.
DE LAMOTTE, PETER	Ensign, 17-1-1799	Ensign, 18-12-1799	From 1st Bn. 4th Regiment N.I.; F.S. in Mysore, Capture of Seringapatam, 4-5-1799; Trfd. to Bombay European Regt., 18-12-1799.
DICKINSON, THOMAS	Lieutenant, 18-12-1799	Lieutenant, 1-1-1800	At Woolwich, never joined; Trfd. to 6th Regt. N.I., 1-1-1800.
DISNEY, ARTHUR	Lt.-Colonel, 7-1-1810	Lt.-Colonel, 18-2-1812	From the Grenadier Bn.; On furlough in Europe, never joined; Trfd. to Bombay European Regt., 18-2-1812.
DOBBIE, THOMAS BROWN	2nd Lieutenant, 16-2-1918	2nd Lieutenant, 21-6-1918	Attached for duty from 1st Bn. 123rd Outram's Rifles; F.S. Mesopotamia, 1918; Invalided, 21-6-1918.
DODD, WILLIAM	Lieutenant, 18-12-1799	Lieutenant, 21-3-1800	Trfd. to 1st Bn. 3rd Regt. N.I.
DORMER, JAMES GARRAD	2nd Lieutenant, 26-3-1906	Major, 3-5-1930	From U.L.; Quartermaster, 1910-12; F.S. Mesopotamia, 1915-17; Action of Ctesiphon, 22-11-1915 (wounded); served as Adjutant 97th Inf.; Actions of Dujaila, Hanna and Sannaiyat, 1916; Staff Capt., Amara, 1916-17 (Despatches); Trfd. to 3rd Bn. 19th Hyderabad Regt. as Commandant, 3-5-1930.
DOUGLAS, JAMES	Major, 29-3-1806	Lt.-Colonel, 5-12-1809	From 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I.; Retired, 5-12-1809.
DRYSDALE, JOHN	Captain, 7-4-1796	Captain, 23-8-1796	From 11th Bn. N.I.; Died, 23-8-1796.
DUNBABIN, HOLDEN	Ensign, 1-6-1814	Lieutenant, 4-3-1818	F.S. in Kathiawar, 1814; Trfd. to the Pioneers, 4-3-1818.
DUNCAN, JOHN GRANT	2nd Lieutenant, 1-12-1915	2nd Lieutenant, 1-9-1916	Served with the Depot; Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 19th Infantry, 1-9-1916.
DUNSTERVILLE, JAMES BRUCE	Ensign, 27-11-1840	Lt.-Colonel, 1-9-1864	From 2nd Bn. Bombay European Regt.; F.S. Punjab Campaign, 1848-49; Persia, 1856-57; Capture of Reshire, 9-12-1856; Capture of Bushire, 10-12-1856; Appd. Commissary General Bombay Army, 1-9-1864. Never joined the Regiment for duty.
DUNSTERVILLE, JAMES HENDERSON	Lt.-Colonel, 4-4-1835	Bt. Colonel, 24-12-1845	Appd. Commandant, 1782; F.S. Malabar, Capture of Mangalore, 9-3-1783; Siege of Bednore, 9 to 28-4-1783; Poisoned by orders of Tipu while a prisoner of war at Caveldrug in 1783.
EAMES, RICHARD	Captain, 1782	Captain, 1783	Suspended for 6 months in 1786 and struck off.
EAST, WILLIAM	Ensign, 1784	Ensign, 1786	Attached.
EKFORD, ROBERT	Asst. Surgeon, March 1806	Asst. Surgeon, Dec. 1806	

*Appointments, Transfers and Field Service  
while with the Battalion*

<i>Name</i>	<i>Joined</i>	<i>Struck off</i>	<i>Appointments, Transfers and Field Service while with the Battalion</i>
ELDERTON, CHARLES FREDERICK	Lieutenant, 7-6-1824	Lieutenant, 27-9-1824	From 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I.; Trfd. to 3rd Regt. N.I., 27-9-1824.
ELLIOTT, ROBERT	Lieutenant, 7-4-1796	Lieutenant, 10-11-1797	From 11th Bn. Bombay Sepoys; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 3rd Regt., 10-11-1797.
FARR, CECIL JAFFREY	2nd Lieutenant, 26-3-1917	2nd Lieutenant, 15-6-1917	I.A.R.O.; Trfd. to 2/10th Jats, 15-6-1917.
FENWICK, HENRY	Ensign, 3-10-1840	Ensign, 6-10-1840	Trfd. to 10th Regt. N.I., 6-10-1840.
FENWICK, JOHN STANHOPE	Lieutenant, 12-4-1918	Lieutenant, 28-7-1919	On probation for Indian Army; Relinquished Commission, 28-7-1919.
FINLAY, JAMES	Lieutenant, 7-5-1819	Captain, 5-11-1826	F.S. in Mahi Kantha in command of the Bn.; Capture of Techow, 29-1-1823; Received thanks of Bombay Government; Capture of Toissow, 4-5-1823; in Sirohi State, capture of Limbuj, 14-4-1824; Died at Cambay, 5-11-1826.
FINLAY, JAMES	Ensign, 12-12-1840	Ensign, 8-5-1844	Died at Baroda, 8-5-1844.
FINLAY, MATHEW	Ensign, 1784	Ensign, 1786	Trfd. to 2nd Bn. Bombay Sepoys, 1786.
FLEMING, HAROLD	Lieutenant, 1-10-1922	Lieutenant, 23-7-1923	From U.L. on probation; Retired, 23-7-1923.
VERNON			
FLOOD, JOHN DUNCAN	2nd Lieutenant, 26-1-1904	2nd Lieutenant 24-5-1904	From 2nd Bn. Royal Irish Fusiliers; Trfd. to 58th Rifles, 24-5-1904.
FORBES, DAVID	Lt.-Colonel, 24-12-1845	Lt.-Colonel, 13-9-1850	Commanded the Regt. in 1846; Trfd. to 8th Regt. N.I., 13-9-1850.
FORBES, LEONARD	Lt.-Colonel, 1-9-1926	Lt.-Colonel, 23-9-1926	Never joined; Trfd. to 10th Bn. 6th Rajputana Rifles.
FORBES, LESTOCK CHARLES	2nd Lieutenant, 23-10-1928	Still serving	From U.L.; Adjutant, 9-10-1935.
FORBES, WILLIAM MCNEIL REID	Ensign, 23-9-1826	Ensign, 5-11-1832	Died in Scotland, 5-11-1832.
FORD, CHARLES ANNES- LEY WILBRAHAM	Lieutenant, 22-6-1891	Major, 26-3-1911	From the Durham L.I.; Quartermaster, 1892; Adjutant, 1895; F.S. as Adjutant in East, Africa against Ogaden Somalis, 1898; Retired, 26-3-1911.
FORJETT, FREDERICK	Major, 19-7-1885	Major, 4-4-1890	From 26th Regt. Bombay Inf.; Apptd. President Language Exam. Committee, 1889; Trfd. to 21st Regt. N.I., 4-4-1890.
FORTEATH, FREDERICK PRESCOTT	Lt.-Colonel, 23-10-1882	Brev. Colonel, 2-8-1888	From 18th Regt. Bombay Inf.; Commandant of the Regt., 1883-88; Vacated Command, 2-8-1888.
FREDERICK, EDWARD	Lieutenant, 6-10-1804	Lieutenant, 22-8-1805	Attached for duty as a volunteer from 1st Bn. 4th Regt. N.I.; F.S. in Gujarat, capture of Deeg, assault on Bhurtpur, 1805; Rejoined own Bn., 22-8-1805.
FRY, CHARLES IRWIN	Lieutenant, 27-1-1887	Major, 12-5-1903	From 12th Bombay Infantry as Adjutant; F.S. East Africa against the Ogaden Somalis, 1898 (Despatches). Brilliant Star of Zanzibar; Trfd. to 125th Napier's Rifles as Commandant, 12-5-1903; Subsequently promoted Major-General; F.S. Mesopotamia, 1914-17; C.B.
FRY, GEORGE CYRIL	Lieutenant, 16-6-1921	Captain, 17-11-1932	From 36th Jacob's Horse; Adjutant, 1927-31; F.S. Waziristan, 1921; Retired, 17-11-1932.
GARDINER, CHARLES	Lieutenant, 19-12-1799	Lieutenant, 8-1-1800	Never joined; Drowned on passage out from England, 8-1-1800.

GIBSON, ALEXANDER	Ensign, 18-12-1799	Ensign, 1-1-1800	Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 1st Regt. N.I., 1-1-1800.
GIBSON, THOMAS	Ensign, 1784	Ensign, 13-9-1787	Trfd. to 12th Bn. of Sepoys, 13-9-1787.
GIFFORD, FREDERICK	Lt.-Colonel, 17-1-1817	Lt.-Colonel, 11-4-1817	From 1st Bn. 5th Regt. N.I.; Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 3rd Regt. N.I.
GILKIE, JAMES	Captain, 10-11-1797	Captain, 15-3-1799	From 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I.; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 4th Regt. N.I., 17-1-1799, but remained attached for duty; F.S. in Mysore, Died, 15-3-1799.
GLASSPOOLE, WILLIAM ALFRED	Ensign, 3-5-1847	Lt.-Colonel, 12-7-1875	F.S. Punjab Campaign, Storming of Multan, 2-1-1849; Persia, 1856-57; Capture of Reshire, 9-12-1856; Capture of Bushire, 10-12-1856; Action of Khushab, 8-2-1857; Central India, 1857-58; Satpura Field Force, Defence of Peint, Jan. 1858, received the thanks of the Government; Malwa Field Force in pursuit of Tantia Topi; Action of Rajghur, 15-9-1858; A.D.C. to Maj.-General Honner, 1863; Retired, 12-7-1875.
GOADBY, M.B.E., FRANZ REGINALD LANSAY	Captain, 7-12-1932	Still serving	From Sikh Pioneers.
GOLDING, RICHARD FISHER	Ensign, 1-11-1789	Lieutenant, 14-4-1794	F.S. in the Deccan and Mysore, 1791-92; Siege of Dharwar, Jan.-April 1791; Capture of Doridrug, 13-7-1791; Capture of Hooly Onore, 12-12-1791; Action of Simoga, 29-12-1791; Died, 14-4-1794.
GOODFELLOW, NAPIER GEORGE BARRAS	2nd Lieutenant, 24-10-1899	Lieutenant, 8-8-1902	Trfd. to 128th Pioneers, 8-8-1902.
GORDON, ALEXANDER	Asst. Surgeon, 1808	Asst. Surgeon, 1808	Attached.
GORDON, ELDRED POTTINGER	2nd Lieutenant, 21-10-1915	2nd Lieutenant, 22-11-1915	I.A.R.O.; Joined at Aziziya; F.S. Mesopotamia, 1915; Killed in action at Ctesiphon, 22-11-1915.
GORDON, GEORGE	Asst. Surgeon, 15-7-1810	Asst. Surgeon, 1-10-1814	Granted sick leave and struck off, 1-10-1814.
GORDON, ROBERT	Captain, 21-3-1800	Major, 29-3-1806	Adj.-General, Bombay Army; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I., 29-3-1806.
GORDON, ROBERT	Ensign, 5-1-1842	Captain, 29-10-1863	Adjutant, 1846-48; F.S. Punjab Campaign, 1848-49; Storming of Multan, 2-1-1849; Retired, 29-10-1863.
GORDON, THOMAS	Ensign, 20-5-1806	Captain, 15-2-1833	F.S. in Sirohi State, 1824; Capture of Tallieta, 28-2-1824; Commanded a detachment at the action of Roera, 1-3-1824; Capture of Limbuj, 4-4-1824 (Despatches); Died at Belgium of measles, 15-2-1833.
GRACEY, HUGH MALCOLM KIRKWOOD	Captain, 1-11-1919	Captain, 15-12-1919	Attached for duty from 101st Grenadiers; F.S. Waziristan, Tochi Column; Left the Regt. at Khirgi, 15-12-1919.
GRAHAM, ARCHIBALD	Surgeon, 1-7-1836	Surgeon, 21-12-1838	Trfd. to 15th Regt. N.I., 21-12-1838.
GRAHAM, ARCHIBALD WILLIAM	Ensign, 14-1-1846	Major, 11-11-1868	F.S. Punjab Campaign, Storming of Multan, 2-1-1849; Persia, 1856-57; Capture of Reshire, 9-12-1856; Capture of Bushire, 10-12-1856; Action of Khushab, 8-2-1857; Central India, 1857-59, with armed police Bn. as Superintendent of Police, Broach (wounded 18-10-1857); Trfd. to the Pay Department, 11-11-1868.



*Appointments, Transfers and Field Service  
while with the Battalion*

<i>Name</i>	<i>Joined</i>	<i>Struck off</i>	
GRANT, BARTHOLOMEW	Ensign, 8-10-1803	Lieutenant, 2-9-1811	F.S. in Gujarat and Bhurtpur, 1805; Bourbon, raid on St. Paul, 21-9-1809 (wounded); Capture of Mauritius as Bde. Quartermaster to Colonel Keating, 2-12-1810; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I., 2-9-1811. From 17th Bombay Inf.; Commandant, 12-6-1891. Retired, 12-6-1898.
GRANT, JAMES	Major, 12-6-1891	Colonel, 12-6-1898	From 24th Regt. Bombay Inf.; Trfd. to 13th Bombay Inf., 25-10-1876.
GRANT, MURRAY DOVEYTON VALENTINE TREASURE	Captain, 20-10-1875	Major, 25-10-1876	From 32nd Lancers; Served with Meywar Bhil Corps, 1906-08; Comdg. detachment of Regt. at Las Bela in Mingal Rising 1908; F.S. Mekran Expedition, 1911; Mesopotamia, 1915-18; Waziristan, 1920; Trfd. to 1/129th D.C.O. Baluch Inf., 1920.
GRANT SMITH, HERBERT	Lieutenant, 19-6-1903	Major, Sept. 1920	From 153rd Rifles; Trfd. to the Cantonment Magistrates Dept., 28-2-1922.
GEORGE HENRY			Served with the Malabar Rangers from 1806 to 1811; F.S. Southern Konkan, 1818-19; Commanded a column at capture of Bhagwantgarh, 30-3-1818; Officiating Commandant, 4-1-1825; Died at Ahmedabad of cholera, 12-4-1826.
GRAVESTON, HENRY BLAKEMAN	Captain, 2-12-1921	Captain, 28-2-1922	From 1st Bn. 2nd Regt.; Asst. Resident at Baroda; Died at Cambay, 11-12-1810.
GRAY, CHARLES	Lieutenant, 12-3-1803	Major, 12-4-1826	Apptd. Adjt. 14th Bn. Sepoys in 1783.
			From 153rd Rifles; Never joined; Trfd. to 5th Bn. 6th Rajputana Rifles, 1-10-1926.
GREENWOOD, SAMUEL	Captain, 27-6-1810	Captain, 11-12-1810	Died at Dapoli, 28-6-1828.
GREY, WILLIAM GUY, KENNETH	Ensign, 1778 Captain, 1-8-1922	Lieutenant, 1783 Captain, 1-10-1926	Trfd. to 1st Bn. 7th Regt. N.I.
GWINNETT, JAMES	Ensign, 17-8-1827	Ensign, 28-6-1828	Adjutant, 1861-64; F.S. Punjab Campaign, Storming of Multan, 2-1-1849; Persia, 1856-57; Capture of Reshire, 9-12-1856; Capture of Bushire, 10-12-1856; Action of Khushab, 8-2-1858; Central India, 1857-59; With Satpura Field Force action at Amba Pani, 11-4-1858; Malwa Field Force in pursuit of Tania Topi; Action of Rajghur, 15-9-1858; Trfd. to Central India Horse, 1-4-1866.
GWYNNE, DAVID	Ensign, 28-11-1801	Lieutenant, 19-2-1802	Trfd. to 1st Bn. 5th Regt. N.I., 1-12-1821.
HALL, JOHN DURHAM	Ensign, 17-12-1847	Captain, 1-4-1866	Attached for duty.
			From 2nd Bn. 125th Napier's Rifles; Quartermaster, 1921-24; F.S. Waziristan, 1920-21 (Despatches); Trfd. to I.A.S.C., 7-7-1926.
HALL, JOHN HAMILTON	Lieutenant, 21-6-1820	Lieutenant, 1-12-1821	From 13th Rajputs (The Shekhawati Regt.); Trfd. as 2nd in Comd. to 10th Bn. 6th Rajputana Rifles.
HALL, WILLIAM	Asst. Surgeon, 22-10-1814	Asst. Surgeon, 22-11-1814	Trfd. to the 8th Regt. N.I., 1792.
HAMILTON, ERIC WALTER HAMILTON	Lieutenant, 24-10-1920	Captain, 7-7-1926	I.A.R.O.; Acting Adjutant, 1917-19; F.S. Mesopotamia, 1917-18; Demobilized, 22-2-1919.
HAMMICK, ST. VINCENT FREDERICK	Captain, 1-6-1922	Major, 6-1-1930	
HARDING, JOHN	Lieutenant, 26-4-1789	Lieutenant, 1792	
HARPER, CUTHBERT SUTCLIFFE	2nd Lieutenant, 29-1-1917	Captain, 28-2-1919	

HARRISON, DOUGLAS CHARLES WILLIAM	Lieutenant, 18-8-1878	Major, 11-2-1895	Adjutant, 1878-86; F.S. Afghanistan, 1879-80, Defence of Kandahar, Action of Kandahar, 1-9-1880; Bde. Major, Aden, 1886; 11-2-1895; Subsequently took Holy Orders. I.A.R.O.; F.S. Mesopotamia, 1915; Action of Shaiba, 13-4-1915; Trfd. to S. and T. Corps, 1-4-1915. Attached for duty from 7th Regiment N.I. for F.S. in Southern Konkan.
HART, JOHN EDWARD ALEXANDER	2nd Lieutenant, 1-1-1915	2nd Lieutenant, 1-4-1915	
HARVEY, HARVEY AUGUSTUS	Lieutenant, March 1817	Lieutenant, Sept. 1817	
HASKET-SMITH, ERNEST ANDREW	Captain, 1919	Captain, 1921	A.D.C. to the Govr. of Bengal; Never joined the Regt.; Trfd. to Worcestershire Regt.
HASWELL, THOMAS	Lieutenant, 4-3-1797	Lieutenant, 21-12-1799	From 1st Bn. 2nd Regt.; Trfd. to Marine Bn., 1799, but remained attached for duty; F.S. in Mysore, Capture of Seringapatam, 4-5-1799.
HEATH, ROBERT	Captain, 17-1-1799	Lt.-Colonel, 16-10-1809	F.S. in Mysore, Capture of Seringapatam, 4-5-1799; Commandant, 4-12-1804 to Feb. 1806; Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 7th Regt. N.I., 16-10-1809.
HICKS, FREDERICK	Ensign, 22-2-1806	Lt.-Colonel, 2-9-1837	Adjutant of a Bn. in Peshwa's Brigade, 1813, later Commanded 3rd Bn.; Commanded the Marine Bn. from 1829 to 1833; Commanded our Bn. 1833-37; Trfd. to 7th Regt. N.I., 2-9-1837; F.S. in Kathiawar, 1807-08; Capture of Fort Kadorna. Ranaka, 26-11-1807; Battle of Kirkee (with Peshwa's Bde.), 5-11-1817; Killed in action by a cannon shot as Brigadier-General at the capture of the fort of Panhala, 2-12-1844.
HICKS, JOHN	Lieutenant, 21-3-1800	Major, 9-4-1821	F.S. in Deccan under Col. Wellesley, 1800-01; Commanded a detachment at assault and capture of Rani Bednore 17-6-1800; Dammal, 26-7-1800; Huli and Seringhi, 22-8-1800; in Wynaad, Nov. 1802 to April 1803; Sirur Field Force, 1812; Battle of Kirkee (Comdt. of a Bn. in Peshwa's Bde.), 5-11-1817; Rejoined and officiated in command of our Bn., 1820-21; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 2nd Regt., 9-4-1821.
HILL, HAROLD CHARLES ROSSITER	2nd Lieutenant, 1-1-1917	2nd Lieutenant, 30-6-1917	I.A.R.O.; Served with the Depot; Trfd. to 102nd Grenadiers, 30-6-1917.
HODGE, JOHN FURBER	2nd Lieutenant, 3-2-1917	Lieutenant, 22-2-1919	From 125th Napier's Rifles attached for F.S. Mesopotamia, 1917-18.
HODGSON, ANTHONY JOHN	Ensign, 17-1-1834	Ensign, 20-2-1834	Died in Mahableshwar Hills, 20-2-1834.
HOGG, ADAM	Lieutenant, 21-3-1800	Colonel, 30-3-1825	F.S. in Deccan under Col. Wellesley; Capture of Forts Rani, Bednore, 17-6-1800; Dammal, 26-7-1800; Huli and Seringhi, 22-8-1800; in the Wynaad, Nov. 1802-April 1803; Commandant, 1820-21; Trfd. 11th Regt. N.I., 30-3-1825.
HOLL, FREDERICK CHRISTOPHER	Ensign, 1-7-1824	Captain, 18-8-1847	F.S. in Southern Konkan against the Ramosis, 1827-28 and in 1831; Retired, 18-8-1847.
HOME, WILLIAM	Ensign, 1778	Lieutenant, 1782	F.S. in Deccan 1779; Trfd. to Bombay European Regt., 1782.

*Appointments, Transfers and Field Service  
while with the Battalion*

*Struck off*

*Joined*

**Name**  
HONNER, ROBERT  
WILLIAM

Bt.-Colonel, 1-4-1861

Ensign, 20-8-1821

Adjutant, 1826-42; Commanded the Regt., 1847-55; Commandant, 1856-61; F.S. in Mahi Kantha, Attack on Techow, 29-1-1823, and Toissow, 4-5-1823; in Sirohi State, Capture of Talleta Pass, 28-2-1824; Roera, 1-3-1824; Limbuli, 4-4-1824; Punjab Campaign, 1848-49, in command of the Regt.; Storming of Multan, 2-1-1849 (Despatches); Brevet of Lt.-Colonel; Persia, 1856-57, as Brigadier; Capture of Reshire, 9-12-1856; Bushire, 10-12-1856; Action of Khushab, 8-2-1857 (Despatches); C.B., 22-1-1858; Trfd. to 30th Regt. N.I., 1-4-1861; Maj.-General, 17-9-1861; K.C.B., 26-3-1865; Died, 8-11-1868.

Never joined.

Lieutenant, 18-1-1801

Lieutenant, 21-3-1800

HOPKINSON, CHARLES  
HOWDEN, ADAM  
HUGHES, SAMUEL

Ensign 1787  
Lt.-Colonel, 25-11-1832

Ensign, 1784

Lieutenant, 22-2-1805

No record.

F.S. Southern Konkan as acting line Adjutant; Capture of Bhagwantgarh, 29-3-1818 (Despatches); Deogarh, 19-4-1818 (Despatches); Commanded the Regt., 1827; Awarded C.B., 27-9-1831; Lt.-Colonel, 1832; Trfd. to 15th Regt. N.I., 25-11-1832.

Captain, 1-7-1849

Ensign, 5-6-1838

HUGHES, WILLIAM  
GRANT CARNAC  
HUNT, ROBERT

Lieutenant, 1795

Lieutenant, 1792

HUNTER, FREDERICK  
ERNEST

Captain, 14-11-1853

Ensign, 4-1-1845

HUNTER, JAMES

Regt., 1795.

Lieutenant, 15-4-1851

Ensign, 10-3-1840

Adjutant, 1849-51; F.S. Punjab Campaign, 1848-49, as Commandant of 2nd Division Camel Corps; Retired, 14-11-1853.

Lieutenant, 5-2-1918

2nd Lieutenant, 4-10-1917

HUSSEY, GLEN OWEN  
GILBERT

Lieutenant, 17-1-1799

Lieutenant, 1795

LIEFF, THOMAS  
INLACH, WILLIAM

Trfd. to Bombay European Regt., 17-1-1799.

F.S. in Mysore, Capture of Seringapatam, 4-5-1799; Gujarat, 1804; Commanded the Bn. in the assaults on Bhurtpur, 1805 (wounded); Bourbon, commanded detachment at raid on St. Paul, 21-9-1809; Capture of Bourbon, 3-7-1810; Capture of Mauritius, 2-12-1810; Despatches and C.B.; Commanded the Bn. in Kathiawar, 1814; Southern Konkan, 1817-18, as Commandant; Capture of Forts Seedgarh, 16-3-1818; Bhagwantgarh, 29-3-1818; Deogarh, 8-4-1818; Newty, 4-2-1819; Raree, 10-2-1819; Appd. to Command Southern Division of Gujarat, 17-12-1819; Died at Malegaon, 8-4-1822.

Asst. Surgeon, 1-4-1806

Asst. Surgeon, 29-7-1802

INVERARITY, JAMES

No record.

INWOOD, RALPH PRESTON	2nd Lieutenant, 23-10-1931	Still serving	From U.L.
IRELAND, GILBERT	Major, 1-6-1922	Major, 5-3-1931	From 123rd Outram's Rifles; Trfd. to 3rd Bn. 6th Rajputana Rifles, 5-3-1931.
JACKSON, HENRY	Ensign, 28-11-1801	Lieutenant, 19-2-1802	Trfd. to 1st Grenadier Bn. N.I., 19-2-1802.
JACKSON, JOHN THOMAS	Ensign, 3-4-1793	Lieutenant, 22-8-1794	From the Bombay European Regt.; Trfd. to 2nd European Regt., 22-8-1794.
JAMES, CHARLES BUTLER	Ensign, 3-9-1802	Colonel, 8-4-1867	F.S. in Gujarat and assault on Bhurtpur, 1805; Appd. Colonel, 6-1-1847; Commanded Northern Konkan, 1851; On furlo. in Europe till struck off the strength, 8-4-1867.
JAMES, FRANK HARLEY	2nd Lieutenant, 23-1-1904	Lt.-Colonel, 24-9-1930	From U.L.; Adjutant, 1908-12; Adjutant Bombay Vol. Rifles, 1912-14; Commandant, 1926-30; Served with Las Bela Column in Mengal rising 1908; F.S. Mekran Expedition, 1911; Commanded Volunteer Maxim Gun Coy. in East Africa, 1914-17 (Despatches, M.C.); Mesopotamia, 1917-18 (Despatches); Waziristan, 1919-22 (Despatches, O.B.E.); Retired, 24-9-1930.
JAMESON, GEORGE INGLIS	Lieutenant, 30-6-1821	Lt.-Colonel, 29-10-1855	From 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I.; Adjutant, 1822-26; F.S. in Sirohi State as Bde. Major; Capture of Limbuj, 4-4-1824 (Despatches); Deputy Military Auditor-General, 1832-52; Military Auditor-General, 1852-55; Trfd. to 3rd European Regt., 29-10-1855.
JOHNSON, CHARLES	Lieutenant, 1-11-1819	Lieutenant, 24-11-1823	F.S. Beni Boo Ali, 1820-21; Quartermaster, 1821-23; Trfd. as Adjutant to 3rd Regt. N.I., 1823.
JOHNSON, LEWIS FURNEAUX	Ensign, 24-11-1845	Lieutenant, 13-3-1855	F.S. Punjab Campaign, 1848-49; Storming of Multan, 2-1-1849; Trfd. to the Invalid Establishment, 13-3-1855.
JONES, ELHANNAN WINCHESTER	Lieutenant, 24-7-1821	Lieutenant, 2-10-1824	Trfd. to 3rd Regt. N.I.
JONES, GEORGE	Lieutenant, 5-1-1777	Lieutenant, May 1779	F.S. Deccan, 1779.
JONES, LOUIS	2nd Lieutenant, 12-1-1917	Actg. Captain, Feb. 1919	From 123rd Outram's Rifles; F.S. Mesopotamia, 1917-18; to Vladivostok to join Knox's Mission, Feb. 1919; Subsequently rejoined his own Regt. I.M.S.; Trfd. to Civil Employment, 11-4-1910.
KAMAT, DWARKANATH DHARMAJI	Lieutenant, 30-8-1908	Captain, 11-4-1910	From 1st Brahmans, attached for F.S. Waziristan, 1920-21.
KELLIE, CHARLES CHAMPION JEROME	Captain, 1920	Captain, 1-1-1922	Commandant, 1821-24; F.S., Commanded the force in Sirohi State, 1824; Capture of Talleeta, 28-2-1824; Limbuj, 14-4-1824; Trfd. as Comdt. to 13th Regt. N.I.
KEMP, GEORGE REES	Lieutenant, 18-12-1799	Lt.-Colonel, 7-6-1824	Judge-Advocate-General; Died in Bombay, 29-12-1846.
KENNEDY, VANS	Captain, 22-1-1812	Colonel, 29-12-1846	Adjutant, 1890-91; Burma Mil. Police, 1891-93; Trfd. to 12th Napier's Rifles, 5-4-1903.
KEOWN, JOHN CHARRIER	Lieutenant, 27-12-1887	Major, 5-4-1903	I.A.R.O.; F.S. Mesopotamia, 1915-16; Attached 125th Rifles (Despatches) and M.C.; Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 124th Baluchistan Inf., 1918.
KIDDLE, JOHN ARTHUR COPLESTON	2nd Lieutenant, 1915	Lieutenant, 1918	

*Appointments, Transfers and Field Service while with the Battalion*

<i>Name</i>	<i>Joined</i>	<i>Struck off</i>	<i>Appointments, Transfers and Field Service while with the Battalion</i>
KILKELLY, PATRICK PERCY	Surg. Captain, 24-2-1898	Surg. Captain, 21-12-1898	I.M.S. from 4th Poona Horse for F.S. in East Africa, 1898, against the Ogaden Somalis (Despatches); Rejoined 4th Poona Horse, 21-12-1898.
KING, GEORGE	Captain, March 1918	Captain, 28-3-1919	R.A.M.C.; joined at Annara; F.S. Mesopotamia, 1918; Left the Regt. on its return from Mesopotamia, 28-3-1919.
KING, REGINALD MAURICE	Lieutenant, 4-10-1920	Lieutenant, 1-5-1922	On probation for I.A.; Relinquished Commission, 1-5-1922.
KINNERSLEY, ISAAC	Ensign, 1-10-1798	Lieutenant, 21-12-1799	F.S. in Mysore; Capture of Seringapatam, 4-5-1799; Trfd. to European Regt.
KNOCKER, JOHN BEDDINGFIELD	Lieutenant, Nov. 1920	Lieutenant, 19-5-1922	From 1/125th Napier's Rifles; Acting Adjutant, 1921-22; F.S. Waziristan, 1921 (Despatches); Demobilized, 19-5-1922.
KRIKENBECK, RONALD EDWARD ELLIOTT	2nd Lieutenant, 6-3-1894	Lieutenant, 16-7-1898	Trfd. to 19th Bo. Inf., 16-7-1898.
KUKDA, KRISHNAJI VISHNOO	Surgeon Lieutenant, Feb. 1898	Surgeon Lieutenant, Dec. 1898	I.M.S.; Attached for duty on F.S. in East Africa, 1898, against Ogaden Somalis.
LACEY, THOMAS	Ensign, 9-9-1800	Lieutenant, 1801	No record.
LAMOTTE, HENRY JOHN	Ensign, 15-11-1822	Ensign, 1-2-1826	Died in Bombay, 1-2-1826.
LANGSTON, JOHN	Ensign, 16-7-1842	Lt.-Colonel, 6-1-1867	F.S. Punjab Campaign, 1848-49; Storming of Multan, 2-1-1849; Persia, 1856-57; Central India, 1857-58; With Satpura Field Force, commanded a column in the action at Amba Pani, 11-4-1858 (thanks of Government); Malwa Field Force in pursuit of Tantia Topi; Action of Rajghur, 15-9-1858; Action at Rajpur, 24-11-1858; Trfd. to General Duty, 6-1-1867.
LARKINS, THOMAS BROOKES	Asst. Surgeon, 18-12-1841	Asst. Surgeon, 24-6-1845	Trfd. to 2nd Grenadier Regt. N.I., 24-6-1845.
LAURIE, JOSEPH	Lieutenant, April 1810	Lieutenant, 1812	From 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I.; Retr transferred to same Bn., 1812.
LAWRENCE, HARRIS ANDERSON	Ensign, 7-6-1824	Lieutenant, 25-9-1831	F.S. in Southern Konkan against the Ramosis, 1827-28; Died in Bombay, 25-9-1831.
LECKIE, OTWAY TREVOR McRITCHIE	2nd Lieutenant, 18-4-1903	Captain, 13-4-1915	From U.L.; Malay States Guides, 1906-09; F.S. Mekran Expedition as Signaling Officer, 1911; Mesopotamia, 1914-15; Actions of Saihan, 15-11-1914; Sahil, 17-11-1914; Qurna, 4 to 7-12-1914; Killed in action at Shaiba, 13-4-1915.
LEMON, GUY TALBOT	2nd Lieutenant, March 1915	Major, 1920	I.A.R.O.; joined in Shaiba; F.S. Mesopotamia, 1915; Actions of Shaiba, 12 to 14-4-1915, as Orderly Officer to General Melliss, V.C. (Despatches); Ctesiphon, 22-11-1915 (wounded); Attached A.H.Q. India, Q.M.G.'s Branch, 9-9-1916; (Despatches, O.B.E.); Demobilized, 1920.
LEWIS, ROBERT LITHGOW, JAMES	Colonel, 7-6-1824 Lieutenant, 18-12-1799	Colonel, 4-9-1837 Lieutenant, 12-3-1800	Died in Europe, 4-9-1837. Trfd. to Bombay European Regt., 1800.

LIVINGSTON, ANDREW	Ensign, 13-10-1798	Ensign, 20-5-1800	F.S. in Mysore; Capture of Seringapatam, 4-5-1799; Died in Bombay, 20-5-1800.
LLEWELLIN, JOHN	Asst. Surgeon, 1814	Asst. Surgeon, Oct. 1815	Trfd. to the Pioneer Bn., Oct. 1815.
LLOYD, THOMAS	Ensign, 20-5-1807	Lieutenant, 9-5-1811	F.S. in Persian Gulf, 1809-10; Capture of Ras-el-Khaimah, 13-11-1809; Left, 27-11-1809; Shinaas, 3-1-1810; Cashiered by sentence of G.C.M., 9-5-1811. I.A.R.O.; Posted to the Bn. during the Siege of Kut al Amara; Died as a Prisoner of War in Kashtamuni, Aug. 1916.
LOCK, ARTHUR CUTHBERT	2nd Lieutenant, 24-12-1915	2nd Lieutenant, 1-8-1916	F.S. in Mysore; Capture of Seringapatam, 4-5-1799 (wounded in the assault); in the Deccan under Col. Wellesley, 1800-01; Commanded our Bn. at capture of Forts Huili and Seringui, 22-8-1800 (Despatches); A.Q.M.G. Poona Subsidiary Force, 1807-10; Died at Sea, 13-9-1811.
LOCK, JEREMIAH	Lieutenant, 7-4-1796	Major, 13-9-1811.	F.S. in Persia, 1856-57; Capture of Reshire, 9-12-1856; Bushire, 10-12-1856; Action of Khushab, 8-2-1857; Died at Mhow, 24-10-1862.
LODWICK, FREDERICK	Asst. Surgeon, 14-6-1855	Surg. Major, 24-10-1862	From 3rd Regt. N.I. as Commandant; Town Major, Bombay, 22-3-1831; Trfd. to 11th Regt. N.I., 30-3-1832.
LODWICK, PETER	Lt.-Colonel, 3-12-1830	Lt.-Colonel, 30-3-1832	Quartermaster and Interpreter, 1833-37; Adjutant, 1843-44; F.S. in Southern Konkan, 1829-30; Invalided and posted to Native Veteran Bn., 30-7-1846.
LUCAS, CLAUD CLIFTON	Ensign, 23-9-1826	Captain, 30-7-1846	Attached from 1st Bn. 3rd Regt. N.I. for F.S. in Southern Konkan; Capture of Newty, 4-2-1819; Raree, 10-2-1819; Rejoined his own Bn., 26-9-1819. Died at sea, 10-11-1824.
LYONS, HUMPHREY	Lieutenant, 7-12-1818	Lieutenant, 26-9-1819	I.A.R.O.; Served with the Depot.
MCCALLUM, JAMES	Ensign, 6-3-1812	Captain, 10-11-1824	On duty with Mopla Bn., 1796; F.S. in Mysore, Capture of Seringapatam, 4-5-1799; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 5th Regt., 1799.
MCDONALD, DONALD CHARLES	2nd Lieutenant, 1918	2nd Lieutenant, 1919	Attached for duty.
MCDONALD, ROBERT	Lieutenant, 7-4-1796	Lieutenant, 1799	From East Lancashire Regt.; Quartermaster, 1907-09; F.S. Mesopotamia, 1914-16; Action of Shaiban, 15-11-1914 (wounded). Despatches, Brevet of Major, Mil. Sec. to G.O.C. in Mesopotamia, 1915-16; Asst. Mil. Sec. A.H.Q. India, 1917-18 (Despatches), C.I.E.; Trfd. as Commandant to 3rd Bn. 6th Rajputana Rifles, 31-3-1925.
McKENZIE, George JOHN	Asst. Surgeon, 21-4-1855	Asst. Surgeon, 16-6-1855	From 1st Bn. 8th Regt. N.I. attached for F.S. in Southern Konkan, 1817; Rejoined his Regt., 8-11-1817.
MACLEAN, GEORGE GILBERT CRESWICK	2nd Lieutenant, 20-12-1904	Major, 31-3-1925	Died at sea <i>en route</i> to India, Oct. 1843.
McMAHON, BERNARD	Lieutenant, 17-1-1817	Lieutenant, 8-11-1817	F.S. in Deccan 1779.
McMORRIS, JOHN	Surgeon, 23-1-1839	Surgeon, 20-10-1843	
McPHERSON, KENNETH	Lieutenant, 1778	Lieutenant, 1799	

Name	Joined	Struck off	<i>Appointments, Transfers and Field Service while with the Battalion</i>	
			Posted as	Trfd. in same appointment to
McRAE, D.S.O., O.B.E., HENRY ST. GEORGE MURRAY	Lt.-Colonel, 1-4-1922	Lt.-Colonel, 8-5-1922	Commandant;	11th Sikh Regt., 8-5-1922.
MADGET, JAMES MANNERS, CHARLES MOLYNEUX SANDYS	Ensign, 1778 2nd Lieutenant, 8-3-1906	Ensign, 1779 Still serving	F.S. in Deccan, 1779. From U.L.; F.S. Mekran Expedition, 1911 (Despatches); Mesopotamia, 1914-16; Actions of Sahil, 17-11-1914; Shaiba, 13-4-1915, Kut al Amara, 28-9-1915; Ctesiphon, 22 to 24-11-1915; Siege of Kut al Amara in Command of the Regt. (Despatches, D.S.O., M.C.); Prisoner of War in Turkey; Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 6th Rajputana Rifles, 1922. Appointed Colonel 26-8-1938.	
MANSON, ALEXANDER ROBINSON	Ensign, 2-5-1840	Colonel, 6-12-1864	Quartermaster and Interpreter, 1844-48; Adjutant, 1848-49; Commanding Officer, 1856-64; F.S. Punjab Campaign as Adjutant; Storming of Multan, 2-1-1849; Persia, 1856-57, as Commanding Officer; Capture of Reshire, 9-12-1856; Bushire, 10-12-1856; Action of Khushab, 8-2-1857; Central India, 1857-59; in Command of Regt. Malwa Field Force in pursuit of Tantia Topi, action of Rajghur, 15-9-1858; Maj.-Genl., 17-5-1869; Lt.-Genl., 1-10-1877; Genl., 28-8-1884; Died, 28-4-1900.	
MARSHALL, FRANK WALTER MORTON MARSHALL, THOMAS	2nd Lieutenant, 30-12-1902 Lt.-Colonel, 12-4-1797	2nd Lieutenant, 19-3-1903 Lt.-Colonel, 30-1-1801	From 2nd Bn. The Royal Scots; Trfd. to 29th Baluch Inf., 19-3-1903. Posted from Marine Bn. as Commandant; F.S. in Mysore in Command of the Regt.; Capture of Seringapatam, 4-5-1799; Trfd. to Bombay European Regt., 30-1-1801. Attached for F.S. in Southern Konkan, 1819; Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 10th Regt. N.I., 27-5-1819.	
MARSHALL, THOMAS MARSHALL, WALTER	Lieutenant, 7-12-1818 Lieutenant, 10-7-1867	Lieutenant, 27-5-1819 Major, 8-4-1881	From Staff Corps; F.S. Afghanistan, 1879-80; Defence of Kandahar, 1 to 24-8-1880; Trfd. to 25th Native L.I., 8-4-1881.	
MARSHALL, WILLIAM	Ensign, 1-10-1798	Ensign, 21-12-1799	F.S. in Mysore; Capture of Seringapatam, 4-5-1799; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 1st Regt. N.I.	
MARTIN, JAMES	Lieutenant, 17-1-1799	Lieutenant, 18-12-1799	F.S. in Mysore; Capture of Seringapatam, 4-5-1799; Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 4th Regt.	
MASON, WILLIAM	Lieutenant, 1788	Lieutenant, 1792	On leave at St. Helena and never joined; Trfd. to 1st Grenadier Bn. 1st Regt. N.I., 1792.	
MAUDE, EDWIN	Ensign, 23-11-1844	Lt.-Colonel, 29-7-1862	Quartermaster and Interpreter, 1848-51; F.S. Punjab Campaign, 1848-49; Storming of Multan, 2-1-1849; Persia, 1856-57; Capture of Reshire, 9-12-1856; Bushire, 10-12-1856; Action of Khushab, 8-2-1857; Central India, 1857-59; with Satpura Field Force; Action at Bheelwara, 19-2-1858; Malwa Field Force in pursuit of Tantia Topi as A.D.C. to Genl. Michel, C.B.; Actions of Rajghur, Mungrowli, Sindwaho, Kurai (Despatches); Trfd. to H.M.'s 109th Foot, 29-7-1862; Died, 30-3-1908.	

MAYNE, JOHN	Lieutenant, 8-1-1800	Lieutenant, 12-3-1800	From 1st Bn. 3rd Regt. N.I.; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 7th Regt. N.I., 12-3-1800.
MEALY, WILLIAM	Lieutenant, 1794	Major, 3-10-1811	F.S. in the Wynaad, 1797, in command of a detachment; in Mysore, Capture of Seringapatam, 4-5-1799; in Deccan under Honble. Col. Wellesley, 1800-01; in Wynaad, 1802-03; Trfd. to Invalid Bn. F.S. in Wynaad, 1797 (wounded); in Mysore, Capture of Seringapatam, 4-5-1799; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I., 1799; Died at Karanjah, 21-8-1814. Trfd. to the 2nd Regt. N.I. Grenadiers, 27-7-1869. Trfd. to the Political Department, 14-3-1889.
MELLINCHAMP, CHARLES	Lieutenant, 1794	Lieutenant, 18-12-1799	Trfd. to the 13th Regt. N.I., 28-3-1876.
MELLIS, HOWARD MEREWETHER, HERBERT DUNCAN	2nd Lieutenant, 21-4-1869 Lieutenant, 8-10-1886	2nd Lieutenant, 27-7-1869 Lieutenant, 14-3-1889	Died at Tellicherry, 18-2-1803. From Bombay European Regt.; To Europe on furlough, 1869.
MIGNON, GEORGE STRACHAN	Major, 7-11-1874	Major, 28-3-1876	Trfd. to Bombay European Regt., 13-12-1814. Trfd. to Civil Employ., 17-5-1888.
MILES, WILLIAM MILLER, THOMAS	Ensign, 31-5-1800 Asst. Surgeon, 29-9-1866	Lieutenant, 18-2-1803 Surgeon, 13-10-1869	Posted as Adjutant, 1789; F.S. in Deccan and Mysore, 1791-92; Siege of Dharwar, Jan. to April 1791; Capture of Hooley Onore, 21-12-1791 (wounded); Simoga, 29-12-1791 (wounded); Trfd. to 1st Bn. 4th Regt. N.I., 1797.
MITCHELL, DONALD MONKS, CHARLES MOOR, EDWARD	Ensign, 3-5-1814 Surgeon, 27-5-1881 Lieutenant, 1789	Lieutenant, 13-12-1814 Surgeon, 17-5-1888 Captain, 1797	From 3rd Regt. N.I. (never joined); Promoted Colonel and struck off, 4-8-1849.
MOORE, GEORGE	Lt.-Colonel, 30-7-1849	Colonel, 4-8-1849	Trfd. to the Bombay European Regt., 18-12-1799. Adjutant, 1844-46; Died in Bombay, 28-1-1854.
MORLEY, JOHN MORRIS, ARTHUR MORSE, JAMES	Lieutenant, 17-1-1799 Ensign, 11-7-1838 Lt.-Colonel, 1-3-1828	Lieutenant, 18-12-1799 Captain, 28-1-1854 Lt.-Colonel, 3-12-1830	From 13th Regt. N.I. (on furlough in Europe, never joined); Trfd. to 3rd Regt. N.I., 3-12-1830.
MOSS, ARTHUR HENRY EYRE	2nd Lieutenant, 1-12-1868	Lieutenant, 1-4-1900	From Durham L.I.; Trfd. to 9th Bombay Inf., 1-4-1900.
MOWBRAV, CHARLES HOLME	2nd Lieutenant, 2-1-1900	2nd Lieutenant, 1-4-1900	Trfd. to 10th Bombay L.I., 1-4-1900.
MULRAJ SINGH, KUMAR SHRI	Lieutenant, 23-10-1919	Lieutenant, 1-6-1920	Joined at Bannu for F.S. in Waziristan; Tochi Column, 1919; Derajat Column, 1920; Demobilized, 1-6-1920.
MUNRO, CHARLES	2nd Lieutenant, 15-11-1853	2nd Lieutenant, 3-1-1855	Died on board s.s. <i>Esuine</i> , en route to England, 3-1-1855.
MUNROE, CHARLES	2nd Lieutenant, 15-12-1915	2nd Lieutenant, 1916	From Indian Cavalry and Royal Flying Corps attached for duty during the siege of Kut al Amara.
NALDER, JAMES NEAL, DENIS NEPEAN, HERBERT EYAN CHARLES BAYLEY	Ensign, 1777 2nd Lieutenant, 24-10-1932 Major, 3-4-1906	Ensign, 20-3-1778 Still serving Major, 8-1-1910	Died at Surat, 20-3-1778. From U.I. From 108th Infantry and Moplah Rifles; Trfd. to 125th Napier's Rifles, 17-2-1909.
NESSBITT, ROBERT	Lieutenant, 1782	Lieutenant, 1787	F.S. in Malabar, 1783; Capture of Mangalore, 9-3-1783; Siege of Bednore, 9 to 28-4-1783; Prisoner of War, at Chitaldrug, 1783-84.



## HISTORY OF THE 1st BATTALION

*Appointments, Transfers and Field Service while with the Battalion*

<i>Name</i>	<i>Joined</i>	<i>Struck off</i>	
NIVEN, WILLIAM NODING, JAMES	Asst. Surgeon, 30-10-1862 2nd Lieutenant, 24-7-1849	Lieutenant, 24-6-1861	No record. F.S. Central India, 1857-59; Satpura Field Force, actions at Digrus, 20-12-1857, Mandwar, 21-1-1858 (his horse twice wounded), Bheelwara, 19-2-1858; Malwa Field Force, in pursuit of Tantia Topi, action of Rajghur, 15-9-1858 (got sunstroke owing to excessive heat); Invalided and retired, 24-6-1861. 123rd Outram's Rifles attached for service in Mesopotamia, 1915; Actions of Kut al Amara, 28-9-1915, Ctesiphon (wounded), 22 to 24-11-1915. From the Machine Gun Corps; Adjutant of Depot at Mhow; Demobilized, 1922. Joined at Nasirya; F.S. Mesopotamia, 1917-18; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 10th Jats, 28-9-1918. 123rd Outram's Rifles, attached for service with Mekran Expedition, 1911. Trfd. to 1st Bn. 39th Garhwal Rifles, 15-9-1902.
NORRIS, ARTHUR KENNETH	Captain, May 1915	Captain, 25-11-1915	Malabar Translator, 1798; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 2nd Regt., 17-1-1799. Quartermaster and Interpreter, 1824; F.S. in Sirohi State, 1824; Capture of Talleeta, 28-2-1824; Roera, 1-3-1824; Limbuj, 4-4-1824; Trfd. 26th Regt. N.I., 10-9-1826. From 26th Regt. N.I.; Never joined, was Resident at Satara; Trfd. to 1st Bombay European Regt., 21-1-1845. Malabar Translator and A.D.C. to General Bowles; died, 8-1-1797.
NORTON, CHARLES EDGAR	Captain, 1921	Captain, 1922	No record. From 2nd Bn. 5th Regt. N.I.; Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 5th Regt. N.I., 12-3-1800.
O'CONNOR, MICHAEL JOSEPH	2nd Lieutenant, 11-9-1917	Lieutenant, 28-9-1918	I.A.R.O.; Served with the Depot; Demobilized, 1919.
ODELL, WILLIAM	Lieutenant, 6-4-1911	Lieutenant, 8-5-1911	F.S. in Decan, 1779; Apptd. Lt.-Colonel, 1806, but never joined; Retired, 23-12-1806. Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 7th Regt. N.I., 1-1-1815.
ORTON, SIDNEY BERNARD	2nd Lieutenant, 24-2-1902	2nd Lieutenant, 15-9-1902	Attached for duty to the 2nd Light Cavalry, 1822-23; Trfd. to 3rd Regt. N.I., 7-6-1824.
OSBORNE, HUGH	Lieutenant, 7-4-1796	Lieutenant, 17-1-1799	8th Regt. N.I. attached for F.S. in Southern Konkan, commanded a column at Capture of Bhagwantgarh, 30-3-1818; Ramgarh, 6-4-1818; Rejoined own Bn. 30-9-1819; Apptd. Lt.-Colonel, 25-11-1832, did not join; Died, 9-7-1833.
OTTLEY, THOMAS HENRY	Lieutenant, 30-5-1821	Lieutenant, 16-9-1826	Attached; Trfd. to 106th Bombay Light Inf., 30-7-1862.
OVANS, CHARLES	Lt.-Colonel, 20-11-1838	Lt.-Colonel, 21-1-1845	
PAGE, ROBERT	Lieutenant, 7-4-1796	Lieutenant, 8-1-1797	
PARKHOUSE, PHILIP PARKHURST, LE GENDRE	Ensign, 20-8-1821 Lieutenant, 18-12-1799	Ensign, 1822 Lieutenant, 12-3-1800	
PARRY, BERNARD KING	2nd Lieutenant, 1918	2nd Lieutenant, 1919	
PATTERSON, JAMES	Ensign, 1778	Lt.-Colonel, 23-12-1806	
PAUL, GEORGE JOHN CHERRY	Ensign, 5-12-1814	Ensign, 1-1-1815	
PAYNE, RENÉ	Lieutenant, 18-9-1822	Lieutenant, 7-6-1824	
PEARSON, EDWARD	Captain, 17-1-1817	Lt.-Colonel, 9-7-1833	
PRYTON, EDWARD GILBERT	Ensign, 5-10-1859	Lieutenant, 30-7-1862	

PRYTON, C.M.G., WESTROPP JOSEPH	Lieutenant, 22-2-1884	Lieutenant, 11-11-1886	From The Welch Regt.; Quartermaster, 1886; Trfd. to 3rd Cavalry, 11-11-1886.
PIKE, CHARLES SEPTIMUS	Lieutenant, 20-3-1902	Lieutenant, 3-12-1902	From West Yorkshire Regt.; Trfd. to 7th Bombay Pioneers, 3-12-1902.
PIKE, HENRY	Lieutenant, 3-5-1814	Lieutenant, 1-12-1814	From the Bn. European Regt.; Retrferred to Bo. European Regt., 1-12-1814.
PILGRIM, HENRY GUY ELLCOCK	2nd Lieutenant, 28-5-1915		I.A.R.O.; Served at the Depot.
PINTO, JOHN SEBASTIAN	Lieutenant, 9-8-1920	Captain, 1-1-1922	I.M.S.; Joined at Bannu; F.S. Waziristan, 1919-21; Tochi Column, 1919; Mahsud, 1919-20 (Despatches) O.B.E.
PIYCAIRN, VICTOR	2nd Lieutenant, 18-3-1855	2nd Lieutenant, 1-10-1856	Resigned his Commission, 1-10-1856.
ROBERT POLLOCK, RALPH	2nd Lieutenant, 2-7-1904	2nd Lieutenant, 3-10-1904	From The Cheshire Regt.; Trfd. to 51st Sikhs, 3-10-1904.
CHARLES GEOFFREY POWELL, BURDETT	Ensign, 21-3-1833	Ensign, 17-1-1834	Trfd. to 26th Regt. N.I., 17-1-1834.
RICHARD PRICE, AUGUSTUS	Ensign, 3-3-1834	Major, 22-12-1855	Adjutant of the Sawantwari Local Corps, 1841-45; 22-12-1855.
			2nd in Command same Corps, 1845; Invalided, F.S. in Deccan and Mysore, 1791; Siege of Dharwar, Sept. 1790-April 1791 (wounded and lost a leg); Apptd. Garrison Quartermaster, Surat, 1792; Judge-Advocate-General, 1795; Became a renowned Oriental Scholar, publishing many books on Indian History and Literature.
PRICE, DAVID	Lieutenant, Nov. 1788	Lieutenant, April 1791	From 126th Baluch Inf. for duty on F.S. in Waziristan, 1919-20; Tochi Column, 1919; Mahsud, 1919-20; Rejoined own Bn. Oct. 1920.
PRINGLE, JOHN HEDLEY	Captain, Oct. 1919	Captain, Oct. 1920	F.S. in Southern Konkan against the Ramosis, 1827-28; Trfd. to 27th Regt. N.I., 21-1-1846.
PROTHIER, CHARLES WILLIAM	Ensign, 23-1-1827	Captain, 21-1-1846	Joined the Bn. for duty at Marjana, 14-11-1918; Quartermaster, 1918-19; Demobilized, 17-9-1919.
PUGH, THOMAS EDWIN	Lieutenant, 14-11-1918	Lieutenant, 17-9-1919	I.A.R.O.; Posted for duty during the Siege of Kut al Amara; Prisoner of War.
PUNCHARD, FRANK NORRIS	2nd Lieutenant, 24-12-1915	Lieutenant, 30-4-1916	From 5th Bn. 6th Rajputana Rifles; Commandant 1936-.
QUAYLE, GERALD ARDIS	Captain, 21-12-1923	Still serving	From 6th Regt. N.I.; Adjutant 1886-87; F.S. East Africa, 1898, in command of H.Q. Wing against the Ogaaden Somalis (Despatches, Brilliant Star of Zanzibar); Commandant, 1898-1905.
QUENTIN, WALTER	Lieutenant, 3-3-1882	Lt.-Colonel, 3-9-1905	F.S. in Kathiawar, 1815-16; in Southern Konkan, 1818-19; Capture of Bhagwanagarh, 30-3-1818 (Despatches); Quartermaster and Interpreter, 1820-21; Died at Baroda, 20-5-1821.
RABAN, CHARLES BASSETT	Ensign, 15-11-1814	Lieutenant, 20-5-1821	F.S. in Deccan and Mysore, 1791; Siege of Dharwar, Jan.-April, 1791; Capture of Doridrug, 13-7-1791 (wounded and lost an arm).
RAE, ROBERT	Lieutenant, 1790	Lieutenant, 1792	

<i>Name</i>	<i>Joined</i>	<i>Struck off</i>	<i>Appointments, Transfers and Field Service while with the Battalion</i>
RAMSAY, JOHN SKARDON	Lieutenant, 30-5-1821	Captain, 9-10-1839	F.S. in Southern Konkan against the Ramosis, 1827-28; and in 1829-30; Trfd. to the 2nd Bombay European Regt., 9-10-1839.
RAWLINS, HENRY SEBASTIAN	Captain, 13-3-1930	Captain, 29-10-1930	From 2nd Bn. 6th Rajputana Rifles, attached for duty at Ahmedabad.
RECKIN, GUSTAV	Lieutenant, 1919	Lieutenant, 17-9-1919	I.A.R.O.; Demobilized, 17-9-1919.
REID, WALTER CLARKE	2nd Lieutenant, 12-2-1904	2nd Lieutenant, 12-4-1904	From U.L.; Trfd. to 32nd Lancers, 12-4-1904.
REINHOLD, HERMANN EDWARD	2nd Lieutenant, 25-4-1901	2nd Lieutenant, 31-1-1902	Trfd. to 27th Punjab Inf., 31-1-1902.
RENDALL, JOHN CHARLES SHUTTLE- WORTH	Lieutenant, 9-1-1904	Lieutenant, 29-9-1904	Trfd. to Supply and Transport Corps, 29-9-1904.
REYNOLDS, CHARLES	Lieutenant, 1779	Colonel, 1805	F.S. in Gujarat, 1780; Capture of Dabhoi, 20-1-1780 (wounded, despatches); Had a distinguished career as Surveyor-General; Maj.-General, 25-7-1810; Lt.-General, 4-6-1814; Died at Cheltenham, 24-6-1819.
RICHARDSON, JOHN BRINSON	Ensign, 1-9-1805	Ensign, 12-10-1807	F.S. in Kathiawar, 1807; Died at Gootoo, 12-10-1807.
RIDDELL, JOHN	Captain, 18-9-1788	Major, 30-9-1794	Appointed Commandant on reorganization as 9th Bn. in 1788; F.S. in Deccan and Mysore, 1791; Siege of Dharwar, Jan.-April 1791; Capture of Doridrug, 13-7-1791; Hooley Onore, 21-12-1791; Simoga, 29-12-1791; Trfd. to 1st Bn. Bombay European Regt., 30-9-1794.
RIND, ALEXANDER	Ensign, 20-4-1811	Lieutenant, 13-6-1821	Attached to Resident at Poona's Escort, 1815-17; attached to Poona Auxiliary Horse, 1817-21; F.S. Battle of Kirkee; Died at Bombay, 13-6-1821.
RINGROSE, THOMAS RITCHIE, DAVID	Lieutenant, 1783 Surgeon, 21-1-1846	Lieutenant, 1787 Surgeon, 5-9-1855	No record. F.S. Punjab Campaign; Storming of Multan, 2-1-1849; Sick leave to Europe, 1855.
ROBERTSON, ARCHIBALD	Lt.-Colonel, 30-3-1825	Lt.-Colonel, 9-2-1828	Never joined; Collector of Kandesh, 1825-27; Resident at Satara, 1827-28; Trfd. to 13th Regt. N.I. Exchanged into 21st Regt. N.I., Sept. 1852.
ROBERTSON, THOMAS FORBES	2nd Lieutenant, 15-4-1851	2nd Lieutenant, Sept. 1852	No record.
ROBESON, THOMAS	Asst. Surgeon, 1809	Asst. Surgeon, 1809	Joined at Banu for F.S. in Waziristan; Action at Shinki Tangi, 22-10-1919 (wounded).
ROBINS, M.C., RICHARD TERENCE,	Lieutenant, Oct. 1919	Lieutenant, 22-10-1919	Doing duty with Pioneer Bn., 1825-27; F.S. in Southern Konkan against the Ramosis in Command of our Regt., 1827-28; Died at Sea, 19-4-1841.
ROBINSON, GEORGE COLLINGS	Lieutenant, 1-11-1819	Captain, 19-4-1841	F.S. in Deccan, 1779.
ROMNEY, JAMES	Ensign, 1778	No record	Tempy Comm. I.A.; Demobilized, 17-9-1919
ROPE, CECIL	2nd Lieutenant, 1919	2nd Lieutenant, 17-9-1919	F.S. in Afghanistan, 1879-80; Defence of Kandahar, 1879-80; Retired, 28-3-1881.
ROSS, CHARLES GRANT HOPE	Surgeon, 17-11-1869	Surgeon-Major, 28-3-1881	Action of Kandahar, 1-9-1880; Retired, 28-3-1881.
ROY, JAMES	Asst. Surgeon, 2-1-1815	Asst. Surgeon, 20-7-1819	Died at Juria Bandar, 20-7-1819.
RUDLAND, HENRY	Lieutenant, 18-12-1799	Lieutenant, 21-3-1800	Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 8th Regt. N.I., 21-3-1800.

RYAN, ANTHONY	Ensign, 13-4-1797	Ensign, 21-12-1799	F.S. in Mysore; Capture of Seringapatam, 4-5-1799. Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 4th Regt. N.I., 21-12-1799.
RYDER, THOMAS	Ensign, 19-8-1847	2nd Lieutenant, 15-11-1853.	F.S. in Punjab Campaign, 1848-49; Storming of Multan, 2-1-1849; Trfd. to 3rd Bn. Bo. European Regt., 15-11-1853.
SANDIFORD, WILLIAM THOMAS	Captain, 7-4-1796	Captain, 14-1-1799	Resigned his Commission, 14-1-1799.
SANGSTER, ALFRED BRUCE	Lieutenant, 7-1-1888	Captain, 11-5-1903	From Yorkshire L. Inf.; Quartermaster, 1891; Trfd. to Cantonment Magistrates Dept., 11-5-1903.
SANGSTER, DAVID JAMES KILGOUR	2nd Lieutenant, 12-12-1857	Lieutenant, 29-7-1862	From 23rd Regt. L. Inf.; F.S. Central India, 1858; Malwa Field Force; Action of Rajghur, 15-9-1858; Trfd. to H.M.'s 106th Regt., 29-7-1862.
SANGSTER, THOMAS HENRY	2nd Lieutenant, 8-10-1856	Lieutenant, 29-7-1862	From 7th Regt. N.I.; F.S. Persia, 1856-57; Capture of Reshire, 9-12-1856; Bushire, 10-12-1856; Action of Khushab, 8-2-1857; Appointed Interpreter to 72nd Highlanders, 1861; Trfd. to H.M.'s 106th Regt., 29-7-1862.
SANSOM, HENRY JONATHAN	2nd Lieutenant, 12-1-1917	2nd Lieutenant, April 1918	From 1st Bn. 123rd Outram's Rifles; Rejoined his Bn. with a draft.
SARGENT, WILLIAM PATRICK MILLER	Captain, 7-12-1913	Lt.-Colonel, 7-11-1921	From 123rd Outram's Rifles; F.S. Mesopotamia, 1914-15; Action of Saiban, 15-11-1914; Sahil, 17-11-1914; Qurna, 4 to 7-12-1914; Shaiba, 13-4-1915; Waziristan, 1919-21 (with 2nd Bn. 11th Rajputs) (Despatches); Died, 7-11-1921.
SARNEY, BENJAMIN SAUNDERS, THOMAS HENRY	Lieutenant, 18-12-1799	Lieutenant, 21-3-1800	No record.
SAVAGE, CHARLES	2nd Lieutenant, 10-11-1918	Lieutenant, 17-9-1919	Tempy. Comm. I.A.; from 2nd Bn. 56th Rifles; Demobilized, 17-9-1919.
SAWDY, ALFRED EUSTACE LEON	Ensign, 17-1-1799	Lieutenant, 12-3-1800	Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 3rd Regt. N.I., 12-3-1800.
SCOTT, CHARLES	2nd Lieutenant, 1918	Lieutenant, 1922	From U.L.; Commanded Depot, 1919; Trfd. to S. and T. Corps in 1922.
SCOTT, WILLIAM	Asst. Surgeon, 9-4-1834	Surgeon, 14-9-1835	Died at Ahmednagar, 14-9-1835.
	Captain, 14-7-1905	Lt.-Colonel, 4-2-1922	From 112th Bombay Inf.; F.S. Mekran Expedition, 1911; Mesopotamia, 1914-18; Actions of Saiban, 15-11-1914; Sahil, 17-11-1914; Qurna, 4 to 7-12-1914; Shaiba, 13-4-1915; Kut al Amara, 28-9-1915; Ctesiphon, 22-11-1915 (severely wounded), Despatches; Commandant, 1918-22; F.S. Waziristan, 1919-21; Tochi Column, 1919; Mahsud, 1919-20; Retired, 4-2-1922.
SEALE, RICHARD	Lieutenant, July 1783	Lieutenant, 1790	No record.
SEALY, GEOFFREY ORR FERN	Captain, 20-7-1900	Captain, 18-3-1901	I.M.S.; Trfd. to 24th D.C.O. Baluchistan Inf., 18-3-1901.
SEALY, HENRY GEORGE	2nd Lieutenant, 21-3-1903	Lieutenant, 18-6-1903	From 1st Bn. The Leicestershire Regt.; Trfd. to 30th Baluch Inf., 18-6-1903.
SEALY, HENRY WILLIAM	Lieutenant, 1-1-1800	Lieutenant, 12-3-1800	From 2nd Bn. 3rd Regt. N.I.; Trfd. to 1st (Grenadier) Bn. 1st Regt. N.I., 12-3-1800.

*Appointments, Transfers and Field Service  
while with the Battalion*

<i>Name</i>	<i>Joined</i>	<i>Struck off</i>	<i>Appointments, Transfers and Field Service while with the Battalion</i>
SETON, WILLIAM SAMUEL	Lieutenant, 11-9-1862	Bt. Colonel, 22-5-1889	From 2nd Bn. Bombay European L. Inf.: Adjutant, 1864-69; F.S. in Afghanistan, 1879-80; Siege of Kandahar; Action of Kandahar, 1-9-1880; (succeeded to a Baronetcy in 1884); A.G.G. Northern Division, 1885; Retired, 22-5-1889.
SEWARD, GOODWIN PONSBORNE	Lieutenant, 21-3-1806	Captain, 13-5-1821	From 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I.; F.S. Bourbon, 1809-11; Raid on St. Paul, 21-9-1809; Gujarat, in Command of Flank Coys., 1817; Beni Boo Ali, 1820-21, in Command of Flank Companies; Returned sick to Chaulk; Died at Malwan, 8-5-1821.
SEWARD, ROBERT	Lieutenant, 21-3-1800	Captain, 13-5-1821	F.S. Bourbon, 1809-11; Cashiered by G.C.M., 13-5-1811; Reinstated, 16-6-1817; Retired, 13-5-1821.
SHANKS, GEORGE	Captain, 12-7-1917	Captain, 22-3-1918	I.M.S.; Joined in Jubbulpore on mobilization; F.S. Mesopotamia, 1917-18; Appntd. Bacteriological Specialist at Amara Hospital, 22-3-1918.
SHAW, GEORGE JAMES SHEPPARD, JOHN LEWIN	Asst. Surgeon, 24-6-1845 Ensign, 11-7-1846	Asst. Surgeon, 28-1-1848 Lt.-Colonel, 15-12-1874	Trfd. to 24th Regt. N.I., 28-1-1848. Adjutant, 1854-57; F.S. Punjab Campaign, 1848-49; Storming of Multan, 2-1-1849; Central India, 1857-59; Adjutant, 1st Regt. Beatson's Irregular Horse, 1859-60; Adjutant Marine Bn., 1860-61, 2nd in Command; Died, 15-12-1874.
SHOLL, WILLIAM	Lieutenant, 1794	Captain, 6-3-1799	Adjutant, 1794-99; F.S. in Mysore, 1799; Killed in action at Seedaseer, 6-3-1799.
SHULDHAM, WALTER FRANK QUANTOCK	Lieutenant, 7-4-1917	Captain, 15-9-1926	From Somerset Yeomanry; F.S. Mesopotamia, 1917-18; Trfd. to the Political Department, 22-12-1918; Confirmed in Political Department and struck off Battalion strength, 15-9-1926.
SKILLITER, WALTER INGLES	2nd Lieutenant, 1-5-1916		I.A.R.O.; For duty at the Depot.
SKINNER, ARTHUR LENNOX	Major, 3-12-1930	Lt.-Colonel, 6-7-1936	From 3rd Bn. 6th Rajputana Rifles; Commandant, 1934-36; Retired, 6-7-1936.
SKRINE, PHILIP ROGER HUNTLEY	Captain, 18-11-1923	Still serving	From 13th Rajputs; With South Waziristan Scouts, 1932-38 (Despatches and D.S.O.).
SMITH, FRANCIS MICHELL	2nd Lieutenant, 3-1-1855	Lieutenant, 25-8-1857	F.S. Persia, 1856-57; Capture of Reshire, 9-12-1856; Bushire, 10-12-1856; Action of Khushab, 8-2-1857; Died at sea, 25-8-1857.
SMITH, JAMES	Lieutenant, 18-12-1799	Lieutenant, 6-3-1800	Adjutant, 1800; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 6th Regt. as Adjutant, 6-3-1800.
SMYTHE, JOHN DISNEY	Lieutenant, 7-6-1824	Captain, 5-8-1845	F.S. in Southern Konkan against the Ramosis, 1827-28; Retired, 5-8-1845.
SMYTTAN, GEORGE SNELLING, CYRIL GREY	Asst. Surgeon, Jan. 1815 Lieutenant, March 1917	Asst. Surgeon, Oct. 1815 Lieutenant, 1918	No record.
SOPPITT, BENJAMIN	Ensign, 27-9-1808	Lieutenant, 10-4-1814	From 4th Bn. The Leinster Regt.; Trfd. to Political Department.
SPARROW, EDMUND	Ensign, 5-12-1814	Ensign, 1-11-1817	F.S. in Persian Gulf, 1809-10; Capture of Ras-el-Khaimah, 13-11-1809, Laft, 27-11-1809; Shinaas, 3-1-1810; Died at sea, 10-4-1814. Trfd. to 1st Regt. Native Cavalry, 1-11-1817.

SPELLICY, JOHN	Ensign, 13-4-1797	Lieutenant, 1-11-1797	Trfd. to 1st Bn. 3rd Regt. N.I., 1-11-1797.
SPENS, ARCHIBALD	Captain, 18-12-1799	Captain, 12-3-1800	Apptd. Bde. Major in Malabar and Kanara, 1800.
SPOTISWOOD, JOHN	Ensign, 1778	Lieutenant, 1782	F.S. in the Deccan, 1779.
SPRATT, WILLIAM	Ensign, 23-10-1809	Major, 10-4-1838	Adjutant, 1814-22; F.S. in Southern Konkan, 1818-19, in Command of the Bn.; Capture of Newty, 31-1-1819; in Mahi Kantha as Bde. Major, 1821; against Kitoor as Bde. Major, 1824; in command of Veteran Bn., 1827; Retired, 10-4-1838; Died at Avranches, Normandy, 24-12-1842.
STEPHENSON, HENRY	Lieutenant, 28-3-1821	Lieutenant, 3-10-1823	F.S. in Mahi Kantha, attack on Techow, 29-1-1823; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I., 3-10-1823.
STEVENSON, WILLIAM FREDERICK	Lieutenant, 25-2-1898	Lieutenant, 21-5-1898	From 23rd Bombay Rifles, attached for F.S. in East Africa, 1898; Drowned in the Juba River at Yontli, 21-5-1898.
STEWART, ARTHUR EASDALE	Lieutenant, 19-12-1902	Lieutenant, 11-8-1903	From 1st Bn. Royal Highlanders; Trfd. to 24th Baluchistan Inf., 11-8-1903.
STEWART, DONALD	Asst. Surgeon, 27-6-1829	Asst. Surgeon, 19-10-1830	Trfd. to Native Veteran Bn., 19-10-1830.
STEWART, JAMES	Captain, 10-1-1775	Captain, 4-1-1779	From 1st Bn. Bombay Sepoys; Raised our Regt. as 5th Bn. Bombay Sepoys; Commandant, 1775-79; A.D.C. to the Governor of Bombay; F.S. in Gujarat, 1775; in Deccan, 1779; Killed in action at Karli, 4-1-1779.
STEWART, STODDART, GUY	Ensign, 1778 2nd Lieutenant, 9-3-1906	Ensign, 1779 Lt.-Colonel, 23-9-1934	F.S. in Deccan, 1779. From U.L.; Adjutant, 1912-16; Commandant, 1930-34; F.S. with Mekran Expedition, 1911; Mesopotamia, 1914-18; Actions of Saihan, 15-11-1914; Qurna, 4 to 7-12-1914; Shaiba, 13-4-1915 (wounded); Kut al Amara, 28-9-1915 (wounded) Despatches, O.B.E.; Bde. Major, 45th Bde, 1917; Retired, 23-9-1934.
STONE, BURNETT SIDNEY	Major, 17-12-1923	Major, 11-9-1927	From 5th Bn. 6th Rajputana Rifles; Retired, 11-9-1927.
STONE, M.C., EDGAR JAMES	Lieutenant, Oct. 1919	Lieutenant, 15-7-1922	From 1/4th Gurkha Rifles; Attached for duty on F.S. Waziristan, 1919-21; Tochi Column, 1919; Mahsud, 1919-20; Demobilized, 15-7-1922.
STUART, ALEXANDER PERCY DUNBAR CARMATT	Major, 28-12-1910	Lt.-Colonel, 8-12-1913	From 125th Napier's Rifles as 2nd in Command; F.S. with Mekran Expedition, 1911; Retired, 8-12-1913.
SUTHERLAND,	Ensign, 1775	Ensign, 30-1-1776	F.S. Gujarat, 1775; Dismissed after Court of Inquiry, 30-1-1776.
TANNER, CHARLES ORIEL OLIPHANT	Captain, 25-5-1898	Captain, 16-12-1898	From 27th Baluchis, attached for F.S. in East Africa, 1898 (Despatches, Brilliant Star of Zanzibar); Re-joined his Regt., 16-12-1898.
TANNER, NATHANIEL	Ensign, 20-5-1806	Lieutenant, 21-8-1814	F.S. in Persian Gulf, 1809-10; Capture of Ras-el-Khaimah, 13-11-1809; Left, 27-11-1809; Shinaas, 3-1-1810; in Kathiawar against the Wagurs, 1814; Died in Kathiawar, 21-8-1814.

*Appointments, Transfers and Field Service  
while with the Battalion*

<i>Name</i>	<i>Joined</i>	<i>Struck off</i>	<i>Appointments, Transfers and Field Service while with the Battalion</i>
TATE, GEORGE	Lieutenant, 11-12-1913	Captain, 22-11-1915	I.M.S.; Mesopotamia, 1914-15; Actions of Saihan, 15-11-1914; Sahil, 17-11-1914; Qurna, 4 to 7-12-1914; Shaiba, 13-4-1915; Kut al Amara, 28-9-1915; Ctesiphon, 22-11-1915 (wounded); Trfd. to War Hospital, Khandwa.
TAYLOR, GEORGE	Lieutenant, 18-12-1819	Lieutenant, 1821	From 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I.; rejoined original Bn. in 1821.
TEVERSHAM, M.C., MARK SYMONDS THOMAS, JOHN	Major, 7-12-1932 Lieutenant, 29-2-1801	Major, 13-7-1936 Captain, 13-7-1813	From Sikh Pioneers; Trfd. to 5th Bn. 6th Rajputana Rifles, 13-7-1936. F.S. in Gujarat and Central India; Siege of Bhurtpur, 1805 (wounded); Bourbon, 1809-10; Raid on St. Paul, 21-9-1809; Invalided, 13-7-1813.
THOMPSON, SAMUEL THOMSON, GEORGE SLOANE	Lieutenant, 1784 Surg. Captain, 20-9-1892	Lieutenant, 1786 Surg. Captain, 27-1-1893	No record. Trfd. to 14th Bombay Inf., 27-1-1893.
THORNBURY, NATHANIEL HENRY	Ensign, 23-9-1826	Bt. Major, 1-1-1852	F.S. Punjab Campaign, 1848-49; Storming of Multan, 2-1-1849; Retired, 1-1-1852.
TOLFREY, JOHN FREDERICK	Ensign, 23-10-1844	Lieutenant, 7-12-1847	Died at Karachi, 7-12-1847.
TREMENEERE, HUGH SEYMOUR	2nd Lieutenant, 1918	2nd Lieutenant, 1919	I.A.R.O.; Attached for duty with the Depot; Demobilized, 1919.
TRITTON, CHARLES	Major, 2-5-1902	Lt.-Colonel, 29-4-1908	From 25th Bombay Rifles as 2nd in Command; Commandant, 1905-08; Died in the train at Sukkur, 29-4-1908.
TROTMAN, EWART WASHINGTON TUCKER, WILLIAM PENDOCK	Lieutenant, 21-2-1919 Ensign, 18-12-1799	Lieutenant, 22-3-1919 Lieutenant, 12-3-1800	From Gloucestershire Regt. on probation for I.A.; Joined in Mesopotamia, 21-2-1919. Trfd. to Marine Bn. as Adjutant, 1800.
TUDOR, JAMES CASTON TURTON, HUGH MITCHELL	Ensign, 18-12-1799 Captain, 22-1-1910	Lieutenant, 12-3-1800 Major, 20-5-1913	Trfd. to 1st Bn. 8th Regt. N.I., 12-3-1800. From 123rd Outram's Rifles; F.S. with Mekran Expedition, 1911 (Despatches); Retired, 20-5-1913.
TYDD, THOMAS SAMUEL	Captain, 30-9-1794	Captain, 13-6-1797	From Bombay European Regt.; F.S. in Gulf of Cambay against Koli pirates, 1794 (wounded); Commandant, 1794-97; Died, 13-6-1797.
UNTHANK, GEORGE	Lieutenant, 1788	Captain, 6-3-1794	F.S. in Deccan and Mysore; Siege of Dharwar, Jan.-April 1791; Hooly Onore, 21-12-1791; Simoga, 29-12-1791; Trfd. to 2nd Bn. Bombay European Regt., 6-3-1794.
VIZARD, FRANCIS WADDINGTON, ELVIN CHARLES STAFFORD WADDINGTON, STAFFORD WILLIAM SAMUEL	2nd Lieutenant, 1-1-1852 Lieutenant, 18-12-1799 Lieutenant, 1778	2nd Lieutenant, 27-8-1852 Captain, 30-1-1801 Captain, 1782	Died at Belgaum, 27-8-1852. From 1st Bn. 5th Regt. N.I.; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. on promotion to Captain. Commandant, 1779-82; F.S. in Deccan, 1779; Trfd. to 14th Bn. as Commandant, 1782.
WAITE, HARRY SPACEY	2nd Lieutenant, 1919	Lieutenant, Dec. 1919	Tempy. Comm. I.A.; F.S. Waziristan, 1919; Tochi Column; Demobilized Dec. 1919.

WALKER, ALEXANDER	Captain, 17-1-1799	Captain, 18-12-1799	Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 5th Regt. N.I., 18-12-1799.
WALKER, HENRY LAWRENCE	2nd Lieutenant, 15-1-1917	2nd Lieutenant, 17-10-1917	I.A.R.O.; Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 72nd Punjabis, 17-10-1917.
WALKER, WILLIAM	Lieutenant, 17-1-1799	Lieutenant, 18-12-1799	F.S. in Mysore; Capture of Seringapatam, 4-5-1799; Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 1st Regt. N.I., 18-12-1799.
WALTON, WILLIAM CRAWFORD	Lieutenant, 19-6-1891	Brig.-General, 9-5-1937	From 13th Regt. Bombay Inf.; Adjutant, 1891-95. A.D.C. to Governor of Bombay, 1895; Commanded H.E. The Viceroy's Guard, 1900; A.H.Q. Intelligence Branch, 1903-08; Commandant, 1908-14; F.S. Mekran Expedition, 1911 (Despatches); Subsequently raised 8th Bn. The Royal Berks. Regt., and saw service with them in battle of Loos, 1916 (Despatches, C.M.G.); Commanded the Field Force at Aden (Despatches, C.B.), 1917; Inspector of Infantry, South India, 1917-18; F.S. in Waziristan, 1919; Appointed Colonel 18-2-1927; Died, 9-5-1937. Commandant Surat Local Bn., 1798; A.D.C. to Sir Charles Mallet, 1798; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 4th Regt. N.I., 17-1-1799.
WARD, JEREMY	Captain, 1797	Captain, 17-1-1799	From 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I.; Retrferred to original Bn., Jan. 1817.
WARDEN, FRANCIS	Major, Nov. 1815	Major, Jan. 1817	Adjutant, Gujarat Irregular Horse, 1854-56; Commandant, 1876-77; F.S. Punjab Campaign, 1848-49; Storming of Multan, 2-1-1849 (wounded); Persia, 1856-57; Capture of Reshire, 9-12-1856; Action of Khushab, 8-2-1857; Central India, 1857-59; With Brigadier Parke's Column in pursuit of Tantia Topi; Retired, 16-7-1877.
WARDLE, ALFRED	Ensign, 6-9-1828	Ensign, 30-5-1831	F.S. in Southern Konkan against the Ramosis, 1831; Died at Kalam while on F.S. on 30-5-1831 of smallpox.
WARING, JAMES LIVINGSTON	Lieutenant, 21-2-1919	Captain, 11-11-1922	I.A.R.O.; Joined in Mesopotamia; Retired, 11-11-1922.
WARREN, JAMES TAYLOR	Lieutenant, 1795	Lieutenant, 1798	Adjutant and Quartermaster of the Regt. (two Bns.), 1797; Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 5th Regt. N.I., 1798.
WATKINS, WILLIAM HENRY BARRY	Ensign, 17-1-1834	Lieutenant, 23-2-1842	Struck off the strength of the Army, 23-2-1842.
WATLING, JOHN THOMAS	Lt.-Colonel, 24-11-1888	Lt.-Colonel, 20-5-1891	From 26th Bombay Inf.; Commandant, 1888-91; Vacated Command on appointment as A.A.G., 20-5-1891.
WATSON, JOSEPH D'ACRE	Lieutenant, 1794	Lieutenant, 16-1-1799	Malabar Translator: Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 6th Regt. N.I., 16-1-1799.
WATTS, WILLIAM WEBB, WILFRED FRANCIS	Ensign, 28-11-1801 Lieutenant, 1917	Lieutenant, 19-2-1802 Captain, 14-6-1926	Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 4th Regt. N.I., 19-2-1802. From the R.N.V.R.; F.S. Mesopotamia, 1917-18; Trfd. to the Political Department in Mesopotamia, 22-12-1918; Confirmed in Indian Political Department and struck off the strength of the Battalion, 14-6-1926.




*Appointments, Transfers and Field Service  
while with the Battalion*

<i>Name</i>	<i>Joined</i>	<i>Struck off</i>	
WELLS, FREDERICK WALTER ARBUTHNOT	Captain, 1915	Captain, 1916	From 6th Jats attached for service at the Depot.
WELSH, JOHN HALL	Lieutenant, 1787	Lieutenant, 1792	
WHEATLEY, WILLIAM GEORGE	Ensign, 6-9-1828	Lieutenant, 2-5-1840	F.S. in Deccan and Mysore; Siege of Dharwar, Jan.-April, 1791; Actions of Hooley Onore, 21-12-1791, Simoga, 29-12-1791.
WHITE, DAVID	Surgeon, 1797	Surgeon, 1798	F.S. in Southern Konkan against the Ramosis, 1831.
WHITE, GEORGE	Lieutenant, 29-4-1819	Lieutenant, 1-12-1819	Died at Etola on the march from Baroda to Bombay, 2-5-1840.
WHITLEY, HENRY CYRIL	Captain, 30-8-1919	Captain, 1920	Appointed Surgeon of the Regt. (two Bns.), 1798.
WIGHT, ROBERT	Surgeon, 11-1-1833	Surgeon, 9-4-1834	Trfd. to 1st Bn. 10th Regt. N.I., 1-12-1819.
WILKINSON, WILLIAM EDWARD DUNCAN	2nd Lieutenant, 1918	Captain, 1-10-1935	From 54th Sikhs attached for F.S. in Waziristan, 1919-20; Tochi Column, 1919; Mahsud, 1919-20; Demobilized, 1920.
WILL, DUNCAN ALLURED ELMSEY	Lieutenant, 27-4-1897	Lieutenant, 30-1-1901	Trfd. to 3rd Native Cavalry, 9-4-1834.
WILLIAMS, GRIFFITH	2nd Lieutenant, 8-8-1917	Captain, 7-6-1919	I.A.R.O.; Acting Adjutant, 1919-21; F.S. Waziristan; 1919-22; Tochi Column, 1919; Mahsud, 1919-20;
WILLIAMS, THOMAS ERNEST	2nd Lieutenant, 6-1-1928	Still serving	Attached to 1st Bn. 13th F.F. Rifles for service in Iraq, 1922-23; Trfd. to R.I.A.S.C., 1-10-1935.
WILLIAMSON, WILLIAM	Lt.-Colonel, 18-2-1812	Lt.-Colonel, Jan. 1815	From the Royal Irish Rifles; F.S. East Africa, 1898, against the Ogaden Somalis; Trfd. to the Accounts Department, 30-1-1901.
WILLOUGHBY, MICHAEL WEEKES	2nd Lieutenant, 24-8-1850	Lt.-General, 17-2-1927	I.A.R.O.; Posted for duty with Depot; Adjutant, 1919; Demobilized, 7-6-1919.
WILSON, DAVID	Lt.-Colonel, 25-7-1833	Lt.-Colonel, 16-9-1833	From U.L.; Adjutant, 1-8-1931 to 30-9-1935; Adjutant, Nagpur Rifles, 1935.
WILSON, GEORGE	Lieutenant, 1-1-1800	Lieutenant, 12-3-1800	From the Bombay European Regt.; Appointed while on furlough, never joined to command; Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 7th Regt. N.I., Jan. 1815.
WILSON, RALPH THOMAS	2nd Lieutenant, 9-12-1927	Lieutenant, 1-7-1933	Quartermaster and Interpreter, 1851; F.S. Persia, 1850-57, as Commissariat Agent; Dept. Asst. Commissary-General, 1861; As Lt.-General M. W. Willoughby, C.S.I., was appointed Colonel of the Regt, 12-2-1914; Died at Cheltenham, 17-2-1927, within a few days of his 92nd birthday.
WILSON, SAMUEL	Major, 27-3-1801	Lt.-Colonel, 7-1-1810	Posted while on furlough in Europe, where he died in 1833 without ever joining.
WILSON, SAMUEL DUNDAS	Lieutenant, 1-11-1819	Lieutenant, 30-4-1821	From 2nd Bn. 3rd Regt. N.I.; Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 6th Regt. N.I., 12-3-1800.
			From the Welsh Guards; Resigned his Commission, 1-7-1933.
			From 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I.; Mil. Sec. and A.D.C. to the Governor, 1803; Commanded our Bn., 1808-10; Trfd. to the Grenadier Bn., 7-1-1810.
			F.S. in Persian Gulf, Beni Boo Ali, 1820; Died at Baroda, 30-4-1821.

WILSON, WILLIAM CLEMENT FRANCIS ALLAN	2nd Lieutenant, 14-11-1910	Major, 16-6-1926	From U.L.; F.S. Mekran Expedition, 1911; Mesopotamia, 1914-18, as Quartermaster and Signalling Officer, Actions of Sathian, 15-11-1914; Sahil, 17-11-1914; Qurna, 4 to 7-12-1914; Shaiba, 13-4-1915; Kut al Amara, 28-9-1915 (wounded) Despatches, Bt. Major; Trfd. to Political Dept., 8-2-1916; Struck off, 16-6-1926.
WINKLEY, SIDNEY FREER	Lieutenant, 20-6-1921	Lieutenant, 1-1-1922	From 12th Cavalry; Attached for duty on F.S. in Waziristan, 1921.
WISEMAN, JOHN	Lieutenant, 1778	Bt. Captain, 1786	Adjutant and Quartermaster, 1779-83; F.S. in Decan, 1779; in Malabar, Capture of Mangalore, 9-3-1783; Siege of Bednore, 9 to 28-4-1783; Prisoner of War in Chitaldrug, 1783-84; Trfd. to 10th Bn. Sepoys, 1786.
WOOD, BENJAMIN	Lieutenant, 17-1-1799	Lieutenant, 18-12-1799	From Bombay European Regt.; F.S. in Mysore; Capture of Seringapatam, 4-5-1799; Trfd. to 2nd Bn. 3rd Regt. N.I., 18-12-1799.
WOOD, HENRY HASTINGS AFFLECK	Ensign, 30-5-1844	General, 5-8-1904	F.S. Punjab Campaign, 1848-49; Storming of Multan, 2-1-1849; Persia, 1856-57; Action of Khushab, 8-2-1857; Commandant, 1873-76; Maj.-General, 13-1-1881; Lt.-General, 1-7-1882; General, 22-1-1889; K.C.B., 26-5-1894; as General Sir H. H. A. Wood, K.C.B., was appointed Colonel of the Regt., 13-5-1904; Died, 5-8-1904.
WOODHOUSE, JOSEPH ROBERT	Lt.-Colonel, 4-12-1846	Lt.-Colonel, 27-5-1849	From 11th Regt. N.I.; Never joined, was on sick leave in Europe where he died, 27-5-1849.
WOODINGTON, HENRY	Major, 18-12-1799	Major, 12-3-1800	Town Major at Bombay and A.D.C. to the Governor, 1799; Trfd. to 1st Bn. 4th Regt. N.I., 1800.
WOODYER, JOHN MASON	Lieutenant, 1917	Lieutenant, 1917	From the R.E.; Trfd. to 2/11th Rajputs.
WRIGHT, JOHN	Ensign, 3-10-1823	Ensign, 7-6-1824	Trfd. to 1st Bn. 2nd Regt. N.I., 7-6-1824.
YOUNG, GEORGE	Lieutenant, 1-6-1922	Lieutenant, 19-5-1923	I.A.R.O.; Retired, 19-5-1923.
YOUNG, HENRY WILLIAM	2nd Lieutenant, 29-10-1856	2nd Lieutenant, 11-10-1859	From 21st Regt. N.I.; F.S. Persia, 1856-57; Capture of Reshire, 9-12-1856; Bushire, 10-12-1856; Action of Khushab, 8-2-1857; Central India, 1857-59; Malwa Field Force as Postmaster; Resigned his Commission, 11-10-1857.

# THE INDIAN EMPIRE

MAP No. 20



## INDEX



# INDEX

## A

Abercromby, Gen. Sir J., at Mauritius, 68-70  
 Abercromby, Gen. Sir R., Mysore War, 25-28  
 Afghan War, 1879-80, 118-123  
 Agrarum, attack on, 35  
 Ahmedabad, capture of, 10; riots at, 212, 222  
 Alderman, 2nd Lieut. R. E., 165, 168, 175, 178, 183, 210  
 Alderson, Maj.-Gen. E. A. H., 137  
 Ali Gharbi, 169, 170, 205  
 Allan, Capt. J., 73  
 Amara, capture of, 167; 168, 205, 209  
 Amba Pani, action at, 113-114  
 Ambrose, 2nd Lieut. R. D., 207; Capt., 222  
 Angediva Island, xix  
 Anjar Fort, capture of, 74  
 Arms, 91, 125, 133, 144, 164, 207, 208  
 Arras, battle of, 2  
 Aylmer, Maj.-Gen. F. J., 193, 195, 197  
 Aziziya, 178, 186

## B

Bailey, Maj. G., 142, 143, 149, 170, 179, 182, 183, 184  
 Baker, Lieut. E., 30  
 Band, brass abolished, pipes introduced, 220-221  
 Bannatyne, Capt. J., 20  
 Bannerman, Col. W., 120, 123; Gen., 142  
 Barrett, Gen. Sir A., 146, 151, 165  
 Basra, occupation of, 150; 158, 164, 208, 209  
 Bednore, expedition to, 13; capture of, 15; siege and surrender of, 17  
 Bell Syer, 2nd Lieut. L. S., 165, 168, 169, 186, 191, 193, 200, 202  
 Beni Boo Ali, expedition against, 82-85  
 Besnard, Lieut. N., defence of Pyche Fort, 44  
 Betts, Capt. N., 72  
 Bhagwantgarh, capture of, 79  
 Bheels, operations against, in 1780, 10; in 1823, 86; in 1857-58, 112-114; in 1913 in South State, 142  
 Bhonsle, Raja of Nagpur, 47  
 Bhor Ghat, 4, 5  
 Bhurtpur Fort, assault of, 50-51  
 Bhurtpur, Raja of, 47; comes to terms, 51  
 Bickford, Lieut. W. W., 128, 131  
 Birdwood, Gen. Sir W., 221, 222  
 Blackie, Capt. F. B., 209, 211  
 Bolan Pass, 119  
 Bombay Army, raising of, xx; distribution in 1777, 4; reorganization in 1788, 21; reorganization in 1796, 31; reorganization in 1824, 87; Lieut. Edward's opinion of, 96; reorganization in 1895, 126

Boulderson, Lieut. G., 73  
 Bourbon, 59; reconnaissance and raid on, 62-64; capture of, 66-67  
 Bozdar Column, 124  
 Broomhall, Lieut. M., 39  
 Brown, Capt. W., 33  
 Bugle calls, Mess, 71; Field, 91; Regimental, 133  
 Burrows, Brig.-Gen. G. R. S., 119, 122  
 Burton, 2nd Lieut. R. C., 205  
 Butler, 2nd Lieut. A. G., 207, 212; Capt., 218  
 Butler, Capt. H. M., 137, 140, 143, 147, 151, 154; Maj., 205, 206, 207, 208  
 Byrne, Capt. E. G. J., 139, 143, 152, 153; Maj., 209

## C

Cadger, Capt. A., 5; promoted for gallantry, 8; died, 10  
 Cambay, Gulf of, expedition to, 29  
 Capper, Lieut.-Col., 40-43  
 Carnac, Mr. J., 5  
 Cavagnari, Sir L., 118  
 Caveldrug, 18  
 Chadwick, Lieut. F. J., 136; Capt., 143, 163  
 Chalmer, Lieut. R., 24  
 Cheeke, Capt. A. M. M., 143, 150, 156, 158, 205, 207, 208  
 Chitaldrug Fort, 18  
 Clery, Lieut.-Col. C. B. L., 142, 143, 147, 149, 153, 154, 158, 160-163, 169, 171-173, 175, 179, 182; Bt. Col., 207, 209  
 Cockburn, Lieut.-Col. W., 7, 8  
 Coghlan, Lieut. E., 113  
 Cole, Lieut.-Col. B. L., 218, 219  
 Colours, 54  
 Connaught, H.R.H. Duke of, 124  
 Cornwallis, Lord, 25-28  
 Cory, Lieut. R. W., in Persian Gulf, 55; death of, 73  
 Cowley, Capt. C., R.N.V.R., 151, 199  
 Ctesiphon, battle of, 179-185

## D

Dabhoi, 3; capture of, 9; 11  
 Dammal, capture of, 41  
 Davies, 2nd Lieut. R. M., 208  
 Dawson, Lieut. T., 2, 3  
 Delamain, Col. W. S., 137-141; Brig.-Gen., 144-149; at Shaiba, 158, 162-163; 169; battle of Kut al Amara, 171-176; Ctesiphon, 179-181  
 Delhi riots, 211-212  
 Deogarh, action of, 79  
 Derajat Column, 215

Dharwar, siege of, 23-25  
 Dhoondia Wagh, 39-44  
 Dinki, capture of, 75  
 Doridrug, capture of, 26  
 Dormer, Capt. J. G., 144, 178, 182, 205, 206;  
 Maj., 212, 219  
 Durnford, Lieut. C. M. P., 205, 206

## E

Eames, Capt. R., 17, 18  
 East Africa, field service in, 127-132  
 Edwardes, Lieut. H., 94, 95; opinion of  
 Bombay Army, 96  
 Egerton, Col. C., 4-8  
 Equipment, 11, 40, 86, 90, 91, 96, 136, 144, 219

## F

Facings, see Uniform  
 Forbes, Lieut.-Col. D., 92  
 Ford, Lieut. C. A. W., 128  
 France, Ile de, see Mauritius  
 Frazer, Col. G. S. Q., 151, 155  
 Frederick, Lieut.-Col. C., at Dharwar, 23-25  
 French intrigues, 4, 12, 33, 34  
 Fry, Capt. C. I., 129-132; Brig.-Gen., 153, 174,  
 176  
 Fry, Lieut. G. C., 217

## G

Gaekwar of Baroda, 9, 47, 144  
 Ganesha Ram, Naik, 193; Sub., 223  
 Glasspoole, Lieut. W. A., 113  
 Goa, British Garrison at, 39  
 Goddard, Gen. T., 9-10  
 Gordon, 2nd Lieut. E. P., 178, 182, 184  
 Gordon, Brig.-Gen. R., 1  
 Gorringe, Lieut.-Gen. Sir G., 166, 168, 199, 205  
 Grant, Lieut. B., 61; wounded, 64  
 Grant Keir, Gen. Sir W., 76, 80  
 Grant Smith, Capt. H. G. H., 136, 144, 205  
 Grasias, suppression of, 10, 11  
 Gujarat, field service in, 9, 76

## H

Haidar Ali, 9, 12; death of, 14  
 Hall, Lieut. J. D., 114  
 Hamilton, Brig.-Gen. W. G., 180, 181  
 Harper, 2nd Lieut. C. S., 207  
 Hartley, Capt. J., 7, 8; Lieut.-Col. 9, 10  
 Hasan Muhammad, Sub.-Maj., 188, 191, 198,  
 200, 204, 216; Hon. Capt., 218  
 Havelock, Brig.-Gen. H., 110  
 Hicks, Lieut. F., 72  
 Hicks, Lieut. J., 41; Capt., 72  
 Hoghton, Brig.-Gen. F. A., 172, 174, 175, 180  
 Holkar, 10, 46, 47; comes to terms, 52  
 Honner, Lieut. R., 88; Capt., 90, 92; Maj.,  
 93; at Multan, 97-102; hands over com-  
 mand, 103; Brigadier, in Persia, 103-111  
 Hooly Onore, capture of, 26  
 Hughes, Capt. S., 79  
 Huli, capture of, 43  
 Hurry Hur, 39, 40

## I

Imlach, Capt. W., at Bhurtpur, 51; in  
 Kathiawar 1807, 53; Bourbon and Mauritius,  
 61-70; Maj., awarded C.B., 71; in Kathia-  
 war 1814, 73; Lieut.-Col. in Konkan, 77-80;  
 death of, 81  
 Irwin, Lord, 219, 222

## J

Jacob, Col. C. W., 135  
 Jamalabad Fort, capture of, 39  
 James, Lieut. F. H., 135; Capt., 205, 208;  
 Maj., 210, 214, 216, 219; Lieut.-Col., 222  
 Joasmi Pirates, operations against, 55-59  
 Jones, Gen. R., 49, 65  
 Jubaland, 128-132

## K

Kadorna Ranaka, capture of, 54  
 Kandahar, 118, 119; siege of, 120, 121;  
 battle of, 122, 123  
 Karrak, landing at, 105  
 Kathiawar, operations in 1807, 52-54; opera-  
 tions 1814-1816, 73-75  
 Keating, Lieut.-Col. H. S., at Rodrigues, 60-61;  
 Bourbon, 62-67; Mauritius, 68  
 Keating, Col. T., in Gujarat, 3, 4  
 Khandala, 5, 6  
 Kiddle, 2nd Lieut. J. A. C., 205  
 Kilkelly, Capt. P. P., 127, 132  
 King, Capt. G., 211  
 Kompta Fort, capture of, 13  
 Kut al Amara, battle of, 170-176; siege of,  
 190-200; Battalion strength at beginning of  
 siege, 191; at end of siege, 200

## L

Laft, attack on, 57, 58  
 Lake, Gen. Lord, 47-50  
 Lally, M., 36  
 Langston, Capt. J., at Amba Pani, 113, 114;  
 with Maj. Sutherland, 115-117  
 Las Bela, 135, 136  
 Leckie, Capt. O. T. M., 142, 143, 155, 161-163  
 Lemon, 2nd Lieut. G. T., 164, 168, 182  
 Limbuj Fort, capture of, 87  
 Little, Capt. J., 23-28, 29  
 Lloyd, Ens. T., 55  
 Lock, 2nd Lieut. A. C., 193, 195, 196, 198,  
 200, 203  
 Lock, Capt. J., 39, 41, 43

## M

Maclean, Capt. G. G. C., 142, 143, 147, 205;  
 Maj., 218  
 Madagascar, Lieut. Seward's voyage to, 61, 65  
 Mahe, port of, captured, 12  
 Mahomed Ebram Ajibald, Sub., 19  
 Mahrattas, in possession of Salsette, 1; first  
 war with, 4-8; alliance with, 22; second  
 war with, 46-51; third war with, 75-81  
 Maiwand, 119, 123  
 Malabar, field service in 1782, 12-17; in 1797,  
 31-33; in 1803, 44

Malwa Field Force, 114, 115  
 Mandwa, capture of, 11  
 Mangalore, capture of, 16  
 Manipuri Company, 209, 211  
 Manners, Lieut. C. M. S., 138, 141; Capt., 144, 148, 158, 183, 191, 195, 200, 203  
 Manson, Maj. A. R., 103, 105  
 Marshall, Lieut.-Col. T., 34  
 Marshall, Maj. W., 119  
 Mathews, Brig.-Gen. R., 13-17  
 Maude, Lieut. E., 91, 92, 99-101; in Persia, 108, 109; against the Bheels, 112-113  
 Mauritius, 59; capture of, 67-70  
 Mealy, Lieut. W., 33, 44  
 Mekran, see Persian Gulf  
 Mellinchamp, Lieut. C., 33  
 Melliss, Maj.-Gen. C. J., 160, 162-164, 180, 181  
 Memorial, see War Memorial  
 Mombasa, 127, 131  
 Monson, Col. W., retreat of, 48  
 Moor, Lieut. E., 23; Capt., at Doridrug, 26; at Simoga, 27-28  
 Mostyn, Mr., 5  
 Mulraj, 94, 101  
 Multan, siege of, 94-102; storming of, 99, 100  
 Munroe, 2nd Lieut. C. H. C., 192, 200  
 Murray, Col. J., 48  
 Muzaira, capture of, 152-154  
 Mysore, field service in 1791, 22-28; in 1799, 33-37

**N**

Napier, Gen. Sir R., 91, 92  
 Nasirya, 168, 169, 208  
 Nixon, Gen. Sir J., 164, 166, 177  
 Noding, Lieut. J., 112, 113, 115  
 Norris, Capt. A. K., 165, 182

**O**

Odell, Lieut. W., 138; Capt., 205, 206  
 Ogaden, see East Africa  
 Onore, capture of, 14  
 Organization, 2, 3, 21, 31, 87, 126, 207, 210, 218, 222  
 Outram, Gen. Sir J., 106, 109, 111

**P**

Pandit, S. A. S., 154  
 Paresram Bhow, 22-28  
 Pearson, Capt. E., 79  
 Peint, defence of, 113  
 Persian Gulf, operations in 1809, 55-59; in 1821, 82-85; in 1856, 103-111; in 1911, Mekran, 137-141  
 Peshwa, 4, 6, 9, 46; raises a Brigade, 72; 77  
 Pindaris, 75; operations against, 76, 77  
 Price, Lieut. D., 21; wounded at Dharwar, 24; Capt., 37  
 Prisoners of war, 17-19; 201-204  
 Privateers, French, 60  
 Punchard, 2nd Lieut. F. N., 193, 200  
 Pyche Fort, defence of, 44  
 Pyche Raja, operations against, 32, 33

**Q**

Quayle, Capt. G. A., 219; Lieut.-Col., 223  
 Quentin, Maj. W., 127-132, 134  
 Qurna, capture of, 151-156; 166

**R**

Rae, Lieut. R., 26  
 Raghunath Rao, 2-4, 7, 8, 9  
 Ragoba, see Raghunath Rao  
 Rahim Dad Khan, Sub., 216, 217, 218; Sub.-Maj., 222  
 Rajgarh, action near, 115  
 Rajamandrug Fort, capture of, 13  
 Ramosis, operations against, 87  
 Rani Bednore, capture of, 40  
 Raree, assault and capture of, 80  
 Ras-el-Khaimah, capture of, 56, 57  
 Recruitment, xx, 48, 124, 126, 134, 178, 218  
 Regiments and Corps:—  
 Royal Marine Light Infantry, 137, 139

**British Army**

14th Hussars, 186  
 76th Battery R.F.A., 154, 174  
 1/5th Hants Howitzer Battery, 183  
 9th (2nd Norfolks), 151-153, 155  
 14th (West Yorks), 69  
 43rd (Oxford L.I.), 172, 174  
 47th (North Lincs), 55, 58  
 54th (2nd Dorsets), 144-147, 148, 149, 181, 182, 188, 192  
 56th (Essex), 60, 62-65  
 60th (Rifles), 92, 95, 100, 101  
 64th (North Staffs), 104, 109  
 65th (York and Lincs), 46, 55, 58, 59, 83, 84  
 69th (Welch), 65, 66  
 71st (H.L.I.), 116  
 73rd (Black Watch), 41  
 74th (2nd H.L.I.), 36  
 75th (Gordons), 35, 36  
 77th (Middlesex), 41  
 78th (Seaforth's), 108, 109  
 84th (2nd York and Lincs), 68  
 86th (Ulster Rifles), 46, 65, 67  
 89th (Royal Irish Fus.), 78, 80  
 92nd (2nd Gordons), 115, 116  
 97th (West Kents), 186

**Bombay Army**

Bombay European Regt., 9, 22, 23, 25, 29, 83, 84 (Fusiliers), 95, 97, 98  
 2nd Bombay Europeans (Light Infantry), 105, 109

**INDIAN BATTALIONS (in order of seniority):**

1st (1768), 2; (7th), 21  
 2nd (1768), 21; (1/2nd), 82-85; (3rd), 95; (103rd), 171, 172, 174  
 6th (1775), 2, 21; (2/3rd), 35, 73  
 Grenadier Battalion (1778), 8, 9, 16; (1st), 46  
 3rd (1788), 21; (1/3rd), 46, 83; (5th), 90



4th (1788), (1/4th), 40, 83  
 5th (1788), 29; (2/1st), 32; (1/5th), 35;  
 (9th), 95, 113  
 8th (1788), 21-23, 27, 29  
 11th (1788), 22, 23, 26, 27, 29  
 13th (1796), (2/1st), 46; (102nd), 205, 212  
 1/1st, see Grenadier Battalion (1778)  
 2/1st, see 13th (1796)  
 1/2nd, see 2nd (1768)  
 1/3rd, see 3rd (1788)  
 2/3rd, see 6th (1775)  
 1/4th, see 4th (1788)  
 1/5th, see 5th (1788)  
 2/5th (1797), 73; (110th), 151-156  
 2/6th (1798), 80  
 1/7th (1800), 83, 84  
 2/7th (1800), 75  
 2/8th (1800), 52  
 1/9th (1803), 46; (117th), 144, 148, 149,  
 160, 172, 181, 192  
 1/10th (1817), (19th), 95, 98, 114; (119th),  
 160, 162, 172, 174  
 2/10th (1817), (20th), 104, 109; (120th),  
 148, 153, 218, 222  
 2/11th (1818); (122nd), 218  
 1/12th (1820), 72; (23rd), 110, 125, 134;  
 (123rd), 138, 212, 218  
 2nd and 102nd, see 13th (1796)  
 3rd and 103rd, see 2nd (1768)  
 5th and 105th, see 3rd (1788)  
 9th and 109th, see 5th (1788)  
 10th and 110th, see 2/5th (1797)  
 17th and 117th, see 1/9th (1803)  
 19th and 119th, see 1/10th (1817)  
 20th and 120th, see 2/10th (1817)  
 22nd and 122nd, see 2/11th (1818)  
 23rd and 123rd, see 1/12th (1820)  
 25th and 125th, 72, 125, 205, 206, 218  
 26th and 126th, 109  
 27th and 127th, 130  
 29th and 129th, 105, 109

### Indian Army

7th Haryana Lancers, 171, 187  
 33rd Q.V.O. Cavalry, 157  
 23rd Mountain Battery, 146, 157  
 30th Mountain Battery, 146  
 32nd Mountain Battery, 137  
 22nd Coy. Sappers and Miners, 172  
 20th Punjabis, 144, 146, 147, 157  
 66th Punjabis, 181  
 97th Deccan Infantry, 205  
 7th Gurkhas, 181  
 Kumaon Rifles, 208, 209  
 13th Mule Corps, 137, 144

Reilly, Maj. H. L., 166, 180  
 Reshire, capture of, 105  
 Reynolds, Lieut. C., 9  
 Riddell, Capt. J., 22, 23, 24, 30  
 Riddell, Lieut. H. V., 127  
 Rifle Corps, 89, 90, 125  
 Roberts, Gen. Sir F., 118-123  
 Robins, Lieut. R. T., 214  
 Rodrigues, 59, 61, 64, 65, 67, 68

### S

Sahil, action of, 148, 149  
 Saihan, action of, 146, 147  
 St. Paul, raid on, 62-64  
 Salsette, 1-3, 9  
 Sangster, 2nd Lieut. T. H., 105  
 Sanniya, landing at, 145  
 Sargent, Capt. W. P. M., 143, 151, 205  
 Sarson, Capt. E. V., 154, 174  
 Satpura Field Force, 113-114  
 Scott, Maj. W., 137, 143, 157, 167, 168, 169,  
 179, 182, 186, 207; Lieut.-Col., 209, 212, 216  
 Seedgarh, capture of, 78, 79  
 Seringapatam, siege of, 35-37  
 Seringhi, capture of, 43  
 Seward, Lieut. G. F., 61, 65, 70  
 Seward, Lieut. R., 61  
 Shaiba, occupation of, 157-158; battle of,  
 159-164  
 Shaik Solomon, Sub., 64  
 Shanks, Capt. G., 209  
 Shea, Lieut.-Gen. Sir J., 220  
 Shinaas, capture of, 58-59  
 Shipman, Sir A., xix  
 Sholl, Capt. W., 35  
 Shooting, 126, 222  
 Shuldham, Capt. W. Q. F., 210  
 Sikh War, First, 91-92; Second, 94-102  
 Sindia, 8, 10, 47  
 Sirohi State, operations in, 86  
 Skinner, Lieut.-Col. A. L., 222  
 Smith, Lieut.-Col. L., 55-59; Maj.-Gen., 83-85  
 Soppitt, Ens. B., 55-59, 73  
 Sports, 125, 135, 222, 223  
 Spratt, Lieut. W., 80  
 Stevenson, Lieut.-Col. W., 41-44  
 Stevenson, Lieut. W. F., 129, 130  
 Stewart, Capt. J., 2; in Gujarat, 3; in  
 Deccan, 4-6  
 Stoddart, Lieut. G., 138; Capt., 144, 163, 172,  
 174, 175, 205, 206-208; Lieut.-Col., 222, 223  
 Stuart, Gen. J., 34-37  
 Sukkur, 92  
 Surat, xix, 3, 4, 29  
 Swally, xix, 3

### T

Tanner, Capt. C. O. O., 130, 132  
 Tanner, Lieut. N., 55-59, 73  
 Tantia Topi, pursuit of, 114-117  
 Tate, Capt. G., 144, 182  
 Telegaon, 7  
 Tellicherry, 20, 21, 37  
 Thana, 1  
 Thomas, Lieut. J., 51, 61  
 Tipu, war against in 1782-83, 13-16; be-  
 sieges Bednore, 17; war against in 1791,  
 22-28; intrigues with France, 33; war  
 against in 1799, 34-37  
 Tochi Column, 214, 215  
 Townshend, Maj.-Gen. C., 165-202  
 Trooping, 20, 21, 46, 85, 92, 102  
 Trophies, 156, 162  
 Turton, Maj. H. M., 141  
 Tydd, Capt. T. S., 29, 30

## U

Umm at Tubul, action of, 187  
Uniform, 21, 54, 91, 93, 124, 136, 218, 221, 228, 229

## V

Vans Agnew, Mr., murder of, 94; burial, 101  
Viceroy's Guard, in 1900, 133; in 1928, 222

## W

Waddington, Capt. S. W. S., 10  
Wagurs, operations against, 73-75  
Walker, Maj. A., in Kathiawar, 52  
Walton, Lieut.-Col. W. C., 136, 137, 140, 141, 142, 164; Brig.-Gen., 214, 221

Warden, Lieut. T. S., 100  
Wargaon, 8  
War Memorial, Battalion, 211; Regimental, 220  
Waziristan, operations in, 1919-21, 213-218  
Webb, Lieut. W., 208, 210  
Wellesley, Col. A., 37; service under, 39-44  
Whitley, Capt. H. C., 214, 216  
Wigram, Gen. Sir K., 221  
Will, Lieut. D. A. E., 128  
Willoughby, Lieut.-Gen. M. W., 219  
Wilson, Lieut. W. C. F. A., 144, 157, 175, 205, 206; Maj., 210  
Wiseman, Lieut. J., 17; Lieut.-Col., 34  
Wood, Gen. Sir H. H. A., 134  
Wynaad, operations in, 31-33







\*

PRESIDENT'S  
SECRETARIAT  
LIBRARY